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Foreword
Anthropologists 50 years ago would probably have regarded a collaborative
presentation of essays on indigenous land tenure in Australia and Papua New
Guinea (PNG) as a dubious undertaking, if not a category error. Aboriginal and
Melanesian systems were functionally distinct, one adapted to the needs of a
hunting and gathering economy, the other to sedentary horticulture. Going back
another 50 years, such a conjunction would have been intelligible only if its
purpose was to exhibit lower and higher stages in cultural evolution. As the
authors of the present volume are not motivated by a desire either to overturn
functionalism or advance evolutionism, what brings them together in common
cause?
An important clue is to be found in the curious fact that the Native Title Act
of 1993, passed by the Federal Government on behalf of the indigenous people
of Australia, grew directly out of a High Court action by three Torres Strait
Islanders whose ancestors probably came from PNG and whose people
traditionally lived as subsistence cultivators. In the course of documenting the
denigration of Aborigines in colonial legal history, Justice Brennan made it clear
he would have no sympathy with any attempt to represent the plaintiffs as
belonging to a higher level of native society than any that existed on the mainland
(Bartlett 1993: 27). His colleague Justice Toohey acknowledged significant cultural
differences between the two peoples but insisted that the principles relevant to
a determination of interests in land were the same (ibid: 140).
Although the Mabo decision was the first positive determination by the
judiciary of the rights of native Australians to land at common law, it was
heralded by political and legislative forerunners in PNG as well as Australia. In
the early 1970s, government inquiries were carried out independently to consider
the issue of land rights in two Commonwealth territories — the Commission of
Inquiry into Land Matters (1973) in PNG, and the Aboriginal Land Rights
Commission (1973) in the Northern Territory. Two Acts of Parliament ensued
shortly afterwards: the PNG Land Groups Incorporation Act 1974 and the
Australian Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976.
It need hardly be said that the consequences of this legislation for the intended
beneficiaries were profound. Less conspicuous, though no less profound, were
the side-effects on the practice of anthropology. Whereas in the first three
quarters of the twentieth century investigations of traditional land tenure in
Australia and PNG were pursued at a leisurely pace, in response to the needs of
an academic discipline, in the last quarter they were more often carried out
under contract and under pressure in the context of indigenous land claims or
externally-financed resource exploitation. While I am a relic of the old order,
all the other contributors in this book belong to the new.
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My interest in customary land corporations began while I was an
undergraduate at Sydney University. In 1952, two years before I enrolled in
anthropology, A.R. Radcliffe-Brown published his collected essays and addresses
under the title of Structure and Function in Primitive Society, which enshrined
unilineal descent as a key principle in the occupation, ownership, and use of
land in pre-industrial social formations. In his first article on Aboriginal social
organisation, Three Tribes of Western Australia (1913), he identified the primary
territorial group in the Port Hedland region as a patrilineal clan. In his seminal
treatise, The Social Organization of Australian Tribes (1931), he argued that the
patrilineal clan formed the basis of landowning corporations throughout the
continent.1
Radcliffe-Brown was professor of anthropology at Sydney University from
1926 to 1931. Scholars attracted by his theoretical approach after he returned
to England, particularly E.E. Evans-Pritchard and Meyer Fortes, emerged as
leading exponents of descent theory in the analysis of African societies. In
Aboriginal and Melanesian ethnography his abiding influence dominated the
research agenda throughout the 1950s, particularly following the establishment
of anthropology at The Australian National University. Most of my
contemporaries regarded themselves in some sense as ‘British structuralists’.
One of the most thoroughgoing applications of the school’s doctrines was carried
out by my teacher M.J. Meggitt, who first consolidated descent theory in the
Australian desert and then planted its flag in the New Guinea Highlands (Meggitt
1962, 1965).
While post-war anthropology was thus preoccupied with the documentation
of indigenous corporate culture, post-war native policy under the direction of
Paul Hasluck (Minister for Territories) viewed communal ideologies as barriers
to the assimilation of individuals into the workforce and lifestyle of Western
civilisation. As time passed, the pragmatic and philosophical assumptions
underpinning this approach came to be regarded as repressive by indigenous
activists as well as members of the Australian intelligentsia, and by the end of
the 1960s the policy had effectively given way to demands for autonomy and
self-determination. Of particular significance was a mounting support for land
rights. The rejection of communal title by Judge Blackburn in the Gove case of
1971, followed by the election of a Labour federal government in 1972 and the
approach of Independence in PNG, all helped to mobilise administrative and
legislative machinery in the desired direction. As we have seen, two progressive
Acts were passed in the mid-1970s, one by the Somare government in PNG and
the other by the Fraser government in Australia. The principle architects were
C.J. Lynch and A.E. Woodward respectively — both lawyers of liberal
inclination.
1  Neither of these two publications was included in Structure and Function in Primitive Society.
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While the essays in the present volume take for granted that the land
legislation in question was intended for the protection and benefit of the
indigenous peoples, the authors situate themselves as observers of troubled
waters downriver from the confluence of the two streams I have traced in the
preceding paragraphs. Anthropology, in its classical Radcliffe-Brownian form,
provided the administration with a single-criterion, unambiguous model of the
customary land corporation, admirably suited for registration and incorporation
into the modern world of commerce and capitalism. Unfortunately, it is now
apparent that in many parts of Australia and PNG patriliny is unlikely ever to
have been a sole exclusive principle of recruitment to land groups, and that in
some places it was barely acknowledged.
Scepticism began in PNG somewhat earlier than in Australia. In 1962, John
Barnes, an Africanist trained in the best traditions of British structuralism before
migrating to Australia, drew attention to recurring reports from the New Guinea
Highlands of non-agnates comfortably embedded in patrilineal descent groups
(Barnes 1962).2  Fieldwork over the next 25 years continued to undermine classical
descent theory by demonstrating a range of strategic and opportunistic
considerations, besides patriliny, that contributed to the composition of groups
in the contexts of production, exchange, marriage arrangements, and warfare
(Wagner 1967; Strathern 1968; Kelly 1977; Modjeska 1982). Reviewing this
material in 1987, Daryl Feil concluded that ‘social structures in the Highlands
contain many interrelated elements, the relative emphasis of a single feature,
say patrilineal descent, being only one and not necessarily the dominant one’
(Feil 1987: 125).
In Australia, anomalies began to appear during the 1970s, particularly in the
findings of Fred Myers (1976) in Central Australia and John von Sturmer (1978)
in North Queensland. Among the Pintupi of the Western Desert, admission to
landowning groups depends mainly on conception at a particular site, or close
cognatic links to individuals of previous generations conceived there. Cognatic
kinship is likewise important among the Kugu-Nganychara of Cape York, but
the basis of site ownership is not conception but male dominance through which
an individual comes to be acknowledged as the ‘boss’ for a particular camping
location. In both cases incipient patrilineal tendencies may appear but are
regularly submerged by other considerations. In the Northern Territory a variety
of departures from the classical patrilineal model emerged in the course of land
claim research subsequent to the proclamation of the Land Rights Act, most
conspicuously the recognition of matrifiliation as a ground for ownership status.
In a review of evidence of this kind from widely separated parts of Australia
2  During his first visit to PNG in 1960, John Barnes met a Land Commissioner in Rabaul ‘who had been
taught by Radcliffe-Brown that land was owned by patrilineal descent groups and was finding such
groups all over the Gazelle Peninsula’ (personal communication).
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(Hiatt 1984), I concluded that ‘patrifiliation has been accorded an undue
pre-eminence in the definition of landownership, at the expense of other cognatic
links (especially matrifiliation) and of criteria such as putative conception-place,
birth-place, father’s burial place, grandfather’s burial place, mythological links,
long-term residence, and so on’ (Lakau 1995: 98).3
Given that anthropological orthodoxy was not seriously challenged in
Australia until after the Northern Territory Act had been passed, it is noteworthy
(not to say surprising) that the term ‘patrilineal’ does not appear in the wording.
The landowning group is described merely as a ‘local descent group’. In the
early hearings the Land Commissioner was persuaded that patrilineality was
implied in the definition; subsequently, faced with continuing pressure from
claimants to include matrifiliates in the list of registered owners, he felt free to
interpret the wording literally (and therefore more flexibly).
Patrilineality is likewise not specified by PNG’s Land Groups Incorporation
Act, whose preamble states that the purpose of the law is ‘to recognise the
corporate nature of customary groups and to allow them to hold, manage and
deal with land in their customary names’. A recurrent criticism in the present
essays is that, despite the broad ambit of the legislation, the government and its
agents have represented patrilineal descent groups (‘clans’) as the appropriate
bodies through which indigenous people should protect and pursue their interests
in relation to modern commercial enterprises. In areas where criteria other than
patriliny have been traditionally recognised as valid alternative grounds for
land group affiliation, non-agnates may be excluded from membership through
lack of officially required patrilineal credentials. In some places where patriclans
did not exist traditionally, the people have ‘invented’ them on the understanding
that the government and the developers require them for the purpose of
distributing royalties.
The guiding principle of the Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters was
that land policy ‘should be an evolution from a customary base’. In that case it
is obviously important to get the customary base right, and the present volume
makes a timely and valuable contribution in that direction. There can no longer
be any excuse for imposing a rigid anthropological dogma on people for whom
it was never valid; or worse, tempting them to invent fictions in order to conform
to it. But the issues discussed in the book raise a more radical question: to what
extent will the current preoccupation with cementing customary institutions
into the foundations of political economy in PNG and Aboriginal Australia in
fact impede further ‘evolution’ or even bring it to a halt? Any society that treats
3 Writing generally of PNG a decade later, Andrew Lakau noted that, although inheritance is through
patrilineal or matrilineal descent, individuals in competition for scarce resources in land and survival
resorted to various other recognised credentials, such as ‘affinity, adoption, birthplace, conception
place, father’s or mother’s birthplace, mythological links and so on’ (ibid).
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its traditions as sacrosanct and not subject to inquiry, criticism, revision, or
rejection must sooner or later confront the consequences of stasis.
Several essays raise the question whether capitalist development is compatible
with the perpetuation of communal landownership. The issue is currently the
subject of public argument in both PNG and Australia; and, while no one
seriously expects a consensus to emerge on the basis of either economic facts or
moral values, it seems necessary in the interests of clarity to distinguish among
the kinds of benefits ownership might confer. Where legal title confers rights
to royalties in respect of natural resources (minerals, petroleum, forests), justice
would seem to require equal distribution within the incorporated customary
landowning group. It might even be argued that the appropriate landowning
group in such cases is one of maximal proportions (such as a tribe rather than a
constituent clan). But where legal title confers the right to transmit the products
and improvements of human labour by inheritance (for example, to descendants),
pragmatism probably dictates a system of individual ownership. There is no
need to assume that the two forms are mutually incompatible: the principle of
leasehold with payment of rent makes it possible for communal and individual
ownership to coexist within the same community.
I commend the essays in this volume to all concerned with the social and
economic future of the Indigenous peoples of Australia and PNG. Combining
professionalism with humanism, they seek to protect the land reforms of the
late-twentieth century against over-zealous traditionalism as well as against a
dissipation of cultural and natural resources in the name of modernism.
Lester R. Hiatt
April 2007
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Chapter One
Customary Land Tenure and
Registration in Papua New Guinea and
Australia: Anthropological Perspectives
James F. Weiner and Katie Glaskin
In 2005, the mechanism of indigenous customary land tenure was again under
assault in both Australia and Papua New Guinea (PNG).1  It was claimed that
communal customary land tenure was impeding economic development; that it
was inconsistent with the exercise of individual autonomy and freedom in a
liberal society, and that it was an archaic base upon which to build and develop
a national economy in the modern world. Steven Gosarevksi, Helen Hughes and
Susan Windybank (2004: 137) thus asserted: ‘communal ownership has not
permitted any country to develop. In PNG, where 90 per cent of people live on
the land, it is the principal cause of poverty.’ Since 2004, comments by such
persons as member of the National Indigenous Council Warren Mundine, Prime
Minister John Howard, and Senator Amanda Vanstone2  have all advocated that
communal landownership was acting as a brake on wealth creation in Australian
Aboriginal communities.3
The notion that communal customary landownership is an impediment to
economic development is not a recent one. As Lund (2004) demonstrates with
respect to customary land tenure in Ghana, colonial authorities there actively
promoted the development of private property rights in land, seeing an
‘evolution’ from customary communal land tenure to individual property as
being necessary and desirable. In the African context generally, Besteman (1994:
484) says that government interventions in customary land tenure regimes have
stemmed from arguments linking customary tenure arrangements with low
agricultural productivity. To this end, many African countries have pursued
the path of ‘individualisation in the form of title registration programmes, either
freehold or individual leasehold on state-owned land’ (ibid). Yet in the case of
1  For example, Brown and Ploeg (1997: 513) record Hasluck’s (1960) policy position as being one that
advocated individual as opposed to communal land titles.
2  See Bradfield (2005) for citations and summaries of these comments reported in the Australian national
media.
3 The intellectual fons et origo for these comments are located in de Soto’s (2000) book The Mystery of
Capital.
1
Somalia, contrary to the link made between economic development and private
ownership, Besteman shows that individual land registration has led to a
‘concentration of ownership, speculation, and decreased agricultural
productivity’ (ibid: 503). Drawing on Channock’s work, Lund (2004) notes a
paradox — that while colonial authorities in Africa began their rule convinced
of the superiority of their understandings of property in individual terms,
individual property rights were not looked on favourably by the end of the
colonial period.
The recent debates concerning private property ownership in PNG and
Australia have also drawn responses providing evidence contrary to the notion
that the individualisation of property rights amongst their indigenous peoples
would constitute an economic panacea to current problems. In relation to PNG,
Jim Fingleton, one of the contributors to this volume, edited a collection of
papers demonstrating the health and vigour of entrepreneurship in PNG based
on customary communal landownership (Fingleton 2005). In Australia, an Oxfam
commissioned report found no evidence to support the idea that individual
landownership is a necessary pre-condition to economic development on
Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory, and drew on the Aotearoa/New
Zealand context to demonstrate that ‘individualising title can actually compromise
sustainable economic development on indigenous land’ (Altman et al. 2005: 5).
As the African studies referred to particularly indicate, recent concerted
efforts to overturn remaining customary land tenure regimes must be placed
within the broader historical development of world capitalism, and indeed
colonialism. However, our goal in this volume is not in the first instance to make
a case for the protection of customary land tenure per se, but to understand the
mechanics of the translation process in which non-Western cultural and social
forms are incorporated and regulated by Western legal and statutory bodies.
While the chapters in this volume4  all apparently describe episodes within an
ever-expanding ‘culture clash’ between indigenous peoples and Western
governments or capital, our conclusions will be provocative — that in a
fundamental cultural sense, ‘the customary’ is a product of the expansion of state
and capital formations, rather than foreign or external to it (Weiner 2006; Weiner
and Glaskin 2006).
As neighbouring countries linked by a colonial past as well as by more recent
political and economic developments, Australia and PNG share commonalities
and differences with respect to customary land registration. Lakau (1997: 537)
and Fingleton (this volume) remind us that the primary instrument of customary
land registration in PNG, the Land Groups Incorporation Act 1974 (LGIA), arose
4 This collection had its genesis in a conference held in Brisbane in 2000, entitled ‘Problems and
Perspectives on Customary Land Tenure and Registration in Australia and Papua New Guinea’, organised
by Laurence Goldman and John Bradley of the University of Queensland.
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from one of the recommendations of the 1973 Commission of Inquiry into Land
Matters that was established during the period of PNG self-government preceding
independence.
It is for the most part only since independence (1975), and to an
increasing degree in the past few years, that the people of Papua New
Guinea have developed claims to land expropriated by missions, previous
administrators, private individuals, and development groups … Local
people now seek to reclaim their land and resources or demand new
compensation for land and resources formerly granted to administration,
mission, or companies (Brown and Ploeg 1997: 512–3).
Even though indigenous claims against land alienations go back to the early
1900s in PNG, and local Papua New Guineans acquired the opportunity to
seriously contest land alienation in the 1960s through the Public Solicitor’s
Office, as the papers in this volume attest, much landowner registration in that
country has been specifically elicited in response to mineral exploration and
other recent development projects. In his chapter, Fingleton discusses the East
Sepik land legislation of 1987, which was prompted by ‘a new “reality” —
modern demands being put on people’s customary land’. As he says, such laws
are ‘an attempt to channel the response to that new reality’.
In Australia, the Commonwealth Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory)
Act 1976 granted communal inalienable freehold title to Aboriginal groups in
the Northern Territory who could demonstrate traditional ownership according
to the criteria set down in that Act. While most other Australian states also had
some form of land rights legislation, the first and only nation-wide land rights
legislation, the Commonwealth Native Title Act (NTA), only came into existence
in 1993. This legislation followed the High Court’s Mabo decision5 that
Aboriginal or native title existed and could be recognised within the common
law of Australia (an issue which presumably was never in doubt in PNG). Yet
in Australia, similarly to the PNG situation, many Aboriginal groups have been
required to lodge claims in response to mining or other development on their
country (following the issue of Section 29 notices). Nor is there any real doubt
that the legal mechanism of native title is at least as concerned with identifying
and codifying Aboriginal land interests in order that development may proceed,
as it is with recognising pre-existing Aboriginal rights.
The main theme of the volume is thus to show that legal mechanisms, such
as the LGIA in PNG and the NTA in Australia, do not, as they purport, serve
merely to identify and register already-existing customary indigenous
landowning groups in these countries. Because the legislation is an integral part
of the way in which indigenous people are defined and managed in relation to
5 Mabo & Ors v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1.
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the State, it serves to elicit particular responses in landowner organisation and
self-identification on the part of indigenous people. These pieces of legislation
actively contour the indigenous social, territorial and political organisation at
all levels in these nation-states — or at least in the way that indigenous people
present them to the wider society (Weiner 2000, 2003, 2007).
One of the significant features of the current Australian government’s strategy
with Aboriginal Native Title and Land Rights is to assert that this process will
have an end — at some point, all indigenous interests will be mapped, accounted
for and ultimately compensated for in some way that will historically draw a
line under the era of indigenous struggle for recognition of customary ownership.
But if local regimes of property are brought into being by enduring relations of
structural asymmetry between the State and ‘indigenous interests’, then the
struggle for land rights will always be poised against such state agencies. It is a
defining condition of the State, rather than a finite episode in its evolution.
Those anthropologists who have been working in settled Australia, where
dispossession and removal to Reserves and Missions were common experiences
of Aboriginal people throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, have
confronted the crucial role that Norman Tindale’s (1974) tribal map plays in the
formation and recognition of native title claim groups. Tindale’s map and his
collection of genealogies now serve as the resource with which most native title
claim groups in settled Australia begin the process of identifying their ancestors
and their traditional country. For many families who have experienced severe
impairments to the transmission of cultural knowledge across generations,
Tindale’s identifications of people, tribes and territories become highly
authoritative. Because the entire continent is wholly divided into parcels of
discrete tribal territories, there is an attractive and compelling completeness and
lack of ‘fuzziness’ in Tindale’s scheme. Notwithstanding the authority which
Tindale’s map is typically given by various parties involved in native title in
Australia, its authority has been brought into serious question by many
anthropologists working on this subject.6
Recent advances in mapping wrought by satellite and computer technology
will have a profound effect on the future of customary land registration. The
difficulties in mapping sacred sites that the Central Land Council has encountered
in the past, as described by Elias in his chapter, will be greatly ameliorated.
National Native Title Tribunal president Graeme Neate observes that in the
United States, the Intertribal Geographic Information System Council was recently
set up to promote ‘tribal self-determination by improving management of
6  For example, in a recent native title decision the judge noted that ‘Professor Sutton devoted considerable
effort to reanalysing Tindale’s surviving fieldwork data from his 1933 expedition to the Mann and
Musgrave Ranges in order to refute the latter’s hypothesis’ (Jango v Northern Territory of Australia
[2006] FCA 318, at paragraph 223).
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geographic information and building intertribal communications networks’
(1998: 2). The Global Positioning System will serve to calibrate to a single
Cartesian system for all territorial information, Western and non-Western, and
will provide the empirical basis for what Burton (1991) has called the ‘cadastral
landscape’. Drawing on the established legal sense of this term, Burton intends
it to mean ‘the end result of dealings in land; it is the cumulative record of legal
decisions — arising from customary or state law — in the formation of the
cultural landscape’ (ibid: 197).
Mapping indigenous ownership of land is part and parcel of a more general
attempt by Western governments to define and ‘manage’ their own internal
indigenous relations to land. In his chapter, Jorgensen draws on Scott’s (1998)
discussion of legibility: the State’s implementation of its plans requires legibility,
and for those affected by such plans, recognition is reciprocal to the requirement
for legibility. Recognition of customary landownership creates such legibility,
identifying the groups that have to be considered at any given time in relation
to land, and mapping their interests onto the landscape (Weiner 2004). In
Australia at least, a significant part of this exercise under the NTA includes
clarifying the areas where indigenous landowners do not have to be dealt with,
either because their native title has been extinguished, or because they have
been unable to demonstrate that it continues according to the criteria of
recognition in the NTA, and its interpretation by the judiciary in litigated cases.
At the time of writing (2006), Western Australia is considered to be in the
midst of a resource boom that is significantly fuelling Australia’s current
economic growth and prosperity. Resource extraction and development on such
a large scale is inevitably contingent on accessing land, much of which is
currently under native title claim. The issue of customary land registration in
PNG and Australia, then, is inexorably slanted towards the requirements of the
resource industry to deliver the financial benefits of extractive projects. With
the exception of Martin’s chapter on the Tolai and Glaskin’s chapter on Bardi
and Jawi, all case studies in this collection proceed under the shadow of some
large-scale resource project in which the landowners are involved. And as
Fingleton and Weiner point out in their chapters, the registration of landowning
groups in PNG is not so much oriented towards the management of land but to
the management of resource rents and incomes to indigenous landowners. The
local landowners of the petroleum project area in PNG have, from the inception
of the land group registration process, never really construed the Incorporated
Land Group as having anything to do with ownership or management of
customary activities on land. In this respect, landowner registration has very
little to do with empowering customary control and management of land, but a
great deal to do with eliciting ‘the validation of landowner consent’, as Filer says
in his chapter.
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The idea of the ‘corporation’ is a pervasive theme in this collection (see also
Sullivan 1997). The corporation is the form that modern indigenous customary
groups (if one can call them that) must take according to the legislation; it is also
a technical term both legally and anthropologically (for example, Radcliffe-Brown
1965); and it embodies some of the most central tenets of democratic and
managerial culture that comprises the modern Western polity (Weiner 2003). In
PNG and Australia, registration of indigenous customary land is only partly
about securing ‘land rights’ for indigenous people — it is also about creating a
managerial and legal capacity for them through various processes of incorporation.
Identifying in some anthropological sense customary landowning groups is thus
only half of the problem. Both the NTA and LGIA are as much oriented towards
specifying the obligations, functions and conduct of such groups for the purposes
for which they have been formally and legally registered. But as Weiner says
in his chapter on the incorporation of Foi land groups in PNG, it is often ‘wrongly
assumed that the internal affairs and composition of landowning social units are
both practically and ontologically prior to their external relations’. These groups
are, after all, brought into being in order to make decisions concerning actions
that take place on customary land. Customary landowners are usually less
interested in acquiring legal certification of their landholdings than in entering
into what Filer (this volume) identifies as ‘social relations of compensation’ with
government and developers (see also Filer 1997).
There is a significant difference in the ability of PNG and Australia
respectively to fund, manage and administer the effects of procedures for
registering and supporting indigenous corporations. With respect to native title
claim groups in Australia, Mantziaris and Martin (2000: 186) have noted that
the paperwork, accounting and administrative responsibilities demanded of a
native title group far exceed the capacity of communities characterised by ‘high
levels of residential mobility, poor literacy, and poor understanding of formal
legal and administrative processes’.7  Edmunds (1995) makes the important
observation that increasing governmental and administrative support for
indigenous people within Western states has served to increase the degree to
which indigenous persons can act autonomously, and attenuate the strength of
‘customary’ obligations that kinsmen have to each other in indigenous societies.
Applicants are therefore less dependent upon the support of indigenous kinsmen
or other political bodies within the indigenous community. In Australia, this is
one factor that has led to an increasing tendency for larger quasi-‘tribal’ native
title claim groups to fragment into constituent extended families. In short, the
availability of state support for the maintenance and functioning of indigenous
landowner groups has often had the opposite effect.
7 These same conditions have created the conditions for widespread abuse and manipulation of the
royalty delivery system, also based on the incorporation of local landholding groups, in the petroleum
project area in PNG.
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If ‘customary law’ and ‘customary social groups’ are elicited as responses
from indigenous people to pressures placed on them by the state and developers,
then we should be aware that different conditions and stimuli will call forth
different versions of ‘customary’ and hence different versions of ‘customary
groups’. In her chapter, Glaskin discusses the outstation movement among Bardi
and Jawi of the Dampierland Peninsula, Western Australia, which encourages
the formation of small and separate residential incorporated groups, while the
requirements of the NTA, in which the same people are also involved, requires
them to make claim to land and sea on behalf of a much larger category of rights
holders. Both require a specific form of corporate group to manage rights in
property. Applications for outstations in this area have largely, though not
entirely, been lodged by single, patrifilially composed estate groups. In contrast
to these lower-level landed groupings, recent court decisions in Aboriginal
Australia have focused on more encompassing groups said to constitute the
‘society’ of native title holders, this being understood as that society from which
the laws and customs giving rise to rights and interests in land flow, and which
is held to have continuity with the normative society that existed at the time of
colonisation. In some cases, this has meant that courts have recognised regional
configurations of more than one socio-linguistic grouping or ‘tribe’, based on
similar realisations of shared custom, social interaction, and shared occupation
of a larger territorial domain.8  Such strategies, foreshadowed in the Miriuwung
Gajerrong (Ward) Full Federal Court decision, have been used to characterise
the recent Wanjina (Neowarra) and Alyawarr native title claims.9
In their chapter, Memmott, Blackwood and McDougall describe the active
design of the prescribed body corporate, the legally prescribed body that holds,
manages, preserves and transmits native title. The NTA allows that such bodies
corporate can be based on either customary or non-customary laws of governance
and composition. In Australia and PNG, we witness what Filer (1996: 69) has
called ‘the incorporation of the local community through the adoption or
imposition of bureaucratic management methods’. The legal mechanism of
incorporation is not a neutral organisational and administrative template: like
the mythologies that indigenous people bring to bear in the face of their own
explanatory challenges, it is a systematisation of core components of personhood,
autonomy, consensus and will in Western culture. As such, the language of
incorporation, so widely adopted by indigenous communities in their
8  However, in Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777, the determination of the Bardi and Jawi
peoples’ claim (to which Glaskin refers in her chapter), the judge held a converse view: that Bardi and
Jawi people had not constituted a single ‘society’ at the time of colonisation, but instead were two
‘societies’ at that time. Given the implications of this decision for Jawi people in particular, this
determination is currently being appealed in the Full Federal Court of Australia.
9 Western Australia v Ward [2002] HCA 28; Neowarra v State of Western Australia [2004] FCA 1092;
Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakay Native Title Claim Group v Northern Territory of Australia
[2004] FCA 472.
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confrontation with governments and companies over control of resources and
land, has been the most effective agent of their own sociopolitical transformation.
Whether a truly indigenous form of the corporation — something anthropologists
took for granted in Radcliffe-Brown’s hey-day but which seems far more perilous
a proposition now — can emerge from this conjunctural arena is only one of a
number of questions that an anthropology of indigenous communities in Australia
and PNG will have to closely attend to now.
By the same token, different statutory bodies charged with protecting and
promoting differently-situated ‘traditional’ interests in land can often be at odds
with each other, as Levitus makes evident in his absorbing account of negotiations
over the early Coronation Hill gold mining site in the Northern Territory and
the contested positions taken by the Northern Land Council and the former
Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority. While anthropologists have
conventionally been involved in describing the holistic nature of social life in
small-scale societies, the complex legal framework in which indigenous people
have to register different kinds of rights fragments and compartmentalises their
various interests in land.
Neither the NTA nor the LGIA stipulates a specific form that a customary
landowning group must take; the two pieces of legislation are notable for their
lack of specificity in regards to the nature of indigenous sociality. Both
demonstrate a lack of awareness that the units of social affiliation or membership
and the units of property ownership might be different things in both PNG and
Australia (and by implication generally in indigenous ‘communal’ society
worldwide). It is not just ‘groups’ that are brought into being in this intercultural
process, but the very notion of ‘custom’ itself. While Western law can recognise
varying degrees of non-Western customary law, it draws a line at what it
considers ‘repugnant’ to the common law. In a Land Titles Commission hearing
of 1998, the Chief Commissioner Josepha Kanawi and her co-commissioners (both
men) found that the asserted practice of allowing a woman to pass on rights in
land in a situation where there remained no other adult men in the clan, was
consistent with the avowed constitutional promise of PNG to promote equity
and equality among all its citizens — including women (Kanawi et al. 1998).
Therefore, even though it was not a traditional custom, the Land Titles
Commission went ‘against’ tradition in order to promote ‘change’. The very
opposite has occurred in Australia, where the courts have not legitimated any
marked degree of socio-cultural transformation in Aboriginal society and have
employed a static and over-literal sense of the ‘traditional’ (Glaskin 2003a). This
is the case both in terms of the basis on which claims to native title are evaluated,
and in terms of the kinds of native title rights and interests that may be
recognised. The latter have tended to be confined to so-called ‘traditional’ rights
to hunt and gather, to conduct ceremonies and protect places of significance,
and so on. They have to date explicitly excluded commercial rights to resources,
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even over land where ‘full exclusive possession’ determinations of native title
Australians’ capacity to generate their own wealth from land that has been
‘recognised’ as traditionally theirs, but this is not generally articulated in those
discussions in Australia suggesting that communal customary landownership is
an impediment to Aboriginal economic development.
Most of the contributors to this volume have had experience both as academic
and consulting anthropologists and have taken seriously the relation between
these two areas of anthropological practice. The consultant anthropologist must
not only manage the translation between Indigenous and Western lifeworlds,
he or she must also negotiate the divergent expectations of developer, government
relationship between Law and Anthropology. In his chapter, Laurence Goldman,
long-time ethnographer of the Huli people of the Southern Highlands Province
and currently Manag
strong case that the role of the anthropologist is not just to passively annotate
the traditional structures of indigenous project landowners, but to actively
own interests and those of governments and developers. He found that Huli
social organisation, which is not based on a unilineal descent rule, does not lend
itself to the registration of discrete, non-overlapping units of property holders.
Instead, he devised a system of spatial ‘zones’ within the Hides gas project licence
enduring social and political alliances, ‘conceived as loosely drawn territorial
areas in which an aggregated set of clans and clan sections resided which
sustained long-term relationships based on intermarriage and exchange’. The
Ipili of the Porgera Valley, as described by Golub in his chapter, evince similar
characteristics — ‘the focus … was on regional embeddedness and connections
do not even have a word for ‘clan’. Rather, like the word  ruru  for the Kewa of
the Southern Highlands Province, the Ipili term yame refers to any group of
people, at any level of organisation, who coalesce for any reason, and thus can
refer, among other things, to a cognatic grouping at any level of inclusiveness.
Golub and Jorgensen both make the point in their chapters that in the absence
the theoretically unambiguous manner in which it can allocate people to discrete
social groups, unilineal descent as a social recruitment mechanism has been in
establishment in both countries. Anthropologists have in both countries had to
argue  strenuously  against  the  applicability of unilineal descent in certain cases,
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not always successfully.10  Needless to say, unilineal descent lends itself more
readily to the conditions of legibility required by the state than other mechanisms
of group recruitment and attachment to land, such as those of the Australian
Western Desert (Sutton 2003: 140–4).
Introducing his chapter, Burton draws attention to what this has produced
in both cases — a serious disjunct between the necessity to identify the property
owning unit on the one hand, and to officially endorse some unit of indigenous
governance and self-management on the other. Thus, as Filer suggests in his
chapter, the question can be raised ‘whether land boundaries are more or less
substantial, flexible, or porous than group boundaries’. Martin, in his chapter
on contemporary Tolai land tenure in East New Britain, and Elias, in his chapter
on Warlpiri relations to land and heritage protection in the Tanami Desert, also
confront this major anthropological discrepancy that has emerged in legislation
designed to recognise customary entitlements to land: a failure to distinguish
between laws and customs pertaining to territorial group membership and those
pertaining to the exercise of property rights. In Australia, Sutton (2003: 111–34)
has described a ‘dual structure of traditional land tenure’ in which there is a
distinction between underlying and proximate title to land — that although
individuals and local descent groups assert immediate control of any given
territory, the wider group recognising shared custom is the source of customary
entitlements that are recognised by the ‘jural’ Aboriginal public. This means,
among other things, that where local organisation is that of estates or clan groups,
the higher level grouping has mechanisms for succession to deceased estates, so
that the underlying title to those estates is not lost when they no longer have
living members. The courts of Australia, since the Yorta Yorta High Court
decision,11  have more or less taken on this distinction, concluding that native
title claims in Australia must be located at the level of underlying title — the
wider ‘society’ within which members of lower-level groupings, such as clans,
recognise they belong. In PNG, however, where perhaps a similar distinction
could be drawn — although ethnographically it has received scant attention —
no landowner would ever agree to relinquish control of clan land to such a
putative entity. Such entities never had political functions in traditional PNG
society (at least not in the interior).
An examination of the Torres Strait also provides an important contribution
to the consideration of these issues. The islands lie between the Australian
mainland and PNG, are considered part of Australian territory, and gave rise to
the Mabo decision that established the existence of native title in Australia. In
his chapter, Burton discusses the ways in which proximate titles have been
handled in Australia and PNG, with his discussion of native title focusing on
10  For example, see Jango v Northern Territory of Australia [2006] FCA 318.
11  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v State of Victoria [2002] HCA 58.
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the islands of the Torres Strait. The tendency in Australia has been for the courts
to resist recognising the discrete property rights of smaller units or individuals
as constitutive of native title, instead keeping native title tied to the level of
encompassing linguistic, territorial and cultural unity. Burton argues, however,
that for the Meriam people of the island of Mer in the Torres Strait, the Mabo
determination has given the Meriam ‘something that they did not want in the
form of the forced collectivisation of traditional land’. Many Australian
anthropologists have pointed out that the concept of the ‘tribe’ has been a
mainstay to theorising about the nature of the Aboriginal polity for
anthropology’s entire history.12  Merlan (1998: 149) has pointed out that ‘in
recent times, the “tribal” level and other forms of organisation have been elicited
from Aborigines, and given greater concreteness and fixity than they previously
had, as part of a wider project of management of Aboriginal affairs’.
Not only are non-Western social groups over-simplified in legislation; so is
the range of different indigenous relations to places themselves. Aboriginal
people in general did not see ‘places’ in isolation. Sites were always linked to
other sites, because when the landscape was originally created by ancestral
beings, it was the result of a purposeful movement over terrain and through the
landscape. Sites that are linked as points along the journey of a single creator
being thus have a mythological connection and coherence rather than a purely
spatial or geographical one. Present-day communities whose territories are linked
in this way are ‘related’ in the sense that they have important and recognised
social obligations to each other, particularly in religious terms. But when
economic development takes place on indigenous land, developers inevitably
focus on sites of development as discrete and unconnected. They wish to
negotiate over rights to particular sites in isolation from the range of other sites
to which they are connected in traditional and mythological ways. As Elias
describes in his chapter, developers therefore have difficulty in understanding
the spatial and genealogical distribution of interests in particular sites, and also
the range of different connections that often include people located at some
distance from any particular site.
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the registration of customary land
tenure has a number of complexities. Not least of these is the kind of groupings
for which the recognition of landownership takes place, the relationship between
the landowning groups thus recognised, and the exercise of proprietary rights
and interests in land or waters by individuals and groups that may not fall within
these statutory definitions or be a consequence of their application. Thus Filer’s
chapter, which examines the ‘interaction of law, policy and ideology in the social
construction of “land groups”, “land boundaries”, and “group boundaries”’ in
relation to resource development in PNG, has as one of its conclusions that the
12  For example, see Sutton (2003: 42–3, 46, 92–3) for an overview.
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‘ideology of landownership also conceals a real variety of “local customs in
relation to land”’.
In his chapter, Fingleton opens his discussion by referring to the ‘protests,
riots and police killings in Port Moresby which accompanied the World Bank’s
attempt to promote customary land registration in 2001’. Customary
landownership is of considerable significance to indigenous people, and responses
to government proposals for ‘recognition’, and indeed to indigenous demands
for recognition, will vary significantly according to the terms upon which such
recognition is offered or sought. In Australia, Aboriginal people talk about
fighting for their country, for the recognition of their pre-existing ownership
of the land, and the right to control what happens on their country. As the
contributions to this volume demonstrate though, the recognition of customary
landownership is located within complex matrices of colonial history, government
policy and legislation, ideology, indigenous property rights and relations to
land, indigenous responses to requirements for customary land tenure registration
or ‘land reform’, and economic development or large-scale mineral extraction
on which the wealth of nations may considerably depend. The Indigenous and
the ‘Western’ are thus defined against each other, and the articulation of each
includes the other in its foundation. The struggle for recognition of customary
land tenure is as much a moment in the development of Western social economy
as it is an historical trope for indigenous peoples of the world. In bringing this
collection together, we hope to make a contribution to the understanding and
analysis of this conjunctural field.
References
Altman, J.C., C. Linkhorn and J. Clarke, 2005. ‘Land Rights and Development
Reform in Remote Australia.’ Fitzroy: Oxfam Australia.
Besteman, C., 1994. ‘Individualisation and the Assault on Customary Tenure in
Africa: Title Registration Programmes and the Case of Somalia.’ Africa
64(4): 484–515.
Bradfield, S., 2005. ‘White Picket Fence or Trojan horse? The Debate Over
Communal Ownership of Indigenous Land and Individual Wealth
Creation.’ Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Studies, Native Title Research Unit (Land, Rights, Laws: Issues
of Native Title — Issues Paper 3-3).
Brown, P. and A. Ploeg, 1997. ‘Introduction.’ In P. Brown and A. Ploeg (eds),
op. cit.
——— (eds), 1997. Change and Conflict in Papua New Guinea Land and Resource
Rights. Special Issue 7(4) of Anthropological Forum.
12
Customary Land Tenure and Registration in Australia and Papua New Guinea
Burton, J., 1991. ‘Social Mapping.’ In P. Larmour (ed.), Customary Land Tenure:
Registration and Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea. Port Moresby:
Australian National University, New Guinea Research Unit (Bulletin 40).
De Soto, H., 2000. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West
and Fails Everywhere Else. New York: Basic Books.
Edmunds, M., 1995. ‘Conflict in Native Title Claims.’ Canberra: Australian
Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, Native Title
Research Unit (Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title — Issues Paper
1-7).
Filer, C., 1996. ‘The Policy and Methodology of Social Impact Mitigation in the
Mining Industry.’ In D. Gladman, D. Mowbray and J. Duguman (eds),
From Rio to Rai: Environment and Development in Papua New Guinea
up to 2000 and Beyond − Volume 4: Warning Bells. Waigani: University
of Papua New Guinea Press.
———, 1997. ‘Compensation, Rent and Power in Papua New Guinea.’ In S. Toft
(ed.), Compensation for Resource Development in Papua New Guinea.
Boroko: Law Reform Commission (Monograph 6). Canberra: Australian
National University, National Centre for Development Studies (Pacific
Policy Paper 25).
Fingleton, J. (ed.), 2005. ‘Privatising Land in the Pacific: A Defence of Customary
Tenures.’ Canberra: Australia Institute (Discussion Paper 80).
Glaskin, K., 2003a. ‘Representations of “Tradition”: Native Title and the
Recognition of Indigenous Land Rights in Australia.’ Anthropology News,
December 2003.
———, 2003b. ‘Native Title and the “Bundle of Rights” Model: Implications
for the Recognition of Aboriginal Relations to Country.’ Anthropological
Forum 13(1): 67–88.
Gosarevski, S., H. Hughes and S. Windybank, 2004. ‘Is Papua New Guinea Viable
with Customary Land Ownership?’ Pacific Economic Bulletin 19(3):
133–136.
Kanawi, J., B. Noki and C. Malaisa, 1998. ‘Gobe South East Gobe Customary
Landownership Dispute Appeal: Reasons for Judgement.’ Port Moresby:
Land Titles Commission.
Lakau, A.L., 1997. ‘Customary Land Tenure, Customary Landowners and the
Proposals for Customary Land Reform in Papua New Guinea.’ In P.
Brown and A. Ploeg (eds), op. cit.
Lund, C., 2004. ‘The Situation is Incongruous in the Extreme. The History of
Land Policies in the Upper Regions of Ghana.’ Sahel-Sudan
Environmental Research Initiative (Working Paper 46).
13
Anthropological Perspectives
Mantziaris, C. and D. Martin, 2000. Native Title Corporations: A Legal and
Anthropological Analysis. Sydney: Federation Press.
Merlan, F., 1998. Caging the Rainbow: Places, Politics and Aborigines in a North
Australian Town. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
Neate, G., 1998. ‘Native Title: The Spatial Information Sponge’. Address to the
National Conference of the Mapping Sciences Institute, Fremantle, 24–28
May.
Radcliffe-Brown, A.R., 1965 (1952). Structure and Function in Primitive Society.
New York: The Free Press.
Sullivan, P., 1997. ‘A Sacred Land, a Sovereign People, an Aboriginal Corporation:
Prescribed Bodies and the Native Title Act.’ Casuarina: Australian
National University, North Australia Research Unit (Report 3).
Sutton, P., 2003. Native Title in Australia: An Ethnographic Perspective.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tindale, N., 1974. Aboriginal Tribes of Australia: Their Terrain, Environmental
Controls, Distribution, Limits and Proper Names. Berkeley: University
of California Press.
Weiner, J., 2000. ‘The Anthropology of and for Native Title.’ The Asia Pacific
Journal of Anthropology 1(2): 124–132.
———, 2003. ‘The Law of the Land: A Review Article.’ The Australian Journal
of Anthropology 14(1): 97–110.
———, 2004. ‘Introduction: Depositings.’ In A. Rumsey and J. Weiner (eds),
Mining and Indigenous Lifeworlds in Australia and Papua New Guinea.
Wantage (UK): Sean Kingston Publishing.
———, 2006. ‘Eliciting Customary Law.’ In J. Weiner and K. Glaskin (eds), op.
cit.
———, 2007. ‘Anthropology vs. Ethnography in Native Title: A Review Article
in the Context of Peter Sutton’s Native Title in Australia.’ The Asia
Pacific Journal of Anthropology 8(2): 151–168.
——— and K. Glaskin, 2006. ‘Introduction: The (Re)-Invention of Indigenous
Laws and Customs.’ In J. Weiner and K. Glaskin (eds), op. cit.
——— and K. Glaskin (eds), 2006. Custom: Indigenous Tradition and Law in the
21st Century. Special Issue 17(1) of The Asia Pacific Journal of
Anthropology.
14
Customary Land Tenure and Registration in Australia and Papua New Guinea
Chapter Two
A Legal Regime for Issuing Group Titles
to Customary Land: Lessons from the
East Sepik1
Jim Fingleton
Recently, there has been renewed interest in the subject of customary land
reform in Papua New Guinea (PNG). Although it was never really off the agenda,
the protests, riots and police killings in Port Moresby which accompanied the
World Bank’s attempt to promote customary land registration in 2001 meant
that land tenure reform moved to the margins of the political debate. But the
subject is too important for it to remain marginal for long, and customary land
registration was placed on the agenda for a high-level ‘land summit’ held in PNG
in August 2005. In preparation for that meeting, I wrote four articles on
customary land registration that were published in the PNG Post-Courier during
March 2005,2  leading to lively debate there over the desirability of land tenure
reform.
Meanwhile, another debate was running in Australia, over the direction of
aid policy in PNG and the Pacific Islands generally, and on the use of
development aid to promote land tenure reform. On one side, the economist
Helen Hughes from the libertarian Sydney-based Centre for Independent Studies
called for aid to be tied to the privatisation of customary tenures (Hughes 2004),
while others with extensive practical experience in PNG and elsewhere defended
customary land tenures as a viable basis for development (Fingleton 2004, 2005).
Again, the question was raised whether customary land tenures are an impassable
barrier to growth and sustainable development. For those who take the view
that they are not, the challenge is to show how development strategies based
on customary land tenures would work in practice. In responding to that
challenge, attention must be given to the role of customary groups in the
ownership and management of their customary land.
As other contributors to this volume have pointed out, attempts to identify
indigenous groups and give them legal recognition are part of a two-way process,
1 The author is grateful to Tony Power, James Weiner and Martha Macintyre for their comments on
an earlier draft of this chapter.
2 The articles appeared in the Post-Courier on 9, 15, 22 and 29 March 2005.
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whereby ‘laws, practices and customs of both the Western nation state and
indigenous people embedded in it, are developing and evolving out of each
other’ (Sahlins 1976). In this chapter I present information on a ‘scheme of
legislation’3  for customary land registration introduced almost two decades ago
in the East Sepik, one of the provinces of PNG. The main components of that
scheme of legislation were: the East Sepik Land Act of 1987, which set out the
law applying generally to land in the province, and the regulation of dealings
in land; the East Sepik Customary Land Registration Act of 1987, which set out
a process for the selective registration of group titles in customary land in the
province and provided for the legal effects of such registrations; and PNG’s Land
Groups Incorporation Act (LGIA) of 1974, 4  which is a national law providing
for the legal recognition of customary landowning groups and their operations
with regard to land.
A study of that scheme of legislation — its origins, aims, processes and results
— can provide useful information on what is involved in issuing titles to
customary groups in their customary land, and where the problems lie. I lived
in PNG and worked as a government lawyer specialising in land matters from
1970 to 1978, and returned in 1987 to draft the East Sepik land legislation, so I
can comment personally on the origins, aims and processes of the legislation
being studied here. As for their results, while I have some personal experience
I must rely mainly on the accounts of others.
In what follows, each law will be outlined first, before examination of their
results. My personal involvement in the preparation of the above laws means
that, while I cannot claim complete impartiality, at the same time I do have an
insight into the legislation and can document what the laws were attempting,
and how they were intended to operate.5 This is not well understood today,
and that detracts from the important lessons which can be learnt from the
experience under that scheme of legislation.
The three Acts mentioned above were designed to work together as a ‘scheme’,
interacting with each other. I will first examine the East Sepik land legislation
of 1987, and then the national law for the legal recognition of customary
landowning groups. That law came into operation in 1974, and was invoked by
the East Sepik legislation to provide for the bodies that would be issued with
land titles and authorised to carry out dealings in registered customary land.
3 The term ‘scheme of legislation’ is used by lawyers to denote a number of separate Acts intended to
operate together in a co-ordinated way, as part of a ‘scheme’ to implement a policy goal.
4  Enacted in 1974 as the Land Groups Act No 64 of 1974, the law was re-named after Independence in
1975.
5  My own involvement should not be overstated. Many individuals have an impact on the final form
of legislation including: policy-makers and planners (Tony Power, in the case of the East Sepik laws);
members of drafting committees (Nick O’Neill, Rudi James and Abdul Paliwala in the case of the national
land legislation); legislative draftsmen (Joe Lynch, in the case of the land groups legislation), in addition
to members of the legislatures themselves.
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The period under consideration for present purposes mainly relates to PNG’s
post-Independence period after 1975, but a brief account of previous
developments in land legislation and customary group recognition will be given
as necessary background to what followed.
East Sepik Land Legislation of 1987
The East Sepik land legislation was an exceptional body of law, but it was not
unprecedented. When writing about the legislation in 1991, I said:
Those Acts, with their supporting Regulations, represent the most
significant breakthrough in the field of customary land tenure reform,
not only in PNG but in the South West Pacific generally, since the current
period of independent nationhood began (Fingleton 1991: 147).
The inability of governments in the Pacific to pass legislative reforms affecting
land tenure means that my comment still holds true today, over a decade later.
Most Pacific Island nations are still operating under land legislation from their
colonial period. In PNG, this means that the land registration laws comprise
remnants of a scheme of legislation introduced by the Australian Administration
in the mid-1960s.
One of those laws was the Land Registration (Communally Owned Land)
Ordinance 1962.6 This law, based on Fijian precedents,7  provided for the
registration of customary land in declared areas as either individually owned or
communally owned.8  A Register of Communally Owned Land was established,
in which those persons or groups found to be the owners of land would be
registered. Land entered in the Register remained subject to custom, but an entry
in the Register was conclusive evidence of the stated ownership, as at the date
of the finding. The law made no provision, however, for dealings in the registered
land, or for the legal recognition and operation of the landowning groups.
The other main land law introduced by the Australian Administration in the
mid-1960s was the Land (Tenure Conversion) Ordinance of 1963. In contrast to
the previous law, this legislation expressly provided that the individual freehold
titles in customary land registered under its provisions would thereafter be free
from custom, and all customary interests in the land and controls over it would
be extinguished. Both this law and the previous one were administered by a
special body, the Land Titles Commission, made up mainly of experienced senior
field officers from the Administration.
6 The operation of the 1962 law was suspended in 1970, and the law was subsequently repealed.
7 The 1962 law replaced the Native Land Registration Ordinance 1952, which drew directly from the
Fijian Native Lands Ordinance 1905.
8  For a criticism of the term ‘communal’ with respect to customary land tenures, see Fingleton (2005:
3–4).
17
A Legal Regime for Issuing Group Titles to Customary Land: Lessons from the East Sepik
In the early 1970s the Australian Administration proposed another major
scheme of land legislation, but introduction of such reforms on the eve of
Independence was controversial, and in the face of strong opposition the
proposed laws were withdrawn. After the 1972 national election, the coalition
government led by Michael Somare set up a Commission of Inquiry to make
recommendations for reform of land policies, laws and administration in
preparation for Independence. The Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters
(CILM) made comprehensive recommendations for reform in its 1973 report, its
guiding principle being that land policy ‘should be an evolution from a customary
base not a sweeping agrarian revolution; collective and individualistic extremes
should be avoided’ (GoPNG 1973: 15). The CILM based this principle on the
Government’s ‘Eight Point Programme’, the forerunner of the National Goals
and Directive Principles of the PNG Constitution, one of which (Section 5) calls
for development to be achieved ‘primarily through the use of Papua New Guinean
forms of social, political and economic organisation’.
Recommendations were made by the CILM for a new system of land dispute
settlement, for dealing with problems over alienated lands (such as plantations),
for land resettlement and other land matters. With respect to customary land,
the CILM’s main views were that:
• the previous emphasis on individualisation of titles was not appropriate;
• new legislation for customary land registration should be introduced, but
that it should be used sparingly, and only where there was a clear demand
from the landowners concerned and a real need to replace customary tenures;
• the ‘basic pattern’ should be to register group titles, and provide for the
group to grant registrable occupation rights (to group members) or leases (to
non-members);
• the landowning groups should be incorporated, with a constitution defining
their membership, powers and decision-making processes;
• the system of using ‘representatives’ to make decisions on a group’s behalf
should be abandoned;
• the main controls on dealings in registered land should be through restrictions
on the titles themselves — titles would not be fully negotiable, and limits
would apply to grants of occupation rights and leases, while mortgages
would only be available to secure loans from approved lending bodies
(GoPNG 1973: 17–44).
The CILM Report became the basis for land policy making and legislative
reform during the 1970s, including notably for present purposes passage of the
Land Groups Act (later renamed the Land Groups Incorporation Act) of 1974, and
the Land Disputes Settlement Act of 1975. By the end of the 1970s, however, the
Somare-led coalition government was experiencing political instability. In 1978
the National Executive Council approved policy submissions that would have
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implemented reform in the main outstanding areas of the CILM report, including
for the registration of group titles in customary land. But bureaucratic delays
during 1979 and a change of government following a no-confidence vote in 1980
meant that no laws to implement the National Executive Council decisions were
ever drafted. There has been no important change in PNG’s land legislation at
the national level since then.
Meanwhile, a number of provincial governments were becoming frustrated
by the failure at the national level to provide new legislation for customary land
registration. The existing legislation, providing for conversion of customary
land tenures to individual freehold titles, had been discredited by the CILM
report, and the Land Titles Commission was in the process of being replaced by
the new land dispute settlement machinery. The East Sepik leadership was firmly
committed to basing economic development on customary tenures and Melanesian
forms of organisation as called for by the PNG Constitution. When a World Bank
consultant’s criticism of Port Moresby’s latest proposals for land law reform led
to their being shelved, the East Sepik Provincial Government decided to invoke
its legislative powers under the Organic Law on Provincial Government and
proceed with its own land legislation.9  In 1987, this resulted in passage by the
East Sepik Provincial Assembly of the East Sepik Land Act and Customary Land
Registration Act. The two laws were prepared on the basis of the CILM’s
recommendations.10
East Sepik Land Act 1987
The East Sepik Land Act sets out the general principles of land tenure in the
province, providing in particular, that all land is either held under the State
(alienated from customary ownership) or owned by customary groups under
customary tenure.11  Custom applies to all land in the province, except to the
extent that it has been removed or modified by legislation. Land can only be
removed from customary tenure by government acquisition. The Act also made
provision for three kinds of dealing with customary land — sales, leases and
charges.12
With respect to sales, the Act provides that customary land could only be
sold to the National or Provincial Government, or to another customary group.
Leases of customary land could be granted to a wide list of persons and bodies,
9  I have written previously on the lead-up to this ground-breaking initiative (Fingleton 1991: 147–53).
10  I drafted both these Acts, and their supporting Regulations, as a consultant engaged by the Australian
International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB — the predecessor of AusAID) to work with the
national and provincial authorities in drafting the necessary provincial legislation.
11  Much of the East Sepik Land Act was concerned with the administration of leases over State-owned
land in the province, which does not concern us here.
12 The East Sepik Provincial Government decided to subsume occupation rights — recommended by
the CILM for members of the landowning group — under leases. ‘Charge’ is the generic term for such
things as mortgages.
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including incorporated land groups and business groups, local and registered
foreign enterprises, citizens and non-citizens resident in the province. Both sales
of customary land to customary groups and leases of customary land are
‘controlled dealings’, requiring approval from either the Provincial Land
Management Committee (for all sales and some leases) or the Local Land
Management Committee for the area concerned, depending on the nature of the
parties. Charges over customary land could only be made to secure a debt to
prescribed lending bodies, and restrictions were imposed on the lender’s ability
to foreclose and exercise a power of sale.
East Sepik Customary Land Registration Act 1987
The East Sepik Customary Land Registration Act provides for registration of
customary land at two levels: registration of full ownership, and registration of
interests which are less than full ownership.
The other basic dichotomy drawn by the Act is between registration in
declared Customary Land Registration Areas (CLRAs), and registration outside
such areas. CLRAs were those parts of the East Sepik Province officially identified
as having a priority for registration — based on criteria of local need and demand,
and the availability of administrative resources necessary to carry out and
maintain the registration of land titles. In CLRAs, the group ownership of land
would be systematically investigated and registered. In addition, subordinate
rights (for leases and so forth) granted by landowning groups to individual
members or others could — subject to the requirements of the East Sepik Land
Act outlined above — also be registered upon application. Within CLRAs, a
registration was conclusive evidence of title.
Outside CLRAs, people could also apply for registration of their rights in
customary land, either in full group ownership or as subordinate right holders.
Because they would not be preceded by systematic investigations, the effect of
these registrations was to confer only prima facie evidence of title. In effect, this
was not much more than an official recording service, providing documentation
of interests in land but no statutory protection for them.
The legislation specified that customary land registered under its provisions
would remain subject to custom, although a claim based on custom could not
defeat a registered title in a CLRA. Landowning groups were required to
incorporate under the Land Groups Incorporation Act before they could be issued
with a certificate of title and start entering into dealings with their land.
Key features of the East Sepik land legislation are:
1. All land in the province is either owned by the State, or is owned by
customary groups under customary tenure (that is, customary land cannot
be held in absolute individual ownership).
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2. Custom applies to all land in the province, except to the extent that its
application has been excluded or modified by legislation.
3. Subject to specified controls, three kinds of dealings could be entered into
over customary land — sales, leases and charges (for mortgages and such).
4. Registration of titles in customary land would be introduced selectively,
in CLRAs identified by reference to the criteria of: general support from
the local landowners; genuine need for registration of titles; and availability
of administrative resources.
5. In CLRAs, the group ownership of all land would be systematically
investigated and registered.
6. Group titles issued in CLRAs would be indefeasible — that is, given
statutory protection from competing claims.
7. Groups could enter into dealings with their titles, but first they had to
incorporate under the LGIA.
8. Outside CLRAs, a service was available for recording interests in customary
land, but such interests would be given no statutory protection.
9. Transfers (to other customary groups), leases and mortgages entered into
by incorporated land groups (ILGs) could also be registered, and in CLRAs
the titles so gained would also be indefeasible.
10. Registered customary land would remain subject to custom, but a claim
based on custom could not defeat a registered title in a CLRA.
The East Sepik land legislation was an attempt to balance the economic need
for greater certainty of interests in land with the desire, for social and cultural
reasons, to retain customary tenures. The East Sepik Provincial Government of
the day was committed to village-based development and the retention of
traditional communities, and the legislation was designed to cause minimal
interference with customary tenures. Registration would only be introduced
selectively, where customary tenures were unable by themselves to adapt to
changing circumstances. Even in such cases, the application of custom would
only be removed to the extent necessary to meet the changing circumstances.
Customary groups would remain the key actors under the province’s land reform,
holding ownership of the registered land and having the power to enter into
dealings with the land. The legislation was a statement of belief in the continued
viability of customary groups.
Results of the East Sepik Land Legislation
What was the result of this vote of confidence in customary groups? As with so
many of PNG’s attempts at land tenure reform, the tangible results were
negligible. The East Sepik Provincial Assembly passed the two Acts by early
March 1987, and they were brought into force on 19 May 1987. Later in that
year I returned to East Sepik Province to draft the implementing regulations —
the Land Regulation and Customary Land Registration Regulation, both of which
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were approved by the Provincial Executive Council in November 1988.13 They
prescribed the forms and procedures to be used in application of the two Acts.
I also prepared a detailed Manual of Laws and Procedures, to assist officials in
performing their land administration duties under the land legislation. Many
anthropologists, linguists, geographers and other social scientists have conducted
fieldwork in the East Sepik Province, and I prepared a Background Paper
explaining the new legislation and a Land Tenure Questionnaire, which was
sent to them seeking data for use in applying the new laws. Information Papers
on the new regime were prepared for banks, financial bodies and others.
Meanwhile, at the national level, the World Bank was becoming increasingly
involved in land affairs. In 1986 a World Bank Project Identification Mission
visited PNG, following which the PNG Government approved preparation of
the Land Evaluation and Demarcation (LEAD) Project. The Australian Government
agreed to fund a feasibility study for the proposed project, the main objective
of which was to create more favourable conditions for the implementation of
agricultural and forest development projects (GoPNG 1988: 8). The Project
Preparation Report proposed a project with a number of components, one of
which was for a two-year trial of East Sepik’s Customary Land Registration Act.
Based on this trial, consideration would be given to national legislation for
customary land registration.
But this was too tardy progress for some provinces whose governments,
encouraged by East Sepik’s example, also decided to go ahead with their own
provincial land legislation. My assistance was sought, but the national authorities,
worried about losing the initiative, arranged in 1988 for the World Bank to fund
me to prepare Drafting Instructions for national ‘framework’ legislation for
customary land registration. This approach would have allowed provinces to
have their own legislation like that of the East Sepik, but within the ‘framework’
of a national law which would lay down the basic requirements to be met by
provincial laws. In this way, it was hoped to ensure consistency and coordination
across the country on this important subject.
In 1989, a World Bank loan to PNG was approved for the Land Mobilisation
Project (LMP), based on the LEAD Project feasibility study. Under the LMP
there was some support given to the East Sepik legislation, but not enough to
produce any registrations. A land titles consultant was engaged in 1989 to review
the legislation. His report (Levy 1989) supported its general thrust,14  and made
recommendations on the form and contents of the Customary Land Register
under the new law. Despite this endorsement, the Department of Lands and
Physical Planning delayed putting in train the necessary legislative,
13  My follow-up work on the activities mentioned in this paragraph was also conducted in my capacity
as an ADAB consultant.
14  Levy did suggest some minor refinements.
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administrative and financial arrangements to allow the East Sepik legislation to
come into operation. In 1995, when the provincial government system was
substantially re-organised, the legislative powers of provincial governments
were greatly reduced. The East Sepik land legislation never came into effective
operation, and as it was not ‘re-enacted’ under the new provincial government
arrangements it has now lost its legal status.15
One of the requirements of the East Sepik legislation was that, before a
customary group could be issued with a registered title in its land, it had to be
incorporated under the LGIA. The rationale for this requirement was the need
for customary groups to be set up for effective decision making before being
issued with a title and entering into dealings. The requirement provided
protection both for the landowning group and persons dealing with the group.
As it was a major component of the East Sepik’s scheme of legislation, that law
will now be examined.
National Legislation for Land Group Incorporation
The Land Groups Incorporation Act, passed by PNG’s House of Assembly in
1974,16  was another exceptional law, like the East Sepik land legislation which
followed it over a decade later. In 1998, in a review of laws for the recognition
of indigenous groups published by the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), I described the Act as ‘one of the most innovative laws on
the general subject of group recognition’ (Fingleton 1998: 11). As previously
mentioned, the Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters in PNG recommended
in 1973 that, for purposes of the registration of titles in customary land,
landowning groups should be incorporated, with a constitution defining their
membership, powers and decision-making processes. The person who drafted
the legislation to give effect to these proposals was C.J. (Joe) Lynch, then PNG’s
Chief Legislative Draftsman.
As it happened, Lynch had already been considering the general subject of
legal recognition of customary institutions for some years. It was clearly a subject
which interested him, both intellectually and professionally. From the mid-1960s
until his death in the late 1980s he wrote prodigiously on subjects ranging from
the recognition and enforcement of custom (including deliberations by
‘grass-roots’ courts) to the question of how legal provision could be made for
traditional leadership — sometimes writing about a particular country and
sometimes comparing the approaches taken to these matters across the Pacific
Islands. Not only did he prepare the legislation passed by the law-making bodies
of Pacific countries, he frequently produced papers debating the issues or
15  Under the new arrangements, the Governor of East Sepik, Sir Michael Somare, failed to move for the
re-enactment of the land legislation by the Provincial Assembly within the 60 days provided (personal
communication, Tony Power, 2005).
16 The House of Assembly became the National Parliament upon Independence in 1975.
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commenting on the outcomes. He drafted PNG’s Constitution in the mid-1970s,
and was engaged in the early 1980s as Legislative Counsel in both Marshall
Islands and Kiribati, shortly after their Independence.
Lynch’s (1969) paper on ‘Legal Aspects of Economic Organization in the
Customary Context in Papua and New Guinea and Related Matters’ dealt with
four interrelated subjects, one of which was ‘Community Landholding’.17 The
paper starts with an introductory part where Lynch outlines the purpose and
scope of his endeavours:
The theme of the whole paper is simply that for too long we have all
acted on the theory that indigenous forms of organization are not apt
for ‘Westernized’ economic development and that the latter must wait
on a long period of ‘Westernizing’ economic education. In my view, it
is high time that we asked ‘Why not?’ and tried to find remedies for
specific deficiencies in the indigenous system. It is hoped that this paper
may furnish a starting-point at least in the field of statutory requirements
(Lynch 1969: 3).
In arguing for the adaptation of indigenous forms, Lynch’s approach was radical
for the time — especially for a lawyer. PNG was only just emerging from what
has recently been termed the ‘replacement paradigm’, where development was
seen as requiring replacement of customary institutions with their Western
counterparts.18  Paul Hasluck’s influential reign as Australia’s Minister for
Territories (1951–63) was not long over, and his views on land reform saw no
future for customary tenures (Hasluck 1976: 126). The Derham Report of 1960
advising on the administration of justice in PNG also saw no place for a
village-based system of courts applying custom (Oram 1979: 61–4). Even the
then Public Solicitor, W.A. (Peter) Lalor, a champion of indigenous rights and
often a thorn in the Administration’s side, was a legal conservative when it came
to embracing customary institutions.
Among the sources for his own paper, Lynch mentions publications by the
New Guinea Research Unit of The Australian National University dealing with
indigenous business enterprises (Lynch 1969: 4). He also set out the ‘propositions’
on which he based his approach,19  including the ‘undesirability of unnecessarily
interfering with custom by forcing it into an artificial legal framework’, and the
‘need for simplicity and flexibility and for leaving alternatives open’ (ibid: 2).
17 The other three topics were group businesses, the use of customary land as security for loans and
taxing customary land.
18  Movement away from the ‘replacement paradigm’ towards the ‘adaptation paradigm’ in land tenure
reform is discussed in FAO (2002: 223).
19  Some of the quotes which follow are from the part of Lynch’s paper dealing with group businesses,
but he made it clear that his views also applied to land groups (Lynch 1969: 8).
24
Customary Land Tenure and Registration in Australia and Papua New Guinea
In discussing the particular requirements of a land groups’ law, Lynch notes
that the need for a legal form for landholding by customary groups arises from
‘external factors’.
The needs of people dealing with the land-holding group … the general
(though not necessarily individual) need for overall land registration in
some form, the need to have some recognized authority who can be made
legally responsible in legal matters affecting the land, and so on … [the
need to] interfere with the internal structure and working [of land groups]
to the minimum, even allowing for the fact that the observer does
influence the observed and the mere description of a custom may affect
it either immediately or in relation to its development … [the need for]
the utmost flexibility in our requirements as to the constitution and
powers of our corporate body … [and the need to recognise] that we are
not dealing with social organizations which have been worked out ad
hoc, but with highly developed organizations with existing implications
for many fundamental aspects of community life (Lynch 1969: 9–10).
His conclusion was that ‘we should not impose a structure, but should concentrate
on describing one’ (ibid: 9, emphasis in the original), and he proposed a simple
method to recognise and give corporate legal status to existing customary groups
(ibid: 8), and then to regulate their external dealings — ‘and even in this to
interfere as little as possible’ (ibid: 6).
Lynch recognised that what was being undertaken was ‘attempting to fit a
non-English institution into the framework of English law’ (Lynch 1969: 12),20
and he acknowledged that he was approaching the task as a lawyer,
recommending that the views of anthropologists should be sought on his
proposals.21  He attached to his paper a preliminary draft bill for a ‘Group Land
Ordinance’, which included the procedure for recognition of land groups and
the requirements for a land group’s constitution (ibid: 58–70).22  Apart from
enabling customary groups to own and deal with land in their own right, Lynch
saw that his proposed legislation would also do away with the existing provision
for the use of agents in land dealings (ibid: 15), and — in what, with hindsight,
might now be seen as an inopportune prediction — he saw it as providing a
method for making payments under mining and forestry legislation ‘in safety’
(ibid: 15–16).
20  Here he was referring to the concept of land ownership, but his comment applies also to group
recognition.
21  In fact, it seems from a copy of Lynch’s paper in my possession that he received comments from the
lawyer-anthropologist A.L. (Bill) Epstein on his completed paper.
22  Proposed laws are called ‘bills’ before they are passed by the legislature. Before self-government
(1973), the principal legislation in PNG were Ordinances. They became Acts after self-government.
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Notable features of the above views are Lynch’s regard for customary
institutions, his belief that they could be adapted to meet modern needs, and
his perceptions that the law’s task was to recognise the corporate nature of
groups already existing under custom rather than create corporate bodies de
novo. Legal recognition was mainly for the benefit of outsiders; groups did not
require much internal regulation and the goal was minimum interference by the
legislation in the group’s internal affairs. At the same time, he clearly understood
that even such minimal interference would affect the groups, and ‘mere
description of a custom may affect it either immediately or in relation to its
development’ (Lynch 1969: 9).
In 1974, the task began of bringing forward recommendations of the CILM
for government consideration.23  Most pressing were the problems of claims to
alienated lands, mainly foreign-owned plantations which in some areas were
contributing to pressures on land and racial conflict. The Plantation
Redistribution Scheme, adopted in 1974, was underpinned by a scheme of four
laws, one of which was the LGIA.24 The CILM had called for such a law to enable
the vesting of land titles in customary groups, but the Act was brought in initially
to allow the vesting of registered titles in redistributed plantations.
As PNG’s Chief Legislative Draftsman, Joe Lynch drafted the Act, but it was
more than just a dusting-off of his 1969 preliminary draft of the Group Land
Ordinance.25 Two of the CILM’s small support staff of advisers were the
anthropologist Professor Ron Crocombe, then Professor of Pacific Studies at the
University of the South Pacific in Fiji, and Dr Alan Ward, then a Senior Lecturer
in History at La Trobe University in Melbourne and an authority on Maori land
affairs. They lent their authority to the CILM’s recommendation that landowning
groups should be incorporated with a constitution defining their membership,
powers and decision-making processes. Furthermore, a drafting committee of
government officials and lawyers from the University of Papua New Guinea
participated in the drafting of the new Act during 1974.26  But the approach
taken in the LGIA of 1974 followed the main views and proposals formulated
by Joe Lynch in his 1969 paper, and he is, therefore, entitled to be regarded as
the true ‘architect’ of that innovative piece of legislation.
23  From 1974 to 1978 I was employed in the PNG Department of Lands (under its different names), with
responsibility for advising the PNG Government on land policy and legislation.
24 The other laws were the Land Acquisition Act, Land Redistribution Act and Land Trespass Act.
25  In the scheme of land reform legislation prepared in 1971, provision was made for customary groups
to be registered as the owners of land, but the legislative machinery provided for the ‘incorporation of
landowning groups’ was rudimentary and fell back on the use of ‘group representatives’ — a practice
not favoured by the CILM (GoPNG 1973: 30).
26  I chaired the drafting committee in my capacity as a government lawyer seconded to the Department
of Lands to assist in implementing the CILM report.
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Land Groups Incorporation Act 1974
The preamble to the LGIA states that it is a law ‘to recognize the corporate nature
of customary groups and to allow them to hold, manage and deal with land in
their customary names’. The following treatment will first spell out the main
provisions of the Act, then list its key features.
The Act provides a simple process for the incorporation of land groups, which
begins with preparation of the group’s constitution. This document must set
out:
• the name of the group;
• the qualifications for (and any disqualifications from) membership of the
group;
• the title, composition and manner of appointment of the committee or other
controlling body of the group;
• the way in which the group acts, and its acts are evidenced;
• the name of the custom under which the group acts;
• details of the group’s dispute-settlement authority;
• any limitations or conditions on the exercise of powers conferred on the
group under the Act; and
• any rules applicable to the conduct of the group’s affairs.
A group applies to the Registrar of Incorporated Land Groups for
incorporation, sending in its constitution. The application is given publicity in
the area concerned, and checks are carried out on the group’s suitability for
incorporation. After considering comments received and any objections, the
Registrar can issue a certificate of recognition, whereupon the group becomes
legally incorporated, gaining legal status as a corporation with perpetual
succession and the capacity to sue and be sued, and do other things a corporation
can do.
Upon incorporation, the rights and liabilities of the customary group become
rights and liabilities of the ILG. The powers of the ILG relate only to land, its
use and management, and they must be exercised in accordance with the group’s
constitution and the relevant custom as nominated in the ILG’s constitution.
Subject to these requirements, an ILG may acquire, hold and dispose of customary
land, enter into agreements for its use and management, and distribute any
product or profits from the land. Evidentiary provisions protect persons who
enter into transactions with ILGs which are in formal compliance with the
provisions of its constitution.
Each ILG must have a dispute-settlement authority, for dealing with disputes
between group members or between the ILG and a member, including disputes
over entitlement to membership. The dispute-settlement authority may be a
person or persons specified by name or position, or determined in the manner
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specified in the ILG’s constitution. Dispute-settlement authorities are required
to do ‘substantial justice’ between all interested persons, in accordance with the
Act, the ILG’s constitution and any relevant custom.
Provision is made for the dissolution of an ILG, in cases where it has ceased
to function as such, or its affairs are being conducted in an oppressive or unfair
manner, or for some other reason ‘it is just and equitable that the affairs be
wound up’. In general, customary land belonging to an ILG which has been
dissolved reverts to the persons who would be its customary owners if the ILG
had never been recognised.
Key features of the Land Groups Incorporation Act are:
1. It is a process for the recognition of existing groups — that is, bodies which
already have a corporate identity under custom.
2. Groups have considerable freedom in preparing their constitutions. The
Act prescribes certain matters upon which rules must be made (on
membership, the way the ILG acts and its acts are evidenced), but it does
not dictate the content of those rules.
3. ILGs remain subject to custom. They are required to identify in their
constitution the custom under which they operate, but this may be done
by simply naming it. There is no requirement for the custom to be written
down.
4. The powers of ILGs are confined to their land — its ownership, use and
management, and the distribution of its product and profits. An ILG may
place limits or conditions on the exercise of those powers in its constitution.
5. Upon incorporation, the assets and liabilities of a customary group are
transferred to the ILG. Upon dissolution, the ILG’s customary land is vested
back in its customary owners.
6. Protection is given to outsiders dealing with an ILG. They are entitled to
rely on its constitution, and if the ILG has entered into a dealing — other
than a transaction disposing of its land27  — in accordance with the formal
requirements set out in its constitution, that is generally conclusive as to
its power to enter into the dealing.
7. Special machinery is provided for settlement of internal disputes within
ILGs.
Results of the National Legislation for Land Group
Incorporation
The LGIA was passed in 1974, but for many years there was virtually no action
taken to use its provisions. This was partly because the Act was initially
introduced as a component of the Plantation Redistribution Scheme, and when
27  An ILG’s power to dispose of its land would have to be proved under the normal rules of evidence.
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that measure started to experience delays (Fingleton 1981), the immediate need
for the Act declined. A second reason was the division of responsibility for land
group incorporations between the Registrar-General (responsible for
incorporations) under the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Lands
(responsible for land administration). A capacity for carrying out the special
responsibilities involved in supervising the incorporation of customary land
groups was never developed.
The third and main reason, as explained above, was that the national
legislation for registration of titles in customary lands did not eventuate. The
main purpose of the LGIA was to enable customary groups to hold, manage and
deal with their customary land in their own names. The most important legal
device to facilitate the management of land — affording security of tenure for
its owners and for those entering into dealings with its owners — is a registered
title. It was anticipated that, once the customary land registration law was in
place, ILGs would be the bodies in which the group titles would be vested.28
That was the clear intention of the CILM.
In 1988 I was engaged as a consultant, under the UNDP-funded Urban
Settlement Planning Project in PNG, to design the land tenure arrangements for
provision of low- and medium-cost housing to persons occupying customary
lands at two sites — Buko settlement (40 ha) near Butibam village on the edge
of Lae, and Kreer settlement (131 ha) within the Wewak town boundary. The
arrangements were approved after extensive consultations with the customary
owners of both sites and the people already occupying much of the land (so-called
‘squatters’ — nearly 500 households at Buko and over 400 at Kreer). A meeting
was also held with the main commercial banks operating in PNG, whose managers
agreed in principle that the proposed land tenure arrangements would provide
acceptable collateral for lending to the settlers for their house construction and
improvement. One aspect of the arrangements was for the customary groups
which owned the land in question (six clans for the Buko site and two clans for
the Kreer site) to be incorporated under the LGIA.
This was my first ‘hands-on’ experience of the Act I had been involved in
drafting in 1974. My inquiries showed that only a handful of incorporations
had been carried out by 1988 — 14 years after the Act was passed. During the
period 1988–90, I visited the two sites on a number of occasions, holding village
meetings and collecting data for the preparation of clan genealogies. Based on
that information I drafted constitutions for the proposed ILGs, setting out their
membership rules, decision-making processes, dispute-settlement authorities
and so on, as required by the Act. Applications for incorporation were prepared
28  Although Section 13(3) of the Act provides that the grant of an interest in land to a group member
could not be registered under existing registration laws, this was only a temporary provision until the
appropriate arrangements for customary land registration were in place.
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and sent to the Registrar of Incorporated Land Groups and, after lengthy delays,29
the ILGs were incorporated. The next step was for the ILGs to re-incorporate as
companies under the Companies Act — one company made up of the six ILGs
for Buko and another company made up of the two ILGs for Kreer. The companies
would then be authorised to manage the settlement sites on behalf of the ILGs
under management agreements, which included the granting of leases to the
individual settlers.
Although by 1991 all the legal arrangements were in place, and house block
surveys and the provisions for power, water and sewerage infrastructure had
reached an advanced stage at the two sites, the project became a victim of PNG’s
financial crisis following the Bougainville rebellion. Negotiations were held with
the World Bank, but the project was not included for funding under the
Structural Adjustment Program or the Special Interventions Project, possibly
partly because of the Bank’s aversion at the time to working with customary
land groups. Funding dried up, and the land tenure arrangements were never
completed by the grant of leases to the settlers.
In 1992, I had my only other ‘hands-on’ experience of land group
incorporation. That year I was engaged by Chevron Niugini Limited (CNGL),
together with an anthropologist Dr Tom Ernst, to advise on the incorporation
of customary groups within the Kutubu oilfields of the Southern Highlands
Province. Tony Power, who had been the moving force behind the East Sepik
land legislation in the 1980s, was now working for CNGL as their Business and
Community Development Manager, and he drew on the East Sepik experience
in conceptualising how ILGs could be used to improve participation by customary
landowners in the benefits of the project. After a field trip with Ernst and Power
to the area and some brief village meetings, I prepared the ‘Manual of Laws and
Procedures for Incorporation of Customary Landowning Groups’, drawing on
my previous experience in incorporating the eight ILGs for the Urban Settlement
Planning Project. This manual was then used by CNGL staff to incorporate ILGs
in the project area for the purposes of royalty distribution and participation in
‘spin-off’ business opportunities.
Mention must now be made of two developments which were to have major
significance for administration of the LGIA. In 1992, the new Forestry Act of
1991 came into operation. One goal of the Act was to improve the arrangements
for gaining access to PNG’s forest resource, almost all of which stood on
customary land. For this purpose, the Act provided that, as a general rule, the
timber rights in customary land could only be acquired if the title to the land
29  I had to chase up the Registrar more than once to carry out his registration functions — a sign that
there was no routine in place for ILG incorporation.
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was vested in land groups incorporated under the LGIA.30 This requirement
threw open the gates for a stream of ILG applications. In anticipation, the PNG
Forest Authority adopted my CNGL manual prepared for the petroleum project
at Kutubu as the model for its Manual on Land Group Incorporation (GoPNG
1995). Then, in 1998, a new Oil and Gas Act was passed. By one of its provisions
(Section 169), payments of landowner entitlements had to be made to ILGs. What
had begun as the brainchild of Tony Power, to facilitate involvement of
customary landowners in the Kutubu petroleum project, had now become a
statutory requirement for all forestry and petroleum projects across the country.31
And the same basic manual, which I prepared privately for CNGL, was now
being used for the purposes of all forestry and petroleum projects in PNG.
The result was that, after almost two decades of negligible activity under the
LGIA, the last decade had seen a flood of ILG incorporations. In March 2004 I
interviewed the Titles Officer (ILGs) in the Department of Lands and Physical
Planning in Port Moresby, who informed me that a total of over 10,000 ILGs
had been incorporated by then, and that between 10 and 15 applications for
new incorporations were being processed daily. All the duties of checking the
suitability of new incorporations, as well as the oversight of existing ILGs, had
fallen on the shoulders of this one officer. He had no special training, and was
manifestly unable to carry out the statutory responsibilities in anything other
than a perfunctory fashion. Most of the applications for incorporation related
to forestry and petroleum projects,32  and it is apparent that the manuals were
being slavishly followed without regard to local variations in custom. It was a
situation where breakdown in the operation of ILGs was inevitable.
When to this was added the fact that the great majority of ILGs were being
incorporated not for the main purpose for which they were designed — holding
and managing land — but for the subsidiary purpose of receiving and
distributing royalties from their land, then problems were even more to be
expected. Management of a group’s money was fertile ground for disputes
everywhere: the greatest problems with ILGs in PNG arose from royalty
distribution.
Issues Raised by the Legal Recognition of Customary
Groups and Their Land Titles
I have been considering legislation which had two main aims — the legal
recognition of customary landowning groups, and the registration of land titles
in the names of such customary groups. Two main findings from the above
30  Section 57 of the Forestry Act was originally headed ‘Verification of tenure of customary owners’.
This was later changed to ‘Obtaining consent of customary owners to Forest Management Agreement’.
31  But not, apparently, for mining projects. The Mining Act of 1992 has no similar requirement for ILGs.
32  A newspaper advertisement early in 2004 referred to 599 ILGs in one Forest Management Area in
the Gulf Province.
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account are that a great many customary groups were recognised as ILGs, but
no land titles were ever issued to them.33
In these circumstances, most of the critical comment has been on the problems
of group recognition and organisation, but some critics have also attacked the
attempt to vest registered titles in customary groups. I have not carried out a
systematic review of the literature, but sufficient, I think, to give a representative
account of the main problems being encountered by ILGs. These can be divided
into two main kinds — problems with the way the legislation is implemented,
and problems with the legislation itself. A clear-cut division is not possible, but
for purposes of analysis — in particular, for identifying the lessons to be learnt
in the final part of this paper — I will consider the problems raised in the
literature under those two headings, and then give a brief response to the
criticisms.
Problems in Implementing the Legislation
As mentioned above, only the LGIA was implemented, so only the problems in
implementing that legislation can be considered. It is worth repeating that the
great majority of ILGs were incorporated for the purposes of forestry and
petroleum projects, not for the vesting of land titles. Indeed, the anthropologist
Colin Filer, who was much involved in developing the methodology for
improving landowner participation in resource projects, describes how the LGIA
was captured by the ‘heavy’ industries — oil and gas, mining, timber and palm
oil — for their purposes (Filer, this volume). Another much-involved
anthropologist, James Weiner, makes a similar point about CNGL’s ‘managerial
approach’ to the landholding groups in the Kutubu oil project area (Weiner, this
volume).
A very good account is given by Samuel Koyama, an officer of the PNG
Department of Petroleum and Energy, of problems which have arisen in the
petroleum sector, in using ILGs as a mechanism for the distribution of royalties
and other benefits. He discusses the main problems under the following headings:
• leadership struggles;
• unlawful and unfair sharing of benefits;
• complaints about leaders misusing ILG funds;
• lack of representation and responsibility of ILG leaders;
• lack of accountability and transparency;
• inability of ILGs to solve their problems internally;
• political alliances as a means of facilitating rent-seeking;
33 To be quite accurate, I should say ‘no land ownership titles’ were ever issued to ILGs. Under the
‘lease-lease back’ system used mainly for oil palm development, landowners leased customary land to
the State, which then leased the land back to ILGs made up of the customary landowners, who then
subleased the land to an oil palm company.
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• bribery and corruption within ILGs;
• failed landowner business enterprises (Koyama 2004: 23–8).
Koyama concludes that these are ‘mostly principal-agent problems arising from
the poor design and lack of oversight of the ILGs — effectively, a failure of the
government after it approved of these new institutions through legislation’ (ibid:
20).34 Taylor and Whimp made a similar finding in their report on land issues
for PNG’s Department of Mining and Petroleum. Although they had their
reservations about aspects of the LGIA, they noted that ‘there are almost no
government facilities for the proper management of ILG incorporation processes,
and little support for ongoing maintenance outside that offered by developers’
(Taylor and Whimp 1997: 12).
The academic David Lea, in his recent study of the forest industry and the
role of incorporated entities, concludes that ‘ILGs have been less than successful
in resolving problems besetting the forestry industry’ (2005: 169). Having
mentioned the requirement under the new Forestry Act for landowners to form
ILGs for logging projects, he continues:
In most cases, however, it seems that, when landowners proceed to
associate with the logging company, they persist in setting up so called
landowner companies in particular to receive financial benefits which
accrue to the landowners under the terms and conditions of the Timber
Permit (2003/2004 Review Team 2004: 29). This is generally promoted
by the PNG Forest Authority and the logging companies because it is
easier to deal with a single entity than a large number of individual
incorporated land groups (ILGs) (ibid).
Although Lea does make some important criticisms of the ILG concept, the
problems he refers to are mainly caused by inadequate administration of the
legislation — indeed, in this case, not just the LGIA but also the Companies Act.
Problems with the Legislation Itself
The criticism of the scheme of legislation in PNG for recognition of customary
groups and registration of titles in their customary land generally takes the
approach that what was being attempted was misconceived. Some critics take
the view that ILGs are inappropriate entities to be involved in benefit sharing,
while others challenge the legitimacy of attempts by ‘Western‘ legislation to
reconcile ‘traditional’ custom with development. Anthropologists in particular
are concerned by what they see as attempts to ‘reify’ or ‘entify’ custom (Ernst
1999)35  and perpetuate an ‘ideology’ of landownership (Filer 1997).
34  I take Koyama to be referring here to the Government’s ‘approval’ for the incorporation of the
particular ILGs, not approval of the ILG concept.
35  ‘Entify’ is defined as meaning to make an entity, or to attribute objective existence to something.
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For David Lea, ILGs have been unsuccessful actors in forestry operations
because they are based on social relationships rather than on trust, and because
they are essentially ‘wealth-distributing’ rather than ‘wealth-creating’ bodies
(Lea 2005: 171–3). For him, the solution lies in abandoning ILGs and installing
in their place companies created on a voluntary basis (ibid: 173).
James Weiner (this volume) asserts that the whole purpose of the LGIA is
misconceived.
[It] is based on a quite erroneous assumption of the communal nature of
landholding and transmission within the Melanesian ‘clan’, and of its
essentially ‘collective’ interest …
There is thus a fundamental conflict at the heart of the ILG mechanism,
which crops up constantly. This conflict can be stated as follows: the
Land Groups Incorporation Act of 1974 was purportedly designed to
enshrine the traditional landowning group as a legal landowning
corporation. The purpose of this was to give legislative protection to the
traditional landowning units in any given area of PNG …
The conclusion we must face is that traditional custom cannot be protected
by an Act of legislation [my emphasis]. The legislation is composed and
empowered by a cultural and legal system very much at odds with the
way local ‘traditional custom’ arises and is implemented.
Weiner seems to be making two different points here — the LGIA has wrongly
understood the nature of Melanesian customary tenures, and in any case,
legislation cannot be used to protect custom — but his fundamental criticism is
that Western-style legislation cannot faithfully capture customary institutions,
values and processes. Colin Filer (this volume) represents this as an argument
that there is ‘no way of reconciling custom with development, either in theory
or in practice’. His own argument is that ‘Melanesian custom does not really
exist in a form which would allow us to ask how it could or should be recognised
in modern national law, because it was actually born out of the armpit of
Australian colonial law’.
A Response
There is no doubt that the scheme of legislation for land group recognition and
the registration of group titles has been dogged by problems of implementation.
In many cases it is clear that the breakdown in ILG operations can be attributed
to failure to follow the Act’s requirements in setting up ILGs and supervising
their operations, not to the Act itself. In commenting elsewhere on Koyama’s
list of problems above, I have made the further point that it ‘is no coincidence
that these are precisely the problems facing the PNG State, in its grappling with
the new responsibilities of nationhood’ (Fingleton 2004: 101). One can hardly
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blame the ILG concept for ‘leadership struggles’ and lack of leadership
responsibility, misuse of funds, political alliances being formed to maximise
benefits, bribery and corruption, and the failure of ‘spin-off’ business enterprises.
To the extent that malfunctions are due to poor administration, the way
forward lies in putting in place a suitable administrative structure, with adequate
staff, trained to carry out their functions and provided with the funds and
facilities to do so. Without the necessary capacity for a law to be properly
implemented, it cannot be given a fair trial. Only when a law has been properly
implemented can a true impression be gained of how well the law is suited to
achieve its purposes. As with any new legislation, it is important to keep its
operations under review, and be prepared to make amendments and other
adjustments where the need arises. Acts usually require implementing
regulations, to carry them more fully and effectively into operation. There is a
basic Land Groups Incorporation Regulation providing the forms and procedures
for incorporation, but no provision has been made for distribution of benefits,
for example — an obvious area for better regulation when the Act was being
mainly used for that purpose.
As for the arguments that the legislation is fundamentally misconceived, I
would first of all point out that the views of some commentators seem to be
based on some basic misunderstandings. It is not the purpose of the legislation
to codify custom. The LGIA is a measure which is based on custom and which
applies custom, but it does not seek to set out custom. Nor, as some people seem
to think, was the Act intended to record land boundaries and the ownership of
land. That is the function of a customary land registration system — the missing
element in implementing the reforms based on the CILM report of 1973.
Unfortunately, many commentators seem to base their views of the legislation
on how it has been applied — or, too often, misapplied. One main purpose of
this paper is to provide a better information base, so that the legislation can be
more constructively analysed.
The biggest concern is the view that to legislate for the legal recognition of
customary landowning groups was attempting the impossible. Taken to its full
extent, this would mean that the legislatures of countries which have adopted
constitutional democracies and the rule of law can never bring that law to the
aid of their traditional systems of social, political and economic organisation.
Such a result approaches the prescriptions of critics like Helen Hughes (see
Weiner and Glaskin, this volume), who see no ongoing role for customary tenures,
but only their replacement by Western-style freeholds. The same sort of dismissal
of custom lay behind the objections of the colonial judges and legal officers,
which delayed the introduction of Village Courts in PNG for three decades (Oram
1979: 58–64). Such was emphatically not the view of the framers of PNG’s
National Constitution, which makes custom part of the nation’s underlying law,
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which lays down as a National Goal that development should be achieved
‘primarily through the use of Papua New Guinean forms of social, political and
economic organisation’ (Section 5), and which requires all governmental bodies
(including the National Parliament) to apply and give effect to such National
Goals (Section 25(2)).
Conclusion
The underlying purpose of the East Sepik land legislation was to give effect to
the National Goals of PNG’s Constitution as they relate to customary land in the
province, in particular for development to take place primarily through the use
of Papua New Guinean forms of organisation, and for traditional communities
to remain as viable units of society. What prompted the laws was a new ‘reality’
— modern demands being put on people’s customary land36  — and the laws
are an attempt to channel the response to that new reality. As observed by Nigel
Oram, the aim of such laws is ‘to bring about a synthesis of the modern with the
traditional systems’ and ‘attempt to close the gap between Western and
indigenous systems, which are products of different cultural milieux’ (Oram
1979: 71).
Are the critics saying that these attempts by elected legislatures in PNG to
adapt to new realities and further the National Goals are never valid? If so, then
they invite the response which the pioneer Pacific anthropologist Bronislaw
Malinowski gave in 1930 to the dismissive views of the British authorities on
African systems of land and property law. Weiner himself quotes Malinowski’s
response:
It is absurd to say that such a system ‘cannot be reconciled with the
institutions or the legal ideas of civilised society’. To reconcile the two
is precisely the task of Colonial statesmanship (cited in Weiner 2000:
124).
The aim of the legislative recognition of custom, customary tenures and
customary groups is to provide a legal process which maintains their basic
character and dynamism, and enables them to adapt to new demands. ILGs in
PNG are not meant to be the actual clans or other indigenous groups, but their
legal representation.37 Weiner calls the results ‘legal transformations’ (ibid: 3),
but then judges them according to their sameness. The important question is
not ‘Are they the same?’, for they are not meant to be, but ‘How will they work?’
In other words, the attention should be on how to recognise custom, not on
36 Weiner (this volume) acknowledges the new ‘reality’ among the customary landowners in the Kutubu
project area, that the land was now valuable ‘in a way that traditional land was not’.
37  It should be noted that, upon the dissolution of an ILG, ownership of its customary land reverts to
the customary owners. The implication is that the indigenous group continues to exist, and is not
replaced by the ILG.
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whether to recognise it. As the accounts of abuses by the leaders of ILGs show,
this is a challenging task, but it should not be regarded as impossible.
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Chapter Three
Land, Customary and Non-Customary,
in East New Britain
Keir Martin
The Gazelle Peninsula of East New Britain (ENB) Province has for many years
been regarded as one of Papua New Guinea’s (PNG’s) most ‘developed’ regions,
with the village of Matupit being seen as one of the most forward-looking Tolai
villages. It was the village closest to the town of Rabaul, and by the 1970s was
regarded by many as one of its suburbs. Matupit was one of the most prosperous
villages in PNG, where Tolai people enjoyed a peri-urban lifestyle and, by PNG
standards, a comfortable standard of living. This prosperity was paid for by
wage labour in town and the cash cropping that the Tolai had successfully
developed on their customary land. This paper builds on previous anthropological
research that has addressed business and change in the Gazelle (T.S. Epstein
1968; A.L. Epstein 1969; Salisbury 1970; Bradley 1982; Fingleton 1985), by
describing tendencies that have emerged or come to new resolutions in the
resettlement and reconstruction process following the volcanic eruptions of
1994. It will examine how ongoing debates about customary land within recent
economic conditions were re-framed by Tolai in the new environment that they
found themselves in after the eruption. In policy debates over the reform of
customary land tenure in Melanesia, definitions of ‘custom’ are often left unclear
or do not cover all of the potential meanings of the word. But what even a brief
overview of patterns of land disputes at Matupit demonstrates is the number of
different ways that the word ‘custom’ or its Tok Pisin equivalent kastom is used
at a grass-roots level, forcing us to pay attention to the uses we make of key
concepts in the course of such debates.
Despite the prosperity, pressures were already developing in the time leading
up to the volcanic eruption. In contrast to the situation recorded by Smith and
Salisbury (1961), in which intra-Tolai land litigation was rare, by the early 1990s
ENB was among the leading provinces in the country in terms of the number of
registered land disputes. In particular there was a growing tension between the
matrilineal landholding clan and the increasingly important nuclear family.1
Fathers wanted to ensure that investments made on clan land passed to their
1  See Bradley (1982: 191–200) or Fingleton (1985: 58–9) regarding the increasing importance of the
nuclear family in Tolai life.
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children rather than to their clan nephews. Customary land came to be seen in
many contexts as a problem, and people were reluctant in many cases to build
new developments on it. When the ENB Provincial Government offered up five
agricultural blocks for lease to individuals before the eruption in 1994, they
were amazed to find that there were thousands of applicants. The problem,
according to John Brown, the then Advisor to the ENB Lands Division, was that
‘people felt as if they had no rights to customary land’ (Post-Courier 12 August
1999).
Free from Custom? Land at Sikut
Matupit, as the Tolai village with the highest population density and the most
extensive economic development, suffered more than most from these problems.
Many people described the eruption to me as a ‘blessing from God’, as the village
was about to explode under the pressure of disputes. It is this irony that drew
my attention — namely, that a disaster could be a divine intervention that would
transform conflictive social relations. The disaster is said to be the main reason
for the decrease in disputes, as many Matupi moved to a resettlement area at
Sikut, an area of government land alienated from the Baining people during the
colonial period. Around 200 Matupi families were each given blocks of around
three hectares. The government is adamant that this land is not ‘customary’
land, meaning that it is to be owned by individual families, not by clans, and
that each block will be inherited as property by the children of the title holder
(in most cases the husband in a nuclear family unit). This position is, on the
surface, supported by the majority of those Matupi who have relocated to Sikut.
I was struck by the number of occasions on which Sikut residents told me that
the land at Sikut was ‘better’ than Matupit land, not because it was more
productive or plentiful, but because it was not ‘customary’ land. They described
themselves as being ‘free’ from problems associated with customary ground. On
these blocks they could work hard and pass on the benefits to their children.
However, just because the land at Sikut is not ‘customary’, this does not
mean it is free from dispute. Rather, most disputes at present have a new
character, causing divisions between some blockholders and those still waiting
for blocks. Those waiting for blocks are housed on a small area of land
euphemistically referred to as the ‘care centre’, living in shacks that have been
erected out of old pieces of corrugated iron, wood, and even cardboard. People
awaiting blocks have been temporarily allocated just under one hectare of land
per family for gardening, but have been forbidden from planting cash crops
because this land has been earmarked for future use as a centre for commercial
activities and government services. The government is wary of the potentially
costly and time consuming claims for compensation that would arise if cash
crops had to be removed. Many blockholders have returned to Matupit and
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their blocks remain virgin rainforest. This has led to increasingly vocal demands
for these blocks to be forfeited and given to those still waiting in the care centre.
In my experience a majority of the Sikut community supported the forfeit
policy, as in theory did the Provincial Government Lands Division. Towards
the end of my time in Sikut a concerted effort was made by the Resettlement
Committee to get the Lands Division to authorise a mass forfeit of around 40 of
the undeveloped blocks. When these undeveloped blocks were allocated to
families living in the care centre, a series of stormy meetings took place at Sikut
during which blockholders and their supporters living at Matupit would descend
en masse. Blockholders who had been threatened with forfeit by the Resettlement
Committee turned up to ‘work’ on the block for a few weeks, as a warning to
the person to whom the block was to be allocated, before returning to Matupit.
Many other people had hoped that the official position of the Lands Division
would make this tactic impossible, but political leadership at all levels was
divided. The elected Resettlement Committee was largely in favour of the forfeit
policy, but they were opposed by most of the councillors, who went to the
Rabaul District Government to declare the Resettlement Committee null and
void. No one knew whether the Rabaul District Government or the Provincial
Government’ Land Division held authority over the land, meaning that any
forfeit policy was likely to be held up by several years of legal wrangling.
An additional problem was that no one had previously secured title to the
Sikut blocks. Most of the blocks were allocated in early 1995, with the
expectation that title would be issued to individual title holders within a year.
Yet at the start of 2004, no titles had been issued because the Provincial
Government and the Gazelle Restoration Authority did not have the money to
complete the necessary surveys. According to the Authority, this was because
World Bank regulations had consistently led to delays in funding being made
available. As a result of this situation, a lawyer who was sympathetic to the
forfeit policy informed a Sikut meeting, shortly before I left, that the forfeits
issued by the Lands Division would not stand up in court as the initial one-year
temporary titles had not been renewed. Consequently, every blockholder at
Sikut, whether resident or not, is legally regarded as a squatter, remaining on
government land with tacit approval. Only when title was issued would the
government be able to attach conditions such as block development to the
continuation of that title. In spite of this situation, the Resettlement Committee
went ahead with the forfeits and started moving people on to the blocks. In my
last week of fieldwork in ENB in February 2004, the inevitable fights were
breaking out as the original blockholders arrived to remove the newcomers.
On the surface, the current situation at Sikut may not appear to be a dispute
over custom, as both sides accept that Sikut is ‘non-customary’ land. But the
debate over forfeits has inevitably become, at least in part, a debate about the
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role of custom in land matters. Often in debates about the appropriate use of
land at Sikut the phrase ‘it’s not customary ground’ would be used as
counter-claim. It was argued by supporters of the forfeits that their opponents
(deliberately) failed to understand the difference between land that was given
by state licence, whose continued ownership was contingent upon development
of that land, and customary land that was held by clans by virtue of an
inalienable right, or kakalei (Epstein 1969: 131). In these arguments the word
‘custom’ was used in an entirely negative sense as the alleged recourse of those
who were too ‘lazy’ to develop their state land. The opponents of the forfeit
policy did not ever claim to consider Sikut to be customary land, but some of
their counter-arguments did draw on practices that most people would consider
to be customary. Part of the rationale of the resettlement program was the
anticipation that blocks would be developed in the bush at Sikut so that, in the
event of another eruption, the displaced people of Matupit would be able to go
and stay on blocks at Sikut that they had developed, or with kin who had
developed blocks. This was because it was custom among the Tolai to go and
stay with kin and seek assistance from them in times of need. The original
distribution of Sikut blocks followed the council ward divisions of Matupit,
meaning that there was a tendency for members of certain clans or people who
had other close customary kinship relations to be situated near to each other.
This pattern was arguably put at risk by forfeits that gave priority to residents
of the care centre, and this is what prompted objections from some opponents
of the forfeit who argued that breaking such patterns jeopardised customary
networks of assistance in case of emergency. They argued that if forfeits were
truly necessary then the blocks should be given to relatives of the original
blockholders to preserve these networks. Although it is accepted that the land
is not customary, according to this argument it is still important to take custom
into account in the governance of this land.
This kind of argument was not just made by opponents of the forfeits. The
wave of forfeits that occurred towards the end of my first fieldwork period was
spearheaded by ToPirit, the chair of the Resettlement Committee. At the meeting
in Sikut at which he announced that the forfeits were going ahead, Pirit raised
another issue, namely the need to correct the inequity that had occurred in the
case of large families, where the men had all been given blocks but their sisters
had not. Later Pirit told me that the purpose of trying to ensure that sisters also
received blocks was to keep clans together. In addition, he was concerned that
the young men of the clan would become angry if there were no road open to
them to inherit land. More important, however, was his concern to keep the
clan together as a kind of social security network. He acknowledged that some
people at Sikut said that the clan should become a thing of the past, and that
individual families should be self-sufficient. However, he believed that this kind
of ‘Western’ self-sufficiency would never be an option for most Papua New
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Guineans, and that even those people who had told me they would not help
their nephews would still feel obliged to do so if pushed. Pirit felt that the
continuation of this kind of custom was still going to be essential for years to
come, and he saw tweaking the land tenure system as a means of encouraging
its survival. He argued that this would ensure that people lived close to at least
some members of their own clan and to other people who had been ‘fathered’
by their clan, thus ensuring that these relationships were of daily importance
to them and strengthening the bonds of reciprocal assistance. Again, although
the non-customary nature of the land is asserted, it is combined with a concern
that the way non-customary land is administered can help to preserve at least
some elements of what is considered to be customary.
Does Custom Hold Back Development, or Is It ‘Fading’?
The widespread enthusiasm of Sikut residents for the new land as ‘freeing’ them
from the obligations, constraints and disputes inherent in customary land, is
taken by some politicians and government officials as evidence that a more
general reform of customary tenure would act as a spur to development. There
has indeed been significant investment and development in some of the blocks.
Some blockholders have planted thousands of cocoa trees and are anticipating
an income of several thousand kina a month (dependent of course on price
fluctuations and crop success). Yet we must add some caveats to this development
success story. Individual tenure requires the state to have the resources and will
to support it if tenure is to be more than a piece of paper. The inability of the
state in ENB to provide title even after 10 years, and the lack of clarity as to
which of the competing arms of government has jurisdiction at Sikut, has directly
led to the under-utilisation of large amounts of Sikut land. People who have
been allocated blocks more recently are wary of putting too much effort into
developing the land as they have seen others lose their blocks to the original
landholders.
An example that illustrates the shaky basis of government jurisdiction is the
road access to the blocks at Sikut, where one of the two main roads is only sealed
half way. This is because, in 1995, despite warnings to the contrary, one of the
blockholders planted cocoa seedlings close to the edge of his block. When the
time came for the road to be sealed, he demanded several hundred kina in
compensation from the Division of Works, which was going to remove his
seedlings so that the road could be sealed. Exasperated by the prospect of wasting
years and thousands of kina on legal action, the Provincial Government
reallocated the money to another resettlement scheme. As a consequence, the
blocks further away from the centre of Sikut are now serviced by a dirt track.
Buses refuse to traverse the dirt track as the damages result in prohibitive costs
for spare parts. Blockholders cannot afford to hire vehicles to take their cocoa
to selling points, with the result that these blocks are among the least developed
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in the resettlement area. In theory, as this was government land, not customary
land, the government could have removed the cocoa seedlings and continued
with the road development. In reality, however, they could not afford the legal
costs nor have the police tied up in resolving this situation. This example
illustrates the difficulties facing the government in enforcing requirements for
project development on land over which they have title, and that leaves serious
doubt over the government’s ability to enforce tenure reform on customary
ground.
It is also worth bearing in mind that individual title, in and of itself, does
not free one from the demands of kin or from customary obligations that many
see as a disincentive to development. While extensive development has occurred
at Sikut, no one has planted their entire three hectares with cash crops and food;
the maximum planting level has been around two hectares. The reason frequently
given for partial block plantings is the need to avoid constant requests for
assistance or the risk of being victimised as a result of jealousy. With increased
plantings, relatives calculate the future gains from produce sold and hence
increase demands for assistance. As one blockholder put it, ‘if they see me
harvesting all the time and I don’t give to some people they can do some things
to my block and my cocoa won’t bear fruit’. Although this problem is not as
bad as it was 20 or 30 years ago, several informants told me that people who
consistently refuse requests can end up dead or injured because of sorcery that
is nearly always inflicted by jealous siblings or cousins. The previous chair of
the Resettlement Committee (before Pirit) was one of the few who consistently
attacked this belief about family interference, yet his credibility in the village
in this respect was undermined by chronic arthritis in his left leg, which was
seen by many as being caused by the jealousy of someone having magical power.
Most important of all, the granting of individual title will not guarantee
against the re-emergence of tenure practices that many would describe as
‘customary’. There is a precedent for this in ENB. In the 1950s, the Australian
Administration released several large blocks of land at Wudal for lease to
individuals from Tolai villages near Rabaul. These leases came with the guarantee
of individual title and a policy that the land was to be inherited by the next of
kin — ideally the children of the blockholder. In most cases, however, the land
stayed within the blockholder’s clan, often passing on to his sisters’ sons, as
would be the case with customary land. Although the majority of Tolai are
adamant that this is ‘new land’, and it is morally right that the children of the
blockholder who had put in all the hard work of development should inherit it,
the strength of kinship ties makes it hard to refuse nephews of one’s own clan
when they ask to be allowed to help out on the block and plant a section of it
for themselves. In such situations, when there are many working the land, it is
even harder to remove them. In most cases the nephews have ended up in
possession of the block after the death of the original blockholder. In theory,
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they could be legally removed. In practice, however, it is a process that can take
decades and cost thousands of kina, which is not a realistic option for most Tolai.
A plaintiff would probably have to wait several years before the case was heard
by a local land court, and any case heard in a local land court would be liable
to appeal in a higher court. There are three blocks at Wudal that were given to
Matupi. Of these, two are now inhabited by nephews of the same clan as the
blockholder. In only one case have the children managed to assert their legal
right to inherit the title.2
Many Sikut residents will argue that Tolai society has changed since the
1960s. They argue that the nuclear family is stronger today, and that the large
numbers of people at Sikut (compared to Wudal) will make it possible for a
culture to emerge in which demands by clan nephews will be easier to resist.
Although people never refused to recognise their nephews, I observed many
occasions on which clear boundaries were drawn around the relationship —
especially the nephews’ rights to come and stay on the block for extended
periods. This is important as traditionally, in the matrilineal system, the
relationship between a boy and his maternal uncle was seen as being in many
contexts more important than a boy’s relationship to his father, and uncles and
nephews were expected to spend as much time as possible together. Now the
fear of a land grab means that uncles try to limit this relationship and the amount
of time that nephews spend on their block. Many people held strong views about
this, including one Sikut blockholder working at one of the big mines elsewhere
in PNG:
Now custom is fading away. What happened at Wudal won’t happen
here. Sometimes the nephews do just take over. But that can’t happen
now. You’ve got no right to come and just grab the land from my family.
Why do I have to grow my kids? Why do I have to settle some place?
This custom from the past is no good. Our ground is clan ground, but
my ground is my ground automatically. I will never give it to the clan
— no way. This kind of thinking is just for the old or the ancestors, now
we’ve been to school we’ve got better ideas. If I develop this ground
with my children? With my sweat? I’m just going to come and let the
nephews kick them off?! No way. Not now! Why should I bother getting
married? This kind of thinking is bloody rubbish and bullshit from
before … The nephews won’t be able to put demands on the kids just
because the father was the same clan. It’s different now. The kids will
be able to get a bush knife and chase them away! My kids haven’t seen
a cousin come and help, and if they come and ask, I’ll tell them no way.
If the nephews take over, the people today see it’s no good. You’re
2  Fingleton (1985) gives a fuller discussion of the emergence of this tendency in the resettlements of
the 1960s.
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making the man’s family suffer. If I behaved like this on clan land, of
course there would be talk, and yes at Wudal it happened, but this
generation we’ve seen it’s not good. Because the father raised the
children. The father planted the cocoa. It’s not the nephews’. It’s not
the clan’s.
I was continually struck by the strength with which these feelings were
expressed at Sikut. Although there were some who felt that customary tenure
would re-establish itself as it seemed to have done at Wudal, they were a clear
minority. Although it is early days, in the majority of cases where blocks have
been transferred as a result of death or choice it has gone to the original holders’
children or other relatives outside the clan. Perhaps the most vitriolic dispute
that I encountered at Sikut was between a sister and brother. The block was in
the name of the mother, who initially allowed her daughter to live on the block.
Several years later she decided to remove the daughter and give the block to
her son. This action was believed to be motivated by an intense dislike of her
daughter’s husband. As the daughter and her husband had planted hundreds
of cocoa seedlings and erected a permanent house, the mother’s actions led to a
very heated dispute. Without going into the details of the dispute, many Sikut
residents remarked that the mother’s original arrangement would have ensured
that the land stayed in her clan for the next two generations. By attempting to
remove her daughter and replace her with a son, she was, in one person’s words,
‘giving the land away’. Many Sikut residents saw her actions as evidence of a
new attitude developing towards kinship and land tenure on state land.
Buying and Selling Land at Matupit: Can Customary Land
Be Alienated?
If the allegedly individual and discrete nature of blockholdings at Sikut is
potentially complicated by the tendency of customary ways of thinking and
acting to creep back in, then it is perhaps also the case that ownership of
customary land back at Matupit has also been complicated by Tolai responses
to new economic circumstances. Debates around land tenure in this part of ENB
have long centered on the issue of patrilineal versus matrilineal transfer of rights,
with many associating patrilineality with a positive move towards ‘modern’ land
tenure systems. Most of PNG, however, is classified by anthropologists as having
‘patrilineal’ customary land tenure. What is fundamentally at stake in these
debates is an argument about the alleged economic advantages of removing
interests in land from cycles of ongoing customary obligation and reciprocal
social relations, and instead making land the alienable property of individual
persons or household units. In the matrilineal Gazelle, the distinction between
matrilineal and patrilineal inheritance has understandably largely come to stand
for this debate, with a shift to patrilineality representing the removal of
clan-based reciprocal obligations. However, the ways in which Matupi negotiate
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these tensions today show that characterising land as customary or non-customary
is a far from simple matter.
At Matupit today a large proportion of houses are built on purchased land.
It is particularly common for fathers to buy land from their own clan to overcome
the problems that will arise between their children and their nephews if they
build permanent houses on their own clan land. The buying and selling of
customary ground is in theory illegal in PNG, unless the buying and selling can
be shown to be a customary practice. The custom of ‘buying’ ground is known
among the Tolai as kulia. However, Bill Epstein, who conducted fieldwork at
Matupit in the early 1960s, was keen to stress that kulia does not neatly equate
with the Western idea of an alienable commodity transaction, noting that, ‘[t]he
indigenous concept of kul then is translated by the term purchase only at the
risk of serious misrepresentation’ (Epstein 1969: 132). Epstein devotes some
attention to what distinguishes kulia from Western ideas of buying and selling,
as for him the different nature of this transaction is key to illuminating the ways
in which Tolai customary land tenure differs from Western property regimes.
In the indigenous system land was not a commodity. Transfers of land
were not conducted according to the principles of the market; rather
they were effected between parties who saw themselves as already linked
by social bonds, and when land was exchanged in return for tambu it
was usually in recognition of the obligations of kinship or other
customary claims … the payment demanded in tambu was also small.
This remains the position today in regard to ‘sales’ of land within the
village, where the sums involved in cash and tambu fall very far short
of the market value (ibid).
Two reasons are given here for why kulia should not be considered equivalent
to Western commodity transactions. First, there is the nature of the bonds
preceding the transaction, implying that kulia should be seen as a part of an
ongoing cycle of customary obligation rather than as a stand-alone purchase of
alienable property. Second, the low level of payment, ‘short of the market value’,
is provided as evidence that the payment is ‘in recognition of … customary
claims’ rather than an outright purchase.3
The conclusion that Epstein draws from this state of affairs is that the kakalei
or ‘claim’ to the land ‘remains vested in the vendor lineage’ (Epstein 1969: 104).
This non-alienability of claims in the land is a key difference between Tolai
customary land and Western landed property.4  I have been told that in the past
3 These two observations are backed up by Fingleton in his (1985) study of land tenure at the nearby
Tolai village of Rakunat during the mid 1980s.
4  See Mauss (1970) and Gregory (1982) for key discussions of the central importance of the
non-alienability of objects in Melanesian societies in contrast to Western conceptions of alienable
property.
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there would often be expectations that the land might return to the vendors at
some point after the death of the buyers, that they would be considered to have
an ongoing relationship with the piece of ground, and that if the ‘purchasers’
failed to be suitably attentive to their ongoing customary obligations to the
vendors then it would be commonplace for the vendors to find a way to reclaim
the land. However, even by the early 1960s, Epstein had identified trends that
were taking kulia away from this customary ideal. First, the increasing number
of land deals with the colonial administration and the large amounts of money
involved meant that the clan elders who controlled the land were ‘now
encouraged to think of land increasingly as a commodity’ (Epstein 1969: 132).
The young men who protested at many of these deals were essentially claiming
that the elders ‘had no power to dispose of the land so as to remove it from the
sphere of Tolai social relationships and customary obligations’ (ibid). Second,
cash cropping meant that ‘many Tolai are beginning to find it necessary to think
of land as a commodity even in transactions among themselves’ (ibid). Epstein
cites the example of a young man who bought a plot of customary land in the
village of Napapar to plant cocoa. When his cocoa was ready to bear fruit, they
reclaimed the land. Epstein concludes that ‘[f]or him, as for many Tolai, the
traditional system of land tenure was beginning to reveal its limitations in
meeting the needs of contemporary situations’ (ibid: 133).
Today, I would argue that although kulia retains features that distinguish it
from the purest ideal of commodity transaction, it has continued to change in
many respects. Radin (1996) suggests that what is referred to as ‘commodification’
is necessarily an incomplete process, and whether a thing, transaction, or
relationship should be viewed as a commodity is therefore a matter of degree,
rather than an ‘either/or’ distinction. In my opinion, changes to kulia over the
past 40 years can be usefully looked at in this way. Parties to the transaction
will tend to be involved in ongoing customary relationships, as almost everyone
at Matupit is involved in customary relations with everyone else anyway.
Fingleton notes that the flexibility of relations in the village makes it easy to
construct customary ties that legitimise a kulia transaction: ‘no land transaction
may be mounted without a pre-existing link between the parties, but the
relativity of Tolai concepts of group corporateness and kinship facilitates the
establishment of a connection between willing people’ (Fingleton 1985: 211).
This means that even outsiders with no history of relationship to the community
can buy land in the village through the creation of customary ties. Although I
was unable to observe the purchase of any land during my time at Matupit, I
was told that it was not hard to accomplish. Even as early as the 1960s a number
of settlers from the Sepik area had bought land on the edge of Matupit, and their
descendants were still living there when I was doing fieldwork. Fingleton makes
a convincing case that this plasticity of customary relations is an example of the
inherent flexibility of customary tenure that makes it better adapted to rapidly
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changing social relations than fixed Western property law. From a theoretical
angle however, this inexhaustible flexibility can be problematic, because if
customary culture is so flexible that it can encompass any kind of relationship
then it is at risk of becoming a tautological concept that defines and prescribes
nothing.
I found that there were regular disputes as to how customary some
manifestations of custom really are, the most frequent examples being criticisms
of economically powerful ‘big-shots’ for ‘commercialising’ custom. Custom is at
least partly judged by whether or not one’s actions are considered to be
embedded in and constitutive of the kind of customary reciprocal relations that
Epstein’s young men accused the elders of abandoning by selling land to the
Australians. Even if one performs custom as a set of rules perfectly, one’s actions
can be considered to be fundamentally non-customary when judged on this
basis. This contrast between custom based on ongoing reciprocal obligations,
and Western social life as being based on business transactions, although far
from exhausting the multivalent possibilities of the word ‘custom’ or kastom,
was an often repeated and important part of the definition. If Radin is correct
to say that commodification is a necessarily incomplete process, and Gregory
(1982: 23), drawing on Sahlins, is correct in arguing that, ‘the distinction between
gift exchange and commodity exchange should not be seen as a bipolar opposition
but rather as the extreme points of a continuum’, then the networks of social
relations that go into making up a transaction can be viewed from more than
one angle, and indeed often are viewed as part of a process of assessing the
morality of these transactions.
The danger in simply describing the ease with which customary relations
can be created to make kulia possible is that this can assume what it seeks to
demonstrate — namely, the fundamental difference between kulia as a customary
practice and standard Western property transactions as an empirical ‘bipolar
opposition’. Just as it is possible for Matupi to view the involvement of big-shots
in custom from an angle that declares it to be non-reciprocal and therefore not
truly customary, it is also possible that customary links which are so easily and
flexibly contracted can be seen from certain angles as a kind of preparation for
a kulia transaction that now looks more like a purchase. Kulia may be formally
the same as before, but its increasing relative weight and degree of finality may
make it appear, in certain indigenous descriptions at least, more like a commodity
transaction for which the preceding transactions are preparatory work, rather
than part of an ongoing cycle of customary reciprocity. Certainly the description
of how custom can ‘hide’ the true value of a transaction suggests that this is one
possible indigenous perspective from which kulia can be described today. Some
transactions sit so clearly towards one or the other of Gregory’s two poles that
the scope for different perspectives to be taken on them is severely limited, but
others are more ambiguous. I would not argue, against Fingleton and others,
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that kulia is a commodity transaction and therefore that Tolai think of land in
the same way as Australians. Rather, my argument is that kulia is not simply an
uncomplicated customary transaction, but can also be viewed as embodying
other, less customary, more commodity-oriented ethics. Changes over the past
40 years, while not totally ‘commodifying’ the transaction (and by implication
Tolai attitudes towards land), have moved it further towards that pole of the
spectrum by creating more situations in which Tolai find it fruitful to describe
land in property/commodity terms. This is perhaps the very process by which
partial commodification occurs.
Epstein and Fingleton (especially the latter) do not just stress the importance
of establishing customary connections prior to kulia, but also the maintenance
and continued recognition of these links after the transaction. For example, after
noting the flexibility with which customary connections legitimising kulia may
be created, Fingleton goes on to say that:
the connection, however, whether direct or indirect, forms the basis of
the land transaction. It characterises the tenure thereby gained, so that
its security remains indefinitely dependent upon maintenance of the
formative connection (Fingleton 1985: 211).
Although it is the case that there is still a tendency for kulia to be transacted
between persons or groups who were already strongly linked — as when a man
buys from his own clan on behalf of his children — I found no evidence that
kulia transactions tend to strengthen the connections, and in some cases there
is little or no ongoing relationship.
One of my closest acquaintances built his house on land that he bought from
the last male representative of one of Matupit’s major landholding clans. This
purchase was made in 1983, and to my knowledge the purchaser has had no
ongoing customary relationship with the vendor, and would give him very short
shrift if he came to ask for favours or gifts on the basis of his ancestral links with
the land upon which the purchaser has built his house, which is something that
vendor is wont to do with some people to whom he has sold land. What is
interesting is the attitude of the majority of Matupi to requests such as this.
Most people say that it is dishonest as it is an attempt to get money ‘twice for
land that you have already sold’. In many contexts in contemporary PNG, such
as negotiations with a mining company, landowners are keen to demand the
establishment of an ongoing and more customary relationship that goes beyond
single payments because of the other party’s long-term presence on the land.
Amongst Matupi, however, the idea that a transfer of land can be a way of
legitimising such demands is treated with near-universal incomprehension or
repulsion. It is clear that Papua New Guineans do not view land transfers
according to a logic of inexorable commodification, or according to an unchanging
cultural logic of inalienability, but instead are as capable as any other group of
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people of judging (or disputing) that different kinds of transactions are morally
appropriate in different contexts.
Registration of Landownership and Transfer
How do Tolai people now respond to the statement made by Epstein that kakalei
remains with the vendor clan even after kulia (sale). In 2002–04, the response
was universally one of incredulity. People would assert that of course kakalei
can be transferred, there would be no point in buying something if you didn’t
receive the kakalei. This would sometimes be followed by the suggestion any
statement to the contrary must be the work of crooked old men who want to
get money twice for the same piece of land. Epstein notes that sale by kulia never
gives secure ownership as it only takes one member of the vendor clan to stand
up a couple of years later, and claim not to have been consulted, for the sale to
be undone (Epstein 1969: 131–2). Epstein implies that this is one of the ways in
which kakalei remains with the vendor clan, like the case in which the purchaser
is remiss in maintaining an ongoing customary relationship with the vendor
after the kulia transaction. Today, this ‘problem’ has been partially resolved by
a practice that has evolved over the past 30 years, of witnessing the purchase
with a statutory declaration which all adult members of the vendor clan must
sign before the deal is finalised.
The practice of witnessing purchase with a statutory declaration started in
this part of ENB under the Australian Administration in the early 1970s, although
T.S. Epstein’s fieldnotes include government records of land purchases in the
much less ‘developed’ Tolai village of Rapitok during the late 1950s.5  According
to Jessep (1980: 123–4), the recording of land sales in ENB was ‘apparently valued
for the documentary evidence of the sale and the publicity of the payment made
at the office’. Fitzpatrick (1983: 19) cites Tolai evidence in support of a wider
argument about PNG in the 1970s:
Unofficial and semi-official land registers … had emerged … [U]nofficial
transfers of land as a commodity were taking place between members of
different groups. Various operative strategies had developed to restrict
the range of obligations effective in succession to land, to increase
individual control over the process and to confine transmitted rights
more to the nuclear family or a favoured son. Nor were these trends
without suggestive precedent in the customary base … With the
extension of cash-cropping after the second world war … there emerged
a greater awareness of land as having a reified value and greater, and
effective, pressure for more clearly defined individual rights in land.
5 T.S. Epstein’s fieldnotes are held in the Mandeville Special Collections Library at the University of
California, San Diego.
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I was often told that if you have ‘the paper’ (meaning the statutory
declaration), then you are safe. One old man explained to me that ‘before we did
not know how to buy and sell properly; now that we have the paper, we have
more save (knowledge)’. This clearly indicates the perception that the nature of
kulia has changed over the years. In this context, as one person described it to
me, ‘papers’ do have power to ‘strengthen’ the practice of buying ground, and
this is part of the process that Tolai have developed in response to their perceived
need to secure land that they were buying for their children. Hence, paper ‘kills
the talk’ on a piece of ground — at least between the selling clan and the buyer
— although there is always the option for a third party to claim that the vendors
never had the right to sell the ground in the first place.
I have no personal experience of the selling clan reclaiming land from a buyer
who had a statutory declaration. Of course a registration can be misleading to
the outside observer, conflating a number of reciprocal customary obligations
into one simple transaction (Fingleton 1985: 184–6). However, registration of
the purchase transaction, in Matupit at least, does seem to set a kind of seal on
the land transfer, making it harder for alleged oversights in the recognition of
ongoing obligations to be used to overturn the transaction. Even if, in many
cases, land transfers are unimaginable without a preceding history of relationships
and anticipation of ongoing relations, the act of registration does seem to give
the transfer a degree of separation from these relations.
The use of statutory declarations is now semi-officially recognised by the
Provincial Government: the Lands Division keeps copies of all land purchase
statutory declarations and has also put in place official guidelines for the practice.
All reports of the origin of this practice claim that its impetus came from the
village not the government. According to Fingleton (1985: 181-2), the practice
began in Rakunat as a continuation of an aborted attempt by the colonial
government to register land in the 1960s, and was carried out by the villagers
themselves in order to secure land transfers, not as part of a government plan
to reform customary land practices. As he puts it, ‘[t]he most important changes
in … land tenure … are those which occurred internally, in transactions within
the village community which continued the process of adjustment to changing
land demands’ (ibid: 178). This is an important point because great attention is
often paid to a history of unsuccessful state-driven changes in land tenure
imposed upon an unwilling population, as it was in the case of the Gazelle
Peninsula (ibid: iii). This ethnographic description fits into what has become a
wider theoretical concern in recent years, namely the ways in which the state
needs to organise its subjects and their practices in ways that enable it to ‘see’
and therefore govern them more efficiently (Scott 1998). It is understandable if
this history is emphasised to counter the misguided arguments of those who
suggest that Western nations should use their disproportionate economic power
to force Melanesian nations into land tenure reform. But it is also important to
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acknowledge that, in an engagement with the global economy in certain contexts,
Melanesians are bound to explore the possibility of different ways of transacting
land, and that sometimes they will seek the support of the state in making these
more secure. To acknowledge that it is just as possible for the state’s subjects to
be recognised in a manner that fits their needs, as it is for the state to demand
that its subjects be organised in a manner that makes it possible for the state to
‘see’ them, should in no way be taken as an endorsement of overarching schemes
to revolutionise village life through legislative action. Quite the opposite: it
shows the importance of a careful ethnographic attention to the different details
of processes of contested commodification as they occur in different
circumstances.
Land that is transacted by this process is still legally considered to be
customary land, and although the purchaser, if a man, has the right to pass it
on to his children, in the next generation it must follow matrilineal principles.6
For this reason Matupi will tend to refer to even ‘purchased’ land at Matupit as
customary land, largely in contradistinction to their land at Sikut. However,
they are also clearly aware that the custom of kulia and its relationship to wider
networks of customary obligation has changed in some respects in the past 40
years. Land disputes at Matupit are not as widespread as they were in the years
leading up to the volcanic eruption of 1994, but it was notable that not one of
the cases I observed was an attempt by vendors to overturn a land sale that had
been registered, and I was told by most Matupi that any such attempt would be
fruitless. The Lands Division and the majority of Matupi clearly view kulia today
as a transaction that implies the complete alienation of all rights in a piece of
land from one group to another. Epstein’s claim that ‘the estate vested by a
“purchase” is always regarded as inferior to a kakalei’ (Epstein 1969: 131, my
emphasis) has, at the very least, been complicated by changes to Tolai kulia over
the past 40 years.
With regard to ‘market value’, I conducted a village household survey and
discovered that the average ‘price’ paid for a house had hardly risen at all in the
past 40 years. This was in contrast to the prices of other essentials, such as
imported foodstuff and materials used to build permanent houses, which had
risen dramatically. Although what constitutes ‘market value’ is hard to ascertain
in an environment such as Matupit, prices as low as K50–100 (equivalent to the
cost of two cartons of beer) seems good value for the outright purchase of a plot
of land on which one is going to build a house that will cost thousands of kina.
This stability seems to bear out Epstein’s original observations about the
non-commodity nature of customary land transactions at Matupit, and to cast
6 This means that it will most likely go to the children of the purchaser’s daughters, so if a man buys
land from his own clan for his children, the land passes from his own matriline to a section of his wife’s
matriline.
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doubt on his prediction that trends were emerging in village life that were going
to push land transactions in a more commodified direction. Matupi offered a
number of explanations for the relative stability of land prices. One was that
land had for a long time been a part of the customary system, although that
answer was always accompanied by a caveat that this was changing and that
prices for land were starting to rise. Indeed, I was often told that the volcano
had stopped an anticipated explosion in land prices, just as it had stopped the
explosion of land disputes. Another response was that many of the prices that
I had been given during the course of my village survey were most likely
exaggerated as many of the prices were much higher than I had been led to
believe. People would publicly ‘buy’ the land for a small amount of money, but
behind the scenes, hundreds or even thousands of kina (or equivalents) would
change hands. The larger amounts would be kept secret. It is worth pointing
out that there were some at Matupit who angrily denied that such a thing could
happen, but the very suggestion demonstrated an awareness on the part of some
Matupi that there was something of a contradiction here. On the one hand, the
legal registration of a seemingly commercial transaction can mask a web of
customary obligations; on the other hand, the low monetary value of a seemingly
customary transaction can mask a commercial exchange of greater value. Indeed,
a few people told me that custom was a means for ‘hiding’ the value of a land
purchase, once again demonstrating that seemingly customary transactions are
capable of being viewed from a commercial perspective if one wants to cast them
in a certain moral light. We are familiar, in Melanesian ethnography, with a
position that stresses how relationships that have seemingly been Westernised
or commodified are, on closer examination, still based on a customary ethic of
reciprocity. This is undoubtedly often true, but perhaps in stressing such
moments we sometimes lose sight of the logical corollary — situations in which
what on the surface appears customary and reciprocal can simultaneously embody
the opposite ethical values. The ways in which Matupi discuss the
‘commercialisation’ of custom demonstrates that they have certainly not lost
sight of these possibilities.
As well, there are tendencies emerging at Matupit today that suggest a more
openly commercial attitude towards land sales. During my last visit to Matupit
I interviewed a village councillor about land sales in his ward. He told me of a
woman who had sold three separate plots of land for houses in the village on
behalf of her clan section in the past year. Instead of the one- or two-hundred
kina standard land sale price on my village survey, she had sold land for K2–3000,
a price much closer to the amount that similar plots would receive on the
commercial market in Rabaul. The councillor stressed that such price rises were
the result of land registration, and that meant that the purchase was secure.
From the point of view of the state and Matupi themselves, although the land
remained customary, in contradistinction to the land at Sikut for example, it
54
Customary Land Tenure and Registration in Australia and Papua New Guinea
clearly does not live up to certain ideals of custom as these are expressed in
many ethnographic and indigenous accounts.
The performance of customary ritual has always been of great importance to
people’s rights to reside on certain pieces of land. A man wishing to stay on his
father’s clan land after his death would pay close attention to helping his father’s
clan in custom, in particular distributing large amounts of customary shell-wealth
on his death. Even someone residing on his own clan land would not expect
residence by right, but would be expected to help in custom. Someone remiss
in their customary obligations would bring shame on the clan and would likely
be given the worst pieces of ground to live and garden upon. Today the picture
is slightly different. The declining power of the big men in the clan means that
complaints about young men simply building a house on clan land without
consultation with elders of the clan are not uncommon. Members of the Matupi
community at Sikut have begun performing customary practices from Matupit,
such as the namata, a kind of initiation for the first-born son of a family. One
of the minority of Matupi who hoped for a return to openly full-blooded
‘customary’ land tenure at Sikut told me that this emergence of custom at Sikut
was a sign that his hopes would be realised, just as had happened at Wudal. He
was also of the view that the Provincial Government’s attempt to remove
customary clan relations from land tenure at Sikut was a continuation of the
Australian Administration’s attempts to ‘turn us into white men’ when they
tried to enforce patrilineal nuclear family inheritance at Wudal. For most Sikut
residents, however, the extent to which the performance of custom heralds the
re-emergence of customary land tenure is not clear. As one young male resident
at Sikut explained to me in October 2002: ‘When you do custom at Matupit you
are concerned with land. When you do custom here it is custom only (tasol).’
He further argued that many Matupit residents who had been heavily involved
in custom before they got blocks at Sikut were now involved in the bare
minimum required for social respectability. Now that they had their own land,
they no longer felt the need to keep the clan happy by performing custom.
Whatever the future holds at Sikut, these examples show that there are
problems in defining land as customary or non-customary, and that these may
sometimes be overlooked in policy debates. The land at Wudal is still formally
regarded by the state as non-customary land, yet it is widely acknowledged to
be land where ‘custom has come back in’ to the extent that many people describe
it as ‘like customary land’ or even as ‘customary land’. The increasing
performance of custom at Sikut, along with trends to acknowledge the importance
of customary relations on non-customary land, may well have effects on land
use and occupation. The question is how much effect will it have, and how much
will be necessary for the inhabitants to acknowledge that the land has become
de facto customary. Conversely, the land bought and sold by kulia at Matupit
is still in the eyes of both the state and Matupit ‘customary’, yet it is described
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in ways that make it appear less customary, according to certain glosses of the
word ‘custom’, than would have been the case 40 years ago. Custom is as much
a position taken on the morality of certain transactions as it is an empirical
description of a juridical process to be preserved or reformed in the interests of
national development.
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Chapter Four
Clan-Finding, Clan-Making and the
Politics of Identity in a Papua New
Guinea Mining Project
Dan Jorgensen
At Independence in 1975 the famously diverse peoples of Papua New Guinea
(PNG) became citizens of a country without any particular sense of national
identity apart from an unevenly shared colonial history. Creating such an identity
was one of the tasks the state felt obliged to shoulder from the beginning, and
adopting the language of tradition was one means of doing so. While there is a
rhetoric of localised ‘custom’ (kastam) in popular discourse, the state takes care
to package its version of tradition as a bundle of values specific to no particular
place but putatively shared by all. Dubbed the ‘Melanesian Way’ (Narokobi
1980), this generic tradition forms the basis of a post-colonial ideology that seeks
to consolidate or overlook differences in the interests of creating a national
culture (Philibert 1986, Otto 1997).1
Much has been written about the formation of national cultures in the Pacific
(for example: Keesing 1989; LiPuma 1995; Wanek 1996: 111–33), and I do not
intend to add to this literature here. Instead, I am more interested in examining
what happens when the state’s ideas about tradition enter into policy and its
implementation. In particular, I wish to show how the articulation of the ideology
of tradition with local practices turns on the twin issues of legibility and
recognition, and how this conjunction plays out in the formation of local
identities.
In his book, Seeing Like a State, Scott (1998) argues that a precondition for
the implementation of state plans is the establishment of what he calls ‘legibility’.
Legibility enables systematic state intervention in the affairs of its citizens, and
creating legibility entails state simplifications of social practices in the form of
a standard grid whereby these can be recorded and monitored. Originating from
above and from the centre, legibility requires the invention of units — citizens,
trees, houses, villages, and so on — that are rendered visible in the interests of
1  In this respect the official discourse on PNG tradition differs from the notion of adat (custom), as
elaborated by the Dutch in Indonesia, by taking pains to avoid features that would distinguish one set
of citizens from another — a fact that has an unexpected relevance for the matters discussed here.
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control. The reciprocal of legibility from the point of view of those affected by
state projects is recognition. Recognition turns upon the ways in which a state’s
citizens make themselves visible to the state in a way that gives them some
purchase on the state’s decisions and operations.
With the issues of legibility and recognition in mind, I begin this paper with
a brief account of tradition as formulated in PNG national discourse, drawing
attention to certain of its more important ideological characteristics. I move from
this to a consideration of the ways in which official tradition takes shape as
policy with regard to the resource development projects that have become such
a prominent feature of recent PNG history. I then turn to the examination of the
dynamics of legibility and recognition in the context of a particular mining
project and how these figure in the production of new identities. Finally, I
conclude with a short survey of what we know about similar processes elsewhere
before offering some observations on what this tells us about the role of
state-formulated tradition as a guide to determining rights in land for the purpose
of concluding mining agreements.
Development, The Melanesian Way, and The Eight Aims
Whatever PNG lacked by way of common tradition at Independence was more
than made up by an enthusiasm for development (developmen) in all regions of
the country, and many of the new state’s claims to legitimacy were based on
promises that all Papua New Guineans could expect development to come their
way. If one were to ask where the Melanesian Way led, the answer would be,
to development, but on authentic Papua New Guinean terms. While short on
specifics, the notion of a Melanesian path to development did more than simply
espouse an essentialised identity based on values of community and the continued
viability of tradition: it claimed modernity as a Melanesian project. Thus the
end of Australian rule did not mean the end of the prospects of development
that had figured so prominently in Australia’s own justification of its tenure in
PNG, and dreams awakened in the colonial era would not vanish, even if the
colonialists did.
In attempting to reconcile generic notions of tradition with modernist hopes,2
the ideology of the Melanesian Way also grappled with one of the worries that
preoccupied planners and politicians in the state’s early days, namely, the tension
between egalitarian goals and the reality that development often produces
inequality. A solution adopted by the Constitutional Planning Committee was
to turn the platitudes of the Melanesian Way into policy guidelines in the
formulation of the ‘Eight Aims’ (or Eight Point Plan). Widely publicised (for
example, Somare 1974) and incorporated into the Constitution, the Eight Aims
set forth principles meant to guide development through the use of ‘Papua New
2 What Geertz (1973: 240–1) described as the essentialism-epochalism dilemma.
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Guinean methods’. Espousing a populist egalitarian ethos, the document calls
for
more equal distribution of economic benefits, including movement toward
equalisation of incomes among people and toward equalisation of services
among different areas of the country … [and] an emphasis on small-scale
artisan, service, and business activity, relying where possible on typically
Papua New Guinean forms of organization (CPC 1974 cited in Fitzpatrick
1980: 203).
Critics have been quick to point out the romanticised myths underlying this
ideology (Filer 1990: 9), and many have noted its tendency to mask growing
inequalities between rural people and the national elite (Fitzpatrick 1980: 202ff).
It is, however, fair to say that the early post-Independence era was marked by
an attempt to realise the romantic ideal by implementing these principles in
terms of a ‘small is beautiful’ development policy.
Under the aegis of this commitment to agrarian populism, the state launched
a series of schemes promoting rural smallholder production. Such policies did
little to generate the revenues needed to finance government programs, however,
and a World Bank report in the late 1970s laid the groundwork for a major shift
towards capital-intensive enclave projects to develop the country's mineral
resources. From the beginning of the 1980s onwards, the state’s development
strategy mandated the inauguration of numerous mining projects that were to
become the mainstay of the national economy.3
Mining, Tradition, and Legibility
The shift to large-scale mining development marked a departure from the
egalitarian program of the Eight Aims, and fostered regional disparities between
prosperous mining enclaves and an increasingly impoverished rural sector.
Despite this, traces of the ideology of the Melanesian Way remain in key aspects
of the state’s dealings with its citizens in areas affected by such projects. The
role of the state in mining projects is a dual one in which it strives to deliver a
secure contract environment while safeguarding local interests.4  It is in this
latter capacity that the ideology of tradition enters into the picture by providing
the outlines of a template for establishing legibility.
PNG law declares subterranean mineral rights to be a state prerogative, but
this doctrine has had to come to terms with the fact that virtually all land in
3 The major exception to this pattern is the Bougainville mine at Panguna, which had already become
a key revenue earner by this time. Problems surrounding this mine later led to a rebellion and war that
resulted in closure of the mine and caused a range of other problems still being addressed through the
Bougainville Peace Process.
4  In recent years the state’s role has been further complicated by the fact that it has acted as an equity
partner in mining projects, giving rise to more than a suspicion of conflict of interest.
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PNG is held under customary forms of tenure — a situation that obliges the state
to broker negotiations with local people in order to identify ‘landowners’. In
this climate the state has been at pains to formulate a template of customary land
tenure informed by its ideology of tradition. The logic underlying this approach
is best summed up in a recent review under the imprimatur of PNG’s Law Reform
Commission. After sketching the principles of segmentary lineage systems familiar
to most anthropologists, the author concludes that:
In Papua New Guinea landownership is vested in descent groups —
tribal or clan segments. All clan members are co-owners. This gives
individuals the right to use land but not to alienate it. Thus, land
ownership is part of the identity of a group. It is an inalienable right,
passed from the ancestors into the guardianship of successive generations
(Toft 1997: 14).
This generic model of clan-based land tenure guards against worries over land
alienation by calming fears that local people will be dispossessed by transnational
capital because it ties land rights to traditional groups. Ideologically, it fosters
a manageable contract environment while affirming tradition, and that means
development in the Melanesian Way. The strategy is to mediate between two
kinds of corporate entities — mining companies and landowning clans — and
its technical prerequisite is to establish the legibility of customary tenure by
making clans visible.
Legibility and Recognition in Nenataman
As Filer has pointed out, a popular ideology of landownership has become a
general idiom through which local people make claims against the state for
everything from compensation to the provision of government services (Filer
1997, 1998; see also Ballard 1997). Where mining projects are contemplated or
are already underway, the discourse of landownership has provided local people
with a powerful bargaining chip in demanding the restoration or extension of
dwindling government services, by raising the possibility that they can block
projects by withholding consent until at least some of their demands are met.
In such a context discussions that at first sight appear to be about property must
be understood to be at least as much about the broad political relationship
between the state and its disgruntled citizens (Jackson 1989, 1991).
This point brings us to an important feature of mining negotiations, for
landowners’ issues are often less about threats to their enjoyment of land than
securing recognition that will confer access to benefits that — it is fervently
hoped — will flow from mining operations once they are underway (King 1997;
Filer 1998). The stakes for local people increase when possible royalties,
compensation payments, employment and business development are added to
the mix of anticipated benefits.
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This context sets up a situation in which there is a tension between the state’s
need to identify clearly legible landholding units and local people’s efforts to
establish recognition of their claims to a share in the wealth generated by mining
operations. That tension can be illustrated with reference to the proposed
Nena/Frieda mining project.5
Situated on the boundary between the East and West Sepik provinces, the
Nena/Frieda prospect is located in a valley known locally as Nenataman — a
thickly forested valley in the rugged foothill ranges south of the Sepik River
(Figure 4-1). As with many other mining projects, the mineral deposits at issue
are found near the top of local mountains, some of which lie along border zones
between adjacent ethnic groups (Figure 4-2).
Figure 4-1: Nenataman location map.
Not surprisingly, this location has given rise to disputes about whose land
this is — a situation intensified and complicated by the pattern of land use and
the history of settlement in the region. Nenataman is inhabited by a scattered
and ethnically mixed population of shifting cultivators who supplement
gardening with wide-ranging hunting, collecting, and sago making. The valley
has been the site of dramatic shifts in settlement and population for at least 150
years, when Telefolmin from the south began expanding into Nenataman at the
5 This project is presently (2006) on hold, and its future is unclear. In this regard it is in fact very much
like most other mining projects whose course is rarely certain, especially at the outset. Despite the fact
that a mine has yet to materialise at Nena, the dynamics of the present case are instructive in
understanding other projects currently on line.
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expense of the original inhabitants, the Untoumin. Over a span of about 50 years
the Untoumin were raided by Telefolmin and the nearby Miyanmin with the
result that most were annihilated and the remainder either scattered or
incorporated as captives into Telefol and Miyan settlements. After the destruction
of the Untoumin at the turn of the century, Telefolmin and Miyanmin raided
each other intermittently until just before pacification around the end of the
1950s. At present, the main settlements in the Nenataman area include: the
Telefol villages of Wabia and Ok Isai; Miyan hamlets belonging to Wameimin
parish; Bapi, the sole surviving Paiyamo village; and a handful of small Owininga
hamlets to the northwest.
Figure 4-2: Topographical and site map of Nenataman.
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The fact that Nenataman has been a contested zone for most of its known
history, and the location of the main mineral deposits along its borderlands, are
only two of several factors blurring attempts to demarcate territorial boundaries.
For Telefolmin of Wabia and Ok Isai, the situation is further complicated by the
fact that they settled the valley as colonists assisted by Telefolmin from the
Eliptaman and Ifitaman valleys to the south (Figure 4-1). Local ideas of entitlement
permit claims of access to the descendants of those who fought to clear the
valley's previous inhabitants, and Telefolmin in Eliptaman and Ifitaman now
invoke these principles to press their interests.
This general fluidity is accentuated by aspects of Miyan and Telefol social
organisation, for although relatively fixed villages provide the structural
backbone of settlement, these villages competed for personnel and were relatively
open in their recruitment. Kinship is reckoned cognatically, and as it was always
possible for individuals to claim affiliation along a diverse range of ties, it is
arguable that this kind of organisation facilitated a kind of demographic warfare
that was endemic to the region before contact (Jorgensen 1997; Gardner 1998,
2004). Finally, men employed in mineral exploration sometimes tended stands
of sago in the prospect area, and Telefolmin recognise such activity as entitling
one to claims in the area worked.
Although this untidy picture is probably not unusual for a number of areas
in PNG, it represents a nightmare for those interested in drawing lines,
circumscribing claims and identifying landowner groups. When it became clear
that the prospects of mining in the area were good, the government, the developer
(Highlands Gold, now Highlands Pacific), and the recently formed Frieda Mine
Landowners’ Association6  sought to clarify the situation by mobilising the
apparatus of legibility: making maps, conducting censuses and collecting
genealogies.7
Both the government and the developer were hoping for some sort of solution
to the apparently intractable problems associated with determining claims, but
local fears of failing to gain recognition fuelled an increasingly contested
atmosphere as the prospect of being excluded from a benefits settlement loomed
larger on local horizons. What emerged in response to attempts to create legibility
was a strategy of seeking recognition through a series of experiments in clanship.
Here it is important to underscore the novel nature of the enterprise, since
Telefolmin have no clans.
6 The name of the association draws upon the official name of the main river draining the Nenataman
valley, the Frieda River. Highlands Gold subsequently opted to change the designation of the site to
Nena in an attempt to recognise local usage.
7  Don Gardner, George Morren, Rune Paulsen and I worked as consultants on this project (Jorgensen
1997).
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Telefolmin from Eliptaman and Ifitaman pressed their claims by virtue of
genealogical ties to the current inhabitants of Nenataman, driven in part by the
obvious significance genealogical material held for the developers and the
government. Some Nenataman Telefolmin began talking about ‘clans’ (klen)
defined by ‘pure’8  patrilineal ancestry, and others went a step further by
insisting that only those claimants with an unbroken line of descent from the
original raiders on both paternal and maternal sides should qualify as landowners.
These local attempts at gaining recognition through clanship failed for a
number of reasons, not the least of which is that these solutions would have
excluded sizeable numbers of Nenataman’s current inhabitants from any
settlement. In the end, however, a novel resolution was proposed: the
resurrection of the Untoumin as a clan. Spurred perhaps by the exclusionary
claims of the partisans of ‘pure’ Telefol descent and invoking their own claims
of prior occupation, a coalition of people descended from Untou captives declared
themselves to be a ‘clan’ and successfully gained recognition as the registered
landowners in the Nena/Frieda prospect. The resulting grouping embraces people
otherwise identified as Telefolmin, Miyanmin, or Paiyamo.9  As such, the
Untoumin might be said to comprise a peculiarly ‘international’ sort of clan,
since they include speakers of three different languages drawn from two
unrelated language families.
The reinvention of the Untoumin has several incongruities, not the least of
which is that as a putatively customary group, the Untoumin have no distinct
body of shared custom nor any sense of common identity prior to the search for
landowners at Nena. Further, with the apparent exception of claims to land upon
which mineral deposits have been identified, the Untoumin seem to have no
property in common.10 While common descent names were sometimes recognised
across ethnic boundaries, these never formed the basis for any kind of group
and entailed no sense of common interests.11
Whether or not the Untoumin are to be regarded as a ‘traditional’ entity,
their recognition as landowners poses more immediate political problems in the
project area. The reincarnated Untoumin are dispersed among several villages
8 The English word ‘pure’ had become adopted into the local vocabulary of discussions about land and
mining — an interesting development in its own right.
9 The latter resided in Bapi village (Figure 4-1) and were putatively related to the Untoumin.
10  It is important to note that claims over land for purposes of mining have had no discernible effect
on land use for traditional purposes such as gardening.
11  For example, the Miyan Temselten are said to be ‘the same’ as the Telefol Atemkayakmin, a claim
based on a perception of cognate features of the names themselves (from atem, a kind of frog) and
suggestions that these commonalities derive from shared ancestry in the remote past. In warfare it was
permissible for Telefol Atemkayakmin to kill and eat Miyan Temselten, and vice versa. By contrast,
Telefol custom categorically rejected the possibility of cannibalism among Telefolmin or, indeed,
bloodshed (though this occasionally took place). The notion that Temselten and Atemkayakmin shared
common land rights by virtue of a shared name would have been as unthinkable in pre-colonial times
as it is today.
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but form the whole of no community. Put differently, the postulated Untou clan
asserts differential claims by inscribing a division between ‘members’ and their
co-villagers.12  As a consequence, this version of clanship runs the risk of
destabilising any broad consensus on mining agreements by excluding
neighbours and kin from entitlements in each of the communities where so-called
Untoumin live — thus ensuring that each village in the project area is internally
divided between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’.
Despite these difficulties, however, the Untou solution offers definite
attractions from the point of view of mining developers and the state. It promises
to transcend the ethnic divisions between Telefolmin, Miyanmin and their
neighbours — divisions that have shaped contention over claims to Nenataman.
Further, the fact that membership in the clan is genealogically fixed eases worries
about the vagueness of defining landowners and beneficiaries. From the corporate
point of view, limiting entitlements is necessary to limit liabilities. Finally, while
PNG land courts have failed to settle on whether conquest or original occupation
should receive priority in land claims (Zorn 1992; Westermark 1997; Marco
2000), the Untou solution has the appeal of respectable antiquity by reaching
back to a past pre-dating the arrival of any of the currently extant groups — a
notional ‘Nenataman Ground Zero’. Viewed from the perspective of anxious
developers in the present, this holds out the prospect of locating a solution to
the distribution of benefits in the distant past — an impulse that clearly owes
much to the desire to avoid the unpredictable hazards of contemporary mining
politics.
Clanship as Legible Tradition
One of the ironies of the Untou solution is that it is more likely to meet the needs
of some claimants for recognition than it is to ensure a secure contractual
environment for the mine: far from recognising something one might be tempted
to call ‘customary land law’, it tacitly endorses the creation of politicised
identities and attendant drawing of factional lines. This is ultimately the
unintended outcome of policies conceived in the light of the ideology of the
Melanesian Way. As a version of the Melanesian Way writ small, the search for
‘traditional landowners’ imagines a depoliticised world in which disagreements
about mining entitlements have already been settled in advance through the
customary usages of the ancestors.
12  Although I lack the space to develop the point here, one of the muddles nouveau Untou identity
poses is this: the claim that they are the original landowners is countered by the view of others that
Untoumin were hosted and sheltered by Telefol and Miyan victors, whose readiness to incorporate
Untou women and children into their families enabled their survival. The point is obviously a contentious
one.
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Whether as national ideology or as doctrine governing mining agreements,
such ideas have a distinctly mythical quality.13  Components of this myth are
the notion that the various parties entering into such arrangements do so with
a minimal disruption of local cultural and social forms. But the state’s commitment
to customary tenure is framed in terms of the state’s own ideas of what customary
tenure looks like. This is the presumption of clanship — the idea that land is
traditionally held by descent groups identified as clans — and this is the crucial
part of the template that renders local land tenure legible (Filer 1997: 165; Gabut
2000). Finding landowners thus becomes a matter of finding clans. For local
people success in the mining game depends upon transforming the fluid history
of occupation in Nenataman into legal recognition of legitimate customary title.
This is an exercise in the creation of legal fictions fulfilling the state’s need to
delineate landowners for the purposes of concluding mining agreements, and a
solution hinges upon formulating identities in a way that satisfies the state’s
interests in legibility by making clans that the state can ‘find’.
In Nenataman local people invented clans — indeed, they invented several
varieties of them — in a way calculated to match the expectations of the
government and the mine developer, albeit in ways far removed from traditional
ideas about the relation between land rights and collective identities. But the
Nenataman case is not an isolated anomaly, as a reading of other instances in
similar circumstances reveals (see Golub, this volume).
Official preferences for defining land rights through clanship show a
remarkable ability to elicit local responses that produce landowning clans on
demand. For example, among the Onabasulu of Mount Bosavi, Ernst found that
previously fluid identities had been crystallised in objectified ‘clans’ tailored to
the needs of the state and multinationals engaged in resource development.
Designed to position their members advantageously vis-à-vis rival claimants to
benefits arising from the Kutubu oil project, these clans are ‘largely an artifact
of a certificate-based incorporation process’ and do not predate the era of
petroleum development (Ernst 1999: 88). Writing of the Foi, who are also
candidates for benefits arising from the Kutubu oil project, Weiner discusses
the effects of the same incorporation process:
The Foi were … forced to adhere to the convention of incorporation in
order to be in a position to deal with both the government and Chevron
Niugini. The effect of this is to rigidify the boundaries of a social entity
whose most centrally important feature was its porousness and flexibility
(Weiner 1998: 10–1).
Such processes are even more striking in cases where there is no system of
traditional descent groupings of any kind. For example, from within the Nena
13  See Filer (1990) on popular myths surrounding the Bougainville rebellion.
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project impact area, the Sawiyanoo of the Left May River traditionally have no
clans, lineages, or other such groups (Guddemi 1997: 634). Yet Guddemi reports
that among the Sawiyanoo a flexible land tenure system built around a diverse
range of cognatic and other relations has been reframed in less than a decade in
terms of principles of patrilineal descent: in response to mineral exploration,
rival claimants have produced new kinds of arguments about land and are
generating ad hoc patrilineages in the process (ibid: 636). While he is careful
not to suggest that such views are illegitimate, Guddemi points out that the
emphasis on patrilineality represents a hardening of lines and a closing off of a
spectrum of claims that were customarily recognised in the pre-mining era, and
he argues that a key role in this shift is played by government officers whose
preference for patrilineal descent is all too evident. In the words of one man, ‘I
used to run around on the land of my wives, but I stopped doing that when the
government explained that it was rubbish’ (ibid: 640). So it is that while there
have been no formal negotiations concerning mining and land rights in the Left
May, the Sawiyanoo formulation has changed ‘as official ideologies begin to
intervene in the ways land is used and thought about’ (ibid: 641).14 The
competition to have one’s claims to potentially lucrative compensation
arrangements recognised has tipped the scales in favour of the creation of
corporate descent groups where none had existed before.
Further afield, Hviding (1993) describes a system of ‘representational kinship’
concocted by New Georgians around Marovo Lagoon in negotiations with a
mineral exploration company. Consciously departing from their flexible pattern
of land rights through ‘highly pluriform principles’ (ibid: 803), local people
produced simplified models of descent-based landownership in the interests of
facilitating recognition of their claims (see also McDougall 2005). Similarly, Burt
(1994) reports that among the Kwara'ae of Malaita, local people found themselves
under strong pressure to formulate land tenure in terms of membership in
unilineal descent groups, despite a fundamentally cognatic kinship orientation.
Although no mining activity was at issue in this case, it seems clear that in the
Solomons too, governments prefer clans.
In these and similar cases it seems evident that the state-mandated machinery
of legibility calls into being what one might call ‘special purpose clans’. Yet
surely there is something strange in all this. Much of what we know from detailed
land tenure studies in Melanesia suggests that an untidy jumble of multiple
overlapping claims is at least as common as clearly demarcated clan estates with
similarly unambiguous lists of members (Lawrence 1967; Ogan 1971; Burt 1994).
Despite this, I would argue that the state favours an image of clan-based tenure
because such a view combines the ideological virtues of the Melanesian Way
14  Guddemi makes reference to a paper on mining and land rights by the East Sepik Province’s Assistant
Secretary for Lands, who claims a generality for the practice of ‘Patriarch lineage’ (ibid: 641).
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with the attractions of a lawyerly desire for clarity. As part of the matrix of
legibility, the presumption of clanship embodies a fantasy of a world in which
once-and-for-all determinations of rights and commitments are possible without
the need for continual readjustments to shifting political alignments.
It is not hard to understand the appeal of such an imagined world, particularly
in view of PNG’s rocky history of landowner-developer relations in the mining
sector. But the presumption of clanship and its simplifications have not always
made things easier, as witnessed by the daunting problems of distribution at
Kutubu (Weiner 1998), Hides/Gobe (Kameata 2000; Marco 2000) or Porgera
(Biersack 1999: 276–7).
Conclusion
Papua New Guineans have proven to be adept at fulfilling the expectations of
legibility, and seem quite capable of inventing clans if they turn out not to have
any to begin with. While such expedients can give rise to tensions with
potentially explosive results, as I have suggested in the case of Nenataman, it
must be admitted that dissension over the distribution of mining benefits can
arise in any number of ways. Unsystematic tracking of the PNG mining scene
suggests to me that those left out of formal settlements seem to have a way of
making their needs felt (for example, Mount Kare), and are often capable of
pursuing alternate avenues of redress. Likewise, Golub (this volume) argues that
insisting too doggedly on fidelity to traditional organisational forms may, at
Porgera at any rate, miss the point, since the real problem may be how to forge
an effective bridge between the needs of local people and developers (see also
Goldman, this volume). Taking such factors into consideration suggests that
invented clans may be serviceable as an element in a kind of organisational
Pidgin for PNG’s mining industry. It does, however, seem prudent to caution
against forgetting that such exercises may produce bridges that are too rickety
and jerry-rigged to bear much weight, particularly if the cost of cutting a deal
is the creation of a pool of dissatisfied neighbours who are unlikely to view their
exclusion as legitimate. Invoking notions of tradition or custom will carry little
weight if we lose sight of the fact that clan-finding is often ineluctably bound
to clan-making.
In an important paper hearkening back to the days of anthropological debates
on loose structure, Roy Wagner challenged the notion that there are social groups
in any meaningful sense in the New Guinea Highlands.15  Instead, he argued
that local people use names as a form of social creativity to generate sociality,
shifting their application as circumstances warrant. He also said that:
15  See also Keen (1995, 2000) who provides an excellent critique of Western group-based metaphors
for identity in an Australian context. See Gumbert (1981) for an early discussion of the mischief
anthropological models of groups caused in terms of Indigenous land claims.
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If we approach the matter with the outright intention of finding groups
or with an unanalyzed assumption that groups of one sort or another are
essential to human life and culture, then nothing will keep us from
finding groups (Wagner 1974: 102–3).
Insofar as he is right, we can count on two things: it will always prove possible
to find clans (or other such groups) if one tries hard enough, particularly if local
people have a stake in making this possible; and such entities are likely to prove
less stable and substantial than government officials (or mining executives) might
like. Reconfiguring identities may turn out to be more traditional than we are
likely to credit, but this lesson should not be misread: as the history of Nenataman
demonstrates, traditional times were times in which identities, communities and
whole populations came and went with breathtaking rapidity. This is scant
comfort for those who hope that looking to the past will resolve disputes about
who is entitled to what, for nobody knows better than Melanesians that the past
is almost infinitely arguable. To the extent that local people are able to achieve
recognition by fabricating new versions of who they are, the Melanesian Way
may indeed be alive and well, but in a way guaranteed to raise questions, rather
than settle them.
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Chapter Five
From Agency to Agents: Forging
Landowner Identities in Porgera
Alex Golub
And this, for me, is the heart of the drama: I’m intensely aware you see
that people are wrong to think of themselves as just one person. Each
one of us is lots and lots of people. Any number, because of all the
countless possibilities of being that exist within us. The person you are
with me is quite different from the person you are with somebody else.
But we go on thinking we’re exactly the same person for everybody,
the person we think we are in our own mind and in everything we do.
But this isn’t the case at all! It comes home to us best when by some
ghastly mischance we are caught out in an untypical act. We suddenly
find we are sort of dangling from a hook! I mean we can see that the act
isn’t ‘us’, our whole self isn’t in it. And it would be a savage injustice
to judge us on that act alone, never to let us off the hook, to hold us on
to it, chain us up for our life on the strength of it for all to see, as if that
one action summed up our whole existence! So now do you see how
treacherous this girl is being? She caught me out in an unrecognisable
situation, in a place where for her I should never have been and doing
something which in her eyes I should not have been able to do; and now
she insists on seeing this undreamed-of contingency as my reality,
identifying me with a single fleeting shaming moment of my life
(Pirandello 1995).
In Luigi Pirandello’s 1921 play Six Characters in Search of an Author the characters
in a nineteenth-century story of family conflict are cast out of their creator’s
imagination and wander in search of an author who will allow them to complete
the telling of their story. The bourgeois melodrama they embodied was exactly
the sort of play that Pirandello was reacting against, but the deeply reflexive
theatre that resulted when the family conversed with directors, actors, and each
other about the nature of artistic production is a supreme example of Pirandello’s
modernist art. In this space of meta-theatre he could explore the thematics which
‘tormented’ him:
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The delusion of reciprocal understanding hopelessly based on the hollow
abstraction of words; the multiple nature of every human personality,
given all the possible ways of being inherent in each one of us; and
finally the tragic built-in conflict between ever-moving, ever-changing
life, and the immutability of form (Pirandello 1995: xvi).1
In this chapter I would like to explore Pirandello’s thematics in an arena far
removed from the Italy of his day. I will examine identity and landownership
at the Porgera gold mine in Enga Province, Papua New Guinea (PNG), and what
lessons we might learn from it regarding registration schemes in Melanesia and,
more broadly, ‘indigenous identity’ in general.
In PNG today it is a matter of settled legal and popular opinion that indigenous
groups have special claims to the ownership of customary land (Rynkiewich
2001; Curtin et al. 2003; Weiner and Glaskin, this volume). This entitlement is
both firm and abstract: firm in the sense that customary land is owned by
customary groups, but abstract because the criteria for membership in
landowning groups are often ambiguous. In cases of land registration for resource
development, the boundaries of the land and the ethnonym of the collectivity
said to ‘own’ it are often quite clear. What is controversial is who, in any given
situation, gets to be a member of a landowning group. The dilemma of aspiring
landowners is similar, then, to that of the characters in Pirandello’s play — both
seek to be acknowledged by the director (here, the state) and, in doing so, get
their turn on stage as a real character in PNG’s national drama.
In the past, policy makers and theorists have applied an optical metaphor to
customary land registration. On this account, local identities pre-exist state
interest in them, and identifying the members of a customary group can be done
simply by ‘viewing’ ‘customary’ or ‘traditional’ or ‘group’ tenure (these are
considered synonymous) and translating these arrangements into Western legal
form. This is the approach, for instance, which underpins James Scott’s (1998)
work Seeing Like A State, in which the state’s pathological misrecognition of
pre-existing grass-roots life leads to technocratic tragedies which, he suggests,
could be overcome through accurate discernment of conditions on the ground
whose shape and form pre-exist its gaze. While his neoliberalism is politically
orthogonal to Scott’s leftist populism, Hernando de Soto (2000) agrees with Scott
that the failure of Third World countries to ‘escape the bell jar’ of economic
stagnation and partake of First World economic prosperity can be traced to the
government’s inability to recognise people’s grass-roots economic activity and
the stable ‘extralegal social contracts’ they generate. A mixture of these
approaches has informed policy work on land registration in PNG. Policy makers
such as Tony Power and Jim Fingleton combine Scott’s fear of disempowerment
1  I acknowledge that the translation used here, by Felicity Firth, takes some liberties with Pirandello
that others do not. However, for the purposes of this chapter I find it to be the most evocative.
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through the individuation of tenure with de Soto’s enthusiasm for grass-roots
entrepreneurship in a vision of ‘Melanesian capitalism’ inspired by
Third-Worldism (Power 1996; Fingleton 2005; Chappell 2005; Golub 2006:
385–406).2  In this instance, as in many others, registering customary landowners
relies first on clear discernment of local situations and second on an accurate
translation of them out of the realm of custom and into the realm of law. This
‘viewing and cataloging’ approach assumes that there are such things as
customary groups. Such an assumption, as Pirandello might put it, hangs
indigenous peoples upon a hook by fixating on only one aspect of what we shall
see is a many-sided identity.
By now there is a large literature on what we might call the ‘poetics of
indigeneity’ in Southeast Asia (Li 2000), Amazonia (Carneiro da Cunha and
Almeida 2000), Australia (Povinelli 2002), and Native North America (Nadasdy
2003) which strongly suggests that indigenous identities are not pre-existing
and ‘found’ intact by Western legal regimes, but are complexly shaped by
Western law’s elicitation of them (Weiner 2006). This shift from ‘viewing’ to
‘eliciting’ is partially due to an increasingly rich body of ethnographic data
about both pre-contact social organisation and the land registration process
itself. But it is also due to wider developments in political philosophy and
socio-cultural theory. In political philosophy authors such as Patchen Markell
(2003) have drawn on an Arendtian re-reading of Hegel to argue, contra earlier
works on recognition (for example, Taylor 1992), that ‘identity can only be
reliably known in retrospect’ (Markell 2003: 14) as the ‘results of action and
speech in public’ (ibid: 13). As a result, Markell suggests it is inappropriate to
speak of the ‘recognition’ of pre-existing identities and prefers instead a ‘politics
of acknowledgment’ in which we pay attention to the mutual constitution of
actors in moments of recognition. This means that we should not only examine
the making of landowner identities, but also the concession of authoritativeness
to certain disciplines (such as anthropology) and of wisdom (or the lack of it) to
the small group of expatriates who have been so influential in the history of
land policy in PNG.
In additional, advances in political science have converged with the
development of a more ‘poetic and pragmatic’ turn in anthropology (Ortner
1984; Sansom 1985; Silverstein and Urban 1995; Wedeen 2003; Silverstein 2004).3
This approach focuses less on a ‘museological’ description of the cultural
inventory of distinct groups, and more on a ‘semiotic praxology’ (Silverstein
2003) in which ‘we now worry about how the image of a language or a culture
2  For critiques of this position, see Weiner (this volume).
3  Processual accounts of indigenous identity have a long history in anthropology and certain aspects
of Western social thought more generally. I mention the ‘poetic-pragmatic’ approach not to emphasise
its novelty, but simply because it represents a particularly recent and coherent (and, to my mind,
fruitful) body of work.
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are themselves constituted as meaningful realities within the scheme of normative
subjectivity of a population’ (ibid: 116) such that ‘cultures’ are seen as an
emergent phenomenon of sociocultural process, unstable and
sociohistorically contingent as they are themselves invoked by ‘the
natives’ [indigenous or otherwise] as a contributory part — a moment
— of a dialectical process of politicoeconomically and historically specific
meaning making’ (ibid: 115).
In other words, both policy scientists and Pirandello increasingly see indigenous
peoples (and everyone else) as living ‘ever-moving, ever-changing’ lives which
are hung on the hook of the ‘immutable form’ of corporate land registration.
Local forms of sociality in PNG seem particularly suited to this method of
analysis due to their tendency to lack clear corporate groups (Barnes 1962;
Wagner 1974). Indeed, a focus on the lack of a clear demarcation of the identity
of landowners of resource-rich areas of PNG is notable. At Tolukuma (Golub
2006: 399–402), Hides (ibid: 394–7), Mount Kare (Filer 1998: 161–6), Frieda
(Jorgensen 2001), and Kutubu (Weiner 2001), politicking over who gets to be a
landowner has prevented compensation from resource developments from
reaching local people, and in some cases it has halted resource development
altogether. A museological approach to viewing and registering supposedly
static customary groups must explain this dynamism away as a ‘corruption’ of
a state of pre-existing purity.
But in fact many fine ‘pragmatic-poetic’ ethnographies of PNG have been
produced (Lederman 1986; Merlan and Rumsey 1991). Indeed, some of the most
fruitful work produced by Melanesianists involves not merely describing
Melanesian approaches to sociality, but adopting them as useful theoretical
constructs — the concept of the ‘elicitation’ of landowner identities being a
prime example. Despite the fact that these approaches explain, rather than
explain away, the failure of museological approaches to registration, there has
been little uptake of this work by policy scientists. In PNG, as in Australia,
anthropologists continue to attempt to disabuse the policy community of their
notions of static corporate groups existing ‘from time immemorial’ without
reverting to analytically crude notions savagery, ‘Africanisation’, barbarism,
‘instability’, dysfunction, and so forth. The question then becomes: How,
concretely, can one understand the translation of landowner identities into
Western legal forms in a poetic-pragmatic mode rather than an optical and
museological one? How do we capture the fact that indigenous cultures innovate
and change over time, and that much of this change is elicited by an entity such
as the state which demands that the object of its gaze remain static? The concept
of the ‘invention’ of tradition, despite its attempted re-workings by many authors
(Otto and Pedersen 2005), continues to carry the critical sting that its original
framers (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) meant to deploy against British imperialist
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pretensions. As a result it is not only disempowering to indigenous people (Briggs
1996) but, more importantly, its use of the term ‘invention’ does a poor job of
conceptualising the relationship between practice and structure that has been
so fruitfully illuminated by the pragmatic-poetic turn in analysis.
More promising seems an approach which sees custom as a ‘modality of action
rather than persistence of the concrete and material substance’ (Merlan 1995:
164). Like Markell, Merlan and Sansom suggest focusing on the process, rather
than the content, of translation, and echoing Markell, urge us to see this process
as one of the reflexive, mutual constitution of indigenous group and state (see
also Merlan 2006). In this chapter I will focus on the creation of an official
schedule of the Ipili owners of the Porgera gold mine in Enga Province, PNG.
This involved the translation of customary forms of sociality into a legal system
of corporate clans. I will describe this not as a process of ‘invention’ but one of
‘forging’, and I will argue that the trope best used to understand Ipili flexibility
and willingness to innovate is not ‘instability’ or ‘barbarism’ but ‘modernity.’
The larger import of this example, I argue, is that modernity might profitably
be used as a trope to describe the phenomenon of indigenous accommodation
to land registration schemes more generally.
I use ‘modernity’ in the sense of a distinctive mode of historical consciousness.
It is, as Habermas put it, a ‘reflective treatment of traditions that have lost their
quasi-natural status’ (1987: 2). Modernity ‘cannot and will no longer borrow
the criteria by which it takes its orientation from the models supplied by another
epoch; it has to create its normativity out of itself’ (ibid: 7). The modern world is
thus ‘distinguished from the old by the fact that it opens itself to the future, the
epochal new beginning is rendered constant with each moment that gives birth
to the new’ (ibid: 6). Seeing modernity as an openness to the new allows us to
develop an account which ‘dissociates modernity from its modern European
origins and stylises it into a spatio-temporally neutral model’ which might be
applied to a variety of groups (ibid).
In addition to Habermas, I also draw on Sahlins’ recent (1992, 2000a, 2000b)
writing on developman, which has also been an inspiration for much of the recent
literature on ‘local’ or ‘alternate’ modernities. I diverge from these approaches
because I feel that they treat modernity museologically, as a process in which
individual items move are either removed from, or incorporated into, an
inventory of cultural traits.4  Bruce Knauft, for instance, defines modernity as
‘images and institutions associated with Western-style progress and development
in a contemporary world’ (2002: 18), while the contributors to a recent volume
on Modernities in Melanesia (Robbins and Wardlow 2005) focus on modernity
as being identical with Christianity, humiliation, and so forth.
4  An example of removal would be the secularisation of Europe, while an example of incorporation
would the adoption of Christianity by Pacific Islanders.
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To me the true insight of Sahlins’ work is that ‘tradition’ is a distinctive mode
of appropriating novelty — a process rather than an inventory to be preserved.
[It] is not the dead hand of the past. On the contrary, ‘tradition’ is
precisely the way people always cope with circumstances not of their
doing and beyond their control, whether acts of nature or of other
peoples. Hence tradition has changed in the past, and, by encompassing
the goods and relations of the market in its own terms, it would continue
to do so (Sahlins 2000a: 21).
Sahlins’ understanding of tradition allows us to understand how the creation of
landowner identities in the context of land registration can be understood as
both ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ when examined from the viewpoint of process.
Finally, I will argue that Ipili identities were ‘forged’, taking my cue from
Daniel Miller’s use of the term in his ethnography of modernity in Trinidad.
In the first place forged is intended to connote the process by which
intractable materials are, in the forge, turned into something new, useful,
solid and fine. But the term forged is also a verb pertaining to the act of
forgery as an act of faking (Miller 1994: 321).
Miller’s wonderful evocation of the ambiguity of this word here captures the
way in which Ipili seized the moment of novelty introduced by mining and
attempted to remake themselves in light of the mine’s elicitation of their identity
in a way that was both ‘modern’ and ‘customary’. It is to this regime of
identification that I now turn.
Porgera’s ‘Seven-Clan System’
The Ipili are an ethnic group located in the Porgera ‘district’ in the far west of
Enga Province in the highlands of PNG (Biersack 1980).5  Since contact with the
Australian Administration in the late 1930s, Porgera’s gold deposits have been
central to Ipili history as well as to the wider fate of PNG as an independent
nation. PNG relies on taxes and royalties from extractive industry for a substantial
proportion of its budget (Banks 2001), and the Porgera gold mine, operated by
the Vancouver-based transnational Placer Dome,6  became a major source of
revenues in 1992 (its second year of production), when it produced 1,485,077
ounces of gold, making it the third most productive gold mine in the world
(Jackson and Banks 2002). The Porgera mine continues to be a national priority
today, even as it matures.
5 The Porgera ‘district’ is now officially part of the larger Porgera-Lagaip District, which includes a
much larger population speaking the Enga language. Speakers of the Ipili language numbered around
5,000 in 1980, but the current population is hard to calculate because of the more recent wave of
immigration and intermarriage.
6  Placer Dome was recently taken over by another Canadian company, Barrick Gold.
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The Porgera mine is unusual not just because of the size of its operations,
but because of the impact that it has had on the valley where it is located (Banks
1997; Filer 1999; Golub 2001, 2006; Jacka 2003). While people outside the valley
often damage the road and power supply into Porgera, and migrants threaten
the valley’s stability (Patterson 2006), the mine does not have the landowner
identification problems faced by other resource developments. Although Porgera
is ridden with conflict, social inequity, civil unrest, and a fair amount of
resentment for the company, there has been little or no questioning regarding
who the ‘real landowners’ of Porgera are. A ‘successful registration’ of
landowners is one of the reasons for Porgera’s success relative to other mines.
How, then, did this registration occur?
Throughout the 1980s Placer Dome compensated individual Ipili on a
case-by-case basis for land damaged by exploration work. However, in the late
1980s, when Porgera proved to be a feasible site for a mine, Placer Dome was
obliged to convert its existing exploration licence into a Special Mining Lease.
Under the Mining Act, it is the National Government which has the power to
issue such a lease, but in order for the lease to be issued the company must sign
a compensation agreement with the customary landowners. As it turned out,
the mine also required land on which Ipili people were currently living, and an
agreement specifying where and how they were to be relocated also became
necessary. Finally, for complex political reasons, Ipili landowners, the Provincial
Government and the National Government also signed agreements with each
other specifying their duties and obligations to each other after the lease was
issued. In sum, in order for the mine to open it was necessary that the government
and company negotiate, not just with Ipili people, but with ‘the Ipili’ as a
collectivity.
Negotiations with all of the 3,000 or so inhabitants of the future mining lease
were obviously impractical, and so government officials used a mechanism of
agency described in PNG’s Land Act whereby Ipili people chose ‘agents’ to
represent them in negotiations. This produced a pool of 300 or so agents, a group
composed essentially of the most prominent persons from each of the extended
households in the Special Mining Lease area. This number was still too large,
however, and so these agents delegated their agency to a set of 23 ‘agents of
agents’ or ‘super agents’. These people formed the Landowner Negotiating
Committee, and it was they who provided legitimate consent to the creation of
a mine by putting their signatures (or thumb-prints) on official agreements with
the company and the government.
This structure of delegation matches the segmented lineage system which
the Porgera Land Study found to be present in Ipili custom. According to this
study, land in Porgera is owned by seven landowning clans. Each clan is
composed of one or more ‘sub-clans.’ There were found to be a total of 23
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sub-clans within the Special Mining Lease. These sub-clans are themselves
composed of a number of ‘house lines’ (an English gloss of the Tok Pisin haus
lain) which took the form of extended families. Land was similarly divided:
extended families live on individual plots which are parts of larger named
territories which are owned by sub-clans, which are themselves part of even
larger named units which are owned by clans (GoPNG 1987a).
The result was a happy coincidence — the social structure of the Ipili
‘discovered’ by outsiders fitted very neatly into a hierarchical Western model
of organisation. Thus the land study and system of delegation in Porgera
represents a clear example of a museological method of landowner registration,
because this Western organisational system is congruent with the segmentary
lineage system of Ipili clans. Each level of social segmentation has its own
representative who delegates power to the agent representing a higher-level
segment of the clan until one reaches the 23 ‘apical’ negotiators of the Landowner
Negotiating Committee. This committee speaks for all 23 clans and thus the entire
ethnic group.
At first glance, then, the success of Porgera’s land registration regime seems
to be an example that could be used to bolster a ‘view and translate’ approach
to registration. However, a close analysis of the land study and the meetings
that produced it will demonstrate that the seven-clan system was forged in the
course of the events of the late 1980s. The seven-clan system is not ‘untrue’ to
Ipili sociality because Ipili ways of being, like Pirandello’s characters, have
several potential ways of appearing. What made Porgera’s system of land
registration resilient, I will argue, is that Ipili had the choice of how they were
to be apprehended. But before I explain how Ipili identity was ‘hung upon a
hook’ in the late 1980s, we must first examine the many-sided nature of Ipili
sociality.
Ipili Sociality
An examination of Ipili sociality, both within Porgera and in relation to people
outside the valley, quickly indicates that the seven-clan system that exists in
Porgera today was not — as a ‘view and translate’ approach would have it — a
method of social organisation which pre-existed the mine and the government’s
views of Ipili. I will discuss first the difficulties in identifying ‘the Ipili’ as a
discrete ethnic group in the wider Enga/Southern Highlands region. Then I will
discuss the difficulty of understanding sociality within the valley as being
composed of clans.
First, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the idea of discrete, clearly
bounded ethnic groups was not common to the wider region in which the Ipili
lived (Biersack 1995). The focus of Iplili local organisation was on regional
embeddedness and connections with — rather than divisions between —
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different areas of settlement. Like those of their neighbours, the Huli and the
Enga, Ipili genealogies run deep, typically beyond ten generations, and terminate
with an eponymous apical ancestor. These genealogies frequently trace the
migration of ancestors across the region, leaving genealogically connected
communities dotted across the landscape. These mythological accounts of
ancestral movement seem to correspond, at least in Enga, to actual prehistoric
migrations of clans from one area to another (Wiessner and Tumu 1998: 119–55).
The result is what might be called ‘clan diasporas’ — a network of related groups
which spread across the Southern Highlands and Enga provinces and which cut
across the ethnic boundaries of what are today considered to be the three distinct
ethnic groups of the ‘Huli’, ‘Enga’ and ‘Ipili.’ In the past, these ties were used
to facilitate long-distance trading (Mangi 1988), to gain access to valuable
resources like salt springs (Wiessner and Tumu 1998), and to request hospitality
when ecological hardship such as drought or frost meant temporary migration
from one’s home (Wohlt 1978). Today Papua New Guineans continue to use
these ties to conduct business along the Highlands Highway, to find hosts at
areas near mines and hydrocarbon projects where work is plentiful, and to travel
safely through areas where tribal fighting occurs.
Thus ethnicity in this area is based on grades or continua of cultural difference
in a population criss-crossed by flows of people. It is for this reason that Burton
argues that the existence of these clan diasporas
throws into question whether the Ipili people even ‘exist’ in the same
way as, say, Motuans or Hageners do … They begin to look far more
like the local representatives of regionally dispersed ‘genealogical groups’,
lumped together under one name only because they live in one place as
neighbours. (Burton 1999: 284).
Porgerans are and were, as Aletta Biersack (1995: 7) puts it, ‘centered not on
themselves as geographical isolates but on culturally diverse fields in which
their mythology, trade routes, and marriage practices embedded them’. As a
result, ‘syncretism is not just an artifact of colonialism; syncretism is the ordinary
state of affairs … Ipili peoples have always been cosmopolitan’ (ibid: 6). Of course,
it is undoubtedly the case that there are coherent and culturally specific practices
which characterise people who live in Porgera as being distinctive from their
neighbours and entitle them to be considered customary owners of the land
surrounding the Porgera mine. But it is important to note that these differences
were not sufficiently clear-cut that they could easily be used as a ready-made
charter by a government to exclude people from membership in resource-rich
groups. So while it is tempting, as Burton (1999: 284) puts it, ‘to uncover as
many of them as possible and map them out’, clan diasporas lack precision
beyond the mythical level, and even mythological associations were unclear and
subject to confusion. Thus Wohlt (1978: 42) recounts that while everyone
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‘know[s] the gist of the myth’, in fact, ‘if one asks a dozen informants over [the]
age of 40 the particulars of genealogical connection … one gets a dozen different
versions’. He concludes that ‘beyond the unity maintained through oral tradition
and the ceremonies described above, relationships among tribal members entail
little else than hospitality, and that only in need’ (ibid: 54). In sum, what we see
is a situation in which individuals justified long-distance travel with reference
to genealogical relationships which were enduring but whose meaning was
ambiguous. In other words, this was a system in which people had agency to
construe the connection between them given a culturally specific form of
connection which nevertheless under-determined the exact nature of the
relationship between them.
But perhaps these genealogies are the basis of a corporate, descent-based
system of clans in Porgera? Not according to John Burton, who argues that ‘we
can abandon any pretence at trying to fit the Porgeran lines of descent to the
orthodox clan model. In fact, there are no corporate groups we can call “clans” in
Porgera’ (Burton 1992: 138). Most researchers agree with him — the Ipili are
overwhelmingly described in the literature as ‘cognatic’ (Biersack 1980, 1995;
Jacka 2003). Models of Ipili sociality as clan-based run into several problems.7
The first problem with the clan model of Ipili social organisation is that the
Ipili do not have a word for ‘clan’ in the sense of a corporate group defined by
descent. It is true that the term ‘clan’ is often used to gloss the Ipili word yame.
But yame simply means ‘group of people’ or ‘organisation’, and has no
connotation of descent, consanguinity, or kinship whatsoever. Ipili use the term
indiscriminately to refer to Security Guards, descendants of Tuanda, and
Lutherans.8  If anything, yame simply means the centre, reason, or principle
around which coalitions of people coalesce, a perception of likeness or
commonalty among a group of persons. Even in cases where it does refer to
cognatic stocks (the technical term for what are often called ‘clans’ in Porgera),9
association with such a stock is not exclusive in Porgera, and these stocks do
not in and of themselves form the basis for exchange or collective action. Ipili
consider themselves to have a ‘portfolio’ of eight stocks to choose from — one
from each of their grandparents. They demonstrate their relationship to these
stocks by reciting malu (genealogies) that connect them to the apical ancestor
after whom the stock is named.
Not only is stock affiliation non-exclusive, it is telling that Ipili do not
consider it a virtue to identify strongly with only one of them. Individual Ipili
strategies of social placement focus on the interstitial spaces between groups,
7  A complete account of Ipili sociality would require a discussion of descent, affinity, and the role of
non-kin-based friendships. Here I focus only on the role of descent in Ipili sociality.
8 The ‘eight tata system’ reported by Jacka (2003: 107–10) for Tipinini does not appear in the Special
Mining Lease area.
9  ‘Stock’ here has technical sense used in the literature on cognatic kinship (Freeman 1961).
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using multiple affiliations to be ‘in the middle’ of things — to be ‘at the border’
as Biersack (1980) describes it. The ideal politician is a tombene akali — a ‘middle
man’ (and it is typically a man) who works the interface between two groups
and is thus to the Ipili ‘at the center of the action’, even though in Western terms
we would consider him marginal to both. Thus, when mining executives doubt
indigenous people’s claims to being ‘real landowners’, they are mistaking their
own ideologies of lineal purity for those of the Ipili. For instance, it was
occasionally said by mine employees that a group of people descended from a
prominent alluvial miner were ‘not really Maipangi’ because their father was
originally from Enga and was related to the Maipangi ‘clan’ in Porgera through
an embarrassingly tenuous set of connections. When I tried this out on one of
my informants he looked surprised and remarked that if anyone was Maipangi
it was these people, since they had no other groups to claim affiliation with. As
far as he was concerned those people were Maipangi because they had used their
agency to activate and maintain ties to that stock-cum-residential group, and
this singular affiliation was thus seen as an unfortunate impoverishment of a
potentially much richer and wider set of relationships rather than a positively
valued ‘pure’ and exclusive group membership.
We can agree, then, with Sturzenhofecker when she writes of the nearby
Duna that ‘what is articulated in malu genealogies is a principle not of group
recruitment but of individual entitlement’ (1993: 79–80). In Porgera, as in Wohlt’s
Yumbisa:
The cognatic nature of groups in practice is the product of the interaction
of a 'vertical' agnatic ideology and 'horizontal' ideologies concerning
cognation, affinity, and, particularly, exchange, as these are played out
against limitations and emergent opportunities in the existing physical
and social environment (Wohlt 1995: 215).
Vertical, descent-based relations often come to be used to label coalitions of
people mobilised through collateral or other means.
As Burton (1992) has pointed out, despite having an ideology of lineage, Ipili
social organisation resembles that of the Garia as described by Lawrence (1984),
although they lack the Garia attachment to territory described by Leach (2004).
When viewed in this light, Porgeran kinship is less a matter of corporate groups
than of a large mesh of egocentric personal networks. An individual’s ‘security
circle’ is composed of ‘persons with whom he has safe relationships and towards
whom he should observe stringent rules governing marriage, diet, and political
obligation’ (Lawrence 1984: 28), of which consanguineal ties are merely a part.
This realisation helps to clarify the meaning of the term yame. ‘Daniel yame’, for
instance, does not refer merely to the descendants of Daniel; it refers to all those
people whose mutual affinity is a result of his presence in their social networks.
So while you can refer to Pulumaini yame to mean ‘everyone whose apical
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ancestor is Pulumaini’, you can also use it to mean ‘those five people who use a
common tie to Pulumaini as an excuse to go out drinking on Thursdays’, even
though the five people in question do not include all of Pulumaini’s descendants.
For Ipili, finding and mobilising these connections is thus an art, and Ipili
are networkers not only in a social-structural sense, but also in the more prosaic
sense of the term: they are inveterately social, always on the lookout for new
allies and potential ways to expand who they know and where they know them.
Ipili enjoy discussing the twists and turns of their malu and those of prominent
people in the valley in the same way that Americans dwell on the statistical
minutiae of professional baseball players. In both regional movement and local
sociality, then, the situation in Porgera was one of entrepreneurial agency.
Forging Landowners: the Porgera Land Study
We can see now that the seven-clan system that exists in Porgera today is only
tenuously related to the sociality that existed prior to the arrival of mining in
the valley. The question then becomes how the entrepreneurial agency of Ipili
network building was transformed into the segmentary descent groups of the
seven-clan system. How, in other words, did the mine’s interest in the Ipili elicit
this transformation on their part? A full answer to this question would have to
take into account the long history of medium- and small-scale gold mining in
Porgera which served as a crucial backdrop for the creation of large-scale mining
in the 1980s. Here I will focus on one key moment in this process — the period
from late 1985 to 1989. This period begins with the official decision to create an
authoritative list of ‘who the Porgera gold mine landowners are’ and ends with
the signature, on their behalf, of the Porgera Agreements by their 23 authorised
agents.
In 1983, exploratory work at Porgera uncovered a zone of particularly rich
ore, and the following year an ultra high-grade area within this zone was
discovered. This work, as well as developments in metallurgy and financing,
made the creation of a large-scale gold mine in Porgera seem increasingly likely
(Jackson and Banks 2002: 119–38). Much was still unknown about how,
concretely, the mine would be created, financed, and regulated. The late 1980s
were spent attempting to clarify how these issues were to be dealt with. One of
these clarificatory projects was the Porgera Land Study.
In order for a mining lease to be issued, the owners of the land in question
had to be identified and compensated. To this end, on 26 September 1985, the
Secretary of the Department of Enga issued an order for public servants to begin
a land study to generate a list of customary landholders. The PNG Department
of Minerals and Energy created a position of ‘Porgera Coordinator’ with
responsibility for liaising with all relevant ministries regarding the mine. John
Reid, a former kiap (government official), was appointed to this position. He in
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turn oversaw a group of Papua New Guinean kiaps who conducted censuses of
the area. Their guideline for conducting the land study was a thin photocopied
booklet produced by a senior public servant in the national department. This
specified that they were to record the names of adult men as ‘landowners’, and
that each of these men could be associated with one and only one clan.
By December 1986, the land study had collected 15,000 names of Ipili in their
schedule of ownership. This was an astonishing feat considering the fact that,
by their own estimate, there were only 3,000 Ipili living in the valley at this
time. The land team was flummoxed: areas of two or three hectares were being
claimed as the customary land of more people than could ever live on the land
or, in the case of very small plots, even physically stand there. It appears that
individual Ipili were responding to questions by being maximally inclusive and
listing their entire kindred.
Both Ipili and government representatives were unhappy with this state of
affairs. At a meeting held in December 1986, government officers complained
that people were registering themselves multiple times on multiple plots of land,
and suggested that Ipili ‘select one or two members of a family to represent them
in other Landownerships [sic] in the other clans/sub-clans’.10  For instance, even
if a man was married to a woman in another group, his claims to that group’s
land (through his affinal status) would be represented by his father-in-law or
wife. This proved completely unacceptable to Ipili, who saw this as a radical
reduction in their portfolio of relationships. As one man put it, ‘Porgera people
have Landownership Rights in more than one clan. Therefore we want all our
names to be enrolled or registered in all the clans that we own Lands’. Another
ominously noted that ‘if any names are excluded, there will be troubles’.
Eventually a proposal was put to the meeting by Kurubu Ipara, a Porgeran
who had previously worked as a kiap and was at that time working for the mine’s
exploration team. He suggested a solution that would ‘make it easy on the kiaps’.
Instead of proceeding by visiting a piece of land and eliciting the names of all
the people associated with it, the land study would instead proceed on a ‘clan
by clan’ basis. The result would be a series of seven ‘schedules of owners’ that
would be attached to the land study. This would allow the government to retain
the idea that there was a set of distinct ‘clans’ which owned land. However, each
individual Ipili would be allowed to list themselves in as many of these ‘clans’
as they considered themselves to be part of. This would allow Ipili to retain the
inclusivity that they desired. Indeed, in some ways it was more inclusive than
previous practice, since Ipili could now be fully ‘in’ clans to which they had
previously only a potential and possibly tenuous claim.
10 This quotation and the following account are taken from the minutes of the meeting held on 3
December 1986, held in the Porgera SML Landowners Association Folder in the Porgera District Archives.
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John Reid, who was at the meeting, objected that a count done in this way
no longer tracked the actual population of the Special Mining Lease and would
result in the sort of thing that the meeting has originally been established to
avoid: a list of 10,000 people that described an actual population of 3,000. Ipili
assured him that redundancies would not over-inflate the list because ‘in the
previous investigation we have included all our wantoks (people who speak the
same language) who are living outside Porgera and therefore the population
increased. Now we are cutting it down or restricted to landowners living within
the Porgera valley’. The Ipili present at the meeting suggested that, in exchange
for the government’s recognising multiple ‘clan’ affiliation, they would limit
claims to membership — out-marrying women, their husbands, and their children
could be included on the list, but all other affines would not be entitled to
membership in landowning ‘clans’. As a result of this agreement the cognatic
stocks which had previously been an important part of Ipili sociality now became
‘clans’ and these became the sole form of sociality recognised as appropriate for
true ‘landownerhood’.
As a canonical account, the social organisation of the seven landowning clans
composed of 23 sub-clans has shaped life in Porgera for roughly two decades.
It exists as a taken-for-granted fact about the valley. The original land study is
not only rarely consulted; it is quite difficult to find. Close examination of the
original document, however, reveals the traces of the more unruly arena of
entrepreneurial agency which, on paper, it replaced.
For example, in the case of the Waiwa ‘clan’, the schedule of owners lists two
sub-clans — Waiwa Yaliape and Waiwa Lunda (GoPNG 1987c). This in itself is
not a surprise, as the Lunda are a large group who are associated with a piece
of ground known as Upalika, whose members include several prominent
Porgerans and the wife of one of the key coordinators of the land study. The
Lunda are not, however, the ‘owners’ of any land within the Special Mining
Lease; Upalika lies outside it. It is not clear, then, why they ought to be included
on a list of owners or have an agent who signed the Porgera Agreements of 1989,
as the agents for Waiwa Lunda did. Furthermore, it is not clear who actually
ought to be agent for Waiwa Lunda — the agent for Waiwa Lunda listed in the
land study is William Gaupe, but the agent who signed the Porgera agreements
is listed as Pospi Karapis (Derkley 1989). Did Gaupe delegate his authority to
Pospi? There is certainly no record of that fact, and during the time that I knew
him William certainly did not make any such claim.
A similar situation pertains with regards to the Tuanda. The Tuanda are
divided into two ‘sub-clans’, Ulupa and Yapala, which are represented by two
agents, Sole Taro and Ambi Kipu (GoPNG 1987b). One of the Porgera Agreements,
however, lists Aiyope Yawane as the signatory for Yapala rather than Sole Taro,
and to confuse matters even more, the ‘signature’ on the document is a
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thumbprint with the word ‘Sole T.’ written over it (Derkley 1989). This is
unusual, since Sole is proud of his education and is one of few agents who could
sign his own name.11  In the agency delegation document authorising Sole as
agent for the Tuanda (as well as in other documents), he uses a florid and
elaborate signature (GoPNG 1987b).
Furthermore, there is no coherent account of the segmentation of the Tuanda.
The terms ‘Ulupa’ and ‘Yapala’ do not appear in the ‘sub-clan’ entry on the top
of each page of the schedule of owners of Tuanda. Instead we have ‘Kareya’ and
then a series of what are presumed to be sub-subclans in parenthesis — Kareya
(Aiyengi), Kareya (Amini) and so forth — as well as a handful of other names.
Most tellingly, the sub-clan ‘Marinaka (Lio)’ is included, and its ‘address’ is
listed as ‘c/o Catholic Mission Kasap, Yangiyangi Village, Mulitaka Patrol Post
— Lagaip District’. ‘The Marinaka’ are in fact part of the larger clan diaspora of
which the Tuanda are also a part. They come from Mulitaka, an area east of
Porgera which is today considered ethnically ‘Engan’ rather than ‘Ipili’. The
schedule lists 94 Marinakas: 87 in Laiagam (the township near Mulitaka), and
seven people who live in Porgera proper, including one Marinaka man, his wife,
and three children. In other words, the schedule of owners purports to list a
segmented series of sub-clans, but embedded within it is a specific form of
regional sociality — a small group of Engans from Marinaka had moved to
Apalaka on the basis of their diasporic ties to Tuanda, recorded themselves as
landowners, and then enumerated their kin in Mulitaka as landowners too. Given
the agentive nature of kinship in this region, it is not surprising that these people
are included in the schedule of owners — as we have seen, the Waiwa Lunda
are included on the schedule of owners as well as in the land study itself, despite
the fact that (like the Marinaka) they have no land within the Special Mining
Lease. But given the imperatives of the system of agency, it is no surprise that
no Marinaka agent was appointed and that the Marinaka do not appear as one
of the sub-clans in the land study or the Porgera Agreements. Between the
compilation of the schedule of owners and the completion of the land study they
had lost their status as landowners — a point that the Marinakans living in
Porgera during my fieldwork have not forgotten.
Examples of this sort could be given in many of the other clans.12  In closing
I will consider only one of these — the land study’s attempted segmentation of
the Pulumaini. Some individuals living on Pulumaini lands did not feel
comfortable with the idea of agents at the ‘sub-clan’ level and instead opted for
a more granular level of representation, but others made a different choice. The
result was a mix of different-sized groups and delegations of agency which
11 The agreement between the National Government and the Porgera Landowners includes nine signatures
and 21 thumbprints, and I am interpreting ‘signature’ as ‘any mark made with a writing utensil’.
12  For instance, two sub-clans of Anga are listed in the land study (GoPNG 1987a), but only one is listed
in the agreements (Derkley 1989).
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simply could not be subsumed under a lineage model. In the agreement between
the National Government and the Porgera Landowners, there are six Pulumaini
‘clans’ — Ambo-Wagia, Ambo-Amu, Ambo-Endewe, Ambo-Gai, Ambo-Paramba,
and Ambo-Yuga (Derkley 1989). Based on these names, each of these groups
appears to be a subset of a larger ‘Ambo’ group. In the agreement between the
Porgera Landowners and Enga Province, there are only five sub-clans, none of
which are subordinate to Ambo. The clan groups Amu, Endewe, Gai, Paramba,
and Yuga are listed, and one of these, Amu, has been added at the bottom of the
document in pen (Derkley 1989). Neither of these two agreements match the
land study itself, which lists the Pulumaini as being composed of Ambo-Wagia,
Ambo-Amu, Tokome, ‘Pulumaini Sub-clan Yamawe’ (with the word ‘Ambo’
pencilled in between ‘Pulumaini’ and ‘Sub-clan’), Ambo-Napali, Ambo-Endeme,
Ambo-Gai, Yamili-Wapini, ‘Pulumaini Sub-clan — Paramba’ (with the word
‘Yamili’ written in pencil between ‘Pulumaini’ and ‘Sub-clan’), Pariwana, and
Yunga (GoPNG 1987a). In other words, these documents have never presented
a coherent model of the Pulumaini as a clan.
Discussion and Conclusion
Advocates of a ‘view and translate’ approach might examine the material I have
presented here and conclude from it simply that the Porgera Land Study was
itself flawed, and that a less sloppy approach would have revealed the coherent
corporate groups they expected. After even this brief presentation, however, I
think it is clear that the incoherence of the land study and other works from
this period are not the result of myopia, but rather of a process through which
corporate entities like ‘clans’ creatively emerged in response to the land study’s
elicitation of them. We have seen that the land study was indeed ‘forged’ — it
is neither a direct translation of a pristine, timeless Ipili social structure, nor a
travesty in which Ipili culture was misapprehended. The land study in Porgera
was instead a creative augmentation of Ipili social organisation according to
government requirements and Ipili predilections.
We see reflected in the land study not the lineages or segments of a clan with
exclusive membership, but a world of malleable corporate identities that took
shape around a few prominent ‘middle-men’ or tombene akali. They reflect the
fact that everyone ‘on the ground’ in Porgera knew who had to sign to make an
agreement feasible that would protect the mine and allow it to operate. The
situation was like that which Evans-Pritchard (1940) describes in The Nuer, and
even more like that which Pirandello (1995) creates in Six Characters in Search
of an Author — not 23 sub-clans in search of an agent but 23 agents in search
of a sub-clan. Like Pirandello’s cast, marooned on stage with no author to valorise
or direct their action, the tomebene akali used their agency to become ‘agents’
through the forging of a newly corporate collective subjectivity that valorised
their actions as its representatives. The remarkable reflexivity exhibited in these
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meetings — ‘our custom is X, so we will agree to Y’ — reveals an openness to
the new and willingness to generate new normative frameworks which is, I have
argued, quite modern. Porgera was successful because the people involved in
the land registration process used the past less as a blueprint which dictated
future behavior, and more as a resource in creatively coping with what was
going to come. In the course of the land study, Ipili peoples managed to be both
modern and traditional.
The land study was meant to be a document which settled once and for all
who was and was not entitled to be considered a ‘landowner’ and an ‘agent’ in
Porgera. What actually happened, however, was that the land charter became
the raw material for a creative semiotics of landownership which enabled a wide
variety of claims to be made, just as in the pre-colonial system already described.
The result is what I have called ‘bounded arenas’ for contests of Ipili identity
(Golub 2006). Interested parties range from Porgerans seeking to use their
grass-roots security circles to become recognised and hence powerful agents to
Australian mine representatives who strategically label claims of landowner
identity true or false in order to widen or contract the field of the mine’s
legitimate interlocutors. What exists in Porgera today is not a system of agents
which replaced a system of agency, but a repertoire of agents and clans within
which Ipili continue to exercise their agency. This environment is flexible in
that it constrains the forms in which claims to identity must be articulated but
does not determine the success of any particular claim. The land study was
forged in the sense that it solidified a fluid and — in Levi-Strauss’s (1966) sense
— ‘hot’ mass of sociality into a durable system of agents which provided a social
context stable enough to host a gold mine. Thus, ironically, even though the
land study got the sociology of Porgera wrong, in the end it allowed an Ipili
mode of sociality to continue, albeit in transformed circumstances.
Many indigenous people who seek recognition from settler-dominated
governments often feel like the son in Pirandello’s play, who says that ‘it isn’t
possible to live in front of a mirror which not only freezes us with the image of
ourselves, but throws our likeness back at us with a horrible grimace’. Ipili were
lucky enough to undertake the registration process at a time when they
themselves would decide what sort of reflection they would cast in the looking
glass of official policy.
Any politician who has ever had to hammer out the details of a piece of
legislation might well find that metaphors of forging come naturally to them. It
would seem unnatural, however, for us say that Australia’s 1993 Native Title
Act was ‘invented’ by the Australian Parliament since, as a quintessentially
modern institution, liberal democracy generates new decisions on the basis of
consensus formation arrived at through a deliberative process which responds
to new situations with legislation which (ideally) expresses the will of its
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constituents. In this chapter I have suggested that we ought to understand
indigenous communities in similar terms. Indigenous traditions are no more
‘invented’ than are parliamentary laws, and for the same reason. Ipili responses
to the Porgera gold mine are, I have argued, just as novel as newly passed laws,
and yet just as acceptably a product of their culture as laws are. In both cases,
I have argued that this is because of a distinct process, adherence to which
constitutes genuineness, rather than because of some specific content. Modernity
is a mode of response to temporality rather than a set of things to confront.
For this reason I would go even further. For Europeans and members of their
settler colonies, the act of forging oneself and one’s society can be unsettling.
To a certain extent, James Clifford’s concern with the predicament of culture in
‘a truly global space of cultural connections and dissolutions’ where ‘local
authenticities meet and merge in transient … settings’ (1998: 4) is merely one
of the many concerns that Europeans have had in the face of a world where the
authority of the past cannot be taken for granted. But this is ‘our’ problem, not
‘theirs’. As Marilyn Strathern has noted:
Melanesians have never needed salvage ethnography. Their vision of
the world had no problem with how parts fit together. There were no
bits and pieces that had to be put back together again, for the sake of a
culture restore, a society to conceptualize. Saved Clifford’s predicament,
I doubt nostalgia for either culture or society figures in their present
cosmopolitanism (1992: 99).
Indeed, I would argue that Melanesians are even more modern — more willing
to attend to novelty and avoid stereotypic reproduction — than are European
organisations and bureaucracies for whom stereotypic reproduction is a condition
of existence.
[T]he relative open-endedness of possible meaningfulness leaves ever
more to be experienced and discovered … [and hence a] rapacious desire
to experience and explore the novelty for what this might make manifest
about possible difference … [an] uncovering of new, heretofore covert
possibilities’ (Merlan and Rumsey 1991: 231).
We might hear in highlanders’ ‘expectation of the potential revelation’ of objects
echoes of Baudelaire’s (1972: 402) painter of modern life who aims ‘to extract
from fashion the poetry that resides in its historical envelope, to distill the eternal
from the transitory’. This is a view of highlanders who are not ‘alternately’ or
‘heterodoxically’ modern (Knauft 2002), but simply ‘modern’.
This image of the Melanesian-as-dandy may strike some as an overly-optimistic
portrayal of the situation in Melanesia today, so it is important to note that the
trope of modernity need not be merely celebratory. Indeed, as Colin Filer (1998)
has pointed out, this level of Levi-Straussian ‘heat’ can lead to a fluidity of social
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relations that ‘menaces’ a resource industry predicated on the bureaucratic,
stereotypical reproduction of action necessary to keep large resource extraction
projects up and running. My point here is that we can understand this openness
to innovation as a disposition to action which can have a variety of outcomes.
Just because ‘menace’ is all about fluidity does not mean that all fluidity is
menacing.
The Porgera case thus suggests that we should examine the way indigenous
claims and Western legal forms are mutually constituted, and suggests that we
direct our attention to the process of that constitution in which elaborating
tradition (as much as legislation) is a reflexive process. As Merlan (2006: 101)
points out, ‘the notion of the “mutual constitution” that reflexivity implies has
long been one of the strongest potential alternatives to the concept of temporally
deep continuity as the source of difference’. If this is the case, then we might in
closing return to Patchen Markell’s ‘politics of acknowledgment’ — a sense that
justice requires that ‘each of us bear our share of the burden and risk involved
in the undertaking, open-ended, and sometimes maddeningly and sometimes
joyously surprising activity of living and acting with people’ (Markell 2003: 7)
rather than indulge in a comfortable assumption of ‘sovereign invulnerability
to the open-endedness and contingency of the future we share with others’ (ibid:
15). For the final step of recognising the contingent nature of ‘their’ identity
means a symmetrical recognition that ‘we’ do not know who we are until after
the fact — and that ‘they’ may be the ones to tell us.
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Chapter Six
Incorporating Huli: Lessons from the
Hides Licence Area
Laurence Goldman
According to Stirrat (2000: 31), the practical or pragmatic impact of reports
written by anthropologists working as development consultants ‘is in many
ways irrelevant’ because such reports are assessed on aesthetic criteria generated
by the culture of modernity and their structure is pre-ordained by the interests
of the client who commissions them. If the point is to attain ‘closure’ rather than
‘dialogue’ (Henton 2000: 586), then the author of such reports may come to feel
that they are being used much as a drunk uses a lamp-post — for support rather
than illumination. For their part, clients often suspect that the consultant
anthropologist is more interested in pickling and preserving ‘cultures’ than in
addressing the practical problems of ‘development’. The result for both parties
may be a portrait of the consultant as ‘someone who borrows your watch to tell
you the time’ (Stirrat 2000: 44). Reticent to adopt the mantle of the social engineer,
the anthropologist falls back on the strategy of telling developers or development
agencies what they already know or can work out for themselves.
Nevertheless, resource developers currently operate in a political climate
where sensitivity to indigenous cultures, rights and voices has never been so
acute, and so they frequently and desperately seek answers from anyone who
appears to exhibit confidence or experience in such matters. Much as they might
wish to ignore the complexities of local social organisation and culture, engaging
such issues is the only way to demonstrate their corporate social responsibility
in respect to the design, implementation and monitoring of their projects. This
chapter examines some of the issues faced by all stakeholders involved with
indigenous lands rights and customary land group registration in the context
of oil and gas development in Papua New Guinea (PNG). It suggests some of the
rethinking that may be necessary for the anthropologist and other stakeholders
to sustain a relationship that works in the best interests of any community
affected by this kind of resource development.
Retrospective on Incorporated Land Groups
Development of petroleum reserves around Lake Kutubu in the Southern
Highlands Province of PNG began in the late 1980s. The original developer,
Chevron Niugini Ltd (CNGL), established a system of Incorporated Land Groups
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(ILGs) in the project area with the approval and support of the then Department
of Minerals and Energy. These ILGs were established under the Land Groups
Incorporation Act 1974 (LGIA) — a law that was meant to empower customary
groups to manage the acquisition, use and disposal of their own customary land
and regulate their internal affairs and disputes in accordance with ‘custom’ (see
Fingleton, this volume). As a piece of legislation, the Act is deliberately general
in nature so as to reflect the diversity of customary social organisation found
across PNG. For example, it often comes as a surprise to those who consult the
Act that it does not contain the word ‘clan’.
There is no legal compulsion on landowners to form ILGs, nor are developers
under any corresponding obligation to perform the function of ILG registration.
Under Section 47 of the Oil and Gas Act 1998, the holder of an exploration or
development licence is only required to produce ‘Social Mapping and Landowner
Identification Studies’ for the information of the Minister and the Department
of Petroleum and Energy. However, other sections of the Act make further
reference to ILGs. Section 169(2)(b) states that the Minister shall determine by
instrument
the incorporated land groups or, if permitted in accordance with Section
176(3)(f), any other persons or entities who shall represent and receive
the [landowner] benefit on behalf of the grantees of the benefit.
Section 176(3)(f) states that
unless otherwise agreed between the State and the grantees of the
[landowner equity] benefit or prescribed by law, the beneficiaries of the
[landowner equity benefit] trust shall be incorporated land groups on
behalf of the grantees.
The Oil and Gas Act therefore seems to imply that ILGs should be seen as the
default system for landowner benefit distribution in the absence of some other
agreed upon system.
From a strictly legal point of view, the registration of ILGs is a responsibility
of the Registrar of Titles (ROT) in the Department of Lands and Physical Planning.
However, because ILGs are also one of the vehicles by which accredited
landowners receive financial benefits from resource development projects, other
government departments, such as the Department of Petroleum and Energy
(DPE), are also involved in the process of registration and the management of
issues that arise from it. Recognition of an ILG depends on the preparation of a
certificate that includes a detailed constitution for each group (see Fingleton,
this volume). Although resource developers have no legal responsibility for the
production of these documents, CNGL had little option but to accept some of
this responsibility because of the limited capacity of government agencies such
as the ROT.
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There are currently some 600–700 ILGs representing the customary owners
of Petroleum Development Licence (PDL) and Pipeline Licence areas in PNG.
While CNGL could reasonably argue that the ILG system ‘has worked’ and the
‘benefits have flowed’, the systemic and persistent factionalising of ILGs has
interfered with the process of registration and validation, and has delayed the
distribution of landowner benefits. As I noted in one social mapping study:
The pattern that has emerged during the course of fieldwork is one where
multiple sub-clans, and sometimes lineages, are constituting themselves
as separate units for ILG status … [I]n this regard it seems an appropriate
juncture to pause and take stock of current ILG work to pose the question
whether this trend is one that is cohesive or divisive of the communities
and their fundamental structural bases … [T]he fear with the present
trajectory of ILG work is that it may promote and institute a pattern of
division which breaks down clan mores and implants fissionary
tendencies that are counter-productive in the long run (Goldman 1997:
20).
The consensus is that groups have been opportunistically massaging their
oral histories and manipulating the lands officers employed by the resource
developer in order to maximise their financial benefits. This can be done by
splitting ILGs to reduce the number of ‘members’ attached to any given
landholding. In effect, the ILG system has become yet one more mirror to reflect
the kind of shifting politics endemic in PNG’s wider society. The question is
whether these ‘resource project cultures’ are moving from a predominantly
clan-based form of social organisation to one of nucleated families whose members
only recognise the wider principles of common descent in a very loose way and
whose claims for ‘separate’ landholding status merely express these generic
tendencies and trajectories. My argument would be that these are not broad-based
changes but rather a manifestation of the narrower opportunistic concern of
each group to maximise its financial gains from the system. The ideology of
group membership is unchanged and still expresses the way that people relate
to each other, to the supernatural world, and to the ground beneath their feet.
The troubled history of ILGs in PNG is also discussed by Fingleton, Weiner
and Filer in this volume. Succinctly stated, whatever system has been put in
place eventually falls prey to the process of constant fissioning whereby ILGs
break up into smaller and more exclusive units. There is opportunistic
registration, de-registration and re-registration, all of which signals a more
general failure of ILGs to function as anything more than conduits for the
distribution of resource project revenues (see Weiner, this volume). While all
parties bemoan the parlous state of customary group registration, and
acknowledge the problems posed by the process, solutions have so far been
conspicuously thin on the ground.
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The origin of these problems is frequently attributed to a number of
circumstances. Project operators were compelled to usurp by default the functions
of the national government in establishing ILGs in the first place because of a
lack of government capacity and resources, but while they did not abrogate
their responsibilities under this ad hoc arrangement, the operators were not
willing in the first instance to do any more than the minimum necessary to ensure
that the project met its own milestones. In effect, the operators identified the
beneficiary ILG groups, prepared the paperwork, submitted the forms to the
ROT, and managed the process of disseminating the outcomes. This procedure
was known as ILG ‘facilitation’. The ROT conferred with the DPE to seek initial
endorsement of ILG applications since these pertained to existing PDLs. Once
DPE staff were satisfied, the ROT usually just endorsed the applications that
had been received. There appears to have been little formality to this process:
for example, there were no joint committee meetings or decision-making forums
involving both government agencies.
While developers took on the burden of creating ILGs, they did not have an
exclusive monopoly on this activity, either in law or practice, so even in a new
operational area, their efforts could be matched by local people taking their own
initiatives, travelling to Port Moresby and filing their own certificates of
registration with the ROT. As we have seen, local people’s empowerment was
precisely the objective of the 1974 Act, but the lack of coordination between
the stakeholders was not conducive to a sustainable outcome. In effect, the
project operator soon lost control of which, and how many, groups were actually
registered within the licence areas. Groups sought to increase their share of
project benefits by establishing their own independent ILGs, both as a marker
of structural autonomy and as a reflection of the dynamic political shifts and
entrenched factionalism that has always characterised indigenous social
organisation in both lowland and highland societies of New Guinea.
Once registered, the ILGs received little support by way of training,
monitoring, or assistance that might have enabled them to develop their corporate
functions and meet their obligations as modern organisations. In effect, the
beneficiary ILGs simply became conduits for cash distributions. Since Landowner
Companies and Landowner Associations were simultaneously established to
cater for the political and economic representation of landowner interests, no
further role for ILGs was envisaged by any stakeholder. A succession of studies
has shown that ILGs simply do not function as micro-corporations of the kind
envisaged by the LGIA. They do not cooperate in the management of their
resources and only rarely reinvest their cash receipts in business ventures; they
do not regulate their membership lists or manage land disputes; they do not
have functional Dispute Settlement Authorities as required by the Act; and they
have not received any infrastructure support or training over the course of the
last decade (Goldman 2005). Social impact assessment data collected since 1998
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shows that landowners’ dissatisfaction with the performance of ILGs has been
increasing, while their dissatisfaction with the performance of Landowner
Companies and Landowner Associations, although still high, has been falling
(Figure 6-1).
Figure 6-1: Percentage of landowner households dissatisfied with different
types of landowner organisation, 1998–2005.
Source: Goldman 2005.
While it seems that landowners do not want ILGs to do anything more than
distribute benefit streams, many are still dissatisfied with the current regime.
Often ILG members do not get their cash benefits because these are stolen by
the ILG’s bank passbook holder — usually a male household head. But there are
broader systemic problems that pose substantial risks for any further resource
development in the affected areas, and therefore seem to demand a new kind of
solution. Briefly stated, the problems are common to each of the PDL areas
established since the early 1990s — Hides (PDL 1), Kutubu (PDL 2), Gobe
(PDLs 3+4), and Moran (PDL 5) — as well as the route of the oil pipeline to
Kikori (see Figure 6-2). However, the community affairs teams dealing with
landowners in each of these areas have lacked a unified vision or strategic plan
for managing such problems. Customary landowner registration has not been
carried out in a way that was sensitive to the impact which programs in one area
may have on other areas, and different principles for ILG formation and benefit
distribution have been applied in different areas. Serious questions have therefore
been raised about the need for a common approach to customary landowner
registration across the extractive industry sector, most especially when dealing
with landowners who belong to a single ‘culture area’.
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Figure 6-2: Petroleum Development Licence areas in PNG.
Making an accurate count of the number of existing ILGs in the licence areas is
problematic because the DPE and the ROT do not have an electronic database
containing this information, and no audit of relevant ROT files has yet been
conducted. Furthermore, records inherited by the current project operators from
CNGL are incomplete, and it is likely that landowners have registered many
ILGs on their own account without the knowledge of the operators. Table 6-1
presents an approximate count based on evidence available in October 2004. In
Gulf Province alone (along the route of the oil pipeline), it would appear that
the number of registered ILGs doubled over the three years from 1997 to 2000.
By the end of this period, there were at least 318 ILGs representing approximately
2500–2900 people, which meant an average of 7.8 persons per ILG in this region,
as compared with an average of around 350 persons per ILG in the Hides Gas
Project area (PDL 1). However, less than 50 per cent of ILGs known to exist in
2000 were in receipt of project benefits in that year. Table 6-1 indicates some of
the problems of ILG proliferation (see also Weiner, this volume), but if these are
considered as ‘operational’ quandaries, the anthropologist can see that the whole
ILG venture is diseased in quite another sense.
102
Customary Land Tenure and Registration in Australia and Papua New Guinea
Table 6-1: ILGs in petroleum licence areas, October 2004.
Moran (PDL 5)Gobe (PDL 3+4)Gulf (pipeline)Kutubu (PDL 2)*Hides (PDL 1) 
332131824121Registered
–––26–Deregistered
53––9Pending
–3–32–Applied
* Includes pipeline landowners in Southern Highlands Province.
ILG registration proceeded on a ‘user-convenience’ basis. There appears to
have been no principled determination in any of the areas as to what unit of
social organisation is appropriate for ILG registration. The evidence of systemic
splitting of ILGs within a short period suggests that the ILG system is
participating in, if not directly impacting on, the wider breakdown of customary
social groups. The unchecked tendency for smaller and smaller social units to
register as ILGs is a force for division, not cohesion. Although clans and sub-clans
in the Kutubu region were always in the process of splitting, the pace and level
at which this is now happening far exceeds what has previously been recorded
as a ‘customary’ process.
The ethnographic evidence shows that, in some areas, the ILG system has
also created new social units not previously recognised in custom. In the case
of the Onabasulu people living to the west of the Kutubu production facility,
the project operator’s enthusiasm for ILGs created ‘clans’ which are an artefact
of a ‘certificate-based incorporation process and which did not pre-exist the era
of petroleum development’ (Ernst 1999: 88).
The people identified as ‘Onabasulu’ are incorporated into 17 clans. This,
incidentally, bears no exact relationship to the number of kinship groups,
which are called mosomu in the Onabasulu language, that are a part of
everyday social practice. Rather, the number 17 is important in Onabasulu
cosmological beliefs and figures importantly in a cosmogonic myth. This
myth has become, in the thinking of people at Walagu, at least, an
important discursive tool for creating an exclusive people and category
‘Onabasulu’ analogous to the category ‘Fasu’ … The ‘17 clans’
corresponds to an Onabasulu identity in relation to the cosmogonic myth
of Duduma, not necessarily empirical extant kinship groups. But it does
so by providing, ‘in law’, a fixed number of incorporated groups that
are called clans (ibid).
In other words, the application of the LGIA induced social structural changes
quite unforeseen and unanticipated by the developer. In place of ‘custom’, the
application of the Act introduced newly adapted forms of social organisation
and ethnic identity in a process which Ernst calls ‘entification’.
The historical lesson from the Onabasulu ILG program is that it is important
for developers to understand the culturally specific nature of local social
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organisation before embarking on programs of incorporation if sensitivity to
culture is to be a guiding operational principle. The Huli, Fasu and Onabasulu
people have vastly different kinship and descent systems, and their complexity
should compel caution when attempting to apply a ‘clan’-based calculus to an
ILG registration system. Nevertheless, the current trend in all areas is towards
the formation of nucleated family groups constituting themselves as ‘clan
segments’ in a manner that would not have occurred in the pre-development
era. In part this may be because the family is the level at which on-the-ground
property rights are actually held and exercised, but the ramifications for
genealogical structure and descent group fission still have no precedents in the
pre-colonial period.
Whilst the argument for change has ringing endorsement from all participants
in the ILG process, the form that this should take is still opaque and the analysis
of precisely ‘what went wrong’ is yet to produce any clear consensus. The
argument I want to pursue here is that the ILG ‘problem’ is precisely the kind
of rich landscape in which anthropological expertise of both a pure and applied
kind can assist in the development of sustainable representative bodies for project
landowners in a manner that also helps resource projects to pursue their business
objectives.
Approaches to ILG Formation
The anthropologist may perhaps be forgiven, when faced with the task of
advising on a new ILG program, for commencing with the obvious question:
What unit of social organisation within this culture or region can we identify
as being appropriate and feasible for the constitution of an Incorporated Land
Group? Even accepting that an ILG system is fundamentally an attempt to
organisationally freeze what anthropologists have long argued is a fluid, dynamic
and ever-changing landscape of social relationships,1  we need to unpack and
spell out the preconceptions which might obscure our answers to this question
and the legal constraints (arising from the LGIA) which might impinge on our
considerations.
Developers and anthropologists both commonly seek out what Keesing (1971:
121) called the ‘primary segments’ of local society. These are building blocks —
localised descent groups or primary residential/proprietary units — that provide
a focus for economic, political and ritual interests. When faced with a directive
to form ILGs, their common inclination is to identify discrete corporate units
with separate territories at some level of social organisation. The idea is that the
ILG system should become a mirror of a pre-existing social structure, and that
ILGs should merely give another form of external recognition to what is already
there. This belief is referenced to that catch-all term ‘customary’, and its legal
1  Structure is always a ‘becoming’ not a ‘being’ (Goldman 1993: 23).
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expression is the stated intention of the LGIA ‘to recognize the corporate nature
of customary groups’. However, since there is no occurrence of the word ‘clan’
in any part of the LGIA, we are entitled to ask whether the Act constrains us to
identify social units which are ‘already there’. Can we not take a more liberal
interpretation of the term ‘customary’ so that it not only reflects the principles
and visions which underpinned the Act itself, but equally takes cognisance of
the fact that ‘custom’ itself is never a static phenomenon?
My argument is very simple: if anthropologist and developer would both
forsake their natural inclination to search out ‘primary segments’, thus allowing
for more lateral solutions to the basic problem, then more progress might be
made with customary landowner registration in PNG. I am mindful that such a
suggestion is easier to make than it is to instantiate, so what I want to do in the
remainder of this chapter is to demonstrate the potential way forward once we
loosen our ties to both the ‘primary segment’ model and its exemplification of
‘customary groups’. The case in point will be the problem of incorporating the
Huli landowners in the Hides Gas Project area, as shown in Figure 6-2.
The Hides Experience
The Hides Gas Project has been supplying gas to the Porgera gold mine since
1991 and has paid royalties to local landowners since 1994. The initial mechanism
for benefit distribution was the so-called ‘agency’ system allowed under the
Land Act. In effect, this meant that landowners appointed agents to represent
their customary groups (mostly clans or sub-clans), to receive monies allocated
to these groups, and then distribute these monies to their own group members.
The system served the first and second operators of the project (British Petroleum
and Oil Search) until 1999, when the proposed development of a new
‘Gas-to-Queensland’ Project raised the question of whether the ‘agency’ system
should henceforth be brought into line with the ILG system used in the oil licence
areas where CNGL had been the operator.
The task of finding a viable route to ILG registration for Huli landowners in
the Hides area was encumbered by the complexity of the Huli land tenure system,
in which there are three categories of people resident on any notional ‘clan’
territory, each with a different portfolio of land rights. Whilst land is notionally
owned by clan and sub-clan ‘corporations’, individual members have rights in
perpetuity to do with the land what they want — they are effectively the
landholders. Individuals can sub-let land to anyone for a fee or for a fixed term,
and can grant others use right or title to garden and hunting tracts by gift, deed
or inheritance. In other words, who uses any particular piece of clan territory
held by a clan member is at the discretion of that clan member and not subject
to any group consensus or decision-making process. The only limitation on such
discretion is that clan land can never be permanently and irrevocably alienated
— the corporation holds the ultimate title and collective interest.
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Two processes operate to cause the Huli clan groups on the ground to have
a more complex and cosmopolitan make-up than the one envisaged in a simple
‘one clan one piece of land’ schema. These processes are at the heart of all
problems encountered by lands officers attempting to grapple with the Huli
land tenure system.
For all sorts of reasons — warfare, severe flooding or drought, the search for
better access to hunting areas, or simply personal preferences — individuals
often moved out of their natal clan territories to take up residence on a permanent
or temporary basis with relatives or friends elsewhere, and they could do this
without necessarily losing any of their rights to land in their ‘home’ territories.
Huli distinguish two categories of migrant: those who are related to their hosts
through descent from a female clan member (sisters’ sons, for example) are known
collectively as yamuwini (literally ‘born of woman’), while those who have no
direct blood tie, but are linked by marriage or friendship, are variously known
as wali haga (‘where women stayed’), igiri yango (male friends), or tara (others).
To distinguish themselves from these other categories of resident, the patrilineal
clan members living on their own clan territory refer to themselves as tene, which
means ‘source’, ‘origin’, or ‘main stem’. On any tract of clan land (or parish)
there will therefore be three distinct classes of residents.
In practice all of these residents are indistinguishable in their everyday
behaviour, but the tene are regarded as primary members in the sense of holding
a sort of freehold title, while the others are secondary members holding a sort
of leasehold title. Another way of conceptualising this relationship is to think
of the agnates or primary residents as hotel owners and the secondary residents
as guests who occupy hotel rooms, often with open-ended bookings, who could
in theory be evicted by their hosts (Goldman 1993).
The second process which produces changes in the ‘one clan one piece of
land’ model is in effect the repercussion of the first process over a period of
generations. As secondary members migrate from various Huli clans and stay
as guests on their hosts’ land for several generations, the result is a complex
mosaic of Huli clan segments scattered across wide distances. Migrant groups
may eventually account for anything up to 99 per cent of the total population
of a clan parish, but each of these groups will still retain some knowledge of,
and share a sense of identity with, their natal clan. The members will still be
tene of Clan A while they count as yamuwini or wali haga for Clan B whose
territory they now occupy. Thus any one Huli clan may have several segments
scattered outside its own ancestral land (see Figure 6-3).
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Figure 6-3: A simplified model of the Huli descent and residence system.
The experience of CNGL in the Moran area (PDL 5) had shown that resident
groups in each category would try to assert their right to a discrete ILG status,
and this meant disputing their relative status as owners, guests, or guests of
guests. To make matters even more complicated, Huli people generally have
gardens in many different named parish areas, so a person would claim
membership of more than one potential ILG and thus claim entitlement to multiple
benefits on the basis of this customary practice.
The process of clan boundary demarcation in the Moran area took more than
two years and identified approximately 15 per cent of the land as being under
dispute. There is still no agreement on the part of the landowners about the
number and names of the ILGs that need to be recognised. After initially
identifying more than 200 possible social units for registration, CNGL introduced
the concept of a ‘stock-clan’ in order to prioritise some groups for registration
as ILGs. Each ILG was to be named after one of these ‘stock-clans’, which angered
those resident groups with different descent affiliations. Initially, 12 groups
were registered, and then a further 14 groups were added to the list but without
the due process of gazettal having been followed. This created another wave of
discontent and a further demand for recognition of 17 more groups that was
eventually met by the DPE and the ROT. Project benefits have been distributed
in proportion to the area of land within PDL 5 that is held by each of the claimant
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groups. Although PDL 5 is only one-sixth the size of PDL 1, closure has still not
been achieved on a lengthy and costly process of land boundary demarcation
and ILG registration.
The proposed development of the PNG Gas Project posed new questions
about the need for stable and democratic landowner representation in the
negotiation of new benefit-sharing agreements, as well as the actual distribution
of cash benefits to project beneficiaries. Government agencies and the project
proponents both began asking themselves whether a special model was needed
to deal with the organisation of Huli landowners, and if so, whether it should
be retrospectively applied to existing ‘brownfield’ licence areas as well as to
new ‘greenfield’ areas on which development licences had yet to be granted.
More than 400 Huli clans had so far been identified, and satellite segments
from each of these clans might be represented in any one licence area. Moreover,
these satellite groups might not be confined to discrete segments of land, but
might be scattered across several locations within a licence area. The predictable
outcome for a developer attempting to locate and register ‘primary segments’
would be a system under constant challenge from groups dividing into subgroups
of ever-diminishing size. At the same time, land boundary work would presage
a series of land court claims which would be protracted, costly and
counter-productive for all parties.2  Providing solutions was very much a matter
of finding the satisfactory interface between culture and commerce. In
consultation with Oil Search community affairs managers, the search began with
an effort to isolate and remove each of the variables in the equation that would
constitute a subject for disputation. For example:
• Not using a ‘clan’-based name for an ILG would remove the appearance of
assigning precedence or priority to one social unit over another or signaling
the allocation of a tract of land to the sole custody or ownership of that clan.
• Not performing land boundary demarcation would sidestep the problem of
trying to pinpoint something which may never have been there in the first
place, and which in any event might best be left ‘unspoken’ or unrepresented.
• Raising awareness of the implications of trying to register more than 400
ILGs in light of the Moran and Gobe experiences would help the landowners
to gain some insight into the dilemmas confronting the developer.
The ‘Zone ILG’ Concept
What was eventually proposed as a result of these discussions was a system of
‘zones’ conceived as loosely drawn territorial areas occupied by an aggregated
set of clans and clan sections which sustained long-term relationships based on
intermarriage and exchange (see Figure 6-4). These relationships are more densely
2  In the case of the Gobe licence areas (PDLs 3 and 4), the resolution of landownership issues took 10
years and legal proceedings cost millions of kina.
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clustered within each zone than they are between neighbouring zones. In essence,
the zone ILG was devised on the basis of customary behaviour patterns rather
than principles of land tenure, albeit with a recognition that there has to be a
certain degree of arbitrariness in the construction of zone boundaries. The best
analogy is to be found in the customary exchange of pigs: If I give you a pig,
with which of your neighbours are you compelled by custom to share it? The
answers to this question provide the basis for defining a zone.
Figure 6-4: Zone ILGs proposed for the Hides licence area (PDL 1).
Each zone would in effect be an umbrella entity capable of subsuming or
incorporating ILGs which have already been registered without the need for
deregistration or disenfranchisement (see Figure 6-5). Its members would be
empowered through their own Dispute Settlement Authority to decide who is
or is not a legitimate landowner or landholder within the zone. Neither the
resource developer nor the relevant government agencies would be required to
adjudicate on competing genealogical footprint claims or make the final decision
on who is and who is not an accredited project beneficiary. The actual make-up
of any zone which might be established in other licence areas would necessarily
reflect local circumstances in light of variations in social organisation across the
wider region.
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Figure 6-5: Zone ILG structure proposed for the Hides licence area.
The zone ILG system has several advantages over the present ILG system:
• it provides a means of ‘registering’ interests without upsetting the status
quo of the constituent groups in terms of their present ownership or usage
of land;
• it obviates the need to undertake land boundary demarcation at a fine scale
and thus avoids land disputes;
• it avoids giving priority in land ownership to any one clan at the expense
of another (which is also a source of dispute between clan-based ILGs) because
zones are not named after clans;
• it allows for non-resident claimants to be incorporated in a zone even if they
are members of another ILG elsewhere, which particularly suits the multiple
residential affiliations characteristic of Huli society;
• it discourages the process of ILG fragmentation because an existing ILG
would gain no financial advantage by seceding from a zone;
• it facilitates a more transparent and efficient form of landowner representation
in the negotiation of benefit-sharing agreements because there is a much
smaller number of higher-order ILGs representing the landowners in each
licence area;
• and this also makes it easier for a developer or an aid agency to build ILG
capacities.
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Zone ILGs would be formed in practice by a consensus of the component
member units informed by social mapping and landowner identification studies
undertaken in accordance with Section 47 of the Oil and Gas Act, and their social
constitution would in that sense be guided by anthropological research. Zone
ILGs would allow local-level politics to continue through the proliferation of
smaller social units, but would contain the ramifications of this process within
a set of higher-level boundaries. The message conveyed by this higher level of
organisation is that closely related people need to ‘cooperate’ to mutually benefit
from resource development rather than continue to argue and fight amongst
themselves. Zone ILGs would to some extent be artificial entities, but would still
be less artificial than the rectangular petroleum licence areas to which they are
related. In each area, the licence holders (and government agencies) would only
need to deal with a committee made up of the elected chairpersons of each zone,
in much the same way as the mining company at Porgera deals with ‘super
agents’ under the agency system (see Golub, this volume).
It is readily acknowledged that any system of this kind is subject to the risk
of political manipulation and social strain. While the representative structures
in a zonal system should provide constraints on benefit abuse by individual
leaders, they would probably alienate the representatives of existing Landowner
Associations who would be fearful of being marginalised in project negotiations.
Equally, a reformed and rationalised ILG system would still need to provide the
community with the level of benefit disaggregation they clearly desire — which
means that benefits should end up with individual recipients and not the
‘representatives’ of larger social units.
Whether or not the zone ILG system needs to be justified in terms of local
‘custom’, there remains the question of whether it is consistent with the letter
and spirit of the Land Groups Incorporation Act. Section 5(3) of the Act states
that:
Recognition shall not be refused to a group simply because —
(a) the members are part only of a customary group or are members of
another incorporated land group; or
(b) the group includes persons who are not members of the primary
customary group, if the Registrar is satisfied that those persons regard
themselves, and are regarded by the others, as bound by the relevant
customs of the primary customary group; or
(c) the group is made up of members of various customary groups, if the
Registrar is satisfied that the group possesses common interests and
coherence independently of the proposed recognition, and share or are
prepared to share common customs …
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The zone ILG is precisely an entity of the type described in clause (c) if we
understand ‘common customs’ to mean agreed principles of behaviour. It should
therefore be evident that the LGIA does not oblige the developer or consultant
anthropologist to chain the constitution of ILGs to some ‘primary segment’ model.
Moreover, Section 5(5) even allows for an ILG to be constituted ‘as a group
consisting only of incorporated land groups’. The notion of aggregated units is
thus specifically and explicitly allowed for in the Act, and if the zone ILG system
places the onus for decisions about membership squarely back in court of the
ILGs themselves, this is also consistent with the spirit of the Act.
If one does imbue such units with what Ernst (1999) called ‘entivity’, this
may in fact be a positive factor for change in the community. The principles of
Melanesian kastom are not inconsistent with the creation of a social artifact
tailored to the interests of a state and a developer which also benefits the
population of local landowners. Under the terms of the Organic Law on Provincial
Governments and Local-Level Governments 1995, zones actually resemble the local
government wards which are also aggregates of local clans and clan segments.
How the ‘Zone’ Concept Fared
In 2000, Oil Search instituted a ‘zone’ ILG system for PDL 1 and two adjacent
Petroleum Retention Licence areas in anticipation of the PNG Gas Project. This
exercise had written endorsement from the DPE and the ROT. Seventeen zones
were proposed, and eight were actually registered with the ROT.3  However,
following representations by some individuals from one of the adjacent licence
areas (known as Hides 4x), further registrations were halted under instructions
from the DPE. Zone ILGs have not yet had an opportunity to function as
representative or beneficiary bodies because there is as yet no PNG Gas Project.
However, zone ILG agreements about the distribution of future benefits between
member sections within each zone are enshrined within the ILG constitutions.
PNG government agencies such as the DPE and the newly established Gas
Office are still considering what is the best mechanism for the distribution of
potential cash benefits to local landowners. Cash benefits from the existing oil
project have either been divided equally between the number of ILGs in a licence
area (as in PDL 2) or in accordance with the acreage held by each ILG (as in
PDL 5). Whilst the retention of a ‘clan’-based system has some attractions because
of its apparent consistency with their understanding of kastom, government
officials are also sensitive to the results of various surveys which indicate that
people in some of the licence areas want benefits to be distributed on a per capita
basis. This preference is evident in a household survey conducted as part of the
3 The eight zone ILGs registered by 2004 (Biangoli, Kupa, Habono, Obai Tangi, Kamia Gere, Mato,
Mindirate and Ayagere) are included in the total number of Hides area ILGs shown in Table 6-1, while
the other nine are shown as ‘pending’ in that table.
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Gas Project Social Impact Assessment in 2005 (see Figure 6-6). However, this
survey also shows a much greater preference for per capita distribution in Huli
areas (Moran and Hides) than along the route of the current oil pipeline which
follows the course of the Kikori River. This may reflect the already splintered
nature of the ILG system in Gulf Province, where many individuals or families
already have their own private ILGs. In all other areas, there is clear evidence
of continuing dissatisfaction with the present benefit distribution regimes and
support for the move to a more equitable system in which individual group
members have their own passbooks and accounts, rather than having to rely on
the decision made by ILG chairmen who look after the accounts of their respective
groups.
Figure 6-6: Landowner preferences for benefit distribution, 2005.
Source: Goldman 2005.
Despite these findings, PNG government agencies are still saddled with the
task of deciding how best to derive a system of landowner representation, given
the factionalised nature of local politics in Huli society, and how best to derive
a list of ‘landowners’ that will be acceptable to local people, given the complex
nature of Huli land tenure. Government officials seem to think that the social
mapping and landowner identification studies required under Section 47 of the
Oil and Gas Act should extricate them from this minefield by painting a frozen
landscape whose ‘landowners’ could then be vetted or endorsed by the Minister
of Petroleum and Energy as ‘entitled project beneficiaries’. This position is at
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variance with the best advice of all consultant anthropologists who have worked
in the licence areas over the last decade, who say that the task of providing a
definitive beneficiary list based on people’s status as individual ‘landowners’ is
nigh impossible, and in any event is a task best left to local people to undertake
in accordance with the wide range of factors that make up kastom. In the many
meetings on this subject in which I have been a participant, the ‘zone’ system
has been firmly rejected by government officials because of its ‘non-customary’
nature. Debate therefore continues on how to reconcile the equitable principle
of per capita distribution with the perceived inequity of a ‘clan’ system that
relies on clan leaders to ‘cut up the pig’. This ongoing debate is enmeshed with
considerations exogenous to the merits of a zone ILG system, such as the
requirements of international financial institutions, the personal agendas of
current landowner ‘leaders’, and misapprehensions or indecision on the part of
the policy makers. The final scenarios have yet to be played out.
Conclusion: What Hides Reveals
The ‘zone’ system was conceived to address problems already experienced with
ILGs elsewhere, and it anticipated what might happen with the formation of
ILGs in the context of Huli culture and social organisation. From long-term
research on dispute resolution and economic exchange in Huli society, a set of
scenarios could be foreshadowed which would pose intractable obstacles to the
progress and stability of a major resource development project. In one sense the
‘zone’ system was engineered to allow local-level politics to continue unimpeded:
as local groups traditionally argued over the way in which pork should be
distributed at ceremonial pig kills, so do these same groups now compete for
increased portions of the ‘project pig’. The solution was to establish a system
with a built-in firewall such that these utterly conventional but highly localised
competitive encounters would not necessarily hamper development activities.
At the same time, the solution seemed attractive to this consultant because
it offered an opportunity to build a new form of ‘community’ within a
socio-cultural environment which lacked village-like settlements or any
aggregated form of residential pattern. Thus supra-local community would be
a grouping of clans and clan segments sharing different parts of the ‘benefit
pig’, with a democratically elected leadership committee that could then seek
to expand its activities by applying for development grants from suitable aid
donors.
It is important to add that a three-month process of consultation with
landowners in the Hides licence area (PDL 1) found unanimous support for the
system, partly because the problem associated with the previous formation of
ILGs in the neighbouring Moran licence area (PDL 5) and the more distant Gobe
licence area (PDLs 3 and 4) were already well known in the Hides area. Indeed,
the success of the implementation process which followed the consultation
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process reflected the real and historical relations of intermarriage and exchange
between zone members.
Perhaps this shows how the anthropologist as consultant is able to ‘gate-keep’
a practical solution to a widely acknowledged problem by engineering a new
social system that is not only consistent with the realities of economic
development and the expectations of the developer, but also helps to manage
‘custom’ as a basis for sustainable innovation. According to Stirrat (2000),
development consultancy work is commonly based on the mistaken belief that
consultants can somehow penetrate to the ‘truth’ or ‘essence’ of what is going
on in the world. But the consultant anthropologist who counts as an acculturated
observer of one particular society is more like a translator who knows enough
to anticipate social trajectories and provide constructive solutions to the problems
they contain.
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Chapter Seven
The Foi Incorporated Land Group:
Group Definition and Collective Action
in the Kutubu Oil Project Area, Papua
New Guinea
James F. Weiner
In this paper I examine the genesis and progress of the Incorporated Land Group
(ILG) in the Kutubu oil project area of Papua New Guinea (PNG). The ILG is a
legal entity empowered by legislation passed in 1974 to give legal and formal
recognition, protection and powers to customary landowning groups in PNG
(see Fingleton, this volume). In the Kutubu oil project area, at the instigation of
Chevron Niugini Ltd (CNGL), the previous managing partner of the Kutubu
Joint Venture, the Foi, Fasu and Lower Kikori River clans became incorporated
under PNG’s Land Groups Incorporation Act 1974 (LGIA) and now receive royalty
payments from the sale of petroleum. The ILG mechanism was employed by the
developers in the belief that it would ‘give powers to landowners so that they
could manage their affairs in a businesslike way’ and ‘provide recognition of
the land group [that would] enable the village landowners to act in a way that
outside people and agencies must recognize’ (Power 2000: 29). The advocates of
the ILG mechanism asserted that ‘the ILG constitution guarantees that decisions
regarding clan resources are made by the correct authorities in the clan’ (ibid).
But since the original round of ILG registrations, there have been numerous
applications for new ILG status from subgroups within these original ILGs
incorporated in the early 1990s. In 1998, 13 new Fasu ILG applications were
lodged, all of them by subgroups within already incorporated clans. This
proliferation is in the context of the most common complaint concerning these
ILGs: that the income is not being satisfactorily shared by those members of the
executive committee designated by the ILG to distribute its income. These new
ILGs wish to have their own passbooks and receive their income payments
directly.
The previous project operator, CNGL, interpreted this trend in two ways: as
a sign that local clan leaders are dishonest, and as a sign that local people
themselves have not yet sufficiently understood the nature of contemporary
managerial procedure. They stop short of admitting the possibility that the clans
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themselves are not ‘customarily’ either corporate or collective units that exist
for the common interest of its members.
But the LGIA is based on a quite erroneous assumption of the communal
nature of landholding and transmission within the Melanesian ‘clan’ and of its
essentially ‘collective’ interest. As Evans-Pritchard reminded us — and this
became a founding approach of the Manchester school of African social
anthropology in the 1950s and 1960s — the whole concept of the segmentary
lineage system around which the attributes of corporateness were first empirically
examined was founded on the notion of enduring and regular structural relations
of conflict and consequent group fission as the mode of societal reproduction.
Acts of legislation such as the LGIA have not understood this aspect of social
structural formation in PNG, resulting in problems such as those CNGL has
encountered in applying the LGIA to customary ‘landholding’ units. The
companies and government departments who have attempted to implement the
LGIA have made an ethnographically indefensible apportionment of the ‘political’
to external relations among landholding units, and consequently see the resulting
conflict and competition within them as adventitious and subversive of the
‘customary’ landholding units themselves. This arises from the tendency to
assume that the internal affairs and composition of landowning social units are
both practically and ontologically prior to their external relations.
The ILG and the Petroleum Industry in PNG
In the early 1990s CNGL undertook a census of all villages with clans who owned
land in its Petroleum Development Licence (PDL) area and incorporated the
recognised landholding groups at the same time. A total of 54 Foi ILGs were
registered as PDL landowners with the aid of CNGL’s Lands Department between
1992 and 1994.
In an unpublished paper circulated amongst CNGL and other petroleum
industry and government personnel, Tony Power, one of leading architects of
this process, stated:
The Land Groups Incorporation Act was the most significant outcome
of the 1973 Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters (CILM). The Act
embodied a constant refrain in the CILM reflecting the desire of the
Commissioners that Papua New Guinean ways be employed to maintain
the integrity of custom in the management of land. The Commissioners
soundly rejected all forms of land tenure conversion. At the same time
the same concepts were being developed by the founding fathers and
found their way into the Constitution exhorting the use of Papua New
Guinean ways. The mind of the legislator was clearly that modern
management mechanisms can and should be applied by customary groups
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to manage their affairs in relation to land and related matters (2000: 52,
emphasis added).
The administrators trying to come to terms with the task of protecting
customary PNG landholding units today are engaged in the same epistemological
exercise that their structural-functionalist predecessors were during
Radcliffe-Brown’s time (Weiner and Glaskin 2006: 1–2).
The more emphatically the investigators insisted on the importance of
definitions, rationality, and their own conceptions of law and property,
the more substantial and strictly bounded the groups became. They
became, in short, much more like the consciously organized, planned,
and structured groups of Western society in spite of a lack of any kind
of evidence that natives actually thought of them in that way. ‘Groups’
were a function of our understanding of what the people were doing rather
than of what they made of things (Wagner 1994: 97).
Anthropologically, it might seem ironic that just as global industry is (re-)
discovering the wisdom of Colonial Codification, anthropology has focused its
attention away from the normative, the collective and the bounded in social life.
In more recent years, a variety of theoretical developments have caused the
pendulum to swing away from an acceptance of the collectiveness and
corporateness of indigenous landholding units, and towards an understanding
of the unstable, porous, nomadic, centripetal and fluid characteristics of such
groups.1 Yet the increasing contemporary struggle over control of land and
resources has produced a movement in the opposite direction: towards some
evolution of universal principles for the protection of property rights, and the
codification and legal protection of indigenous customary law around the world.
The present panoply of laws (increasingly subject to international codification
and recognition, most notably through the United Nations and other international
agencies) that define a wide range of indigenous customary institutions is
consequential for the future of indigenous custom, practice and
self-understanding. Although aspects of this have received relatively recent
public exposure,2  Australian anthropologist Kenneth Maddock put the matter
succinctly somewhat earlier:
It is important to distinguish, in principle, between rights originating
in modern statute law and rights having some other origin. Otherwise,
anthropologists will smuggle into their accounts a legal view that, intended
to express a traditional reality, has been shaped in its original formulation
1  Sutton (2003) comments on the similar effects of Fred Myers’ (1986) Pintupi ethnography on the
interpretation of Australian Aboriginal group structure.
2  Notably the Coronation Hill and Hindmarsh Island Bridge sacred site claims in Australia, the Ok Tedi
pollution case in PNG, and the Exxon Valdez compensation case in Alaska.
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and subsequent development by the exigencies of legal policy and reasoning
(Maddock 1989: 173, emphasis added).
The first problem in PNG law is that nowhere does it contain a definitive
definition of what a ‘landowner’ is. As Filer has convincingly argued in the PNG
context, the issue of ‘landownership’ as such is largely an artifact of the recent
mineral exploitation in PNG:
There is a sense in which Papua New Guineans have only become
landowners over the course of the last 10 years … the question of whether
‘clans’ exist as ‘landowners’ in the fabric of national identity is the
question of how ‘clans’ have actually become groups of landowners
claiming compensation from development of their own resources (Filer
1997: 162, 168).
The genesis of the concept of the landowner can partly be traced to the various
preambles and explanatory addenda to the LGIA:
Developers of resources in PNG must by necessity involve the owners
of land because all land where resources are located is privately and
communally owned. Developers are concerned that the landowners in
the project area fully support their project. In order for this to happen
landowners must manage the physical, social and economic impact of
the resource development. A critical element of impact management is
the distribution of direct cash benefits arising from land use, royalties,
and equity. If the impact of the project is so great as to destroy the social
fabric then the security of the project will be greatly eroded. The ILG
system is not just [an] exercise to distribute cash benefits. The ability to
fairly distribute cash benefits, though important, is only one outcome
of a successful ILG system (Power n.d.(a): 1).
This points to the second problem: there is a critical ambiguity in the above
statement. Is, or is not, the chief function of the ILG system to distribute benefits
from commercial developments such as petroleum extraction, mining and logging,
or should it have some wider and more synergistic function with the traditional
social units in PNG, specifically with respect to the protection of land rights and
their customary form of transmission? Having worked with the Foi, both before
and since the advent of the oil project, there seems no doubt in either my mind
or theirs: the ILG is perceived solely as a petroleum benefit-receiving body, and
all of the uses to which it has been put by the Foi (and other people within the
petroleum project area) have been exclusively related to this function. It has not
yet been put to use to attend to matters pertaining to ownership of land per se,
as it was originally designed to do. PNG's Land Titles Commissioners made this
same point in one of their judgments on a dispute about landownership in one
petroleum project area:
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The issues contested in the hearing is [sic] not only limited to customary
landownership. There are arguments on public policy considerations,
application of the Land Act and the Petroleum Act for purposes of settling
claims of rights of parties owning land affected by the petroleum project
(Kanawi et al. 1998: 11).
Rather than the ILG mechanism serving to legally ‘modernise’ the existing
system of land proprietorship, the Foi and other oil project area peoples have
employed it as the unit of political struggle over petroleum benefit sharing,
much to the consternation of CNGL’s External Affairs Office, the PNG Department
of Petroleum and Energy and the PNG Department of Lands, which deal with
landowner relations in petroleum licence areas.
The Proliferation of ‘New’ ILGs
Tony Power, who was working for the CNGL External Affairs Department when
the initial registration of oil project area ILGs was first carried out in 1992,
recently wrote the following account:
Since the beneficiaries are Incorporated Land Groups, vetting of lists
that have developed since dividends began to be paid must be done to
prevent possible fraud. In the early 1990’s before there was any clear
incentive to form new land groups all the population within the project
area belonged to the original land groups assisted by Chevron to
incorporate via the Land Groups Incorporation Act. All of these people
were also censused and recorded in the Village Census Books. Nobody
forced these village people to record their genealogies in this manner
and hence it must be assumed that the original groups were for the most
part accurate. Since the original land groups were incorporated a number
of ‘new’ ILGs have emerged. As new groups will dilute the benefits to
the original groups it is necessary to examine all new ILGs to see if they
are justified. This could be done in the field by a team including Chevron,
DPE and a Provincial Lands Officer, after consultation with the Registrar
of Titles and PRK (Power n.d.(b): 1).3
As I have said, the ILG is simply seen by the Foi as a strategic device whose
purpose is primarily political-economic rather than one of customary land
management per se. Leaders among the Foi are using the creation of new ILGs
to leverage additional shares of the petroleum revenue for their supporters since,
as a result of the initial memoranda of agreement, each ILG owning land in the
PDL area would receive the same share of the revenue, regardless of population
size or absolute amount of PDL land owned. PDL landowners are also enhancing
3  PRK (Petroleum Resources Kutubu) was a company established by the State to hold equity in the oil
project on behalf of the customary landowners.
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their own support amongst non-PDL landowners by offering to make them ‘PDL
landowners’ in a variety of ways.
An example of how this is working itself out can be found in Lower Foe. The
leader behind the landowner company called Muiyoke Pty realises that he
represents only a small population, and what is more, compared to the larger
and more central Foi villages, he commands few educated, literate men who can
help him form the core of an effective political and economic organisation. He
thus uses Muiyoke to attract men from the more populous Upper Mubi. This is
achieved by promising them that if they buy shares in the company, not only
will they receive oil revenues, but by forming their own ILGs, through their
shares in Muiyoke, they can become, by definition, PDL landowners. This is
illustrative of a distributive mechanism that is not based on the assumed
behaviour of the liberal sovereign individual who is viewed by many as the
basis of the governance system empowered by the LGIA (Weiner 1998; see also
Rowse 1998; Lea 2000).
In the same way that the LGIA requires (without enshrining) this autonomous,
sovereign individual, the same urge that characterised early social anthropology
— towards achieving a clear, unambiguous ‘sharp-edged’ definition of indigenous
social units and their territorial property — is evident in the thinking behind
the LGIA:
If an original land group divided into two or more then the members
would have to demonstrate the following:
• That the two or more land groups have distinct land and do not have
cross claims or interests in each other’s land.
• That they followed their ILG constitution when dividing the original
ILG.
• That they have the support of their ethnic group who recognize their
separate identity.
Where new ILGs have no customary basis for division they would divide
their original one share between them [emphasis added]. This is exactly
what happened with the Foi beneficiaries for royalties. 24 ILGs
representing 8 clans shared 8 shares of dividend …
A primary consideration must be that recognition of new groups will
dilute the benefits to existing beneficiaries. In that case any new groups
would have to be approved by the existing beneficiaries. A mechanism
will have to be devised to seek approval of existing beneficiaries by
means of consultation at general meetings with the members of landowner
associations or shareholders of companies. Once this vetting takes place
a definitive list of beneficiaries can be recognized by DPE and forwarded
to the Trustee (Power: n.d.(b): 1).
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But the previous examples indicate that the ILG (as understood by its
architects) has been uniformly misunderstood and misapplied by the great
majority of ordinary Foi. By 1999, there were at least 48 cases requiring ‘land
group maintenance’: that is, the alteration, re-registration, or splitting and new
registration of previously incorporated land groups. In mid-1999, 26 original
ILGs had been deregistered by the Lands Department in Port Moresby, and
about 80 new ILGs had been registered claiming distinct and separate status
(and separate petroleum revenues as well). Additional new ILGs were applying
for and receiving ILG certificates from the Lands Department in Port Moresby
in June 2000. The reasons given for these proposed alterations have been varied:
• groups fear that money has not been distributed equitably within the ILG
and therefore wish to establish their own income stream and passbook;
• disputes have emerged over the land borders originally registered, and over
the membership of groups already registered;
• there have been uncertainties as to the kinship and clan membership of
component groups within the ILG;
• finally, and commonly, there were accusations of improper behaviour levelled
at ILG chairmen.
At a broader level, regional leaders tried to register as many ILGs under their
own political ‘association’ as they could, to claim as large a proportion of the
fixed petroleum royalty as possible, and to enhance the appearance of their
numerical support. In all of these cases, the codification of customary ownership
of land figures hardly at all.
This progressive fragmentation of ‘traditional’ landowning groups has been
perceived to be against the spirit of the ILG program. The philosophy of the ILG
is that the corporate group will act in the interests of a body corporate. When
it does not do so, it is common to blame the failure on the self-interest of its
leaders or on the ignorance of local landowners — although the frequent and
regular emergence of such ‘self-interested’ leaders should itself act as a critique
of the assumption of the landowning group’s ‘collective interest’.
I have argued, however, that the fragmentation of Foi ILGs is consonant with
more deep-seated oppositional behaviour that governed to a marked extent the
shape of political life and the resulting composition of local residential groups
in Foi and indeed throughout the societies of the petroleum project area (Weiner
1998). The company, on the other hand, has mistakenly taken the appearance
and rhetoric of collective action as evidence for the existence of a collective
interest.
The proliferation of ‘splinter ILGs’ represents the response to the pressure
on the Foi system of pervasive social differentiation caused by the influx of
petroleum revenues. The ‘names’ of Foi social groups, like those of their Daribi
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counterparts, ‘only group people in the way that they separate or distinguish
them on the basis of some criterion’ (Wagner 1974: 106). Usually, this criterion
is territorial in the Foi case. Hence, subdivisions of clans are referred to as, for
example, Mubiga So'onedobo (‘the So'onedobo who live near the head of the
Mubi River’), as opposed to Baibu So'onedobo (‘the So'onedobo who live near
Baibu Creek’).
Individual lines within a Foi clan are conventionally differentiated in one of
two ways. The most common is to label them according to their land. For example,
in Hegeso village, the elder men Abosi and Haibu were ‘Hesa Orodobo’ and
Midibaru and Tari were ‘Yebibu Orodobo’. Midibaru’s son Kora cannot build a
house or garden on Hesa Orodobo land without permission; and Abosi’s son
Dobo cannot do the same without permission from Yebibu Orodobo, even though
they maintain they are of a single clan and act collectively in other matters. The
other manner of distinguishing lines within a clan is by way of their clan of
origin. For example, Sobore, a Fo'omahu'u man, was taken in by the Orodobo
clan of Hegeso, was given resources and protection, and kinship ties were
extended to him. His descendants, though functionally full Orodobo clan
members, are more precisely referred to as Fo'omahu'u Orodobo.
As Wagner has observed, these names are significant ‘not because of the way
they describe something, but because of the way in which they contrast it with
others’ (Wagner 1974: 107, emphasis added). These distinctions are for the most
part contingent and emergent — they appear in the context of some specific
incident of oppositional behaviour, and can easily disappear once that opposition
is defused or brought to some resolution. Most often, Foi men of the same local
clan find themselves in dispute over one issue or another — the division of
bridewealth, the use of specific spots of land, accusations of adultery or theft,
and so on. These can lead to factions emerging that look ‘as if’ the clan is
fissioning. But such acts of fission are not necessarily either irreversible or even
long-lived, though they can be both. They merely reflect the territorial fluidity
of such groups, in a manner strikingly reminiscent of the way Evans-Pritchard
described the Nuer:
Nuer tribes are an evaluation of territorial distribution and tribal and
intertribal and foreign relations are standardized modes of behaviour
through which the values are expressed … Moreover, it is not only
relative because what we designate a tribe to-day may be two tribes
to-morrow, but it can only be said to determine behaviour when a certain
set of structural relations are in operation, mainly acts of hostility between
tribal segments and between a tribe and other groups of the same structural
order as itself, or acts likely to provoke aggression. A tribe very rarely
engages in corporate activities, and, furthermore, the tribal value
determines behaviour in a definite and restricted field of social relations
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and is only one of a series of political values, some of which are in conflict
with it (Evans-Pritchard 1940: 149, emphasis added).
More generally, what Schieffelin (1976) calls the ‘opposition scenario’ in this
part of PNG can have a more positive rendering — that is, the customary
understanding that land boundaries and landownership are what neighbouring
clans acknowledge them to be. In a judgement pertaining to disputed ownership
of the Hides gas project licence area,4  and in one of the judgements pertaining
to the Gobe dispute, it was recognised that ‘a land [sic] is said to belong to a
group when the land boundary is acknowledged by the neighbouring clans’
(Kanawi et al. 1998: 17).5  It is this recognition of the relational aspect of property,
and of land in particular, that leads Cooter (1989: 13) to contrast ‘market
property’, appropriate to the non-kin-based societies of the modern West, with
‘relational property’, characteristic of the kin-based societies of nations such as
PNG.6
The Local Clan Versus the ILG
There is thus a fundamental conflict at the heart of the ILG mechanism which
crops up constantly. This conflict can be stated as follows: the LGIA was
purportedly designed to enshrine the traditional landowning group as a legal
landowning corporation. The purpose of this was to give legislative protection to
the traditional landowning units in any given area of PNG. Take the following
list prepared by Power under the heading of ‘Measurable Indicators of
Incorporated Land Group Effectiveness’:
The most important deliverable of the land group incorporation process
is the identification and training of a cadre of village land workers, being
villagers, old and young, keen to become involved in the learning process
in the transition from an oral to a written society. These are the contacts
in the villages that can relate to government and developer extension
officers in developing management for the ILGs. Answers to the following
questions will illustrate the degree of progress made.
• Does the ILG have a recognized ‘custom expert’?
• Does the ILG recognize a ‘custom expert’ from another clan in the
village?
• Does the ILG have a literate facilitator?
• Does the ILG have access to a literate facilitator within the village?
4 Re Hides Gas Project Land Case [1993] PNGLR 309.
5 The ‘opposition scenario’ can have the opposite effect as well — lines without genealogical connection
have formed a single ILG by banding together in both the Gobe and South East Gobe licence areas. The
Land Titles Commission opined that this was an improper use of the LGIA (Kanawi et al. 1998).
6  Of course all property is relational in the sense that things are ‘owned’ in rem, that is, only as against
other people.
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• Have any of these ILG functionaries ever attended a training
workshop to help them develop their skills?
• How many outstanding land disputes over either ownership or use
rights between resident clans are in the village?
• How many outstanding land disputes over either ownership or use
rights are there with outside clans?
• Does the village recognize a Dispute Settlement Authority (DSA)
empowered under the Land Groups Incorporation Act?
• How many times has the DSA met since the formation of the village
ILGs?
• Does the ILG have a Minute book?
• Does the ILG have a corporate seal?
• How many formal decisions have been made by a given ILG in the
last 12 months?
• Were these decisions recorded in a minute book, signed off by the
Committee and kept for future reference?
• Does the Village Development Committee take an active interest in
ILG functions, activities and responsibilities?
• Is there a formal member of the VDC responsible for ILG matters?
• Enumerate any ILG related activities pursued in the village.
• Does the ILG have any customary obligations to outside clans that
should be addressed by the ILG Committee or are these obligations
more on a family basis?
• Does the village have any permanent residents from other villages?
• Which ILG(s) has responsibility for managing these people?
• What land rights do these guest residents have?
• When did the guest residents first come to the village?
• What is the status of guest residents in regard to land management?
(Power 2000: 99).
These questions invoke the Western terms of corporation. A corporation is a
group that is legally treated as a single individual. The LGIA assumes that the
landowning unit acts collectively in its collective interest. It assumes that the
decisions that a landowning unit makes are similar to the decisions a corporation
makes.
This is not the case, at least not among the Foi. It is not demonstrable that
the local clan acts collectively to further the interests of the clan as a collective
unit. What anthropologists such as Roy Wagner (1974), Marilyn Strathern (1985),
Simon Harrison (1993) and myself have described as the ‘givenness’ of connection
and obligation in PNG sociality has been mistaken by the architects of the LGIA
as evidence of communal, corporatist ownership and decision making. If this is
so, then the act of incorporation cannot protect the customary status of the local
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Foi clan — it can only force it into new forms which can take on the functions
that the LGIA assumes such units will undertake.
The conclusion we must face is that traditional custom cannot be protected
by an act of legislation. The legislation is composed and empowered by a cultural
and legal system very much at odds with the way local ‘traditional custom’ arises
and is implemented. To again quote from Power:
The [LGIA] actually spells out this relationship between land and group
in the opening words: ‘Being an Act —
a. to recognize the corporate nature of customary groups; and
b. to allow them to hold, manage and deal with land in their customary
names and for related purposes.’ [Original emphasis] …
Thus the purpose of the Act is to empower groups owning land
communally to manage their land. NB The Act does not narrowly confine
itself to the aspect of managing benefits coming to the owners, though
it clearly accommodates this.7
In their judgment on the Gobe dispute, the Land Titles Commissioners said that:
Where claims arise in that [sic] a certificate is issued under the provisions
of the Land Groups Incorporation Act amount to title in land, such claims
are not valid on the basis that [sic] the characteristics of the ‘title’ referred
to in the provisions of Section 1 of the Land Groups Incorporation Act is
[sic] not the same title to land ownership in that it [sic] relates to ‘title to
name’ of the customary land owning group ... (Kanawi et al. 1998: 31).
And again:
Sowolo clan members by their own admissions have allied with the
Haporopakes and have formed a common clan unit sharing social values,
protecting and using various common land marks. This traditionally
binds the persons as a clan unit and therefore one cannot retract from
[sic] those customary obligations for the sake of some monetary benefits
derived from the land at this time (ibid: 64).
Thus, insofar as the ILG is acknowledged by the Commissioners to have been
utilised primarily as a unit receiving petroleum benefits, it must constantly work
against what they perceive to be the interests of the traditional customary
landowning group.
7  ‘Definition of Land Groups and Group Lands.’ Chevron Niugini File note A.P. Power 6 February 1998.
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What is Customary Law?
Power has also written about what constitutes the ‘law-like’ in customary law:
The corporate nature of the land group makes allowance for a constitution
to govern the management of the group. This is analogous to the
constitution or articles etc of companies and business groups. A very
significant weakness in implementation of the LGIA to date has been
the failure of the groups to appreciate the importance of their constitution
and hence their inability to manage their affairs accordingly. Thus when
issues arise that could be dealt with by the group under the leadership
of their management committee, the group fails to act. This leads to
dissension in the group and moves to split up into smaller groups.
Splitting into smaller groups may completely distort the responsibilities
and effectiveness of the land controllers and should be avoided at all
costs since it is totally contrary to the purposes of the Act (Power 1998:
39).
The intent of the audit of the Kutubu ILGs which I carried out in 1999–2000,
and the policy of the CNGL Lands and External Affairs officers, was to make
sure that the ILG program preserves the customary landholding units in the oil
project area. However, to repeat, the LGIA is based on Western notions of
property ownership and collective, corporate decision making that are not
Melanesian principles as such. Therefore, the LGIA already works to some extent
against traditional custom, by making a concrete ‘thing’ out of land and of the
landowning group (Weiner 1998). But ‘customary law is not a statement of
practice. It is a normatively clothed set of abstractions from practice …’ (Hamnett
1977: 7). Bohannan says that:
Whereas custom continues to inhere in, and only in, these institutions
which it governs (and which in turn govern it), law is specifically
recreated, by agents of society, in a narrower and recognizable context
— that is, in the context of the institutions that are legal in character
and, to some degree at least, discrete from all others … (1967: 45).
Law has the additional characteristic that it must be what Kantorowicz
calls ‘justiciable,’ by which he means that the rules must be capable of
reinterpretation, and actually must be reinterpreted, by one of the legal
institutions of society so that conflicts within nonlegal institutions can
be adjusted by an ‘authority’ outside themselves. (Bohannan 1967: 45–6).
I think the issue of justiciability and its relation to the work of ‘interpretation’
more generally is what is critical here — a point to which I return at the end of
this chapter.
The Foi landownership system was highly flexible in traditional terms and
groups varied dramatically in size, from the large clans of Damayu and Fiwaga
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which had over 100 adult male members, to Kuidobo clan of Hegeso which in
the 1980s had a single adult male. There simply were no guidelines or ideal
parameters governing what a local clan ‘should’ consist of. Clans and individuals
alienated land frequently and commonly, and gained exclusive ownership over
new parcels of land constantly. It must also be repeated that no local clan was
in any absolute sense disadvantaged over others in terms of access to all types
of land.
In fact, the evidence is that customary land law is human cataloguing of a
land redistribution mechanism that has evolved over a very long time in the
development of interior New Guinea agricultural systems (Weiner 1988b).
Customary law in the highlands redistributes land involuntarily in
response to changing power relationships among groups. Weak groups
that are dispossessed of land by their enemies get absorbed by others
[voluntarily in nearly all cases] to bring power back into balance. By
keeping groups small and constantly re-aligning them, no group gains
complete dominance over others (Cooter 1989: 69, emphasis added).
Another important feature of the fragmentation of Foi clans through the ILG
mechanism is that adopted lines are singled out, either for second-class status
within the clan or for expulsion as outsiders. However, the process can work
the other way around — the impetus can come from the descendants of
immigrants themselves who use that justification of foreign origin to set up their
own ILG. In either case, the territorial dimension of ‘clan’, that is, local group
organisation is being eroded by the inextricable link between the ILG mechanism
and the distribution of resource benefits. In either case, the full status of
descendants of immigrants is subject to erosion of full clan rights. While it is
true that foreign origins were never forgotten in the past, there was virtually
no distinction in status within the clan because of it. It appears that the Foi are
on the way to developing their own model of infra-indigeneity, whereby
‘original’ people are contrasted with ‘immigrants’.
But the fact that PDL land is valuable in a way that traditional land was not
means that the system threatens to ‘set in concrete’ a division of the clan into
PDL and non-PDL landowners (Weiner 2001), although — as the example of
Muiyoke indicates — there are indications that the Foi are indirectly
redistributing even PDL land more widely. These points have already been
summarised more effectively in the course of Cooter’s earlier observations:
The courts that hear cases in customary law — village courts and land
courts — are better placed than parliament to make authoritative findings
about customary law … Melanesian legal principles are to be discovered
by deciding cases in customary law. The ‘common law process’, which
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refers to the courts working custom into formal law, involves litigation,
not legislation (Cooter 1989: 19).
The Fragmentation of Foi Clans
Many of the new ILGs at Lake Kutubu are the result of large clans such as Wasemi
Fo'omahu'u Orodobo or the large Damayu and Fiwaga clans splitting into
constituent subclans and lineages. These new applications are defensible in terms
of population growth alone, which was the most common precipitating cause of
clan fission. In Foi, ira (‘tree’) is the term applied to three generations of male
descendants of a single man. Practically, it takes the form of a group of full
brothers whose land is normally contiguous — in other words, they live near
each other as well as being closely related. The ILGs that were audited at Wasemi
were all ‘trees’ of the Orodobo and So'onedobo clans — the two biggest clans at
Wasemi. I have previously identified the ira as the property managing and
work-related cooperation group within the Foe social system (Weiner 1986,
1988a), and so there is nothing non-traditional about this kind of division — it
merely gives formal ILG recognition to a unit that is already explicit and visible
in the Foi social system.
The ILG, though based on principles by which clans are defined as
landowning entities, is not the same as the clan per se. The Foi themselves are
clear about the different functions of ILGs and their traditional clans. For
example, a single clan may consist of two or more subclans for the purposes of
ILG recognition and land stewardship. But the entire clan still acts as a unit, for
example, in the collection and receipt of bridewealth for its female members.
A singularly appropriate feature of the LGIA is that it defines the land
belonging to a landowning group not in terms of a discrete unbroken border,
but in terms of a list of specific sites over which its constituents exercise what
for all intents and purposes are the prerogatives of ownership. In this context,
ownership is defined as control of access to the site or ground in question. Among
Foi the local clan exercises a sort of nominal communal dominion over its
territorial resources, but effective ownership, that is control of access, is always
exercised by specific individuals or, at most, a set of full male siblings and their
father (Weiner 1986, 1988a).8
The issue at stake is not just control of resources but also the mechanism and
locus of decision making at the local level. As a result of there now being two
social units, the ILG and the clan, clan-wide decisions concerning things such
as bridewealth and ceremonial will be split off from decisions concerning resource
management and distribution. It is an open question whether, in terms of
8 This is similar to Sutton’s (1998) distinction between proximate and underlying title in Australian
Aboriginal landholding practices.
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traditional custom, the control of land was seen as distinct from all these other
clan functions.
The local Foi group reached consensus not by convergence upon a common
interest but by the temporary rhetorical abeyance of the fissive mechanism that
really ‘founds’ group formation (Goldman 1983). In traditional times, the local
clan rarely acted as a single unit, except ceremonially, as in bridewealth
distributions for example. Land decisions were the affairs of those directly
involved. Although disputes over land within the clan were commonly
adjudicated, they did arise. Disputes over distribution of bridewealth were also
common.
Some Comparative Observations and Conclusions
I wish to conclude by making the following observations:
• customary law cannot be made into justiciable law without turning it into
something altogether non-customary;
• the landholding clan, at least in regions like the Kutubu oil project area, is
neither solidary, corporate, nor bound by collective sentiment;
• but I agree with the architects of PNG post-Independence land reform that
the relation to land is central to the PNG person’s being and social identity.
As is the case with the Nuer, social units, though phrased in the language of
consanguineal kinship, are also equi-primordially territorial relations. But land
is only one part of what a local clan exists to ‘control’, or to put it another way,
the allocation of rights to land is only one of the social conditions through which
the clan is elicited as a social entity — for the most part, rhetorically. Yet this
is what is required from an ILG by the local ‘External Affairs’ requirements of
the resource companies, which tend to phrase their concern for achieving a
manageable local decision-making process in terms of clear guidelines for the
allocation of authority over land matters.
Wagner (1988: 60) has characterised the so-called solidariness of Daribi social
units in the following way:
Vengeance raids, nasty fights over a pig or domestic situation, and
factional standoffs are not so much accidents of the critical social structure
as social structuring within the larger accident of the critical social mass.
They carry the same weight as social norms and rules or family-values,
only in a different mood. The social charter of the Sogo people is the
fight of their split from Noru; that of Weriai is the fight of its fissioning
from Iogobo, and so forth. Fights, in this context, are the elementary
structures of kinship.
Bamford (1998: 30), writing about Kamea inheritance through clans, makes a
similar and more general statement:
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Land, paternal names, and modes of ritual competence are all transmitted
through men, typically from a father to his son. Yet it is important to
note that gaining access to these and other resources is not an automatic
concomitant of patrifiliation — instead, it is constitutive of it.
Smith (1974: 43) observed much earlier that:
Evans-Pritchard’s distinction between the types of corporateness of local
and lineage units among the Nuer implies a recognition of distinctions
between the ideological and organizational aspects of social units, and
as such, between corporateness evidenced by group action, and
corporateness postulated as such.
And Evans-Pritchard (1940) originally observed that:
Nuer lineages are not corporate localized communities, though they are
frequently associated with territorial units, and those members of a
lineage who live in an area associated with it see themselves as a
residential group, and the value or concept of lineage thus functions
through the political system.
Finally, if we are to take the critique of the self-evidence of internal and
external relations seriously, then neither can we long sustain the fiction that
CNGL is radically external to the land groups themselves. Through its own
attempts at educating landowners about the relevant PNG legislation, its own
acts on behalf of the State in registering the ILGs in the first place, and its
commitment to monitoring, evaluating and maintaining the ILG system in ‘good
repair’, the company is a critical force for the transformation of group dynamics
in the oil project area. The anthropological study of indigenous culture and
society in a resource extraction environment cannot limit itself to the indigenous
people as such. A complex, non-local ‘culture’ comprising government, resource
companies, and local landowners is developing in every mining enclave in PNG,
and this non-local and non-traditional culture deserves monitoring in its own
right. In order to reveal this culture as an object of anthropological scrutiny, it
will be necessary to view the PNG ‘clan’ not chiefly as an age-old and resilient
feature of ‘traditional’ society but also as a strategically elicited form of social
and political self-presentation in the highly charged intercultural encounters of
PNG’s resource sectors.
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Chapter Eight
Local Custom and the Art of Land
Group Boundary Maintenance in Papua
New Guinea
Colin Filer
A variety of agencies engaged in the business of developing (or even conserving)
the natural resources which are located on, in, or underneath the huge swathe
of customary land in Papua New Guinea (PNG) must also deal with the absence
of any systematic record of the social or territorial boundaries of the ‘land groups’
which are generally thought to be the collective owners of such land. The
strategies which they adopt to make amends for this deficiency are shaped, not
only by those national laws and policies which apply to the ownership of
customary land, but also by those which regulate the distribution of
compensation payments and community benefits to customary landowners
within specific resource sectors. At the same time, the past experience and future
prospect of such deals and dispensations has its own effect on the way that ‘land
groups’, ‘land boundaries’, and ‘group boundaries’ are represented in the mental
landscape of the actors who negotiate them, whether at the level of the village
or the level of the state.
In this chapter, I propose to examine the interaction of law, policy and
ideology in the social construction of ‘land groups’, ‘land boundaries’, and ‘group
boundaries’ with reference to specific moments in the recent history of ‘resource
development’ in PNG. Here we find a long debate about the significance of
‘customary land law’ which reveals the existence of at least two distinct forms
of agrarian populism opposed to the resource-dependent form of capitalist
development which has come to dominate the nation’s formal economy. Here
we also find that institutional mechanisms originally established to facilitate the
growth of an indigenous peasant economy have since been applied to an entirely
different business, which is the validation of ‘landowner consent’, the
accountability of ‘landowner companies’, and the distribution of ‘landowner
benefits’, first in the petroleum and forestry sectors, and much more recently
(and only partially) in the mining and agricultural sectors, of this
resource-dependent economy.
It was in the petroleum sector that I first encountered the concept of ‘land
group maintenance’, when I was part of a formal policy process whose remit
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was to rationalise the distribution of landowner benefits to an increasingly
disorganised array of beneficiaries. I have added the word ‘boundary’ to the
title of my chapter, because the relationship between land boundaries, group
boundaries and benefit distribution was the fundamental point at issue in this
process. The art or practice of land group boundary maintenance also counts as
an example of the management, manipulation or negotiation of a thing called
‘custom’ in the name of another thing called ‘development’. This, it might be
said, is nothing but the art of the impossible, because there is no way of
reconciling custom with development, either in theory or in practice. But I would
argue that this opposition or antithesis is broken down and reconstructed in
those practices of management and resistance which belong to real and specific
social relations. It is not a gulf which exists outside of these relations, and which
can therefore cause them to vanish in that world of wishful thinking where
‘custom’ is the light by which ‘development’ is shown to be a false god not worth
worshipping.
Land, Groups, and Boundaries as Elements of ‘Custom’
When anthropologists reflect on the topic of customary land tenure in Melanesia,
their reflections are often configured in terms of the triangular relationship
between ‘land’, ‘groups’, and ‘boundaries’, or the tripartite relationship between
landowning groups, land boundaries, and group boundaries. The sort of question
which arises from this configuration is whether it makes more sense to say that
land belongs to groups or groups belong to land. This question can be rephrased
by asking whether land boundaries are more or less substantial, flexible, or
porous than group boundaries. Should we say that the central feature of the
customary ‘system’ of land (or resource) tenure is the division of the physical
landscape into named parts, to which human beings are attached by various
means, or through which they move by various routes? Or should we say that
the central feature of the system is the division of the social landscape into named
social groups, which exercise various kinds of rights over pieces of land or other
physical resources? Some anthropologists may think of these as purely
ethnographic questions about the variable nature of ‘local custom’, but they are
also questions posed and partially resolved in the realm of public policy, where
‘local custom’ is incorporated into the regulation of a modern economy.
If anthropologists turn their attention to the Land Groups Incorporation Act
(LGIA), enacted by PNG’s House of Assembly in 1974, they find that the Act is
configured in terms of the triangular relationship between ‘land’, ‘groups’, and
‘custom’, in the sense that it provides an avenue for the legal recognition of
customary land groups by means of their ‘incorporation’. But the Act makes no
mention of ‘boundaries’. It makes no provision for the demarcation of land
boundaries, and is as vague as any law could be about the nature of the ‘custom’
which determines the membership, and therefore the boundaries, of the land
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groups which can be incorporated. In other words, the Act underlines the
significance of the questions which anthropologists would normally want to ask
about customary land tenure, but carefully refrains from giving any kind of
answer.
While the LGIA has nothing to say about the demarcation of customary land
boundaries or the registration of customary land titles, it does seem to assume
that the process of legal ‘incorporation’ will help customary land groups to
‘develop’ their land. So if the Act fails to answer questions about customary
land tenure, it does raise other questions about the triangular relationship
between ‘custom’, ‘law’ and ‘development’. These are also questions of interest
to anthropologists. But when anthropologists try to interpret the significance
of a law like this by finding answers to such questions, they often seem to arrive
at a dead end, which is a portrait of ‘custom’ as a distinctly Melanesian way of
reflecting on a generic process of modernisation, commercialisation or
globalisation (Keesing and Tonkinson 1982; Errington and Gewertz 1995; Foster
1995). Speakers of the Neo-Melanesian language may talk about ‘custom’ (kastom
or kastam) in ways that sound quite exotic to Western ears, but that does not
prevent customary law from being part of a national discourse of development
in which Western voices also participate — and these are not just the voices of
ethnographers. The LGIA was one of a number of laws enacted around the time
of Independence which purported to make a contribution to the fifth goal of the
National Constitution, which was ‘to achieve development primarily through
the use of Papua New Guinean forms of social, political and economic
organisation’ (see Fingleton, this volume). Many anthropologists would argue
that any attempt to insert or transform Melanesian custom into state law is
doomed to failure, precisely because the state itself is a European imposition on
Melanesian custom, and not an indigenous form of political organisation. Some
lawyers might agree with them, but lawyers are also adept at the art of making
fine distinctions. Robert Cooter, for example, would agree that the State of PNG
is not in a position to make effective use of national laws which aim to incorporate
customary land groups or register customary land titles, but if local and district
court magistrates make sensible judgements when customary land rights are
disputed, then Melanesian custom will slowly turn into a Melanesian form of
common law, in the same way that ancient English custom evolved into English
common law (Cooter 1989).
The point at issue here is not the flexibility of custom, but the form of its
relationship to law. My argument would be that Melanesian custom does not
really exist in a form which would allow us to ask how it could or should be
recognised in modern national law, because it was actually born out of the armpit
of Australian colonial law. This is not to deny the possibility of reconstructing
the form of social practice which preceded the colonial intrusion, but rather to
assert that the concept of ‘custom’, as an object of contemporary thought and
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practice, as a ‘road’ which is distinct from other roads, is something which only
makes its appearance at the end of the colonial period, and which could only
make its appearance when ‘truly traditional’ or pre-colonial forms of social
practice had already been consigned to the far horizon of the late colonial
imagination (Filer 1990, 2006a). In other words, custom needs here to be
conceived as something which develops out of law, not something which develops
into it. And this is simply one aspect of the wider form of ‘development’ through
which colonial capitalism develops into something else — whatever that might
be.
We can put this point about custom in another way, if we say that the
‘vertical’ relationship between landowners and developers has long since
subsumed the ‘horizontal’ relationship between ‘traditional’ political
communities, and then go on to observe that the internal constitution of the
‘landowning community’, which now reflects this vertical relationship, has
likewise overwritten the ‘traditional’ networks of social reciprocity which once
dissected and shaped these local political boundaries.1  So custom is not the
starting point for a journey along the road, or down the river, which is called
‘development’. Custom is a diversion from that road, or an island situated in the
middle of that river, a subordinate feature of a more general set of social relations.
To go further down this road or river, we may think about the construction or
negotiation of ‘custom’ as something which takes place within the several forms
of ‘development’ which exist at the intersection of different branches of
production (or economic sectors), social formations (which might be construed
in either political or cultural terms), and stages or periods in the history of the
global capitalist system.
As for customary land tenure, we need to recognise that ‘land’, ‘groups’, and
‘boundaries’ are things which were initially removed, abstracted or alienated
from the traditional social landscape by the policy and practice of colonial
administration (MacWilliam 1988). The shape of their triangular relationship
then became part of the further removal, abstraction or alienation of custom
from law in the subsequent process of ‘national development’. Instead of thinking
about the tripartite social construction of ‘land groups’, ‘land boundaries’, and
‘group boundaries’ as a recoverable form of ‘custom’, or as a sort of bridge
between ‘custom’ and ‘development’, I propose to think of it as a pattern which
exists inside that form of development which is commonly called ‘resource
development’, and thus reflects that tripartite social relationship between
Developers, Landowners and the State which I call ‘resource compensation’ (Filer
1997).
1 The tradition of analysis which regards the superficial appearance of Melanesian social groups, and
even Melanesian persons, as the icing on the cake of ‘unbounded’ social relationships (Wagner 1974)
may neglect to consider the extent to which the inherent flexibility or adaptability of these social
relationships has enabled them to take the forces of ‘development’ to their very core.
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Compensation and Incorporation in the Realm of Heavy
Industry
The trouble with the concept of ‘resource development’ is that it sounds like a
specific form of the general concept of ‘development’. But ‘development’ is just
a fairly recent name for what Adam Smith called ‘the wealth of nations’, which
is nowadays measured by a pile of social and economic indicators. We do not
have to deconstruct this general concept in order to recognise that ‘resource
development’ is a very different kind of thing. It is a type of industrial process
which involves the transformation of natural resources into commodities. And
the relative preponderance of this type of industrial process within a country’s
national economy is, if anything, inversely correlated with that country’s general
level of ‘development’. Hence the so-called ‘resource curse’ or condition of
‘resource dependency’ which may be seen as an affliction rather than a
contribution to national welfare (Auty 1993; Ross 1999; Sachs and Warner 2001;
Bannon and Collier 2003). But the concept of ‘resource dependency’ also has its
drawbacks, because it seems to condemn the ‘developing countries’ which suffer
this affliction to a state of backwardness from which they cannot escape, and
draws attention away from the struggles which occur between ‘resource
developers’ and other ‘stakeholders’ in the relations of production which
surround this peculiar type of industrial process (Ascher 2005; Banks 2005; Filer
2006b). And that is why I propose to use the term ‘resource compensation’,
which better serves to highlight the tension between dependency and autonomy
which is embedded in the heart of these relations of production.
Where Marx formerly discovered the relationship of wage-labour (or
employment) buried within the pile of money and commodities which formed
the superficial pattern of the capitalist world, I would argue that this relationship
of compensation is the partly hidden ‘secret’ of the much smaller pile of money
and commodities which is currently found on customary land in PNG, insofar
as this pile of money and commodities emerges from the jaws of what I should
now like to describe as the Melanesian version of ‘heavy industry’. This creature
has four legs, or four component branches of production — the oil (and gas)
industry, the mining industry, the timber (or logging) industry, and the oil palm
industry.2 The resources transacted through the relationship of compensation
are thus rights to extract oil, gas and minerals contained in the ground, the
timber contained in the trees which grow on top of it, and the nutrients contained
in the soil itself. All four types of heavy industry entail large-scale investment
in plant and machinery, but their ‘heaviness’ can also be ascribed to the problem
of managing relationships with customary owners of the land on which these
2  A case could be made for inclusion of the sugar industry, the rubber industry, and even parts of the
fishing industry within the same economic complex, but I exclude these from consideration here in
order to simplify the broad outline of my argument.
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investments are made. And that is why the agencies responsible for managing
these relationships in all four branches of production have been obliged to think
about the merits of land group incorporation as a management strategy.
The products of heavy industry, as thus defined, have accounted for 80–90
per cent of PNG’s annual export earnings over the past decade. While this fact
alone provides us with an indication of its significance to the national economy,
and more especially to the revenues of the national government, my definition
clearly flies in the face of the orthodox argument that agriculture is the real
backbone of the national economy because of the vast numbers of people who
make a living from it and the sheer volume of land which is devoted to it. But
I would argue that the oil palm industry is distinguished from other branches
of agricultural production by virtue of its scale, its ‘modernity’, and the peculiar
nature of its relations of production, which cause it to resemble the three
terrestrial branches of extractive industry rather more than it resembles the
colonial plantation economy (which already lies in ruins) and those forms of
export crop production (notably coffee and cocoa) which are dominated by a
smallholding ‘peasantry’.3
Of course, the four legs of this new-fangled beast all have their own peculiar
characteristics. But before I touch on these peculiarities, I shall try to establish
the general shape of the beast itself, and thus show how Landowners come to
be ‘incorporated’ into it.
As Landowners and Developers enter into their mutual relationship, the State
does two things (apart from any role which it may play as a joint venture partner).
First, it takes certain rights away from the Landowners, by mutual agreement,
not by compulsion, and it hands on these rights to the Developers. This enables
the Developers to begin the process of development. Then the State takes a share
of the proceeds away from the Developers, by means of taxation, and hands a
smaller portion of the proceeds back to the Landowners, in the form of ‘benefits’
which compensate the Landowners for the previous diminution of their rights.4
At the same time, the Developers also ‘compensate’ the Landowners directly,
by providing them with a mixture of ‘compensation’ payments for damage done
to their resources and additional ‘benefits’ which are intended to maintain the
relationship in good working order. The Landowners themselves may not
recognise the distinction between ‘compensation’ and ‘benefits’, nor even the
distinction between the benefits which come from the Developers and those
which come from the State. The whole package simply represents their share of
3  Palm oil has accounted for something between one quarter and one third of annual agricultural export
earnings over the last decade.
4 The balance of the ‘resource rent’ is redistributed between different parts of the State, and sooner or
later finds its way back into private pockets, by fair means or foul, but this aspect of the relationship
does not concern me here.
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the income, or their part of the relationship, which comes from the development
of ‘their’ resources.5
The Developers equate the ‘development’ of natural resources with the
consumption or extraction of those resources, and thus see ‘landowner
compensation’ in the same light as ‘community relations’ — as a cost which has
to be incurred in order to achieve this form of ‘development’ (Filer et al. 2000:
3). The Landowners, for their part, equate the ‘development’ of their resources
with their own social, political and economic advancement to a level at which
they can truly imagine themselves to be the equals of the Developers, so that
‘compensation’ becomes what one Lihir landowner famously described as ‘the
state of equilibrium reached when [the] forces of destruction and impact must
[be] equal to the forces of compensation ... [so that] the Landowners are forever
happy and accept the losses and impact they will suffer’ (Filer 1997: 160).6
But an ‘Integrated Benefits Package’ which is intended to achieve this equation
of ‘compensation’ and ‘development’ also has to be distributed amongst the
Landowners who receive it. This is not just a problem for the Landowners to
solve by themselves. It is also a problem for which the State and the Developers
are obliged to offer their own solutions. That is because their understanding
and experience of the process of development on customary land has led them
to conclude that they must also do something to manage the ‘internal’
relationships of the landowning ‘community’ which has been brought into
existence by this process, and even the ‘external’ relationships between this
local community and those other ‘landowners’ who live around the edges of it.
Where the State attempts to manage these additional relationships, its efforts
could be seen as an extension of its efforts to manage the relationship between
Developers and Landowners. But there is a further element of complexity here,
which arises from the State’s diminishing capacity to manage anything at all,
and which raises the question of whether there really are three parties to this
relationship, or only two. It is often the Developers who have to manage the
relationship between the State and the Landowners, as well as their own
relationship with the State, even to the extent of ‘facilitating’ the process by
which the State acquires the rights which it later passes on to the Developers
themselves. And where the State is unable to manage the relationships within
and between local communities in the vicinity of the development, the Developers
5 The laws of PNG declare that subsurface mineral resources are the property of the State, but the State
has been forced to deal with Landowners in a manner that seems to deny this claim (Filer 2005).
6  Once the definition of ‘compensation’ is expanded to include or subsume the relationship of
employment, where Developers employ Landowners within the context of their mutual relationship,
then we can say that compensation is truly a relation of production, in the Marxist sense, because it
combines specific forms of property and work under the same umbrella.
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may have to extend their own efforts to manage these relationships to the point
of compensating for the State’s failure to do so.7
Nor are the Landowners themselves purely passive recipients of all this
‘management’ (or mismanagement). While some Landowners try to manage (or
mismanage) the ‘compensation package’ which is meant for all Landowners,
some Landowners also try to counter the management strategies of both the State
and the Developers with management strategies of their own, which might better
be described as political strategies intended to enlarge their control over the
total distribution of wealth, status and power within the development
relationship. Indeed, all three parties have a tendency to interfere with whatever
management strategies or political strategies are adopted by the other two, thus
enveloping the relationship in a kind of mutual frustration which tends to defeat
the ‘rationality’ of management itself. And so life goes on.
Now this relationship, with all its complexities, can be construed as a sort of
bargain, or a sort of game, which is the way that economists are inclined to see
it (McGavin 1994). However, it is not my purpose here to elaborate on the general
form of the negotiation which takes place between the agents of each party, but
rather to pinpoint the role which is played by the practice of ‘land group
incorporation’ as a method of managing land, groups, boundaries, or benefits.
We can think of ‘incorporation’, in a general sense, as one of the
transformations which are inherent in the social impact of resource development
or the social relationship of resource compensation. I am not suggesting that
incorporation, in this general sense, is necessarily something which the State or
the Developers impose upon the Landowners as a condition of their mutual
relationship. Landowners have ways of organising themselves, most obviously
through the formation of landowner companies and landowner associations, and
many other ways of being organised by politicians who claim to represent their
interests. But land group incorporation, considered as a specific and variable
feature of this relationship within the realm of heavy industry, has been promoted
by the State and the Developers for reasons which we now need to consider in
greater depth.
The Brave New World of Customary Land Law
More than half a century has passed since Paul Hasluck, in his capacity as the
Australian government minister responsible for the Territory of Papua and New
Guinea, decided that its economic development would necessitate ‘a change in
7  Power (2000[1]: 86–7) has given voice to their frustration at this prospect: ‘The Government just sits
back and expects the developer to make things happen. The landowners expect everything to be done
for them because the developer is on their land. The developer is reluctant to take over what they [sic]
see as the role of the Government … What is needed is a shift in the way the developer and the
Government do business. It requires the taking on of a new mental model where development is part
of the package that is traded for resource commodities.’
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the basic native concepts of rights to use, occupy or cultivate land’ (Hasluck
1976: 126).8  A legal framework for the registration of ‘native’ land or ‘customary’
land had already been introduced in 1952, and the Land Tenure (Conversion) Act
of 1963 provided a further opportunity for members of landowning communities
to secure individual title by mutual agreement with their fellow members. But
these measures did not have the effect of ‘liberating’ large areas of customary
land from the constraints of custom, even if that was their intention (Simpson
1971: 7). Instead, many of the traditional owners of land which had been alienated
for agricultural purposes during the early colonial period were agitating for its
resumption, and their cause was espoused by the more vocal ‘native’ members
of the House of Assembly during the 1960s. One of the first landmarks in the
transition to Independence was the establishment, in 1972, of a Commission of
Inquiry into Land Matters (CILM) whose membership was entirely indigenous,
even though the support staff were all expatriates (Fingleton 1981; Ward 1983).
The CILM’s reassertion of the primacy of customary title was confirmed by
several provisions of the National Constitution, by the LGIA of 1974, which was
intended to facilitate the resumption of alienated land, and by the Land Disputes
Settlement Act of 1975, which established a system of Local and District Land
Courts to resolve disputes over customary title (see Fingleton, this volume).
At the time when the CILM was making its deliberations, it was calculated
that three per cent of PNG’s land area had been alienated, while 97 per cent
remained under customary tenure. For the last 25 years, these figures have been
repeated with such frequency, and circulated so widely, that they now count
as ‘common knowledge’. If true, this would seem to indicate that the CILM was
at least successful in defending customary land from any further acts of
alienation, and might even be taken to indicate that the whole system of land
tenure has been set in some kind of post-colonial concrete. By 1989, however,
the 600,000 hectares of alienated land which could still be found in the records
of the Lands Department was more like 1.3 per cent of the total surface area
(Larmour 1991; Turtle 1991), which would suggest that a substantial proportion
of land formerly alienated to the colonial plantation economy had already reverted
to customary ownership or control. And this estimate was made before the
plantations on Bougainville were effectively ‘resumed’ in the wake of the 1989
rebellion.
But the legal instruments established on the recommendations of the CILM
seem to have been no more effective in facilitating this process of resumption
than the legal instruments of the late colonial administration had been in
facilitating the creation of a class of small freeholders. Fifteen years after the
passage of the Land Tenure (Conversion) Act, less than 10,000 hectares of land
8  Hasluck announced his new land policy in 1960, but this statement was based on the report of a
working party which he had established four years previously (Morawetz 1967: 3).
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had been subject to legal tenure conversion (Cooter 1989). Fifteen years after
the passage of the LGIA, only eight land groups had been incorporated under
the Act (Whimp 1995). In both cases, the demand for conversion or incorporation
was much greater than the capacity of relevant government agencies to meet it.
One might therefore speculate that the net ‘loss’ of alienated land was as much
a function of the loss of record-keeping capacity in the Lands Department as it
was a function of a more substantial social process.
This is not the only respect in which the noble goals of the CILM were
subverted by the force of bureaucratic inertia. The LGIA placed particular
emphasis on the constitution of customary groups, rather than the ownership
of customary land, because the CILM had recommended a separate piece of
legislation for the demarcation and registration of customary land (Taylor and
Whimp 1997; Fingleton, this volume). This was intended to supplant the legal
mandate of the Land Titles Commission, whose own attempts to demarcate and
register customary titles during the late colonial period had not met with great
success (Morawetz 1967; Hide 1973; Jessep 1980). The same recommendation
was repeated, 10 years later, by a national government Task Force on Customary
Land Issues, and the buck was then passed to the Land Mobilisation Programme,
whose achievements included the counting of those 600,000 hectares of alienated
land. But the only piece of legislation which ever reached the statute books was
in the ‘pilot province’ of East Sepik, where the provincial government enacted
a Customary Land Registration Act in 1987 (Fingleton 1991, this volume; Power
1991).
In retrospect, it is worth noting that much of the academic and public debate
on the subject of customary land tenure during the first 15 years of national
independence, from 1975 to 1990, was constructed around the assumption that
agriculture was indeed the backbone of the national economy. A substantial
part of the debate therefore concentrated on the ancient question of whether
customary tenure was or was not an obstacle to the development of capitalist
agriculture, and sought to assess the motives and capacities of those groups or
classes — rich peasants and poor peasants, largeholders and smallholders,
indigenous and foreign members of the bourgeoisie, or simply ‘capital’ and
‘households’ — who were trying to push the boundary between customary and
alienated land in one direction or another (Hulme 1983; Donaldson and Good
1988; MacWilliam 1988). Even those commentators who eschewed the language
of class struggle were primarily concerned with the question of what the State
could or should do, by means of policy or legislation, to meet the material needs
and aspirations of landowners whose main economic activity was farming or
gardening (Cooter 1989; Ward 1991).
While the territorial expansion of small-scale commercial agriculture has
almost certainly been one of the main forces behind the apparent resumption of
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alienated land, this has not made any impact on the territorial expansion of the
four branches of heavy industry. Their occupation of customary land does not
entail the liquidation of customary title, but depends on various forms of partial
and temporary ‘alienation’ which are allowed by the laws pertaining to each
sector. The mining companies get Exploration and Mining Leases, the oil
companies get Petroleum Prospecting and Development Licences, the logging
companies get Timber Permits, and the oil palm companies have come to rely
on the so-called the ‘lease-leaseback’ clause in the Land Act which was originally
meant to facilitate the establishment of 20-hectare coffee blocks in the central
highlands (McKillop 1991). Once we escape the blinkers imposed by the
technicalities of land law, we can see that the social dynamics of the ‘customary’
landscape are not determined by the capacity of customary landowners to resist
or roll back the process of alienation, but rather by their capacity to enter into,
and benefit from, the social relations of compensation which reflect and condition
the process of resource development.
If the CILM did not intend the LGIA to function as a surrogate for the
demarcation and registration of customary land titles, its members also failed to
imagine the use which the State and the Developers would eventually make of
this law in their efforts to manage ‘community relations’ in the sphere of heavy
industry (Sinaka Goava, personal communication, September 1998). While their
report did envisage the possibility that Incorporated Land Groups (ILGs) might
serve as a vehicle for landowner participation in the development of forestry
projects, it expressed grave reservations about the degree of freedom which was
apparently granted to landowners by the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act of 1971.
This law allowed customary landowners to bypass the provisions of the Forestry
Act by selling timber rights to a landowner company under the terms of a
Dealings Agreement, which only required the assent of the Forests Minister,
and allowed the landowner company to enter into a Logging and Marketing
Agreement with a logging contractor, who was then able to extract and sell the
logs with minimal government supervision.
To the best of my knowledge, no land groups were ever incorporated for this
purpose.9  In 1989, a Commission of Inquiry into Aspects of the Forest Industry
(the Barnett Inquiry) found that the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act had simply
enabled logging companies to cheat local landowners of the benefits promised
in the Logging and Marketing Agreements, and recommended that the law
should be repealed (Barnett 1992). And so it was, with the passage of a new
Forestry Act in 1991. The closure of this ‘loophole’ is significant because it
underlines one of the main points of convergence in the social relations of
9  Only eight land groups were incorporated in the eight years following the passage of the LGIA (Taylor
and Whimp 1997: 77), and most of these were formed to take advantage of the Plantation Redistribution
Scheme (Ward 1991: 184).
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resource development on customary land, which is not so much the conflict of
interest between Developers and Landowners, but the manner in which a steadily
disintegrating State continues to interpose itself as a sort of ‘middle-man’ in the
legal form of their relationship. The forest industry was thus restored to its
‘rightful place’ as one of the four branches of heavy industry which are firmly
attached to the trunk of resource compensation.
The new Forestry Act also gave a new lease of life to the LGIA. However, the
forest industry was not the first branch of heavy industry to accomplish this
feat, and the process of land group incorporation does not have the same history
or significance in each of the four branches. The common point of departure
was the criticism levelled, by some individuals associated with some branches
of industry, against the provision of the Land Act which allowed (and still allows)
the Land Titles Commission or a Local Land Court to appoint ‘agents’ to act on
behalf of undefined and unincorporated groups of customary landowners. Once
appointed, these agents had (and still have) the power to transfer all manner of
rights to the State, and to ‘accept any rent, purchase money, compensation or
other moneys [sic] or things, and distribute that money or those things to the
persons entitled’, whoever they might be. The law has assumed that these agents
should be ‘customary leaders’ of some sort, but has never sought to specify the
customs which create or regulate their leadership, nor even the type of customary
group which they should be taken to represent (Taylor and Whimp 1997). The
advocates of land group incorporation regard the process of incorporation as a
way of saving custom from abuse by self-appointed leaders whose pursuit of
‘rent, purchase money, compensation or other moneys’ has no customary
sanction. But how has this argument actually made its way through the four
branches of heavy industry, why has it made more progress in some branches
than in others, and what have been the practical effects of its partial success?
Land Group Incorporation in the Petroleum and Forestry
Sectors, 1990–95
1989 was a good year for anyone who had a ready-made solution to the problem
of managing the social relations of resource compensation — not just because
of the Barnett Inquiry, but also because of the Bougainville rebellion. While
Barnett (1989: 368) found that landowners were ‘gaining a maximum of
dislocation and alienation in exchange for minimum benefit from the harvesting
of their timber’, Francis Ona and the other members of the new Panguna
Landowners Association had come to a very similar conclusion with respect to
the harvesting of copper from their land. What I wrote about the ‘titleholders’
whom the Land Titles Commission had appointed as agents of the Panguna
landowners could just as well have been written about the ‘clan agents’ who
had been responsible for signing Timber Rights Purchase Agreements with the
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Department of Forests, or Dealings Agreements with the directors of ‘their’
landowner companies:
Although the titleholders constitute a relatively small minority within
the landowning community, there is no outside interest in the question
of whether and how they will use these monies for the benefit and
satisfaction of their respective family groups. It has evidently been
assumed that ‘customary’ norms of distribution and consumption will
apply to this new form of wealth, and this will raise no special problems
for the company or for the government. But the complaints of the new
PLA have shown that this assumption is false. The titleholders stand
accused of keeping all the money to themselves, not even giving any to
their closest relatives. If this is true, it might be taken as a sign of
selfishness or greed, but I suggest that it may also be a sign of something
else — the simple absence of a custom which prescribes the proper way
to redistribute rent (Filer 1990: 90).
Of course, the Bougainville rebellion showed that the stakes were much higher,
and the consequences could be far more serious, in the mining sector than in
the forestry sector. But it also added some serious weight to the argument that
dysfunctional ‘clan agents’ were only one part of a larger problem, that
landowner organisations of all sorts were suffering from a serious lack of
democracy, transparency and accountability, that their directors or managers
were ripping off the ordinary members, shareholders or beneficiaries, and that
the State had better do something about it.
It is therefore somewhat ironic that the first application of the LGIA to the
problem of managing the social relations of resource compensation was neither
made in the mining sector nor made by the State. It began in April 1990, when
Chevron Niugini Limited (CNGL) appointed Tony Power as its Business
Development Manager, or perhaps in May 1990, when the company formally
lodged its application for the Kutubu Petroleum Development Licence and
Pipeline Licence, and began to prepare the ground for project construction.10
Power was able to persuade the Developer, and then able to persuade the State,
that the royalty and equity benefits due to the customary owners of both licence
areas should only be paid to ILGs, and that these groups should be the sole
shareholders of the landowner companies which were due to receive the benefits
of CNGL’s Business Development Program. In the five years following his
appointment, he masterminded the incorporation of more than 400 land groups
in the project impact area.
Power had become an advocate of land group incorporation during his
previous incarnation as a senior bureaucrat in the Department of East Sepik
10 The licences were granted at the end of 1990, and the oil began to flow in mid-1992.
147
Local Custom and the Art of Land Group Boundary Maintenance in Papua New Guinea
Province,11  where he had played a key role in promoting the Provincial Land
Act and the Customary Land Registration Act which were passed in 1987 (Power
1991; Fingleton, this volume). Having departed the ranks of the bureaucracy in
1988, he initially entered the petroleum sector as a consultant to Oil Search and
Ampolex, which were both partners in the Kutubu Joint Venture. It was from
this vantage point that he began, in his own words, to ‘fight bloody hard’ to
make ILGs into an essential feature of the Kutubu project landscape (Tony Power,
personal communication, September 2000). By November 1989, he was able to
announce the first signs of his impending victory, and this was done at a forest
policy seminar held at the Forest Research Institute (Power and Waiko 1990:
46). That meeting was part of the policy reform process engendered by the
findings of the Barnett Inquiry, and Power believes that his own intervention
in this process was partly responsible for that part of the 1991 National Forest
Policy which requires, as a precondition of any future Forest Management
Agreement between local resource owners and the State, that
Tenure over the resource must be made certain by: title to the affected
resource being vested in a Land Group or Groups under the Land Groups
Incorporation Act, or title to the resource being registered under a
customary land registration law; or where the above two options are
impractical — at least 75% of customary resource owners in each clan
owning timber affected by the agreement must give their written assent
to the Agreement (PNGMoF 1991: 17).
The process of ‘resource acquisition’ prescribed in Sections 54–60 of the 1991
Forestry Act reiterated this requirement.
This meant that the function of land group incorporation in the forestry
sector was quite different to the function which it performed in the development
of the Kutubu oil project. In one case, a Developer was persuaded to incorporate
Landowners as part of a strategy designed to promote the values of equity,
transparency and accountability in the distribution of project benefits, and the
Developer then had to persuade the State to set its own seal of approval on this
strategy, at a time when the LGIA did not rate a mention in any of the laws and
policies which regulated the petroleum sector. In the other case, the State was
persuaded to incorporate Landowners as part of a policy and a law which were
intended to produce a certain level of ‘informed consent’ to the State’s acquisition
of the right to harvest their timber resources, and to protect Landowners from
Developers who had proven adept at manipulating the appearance of such
consent to their own advantage.
11  He was appointed as Provincial Planner in 1982, and later became the First Assistant Secretary for
Economic Services.
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When the new Forestry Act was finally gazetted and implemented in 1992,
officers of the newly designated National Forest Service were thus confronted
with a task which was already taxing the patience and resources of a
multinational oil company, and were expected to perform this task in many
different parts of the country. If this were not daunting enough, the 1993
National Forestry Development Guidelines indicated that the process of land
group incorporation should be preceded or accompanied by a Landowner
Awareness Programme which would provide landowners with the information
required for them to make their own assessment of ‘the likely costs and benefits,
impacts and responsibilities associated with a forest development project’ and
enable them to ‘truly participate in the project formulation process and ensure
that it is sensitive to their needs and concerns’ (PNGMoF 1993: 4). But help was
at hand, in the shape of a Forest Management and Planning Project organised
by the World Bank as part of the National Forestry and Conservation Action
Programme. This project included a ‘Landowner Involvement Component’ which
was meant to strengthen the capacity of the National Forest Service to practice
the arts of land group incorporation and landowner awareness (PNGFMPP 1995).
In a fitting tribute to his own experience at Kutubu, Tony Power was one of
several consultants engaged to implement this project component. His manual
of procedure, entitled ‘Village Guide to Land Group Incorporation’, was printed
and circulated in March 1995 (Power 1995).
In the three years which had then elapsed since the function of land group
registration was transferred from the Registrar of Companies to the Department
of Lands and Physical Planning, 700 land groups had already been registered,
and another 500 applications were awaiting the department’s attention (Whimp
1995: 71). These figures suggest that officers of the National Forest Service had
already completed the fieldwork and paperwork required to register more land
groups than had so far been registered through the efforts of their counterparts
in CNGL. On the other hand, none of the Forest Management Agreements which
resulted from this process had formed the basis of a new timber concession. The
first Timber Permit issued under the new Forestry Act was granted in June 1995,
as an ‘extension’ of the permit already held by Turama Forest Industries in Gulf
Province. And it seems that the logging company played a fairly active role in
the process of land group incorporation which laid the ground for the Turama
Forest Management Agreement (Hartmut Holzknecht, personal communication,
March 1997). At any rate, some local NGOs referred the decision of the National
Forest Board to the Ombudsman Commission, which eventually found (in August
1997) that there had indeed been some breach of the procedures laid down in
the Forestry Act.
This dispute served to confirm the fear previously expressed by the Forest
Industries Association, that the long drawn out process of land group
incorporation had another, ‘latent’ function, beside the function of protecting
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the property rights of innocent landowners. This other function was to implement
one of the key recommendations of the Barnett Inquiry, which was to ‘slow
down’ the whole process of resource acquisition and allocation in the forestry
sector while new forms and standards of regulation were applied to existing
concessions. The very small volume of timber resources which has since been
allocated through the production of Forest Management Agreements and the
distribution of new Timber Permits would seem to support this interpretation
(IFRT 2001, 2004). But this means that hundreds of land groups which have been
incorporated through the bureaucratic efforts of the National Forest Service have
yet to complete their passage into the social relations of resource compensation
in the logging industry, even if they wish to do so. That is because most logging
operations are still governed by agreements signed under the previous legislation,
and most of the payments or benefits which they yield for local landowners are
still distributed to the clan agents and landowner company directors who signed
these agreements.
Land Groups in the Oil and Gas Act, 1998
The question of how to regulate the distribution of project benefits, and the
question of how local landowners should be organised and represented in the
process of distribution, became a major issue for the local petroleum industry
in 1997. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, the Chan government had
changed the rules of this game in 1995 and 1996, by proposing to grant local
landowners 100 per cent of the royalties which the State would henceforth collect
from the developers of new projects in both the mining and petroleum sectors,
together with a ‘free’ two per cent share of project equity whose cost would be
shared by the other joint venture partners in proportion to their own stakes in
the project. At the same time, the 1995 Organic Law on Provincial Governments
and Local-Level Governments created an entirely new set of financial relationships
between the three tiers of the State, but took not the slightest account of the
relationships already embodied in the development agreements for mining and
petroleum projects. And to make matters even more confusing, the new Organic
Law required all resource developers to pay a new kind of tax, to be known as
‘development levies’, to the provincial and local-level governments hosting their
operations, but did not specify the manner in which this liability was to be
calculated (Filer and Imbun 2004).
These innovations caused more concern in the petroleum sector than in the
mining sector, because the agreements covering development of the Lihir gold
mine had already been concluded, and there were no other major mining projects
whose development conditions were still subject to active negotiation. In the
petroleum sector, by contrast, the stakeholders were still negotiating the division
of the spoils from the Gobe project, whose flow of oil was in the process of being
added to that of the Kutubu project. The Draft Memorandum of Agreement
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between the State and Gobe Project Area Landowners, produced in January
1997, was a model of the muddle which now afflicted the social relations of
resource compensation in this sector. And to make matters worse, three years
of legal disputation had still failed to determine who actually counted as a Gobe
Project Area Landowner in the first place.
Under the draft Gobe agreement, landowner benefits were to be distributed
between local ‘clans’ in proportion to the amount of land which they owned
within the boundaries of the Petroleum Development Licence (PDL), and then
subdivided between a number of ILGs in each ‘clan’ in proportion to the number
of members which they contained (Taylor and Whimp 1997: 81). This principle
of distribution was at variance with the one adopted in the Kutubu project
agreements, where the benefits were distributed equally between all the land
groups which owned any amount of land within the boundaries of the PDL, or
any section of the route taken by the export pipeline.12  But by 1997, the Kutubu
principle had already given rise to a predictable problem: the original land
groups were splitting into smaller land groups, and some ‘spurious’ land groups
were being manufactured in the process.13  Hence the call for CNGL to invest
more time and money in the art of ‘land group maintenance’ (see Weiner 1998,
this volume; Goldman, this volume).
The final, and perhaps the most important, reason for rethinking and
reconstructing the social relations of compensation in the petroleum industry
was the existence of two proposals to develop the reserves of natural gas which
had been found in association with the oil now flowing down the export pipeline.
Both proposals would entail a very substantial amount of fresh capital investment,
and both would yield a new ‘benefit stream’ of unprecedented size (CIE/NCDS
1997; Simpson et al. 1998). The addition of a gas industry to the existing oil
industry demanded a new policy framework and a major overhaul of the 1977
Petroleum Act. If nothing were done to regulate the flow of benefits, the benefits
might never flow at all, because one or both projects might drown in ‘political
risk’.
The ‘interrelationships, roles, responsibilities and authorities of sectoral
participants in relation to issues affecting the involvement of landowners in
petroleum projects’ were scrutinised in some detail by a pair of lawyers engaged
under a Technical Assistance grant from the Asian Development Bank (Taylor
12 The benefits were initially divided between language groups, in accordance with the proportion of
the PDL area, or the length of the pipeline route, which was thought to lie within the territory of each
group, and were then divided equally between the land groups within each language group. This
arrangement was apparently the one preferred by landowner representatives in the development
negotiations.
13 This problem arose because the LGIA does not require land groups to have mutually exclusive
membership lists, and the Registrar of Titles can only refuse to register a land group if it can be shown
to be a ‘non-customary’ group (Taylor and Whimp 1997: 117-8).
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and Whimp 1997). Their recommendations were subject to discussion by a
number of ‘sectoral participants’ at a two-day seminar held in January 1998.
The main target of their recommendations was the State’s manner of dealing
with landowners, though it was recognised that any major change to one side
of the triangular relationship would necessarily have some impact on the other
two. The State’s position, or the State’s quandary, was rather nicely expressed
in the title of the seminar presentation by an official of the Department of National
Planning and Implementation: ‘Packaging MOA [Memorandum of Agreement]
Projects as a Subsidiary or Small Public Investment Programme: A View to
Impose and Instill Discipline and Development Consciousness in the Utilisation
of Benefits Derived from Natural Resources for Equitable Distribution as Benefits
to Landowners’ (Lovuru 1998).
The outcome of this seminar was the establishment of an Action Team whose
membership was drawn from those private companies and government agencies
which had some stake in reformulating the ‘benefit regime’ in the petroleum
sector. The main body of the Action Team held at least 15 meetings between
March and June 1998, at which its members talked at length about the problem
of establishing principles that would serve to rationalise the distribution of part
of the national government’s share of petroleum revenues between provincial
governments, local-level governments, and local landowners in each project
impact area. The fruit of these reflections was a set of drafting instructions for
something to be called the Petroleum (Project Benefits) Act. Some members of
the Action Team joined a smaller talking shop, which came to be known as the
‘ILG Breakout Group’, and which reflected on the riddles posed by the State’s
lack of capacity to make effective use of the LGIA as a vehicle for landowner
organisation and benefit distribution. The conclusions of this smaller body were
discussed at another two-day seminar held in September 1998.
Following one of the recommendations previously made by Taylor and Whimp
(1997: 109), the Action Team suggested that the design of better models for
distributing landowner benefits within a landowning ‘community’ should
henceforth be based on ‘social mapping studies’ funded by developers as a
condition of their prospecting licences. In my own capacity as a member of the
Action Team, I drafted a document on this subject which proposed that:
• one of the aims of a ‘preliminary’ social mapping study would be to ‘establish
the basic principles of customary resource ownership and group formation
in the licence area, with specific reference to the feasibility of incorporating
local land groups under the Land Groups Incorporation Act’ (Filer 1998b:
1); and
• one of the aims of a ‘full-scale’ social mapping study would be to ‘recommend
the principles and procedures to be adopted in the process of incorporating
local land groups’, or else present an argument against land group
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incorporation, and ‘recommend the most appropriate, and least contentious,
alternative forms of representation or methods of distribution, which would
be consistent with both: (a) local custom and practice; and (b) the principles
established by government policy and national legislation’ (ibid: 3).
Despite his unrepentant enthusiasm for the practice of land group incorporation,
Tony Power was unable to persuade all other members of the Action Team that
this practice should now be granted the force of legal necessity. Within the
industry itself, there was a split between CNGL, in its capacity as operator of
the Kutubu and Gobe projects, and British Petroleum (BP), in its capacity as
operator of the Hides gas project, which had been developed as a source of power
for the Porgera gold mine. The BP line was spelt out by one of the company’s
consultants, George Clapp, who argued that the Huli landowners of the Hides
project were recalcitrant traditionalists who preferred to see their leaders divide
up large amounts of cash by means of public ceremony, rather than be forced
to reflect in private on
the sad fact that in a PNG context where one has cheques put into
accounts and signatories to those accounts, there will be fraud. By far
the best method to ensure that some compensation monies trickle down
to the grass roots level is to pay in cash and use the agent system. In that
way the money is there for immediate division according to custom, the
people know when it is going to be paid out and, although the leaders
as agents may be entitled to keep some back, at least the larger proportion
is divided out according to custom (Clapp 1998: 6).
In this respect, the Hides project simply followed the example set at Porgera,
where the Ipili ‘clan agents’ were also accustomed to dealing with public scrutiny
of periodic flows of cash. The Huli people were also seen to resemble the Ipili
people in possessing a form of social organisation in which individuals could
and did claim membership of more than one ‘clan’ (Burton 1991; Allen 1995;
Golub, this volume), thus confounding the principle of mutual exclusion which
had informed the original process of land group incorporation in the Kutubu
project impact area.
Tony Power and other members of the ILG Breakout Group thought that the
problem of multiple membership could be solved by means of a legal distinction
between the ‘controllers’ and the ‘beneficiaries’ of each land group, so that
individuals could have ‘interests’ in more than one land group without being
members of more than one ‘controlling group’. They also proposed a number of
other amendments to the LGIA that were meant to discourage the registration
of ‘spurious groups’, limit the opportunities for misappropriation of group funds,
enable each group to lease parts of its estate to individual members or outsiders
for business purposes, and strengthen the mechanism for resolving disputes
within and between groups. But even if the Lands Department could be
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persuaded to persuade its minister to push this raft of amendments through
Parliament, a very large question mark would still be left hanging over the
State’s capacity to supervise, support or ‘maintain’ an ever-expanding number
of land groups.
In the event, no Petroleum (Project Benefits) Bill was ever presented to
Parliament. Instead, some of the recommendations of the Action Team found
their way into the Oil and Gas Act that was approved by Parliament in November
1998, while others were treated as matters of policy or regulation, and some
were simply laid aside (Filer and Imbun 2004). This is not the place for a detailed
discussion of what the new law had to say about the determination and
distribution of landowner benefits, the conduct of social mapping studies, or
their relationship to the ‘landowner identification studies’ that are also now
required as preconditions for the issue of development licences in the petroleum
sector. Suffice to say that the law follows the recommendations of the Action
Team to the extent of saying that monetary benefits allocated by the State to
project area landowners will normally be paid to ILGs ‘unless otherwise agreed
between the State and the grantees of the benefit or prescribed by law’. Under
Section 169, social mapping and landowner identification studies are two of the
bodies of evidence which are expected to guide the Minister in deciding which
land groups, or which other ‘persons or entities’, are to receive these benefits
on behalf of the landowners. Section 176 follows another recommendation of
the Action Team by saying that these landowner benefits shall be divided
between ‘incorporated land groups or other representatives … in proportion to
the number of project area landowners each represents’. In this respect, the law
exhibits a preference for what I have called the ‘Gobe model’ rather than the
‘Kutubu model’, because it says that benefits should be distributed between
land groups in proportion to the size of their membership, rather than the area
of land which each group holds within a licence area.
But the irony of this preference is revealed in the addition of a new section
(169A) in the Oil and Gas (Amendment) Act of 2001, which expressly relates to
the distribution of benefits from ‘existing petroleum projects’ as well as from
new ones. As in the original Section 169, there is a recognition that the identity
of the landowners or their representatives may still be undecided or disputed,
in which case the Minister is entitled to ‘make a determination’ in light of
… any agreements by persons who are or claim to be project area
landowners, the decisions of courts of Papua New Guinea as to ownership
of land or rights in relation to land in the vicinity of the petroleum project
in question, the results of social mapping and landowner identification
studies carried out in accordance with this Act, and submissions from
affected Local-level Governments or affected Provincial Governments of
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the petroleum project in question or from any other person claiming an
interest or to be affected by the decision of the Minister.
This long list of different kinds of evidence is itself evidence of the ongoing
problems created by the policy and practice of land group incorporation in the
oil and gas sector. And anyone reading the national newspapers in PNG will
know that these problems remain especially acute in the relationship between
the State and the people who claim to represent the Gobe project land groups.14
The Beast’s Two Back Legs
There is little doubt that newspaper stories about the contested distribution of
very large amounts of money to ILGs in the petroleum sector has encouraged a
popular belief that land group incorporation is a way for customary landowners
to gain access to the social relations of resource compensation, even when the
prospect of actual resource development may be quite remote. For example, a
crowd of more than 25,000 people is said to have assembled in one Eastern
Highlands village to witness the presentation of a certificate of incorporation to
a local landowner association whose members thought they had discovered oil
in a lake and ‘were currently working on formalities to enable them to sign a
memorandum of agreement with a possible developer to carry out a feasibility
study and exploration in the area’ (Post Courier, 27 January 2005). According
to Fingleton (2004: 101), there were more than 10,000 ILGs registered with the
Department of Lands by March 2004, which is an awful lot more than the 700
which had been registered by March 1995. It is hardly possible to attribute the
whole of this increase to the diligence of people employed to implement
government policies, whether in the forestry and petroleum sectors or any other
sector of the national economy. What we do know is that land group
incorporation has been deliberately used to promote the expansion of the oil
palm industry, but has found little or no favour with the administrators of the
mining industry. This should lead us to ask whether the use of land group
incorporation as a policy instrument is encouraged or constrained by structural
factors specific to each branch of production, or whether its adoption has more
to do with contingent historical factors. These contingencies might include the
history of decisions and disputes in specific parts of the country, or the influence
wielded by individual decision makers in specific policy domains at certain
points in time, but they might also extend to the growth of a nationwide ‘cult
of incorporation’ that is not part of any formal policy process.
The mining sector is especially notable for the recent appearance of land
groups whose spokesmen seem to be staking dubious claims to projects which
14  See, for example: Post-Courier 8, 22 and 26 January 2004, 23 August 2004, 15 October 2004, 17 and
20 December 2004, 10 January 2005; The National 1 and 2 March 2004, 24 August 2004, 17 and 20
December 2004, 12 January 2006.
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have not yet been developed, as if the act of incorporation were somehow meant
to gain them additional leverage in the process of negotiation with the State and
the developers.15  However, government officials and company managers
responsible for the administration of the mining sector have not followed the
example of their counterparts in the petroleum sector by advocating the
incorporation of land groups as vehicles for landowner representation or benefit
distribution. This is not just because the first group have learnt a salutary lesson
from the troubles encountered by the second group (see Weiner 1998, this
volume; Sagir 2001; Lea 2002a, 2000b; Koyama 2004), even if that explains the
sense of caution currently displayed by the Department of Mining (PNGDoM
2003: 28). Back in 1990, when CNGL was adopting the policy and practice of
land group incorporation, the mining mandarins could hardly have foreseen the
dysfunctional outcomes. Yet they already knew that one of the factors behind
the outbreak of the Bougainville rebellion, which they had also failed to predict,
was the dysfunctional outcome of the ‘clan agent system’ as a method of
connecting the Panguna landowners to the other parties in the resource
compensation relationship (Filer 1990).16  So why did they persist with this model
when an alternative was being actively promoted in both the forestry and
petroleum sectors?
One answer would be that the rest of the mining industry was still engaging
former kiaps (colonial district officers) to manage the corporate relationship with
customary landowners, and these individuals saw no good reason to change
their own customary practice. The practice of ‘land investigation’, through
which clan agents and clan boundaries were identified, was still part of the land
acquisition process prescribed under the Land Act (Filer et al. 2000: 32–3) and
the dispute settlement process prescribed under the Land Disputes Settlement
Act (Filer 2005: 913). Rather than blame the clan agent system itself for the
outbreak of the Bougainville rebellion, the old kiaps were more inclined to blame
the premature localisation of Bougainville Copper Limited’s Village Relations
Office or the unique history of local resistance to colonial rule. Discounting
Bougainville as a ‘special case’ (Griffin 1990), they could maintain that theirs
was still the best way to deal with customary land and landowners in other parts
of the country. They were also dealing with landowners in the petroleum sector,
where George Clapp’s arguments in favour of the clan agent system were typical
of their position. CNGL’s preference for Tony Power’s arguments might therefore
have been a contingent effect of that company’s Texan corporate culture, which
had little in common with the values of Australian colonial paternalism, and
15  See, for example: The National 21 May 2004, 14 and 22 September 2004, 26 August 2005; Post-Courier
6, 26 and 28 October 2004, 3 November 2004, 5, 6 and 20 April 2005.
16 The author can vouch for this fact because he was then in regular communication with senior officials
in what was then the Department of Minerals and Energy.
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CNGL’s ability to influence the national policy process was simply a function
of its dominant role in the development of the Kutubu project.
However, the influence of old kiaps was only one of the factors which kept
land groups out of the mining sector in the decade following the Bougainville
rebellion. As a result of the mineral exploration boom in the preceding decade,
the people responsible for managing ‘community affairs’ had already established
relationships with customary landowners in many different parts of the country
— not only in places where new mines had been or would soon be developed,
but also in places where no development has yet occurred. In 1990 there was
no clean sheet on which to inscribe an unfamiliar process of land group
incorporation. But if this was partly a matter of timing, it was also a question of
scale. The areas of customary land which had to be ‘acquired’ for development
of the Kutubu project were much larger than those required for development
of any mining project, so the Kutubu Joint Venture could not imagine for a
moment that it was dealing with a single ‘landowning community’ with its own
unique set of customs and a small number of customary leaders with whom
personal ‘community relations’ could be cultivated through the process of mineral
exploration. The differential intensity of the social relations of resource
compensation is itself a significant structural difference between the two branches
of production.
If that is one reason why the mining companies preferred to trust old kiaps
to deal with customary landowners, it does not mean that policy makers in Port
Moresby saw no reason to change their own approach to the problem of
landowner representation. Even before the outbreak of the Bougainville rebellion,
they had to deal with an unprecedented set of demands from the Porgera
landowners, and those included a demand for greater representation in the
development process. The policy response to this demand was the institution
of the ‘development forum’, which would henceforth grant formal negotiating
rights to representatives of the customary owners or ‘holders’ of land required
for the development of a major mining project (West 1992). But the policy makers
were careful to avoid making any statement about the way that this
representation ought to be achieved. The Mining Act of 1992 leaves that to the
discretion of the Minister. The project coordinators in his department were well
aware of the extent of variation in the capacity of landowners in different parts
of the country to organise or be organised in any particular way. So, when the
closure of the Panguna copper mine bore witness to the deficiencies of the clan
agent system on Bougainville, they were not inclined to advocate another model
of landowner organisation and inscribe it in the national policy framework.
Instead, they began to advocate the practice of social mapping by anthropologists
as a way of getting beyond or beneath the simplified representations of local
social organisation espoused by the old kiaps (Filer 1999).
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Needless to say, the anthropologists played their part by revealing the
diversity and complexity of the relationship between customary group
boundaries and land boundaries in areas of interest to the mining sector.17  It is
therefore somewhat ironic that the need for social mapping studies found legal
recognition in the Oil and Gas Act of 1998, without ever being enshrined in the
mining sector’s formal policy framework. Although CNGL conducted one early
experiment with social mapping in its own licence area (Ernst 1993), this initially
failed to dent the company’s enthusiasm for land group incorporation or promote
its appreciation of social anthropology. It was the steady accumulation of disputes
about land boundaries and group boundaries in the petroleum sector which
eventually caused a change of heart, and that was because of the intervention
of lawyers providing donor-funded ‘technical assistance’ to the national
government (Taylor and Whimp 1997). It just so happened that these lawyers
were familiar with the policy innovations of the mining sector, and government
officials from that sector were also involved in framing the relevant provisions
of the Oil and Gas Act. However, the official lack of enthusiasm for land group
incorporation as a model solution to the problem of landowner representation
in the mining sector was matched by an appreciation of the need for flexibility
in regulating the social relations of resource compensation (Filer et al. 2000;
PNGDoM 2003). The results of social mapping studies in this sector had only
served to confirm this prejudice, and that is one of the reasons why social
mapping studies themselves have not so far been subject to regulation under
the Mining Act.
While the mining industry has hesitated to follow the model of land group
incorporation adopted by the oil and gas industry, the oil palm industry has
shown more enthusiasm for the model adopted in the forestry sector without
any comparable pressure from government regulators. The reason for this may
be found in the relative permanence of large-scale agricultural estates and the
relative scarcity of land available for their expansion.
By the year 2000, the five main oil palm schemes occupied more than 110,000
hectares of land in four different provinces (Koczberski et al. 2001). More than
half of this land was alienated during the colonial period and then dedicated to
the development of nucleus estates and ‘land settlement schemes’ for smallholders
transplanted from other parts of the country.18  For three decades the industry
was able to expand by bringing an increasing proportion of this alienated land
into cultivation, raising the productivity of the parts that were already under
17  Most of this work remains unpublished because landowners and developers have normally been
wary of potential abuse by competing claimants to ownership of specific licence areas. One exception
which serves to illustrate the methodology is Young’s (1993) study of an area on Normanby Island in
Milne Bay Province.
18 The resettlement schemes are associated with the Hoskins and Bialla projects in West New Britain
and the Higaturu project in Oro Province.
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cultivation, and offering incentives for customary landowners to plant ‘village
oil palm’ on their own land. By 1997, however, it was evident that this process
of expansion could not continue indefinitely without a mechanism for raising
the intensity of production on customary land (Oliver 2000).
Although there have been several proposals to establish new oil palm estates
on customary land by clear-felling forests initially allocated to a logging company
under the Forestry Act of 1992, these have met with disconcerted opposition
from the World Bank, the PNG Forest Authority, environmental NGOs, and
even customary landowners themselves. That is because they all had good reason
to believe that the proponents were using the prospect of long-term agricultural
development as a pretext for extracting the native timber resources as quickly
as possible (Filer 1998a: 187–97). Nevertheless, the World Bank and the national
government have continued to advocate an expansion and intensification of
production in areas where nucleus estates have already been established
(PNGDNPRD 2004). The mechanism which has been adopted in order to achieve
this goal has been a combination of land group incorporation with the rather
peculiar arrangement known as ‘lease-leaseback’ under Division 4 of the Land
Act.
This arrangement was originally devised in 1978 as a way for customary
landowners to secure bank loans and modern managerial expertise for the
development of 20-hectare coffee estates in the central highlands without losing
their customary title to the land (McKillop 1991). By amendments to the Land
Act, the Minister was allowed to ‘lease customary land [from its customary
owners] for the purpose of granting a special agricultural and business lease of
the land’ to a ‘person or persons’ or ‘to a land group, business group or other
incorporated body, to whom the customary owners have agreed that such a lease
should be granted’. In effect, this is a way of getting around the legal prohibition
against non-citizens dealing in land which has not been registered under the
Land Registration Act, for when the State leases land back to a person or body
approved by the customary owners, the lease is registered under this Act. This
has so far proved to be the only way of mobilising customary land for large-scale
agricultural development without actually alienating it.
Although land group incorporation is not an essential feature of this process,
it has come to be recognised as the best way to limit transaction costs when
mobilising fairly large areas of customary land (Jones and McGavin 2000). Even
so, the incorporation and registration of land groups is only one of 16 different
steps which the oil palm industry had to take in order to access customary land
through the lease-leaseback arrangement, and it was necessary to engage a former
Land Titles Commissioner as a consultant in order to make sure that all these
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steps were taken in the right and proper order (Oliver 2000, 2001).19 The first
‘mini-estate’ to be created in this way covered 6,000 hectares of land west of the
Kulu River in West New Britain Province. Once Special Agricultural Leases had
been issued to four land groups representing the customary owners of this area,
each land group issued a 40-year sub-lease to New Britain Palm Oil Ltd.20  In
return, each land group received an annual rental payment of K50 per hectare,
a monthly royalty payment equivalent to 10 per cent of the farm gate price of
harvested fruit, and 10 shares in the oil palm company for each hectare covered
under the lease (Oliver 2000: 24).21
By the end of 2000, the mini-estates covered roughly 11,000 hectares of
customary land, and thus accounted for roughly 10 per cent of the total area
planted to oil palm (Koczberski et al. 2001: 6; Oliver 2001: 69). The area devoted
to mini-estates in four of the country’s five oil palm schemes seems to have
doubled by the end of 2004, and another 4600 hectares had been developed
under a similar arrangement, known as Community Oil Palm Development, in
the vicinity of the fifth scheme (Bourke 2005). Since the other spatial components
of the industry have been relatively static, it is therefore likely that industrial
production on customary land now accounts for as much as 25 per cent of the
total area planted to oil palm. On the other hand, the existing schemes are now
encountering physical and demographic constraints to further expansion along
these lines (Michael Bourke, personal communication, April 2006). Although
Ramu Sugar Ltd (in Morobe Province) has now joined the ranks of the oil palm
industry, and has also taken advantage of the lease-leaseback arrangement to
expand its operations, there is as yet no evidence that this arrangement could
be successfully applied to the development of an entirely new agro-industrial
enterprise in an area where there is no alienated land on which to locate its
central processing plant.
Conclusion: African Models in the Neo-Melanesian
Mindscape
In March 2006, the Secretary for Lands and Physical Planning was reported to
have said that ‘incorporated land groups were not owners of the land but were
people legally recognised as a group’ (Post-Courier, 10 March 2006). This
provoked one member of the public to write a letter complaining that
The Secretary is fundamentally incorrect to insinuate that the ILGs are
not landowners but are a legal group. His very own department subjects
19  Norm Oliver’s role in facilitating this process for the oil palm industry was similar to the role previously
played by Tony Power in the petroleum sector.
20 The period of the lease was based on the assumption that oil palm has a 20-year life cycle. At the end
of the 40-year period, the landowners would have the option of renewing all the lease arrangements,
granting sub-leases to another oil palm company, or allowing all the leases to lapse.
21 The shareholding was later increased to 50 shares per hectare (Oliver 2001: 67).
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clans to prove their ownership of the land the ILGs are incorporated over
because clans own the land, not individuals … Most lives are here at the
rural areas so the ILGs are well positioned for empowerisation and
resourcing now than ever before (Post-Courier, 10 March 2006).
It seems that the Secretary was making a distinction between the process of land
group incorporation and the process of registering titles to customary land, or
between the legal mechanisms for establishing land boundaries and land group
boundaries, in order to show that ‘some of the land legislation needed to change’
if these two things were to be combined. His respondent, on the other hand,
was articulating an ‘ideology of landownership’ which both reflects and distorts
the social relations of resource compensation (Filer 1997, 2006a). This ideology
asserts that ‘clans’ and ‘land groups’ are essentially the same thing, and their
incorporation only serves to confirm the fact that these ‘customary landowning
groups’ are the basic building blocks of Melanesian society. But when the author
of this letter says that the State ‘subjects’ these groups, he exposes an interesting
fault line in this ideology, for it is not clear whether he means to say that the
State itself has been responsible for the creation and empowerment of these
collective subjects, or whether he means to say that they are traditional subjects
which have been subordinated to the power of the State and now need to reassert
their relative autonomy.
One of the ‘Ground Rules’ which the Petroleum Policy Action Team adopted
at the behest of the jolly Chevroid who acted as its facilitator was for its members
to ‘have fun’. And one of the main sources of amusement was the recurrent
banter between myself and Tony Power on the question of whether land groups,
or groups of landowners, should or should not be described as ‘clans’ in any
statement of national policy. At one of our many meetings, I laid two trump
cards on the table, which were photocopies of two pages in a special issue of the
journal Anthropological Forum. One was taken from an article by Dan Jorgensen,
and contained a passage in which he described the type of evidence which his
Telefol informants had prepared for his consumption, once they knew that he
was coming to evaluate their claims to ownership of land in the vicinity of a
proposed copper mine close to the Sepik River.
Most of this came in the form of oral accounts of personal genealogies
and land use histories, with detailed listings of the marks they or their
ancestors had left on the ground around the proposed mine site. This
testimony was backed up with the aid of locally recognised collateral
evidence in the form of ancestral relics, war trophies, and the texts of
commemorative songs that provide a crucial medium of Telefol oral
history. Some came with typescript statements or computer-generated
census lists that made an excellent approximation of official village
registers. Others, who were familiar with government notions of
161
Local Custom and the Art of Land Group Boundary Maintenance in Papua New Guinea
landholding, began talking of traditional cognatic descent categories
(tenum miit) as ‘clans’, complete with patrilineal descent (Jorgensen 1997:
611).
The other page was taken from an article by Philip Guddemi, and included a
rather similar observation about the ‘invention of clanship’ in another community
whose members were reflecting on the same prospect.
The presence of a ‘Sepik Ideology’ of patriliny is a present-day political
reality to which Sawiyanoo make reference as they contemplate the
possibility of land compensation. Certainly, the official East Sepik
government stance is quite clear: Solomon Hopkis, the Assistant Secretary
for Lands for the East Sepik Province, is on record in a Working Paper
on the Frieda Mine issue as saying that: ‘We commonly practice Patriarch
lineage thus very rear materneal [sic] lineage otherwise not at all’
(Guddemi 1997: 641).
Guddemi went on to interpret the word ‘rear’ as one which corresponds to the
Sawiyanoo vernacular term for ‘following behind’, rather than the English word
‘rare’, which is perhaps what Mr Hopkis had in mind. But Guddemi’s allusion
to the existence of a ‘pan-Sepik’ ideology of patrilineal inheritance (if not
patriarchal authority) made no mention of the role which my fellow teamster
had played in the development of this ideology through his efforts to secure the
registration of customary land in East Sepik Province. So I scribbled ‘Influence
of Tony Power!’ in the margin of the photocopy before I passed it over to my
target, and by this means was able to banish the word ‘clan’ from his vocabulary
for the next couple of meetings.
But no amount of ethnographic evidence seems likely to affect the way in
which this word is used by Papua New Guineans whose thoughts lie well beyond
the proven influence of Tony Power. While the Action Team was actively
debating the question of landowner organisation, one member of the national
intelligentsia published a newspaper article whose title boldly declared that
‘The Clan Sits at the Heart of PNG Politics’ (Anere 1998). Oddly enough, the
evidence deployed in support of this statement comprised the votes cast in the
Namatanai Open Electorate in the national election of 1992 — an electorate in
which there were only two candidates, and both accumulated substantial numbers
of votes in each of the 12 census divisions into which it was divided. Nowhere
could the footprint of the ‘clan’ be seen on this particular trail of numbers. At
a seminar held shortly afterwards, I drew this fact to the attention of the author,
and reiterated my own argument that ‘clans’ have only come to be seen as the
homogeneous building blocks of national society because they ‘have actually
become groups of landowners claiming compensation from development of their
resources’ (Filer 1997: 168). But the other members of the national intelligentsia
who were present at this meeting seemed to be unanimous in their endorsement
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of the view that ‘clans’ in all parts of the country are fundamentally alike, have
always been the sole collective owners of all natural and cultural resources, and
naturally vote as one in national elections. No doubt many national members of
the Action Team thought likewise, which might help to explain why Tony Power
soon reverted to the argument that ‘clans’ are not only synonymous with ‘land
groups’, but are also ‘very independent of each other, even within one tribal
(ethnic, language) group’ (Power 2000[1]: 7).
Anthropologists may find it somewhat ironic that they should now be cast
in the role of opposing a ‘nationalist’ ideology that seems to recapitulate the
outmoded version of their own discipline which formerly informed the colonial
vision of ‘native society’. That vision was based on the practical need to establish
representations of the native population that would place its component parts
in the spatial hierarchy of colonial administration and subject them to the most
effective forms of social control (Brown 1963; Strathern 1966; Wolfers 1975).
That is why they adopted the ‘African model’ of segmentary social organisation
in which the principle of unilineal descent gave rise to a set of ‘tribes’ divided
into ‘clans’ and subdivided into ‘lineages’ whose members were literally lined
up in front of the kiap when he came to conduct a census. Melanesian
ethnography began to recoil from this African model in the early 1960s (Barnes
1962; Wagner 1974; Lawrence 1984), and most practitioners have since abandoned
the concept of ‘social structure’ as a figment of the modernist imagination. But
Australian government officials were not content with the application of one
African model to the business of aligning customary group boundaries with
those of a modern state. After 1960, they also tried to apply the ‘Kenyan model’
to the registration and privatisation of ‘communally owned land’ in order to
realise Hasluck’s vision of an indigenous peasant society (NGRU 1971; Quinn
1981). Indigenous politicians objected to the legal instruments of this ‘agricultural
revolution’ (Ward 1972) because they would ‘grant a small number of named
members of the [customary] group the power to deal with the land as if they
were the absolute owners’ (Ward 1981: 250). In other words, they would have
used the ‘clan agent system’ as the basis for a wholesale transformation of landed
property relations.
Like the Constitutional Planning Committee, the Commission of Inquiry into
Land Matters was attempting to nationalise the body of colonial law by turning
‘native custom’ into ‘customary law’ and making this the ‘underlying law’ that
would inform the new laws of the Independent State. If the colonial regime had
divided the native population into ‘clans’ and ‘tribes’ for the purpose of ruling
over them, the new national body of land law was careful to avoid the use of
either of these words for reasons that most anthropologists would readily endorse.
If a customary ‘land group’ were to be granted legal status through the process
of ‘incorporation’, local custom would still need to determine the name, shape
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and size of the group in question. So how is it that the ‘clan’ has since been
reinstated as the heart and soul of the independent nation?
One answer would be that there is no other word in the English language
that could be adopted as shorthand for a ‘customary social group’, and the use
of this word does not necessarily mean that the speaker subscribes to any
particular model of social organisation or would deny the diversity or flexibility
of the Melanesian social groups to which the label is applied. If Tok Pisin speakers
now use the word klan, instead of the word lain, to talk about these customary
groups, this might simply show that they have moved beyond the restricted
vocabulary of the colonial social order. The creolisation of Neo-Melanesian
political discourse might encourage English-speaking social scientists to think
that they are hearing the construction of an ideology when a new noun, like
klan or kastom, appears to turn a set of social relations into an object. However,
it is not single words but whole conversations which have this ideological effect,
and then only because of the way they reveal and conceal what people are talking
about. And in the present case, the point at issue is not the way that people vote
in national elections, but the way that people get involved in the social relations
of resource compensation (Filer 1997; Holzknecht 1997; Ernst 1999; Hirsch 2001).
If ‘clans’ have become subjects or objects in an ideology of landownership,
it might still be argued that this is an ideology articulated by the dominant class
or party in these social relations of production. In that case, the ‘Neo-Melanesian’
mindscape might turn out to be a neo-colonial vision articulated by members of
an indigenous political and bureaucratic elite who represent the constitution of
their own society when dealing with bodies like the World Bank or a
multinational oil company. Their enthusiasm for land group incorporation might
then be seen as a betrayal of the values articulated by the CILM, either because
it merely replicates the colonial project of subordinating customary social groups
to modern political and corporate structures, or worse still, because it has become
a backdoor route to the registration and privatisation of customary land.
There is no doubt that some members of the national elite, including the
Secretary for Lands, would like to strengthen or streamline the connection
between land group incorporation and the registration of customary land.
Furthermore, as we have seen, this connection has already been established in
the oil palm sector. But this does not mean that land group incorporation and
the ideology of landownership are both aspects of a neo-colonial conspiracy to
subordinate Landowners to the State or the Developers.
First, we must recall that the CILM and its legal advisers were never opposed
to the registration of customary land, but were only concerned to ensure that
this was not done in a way that would lead to the dispossession of customary
owners and the creation of a landless proletariat (Fingleton 1981, this volume;
Ward 1981). Second, land group incorporation finds absolutely no favour with
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those expatriate commentators who have recently begun to reiterate the demand
for individual, transferable land titles as an essential condition of PNG’s economic
development (Lea 2002a, 2000b; Gosarevski et al. 2004a, 2004b). Third, the white
advocates of land group incorporation, who might be said to represent the
‘progressive’ strand of agrarian populism, no longer have their hands on the
central levers of public or corporate policy in PNG. Fourth, there are many
national managers of ‘community affairs’, especially those working in the forestry
and petroleum sectors, who have many practical reasons to wish that they did
not have to practice the art of land group maintenance (Koyama 2004). And
finally, the ‘reactionary’ strand of agrarian populism, which opposes land group
incorporation on ideological grounds, is in fact articulated by members of the
national intelligentsia (Lakau 1997), while the demand for incorporation now
seems to be coming from people who represent ‘the Landowners’ in the social
relations of resource compensation.
These are all good reasons to deny that the ideology of landownership is
merely recapitulating the ‘native narratives’ of the colonial regime. Colonial
administrators were content to treat ‘tribes’ and ‘clans’ as the superficial form
of the relationship between the State and ‘native society’. They did not seek to
lift the ‘corporate veil’ by modernising, legalising or harmonising the internal
constitution of these ‘customary groups’ (Taylor and Whimp 1997: 74), but only
tried to establish the social and political responsibilities of the individuals who
were appointed or elected as their leaders. The ‘clan agent system’ implied the
existence of ‘clans’ without granting them any kind of legal status or demanding
that they act in any particular way (ibid: 102). While anthropologists were busily
discovering the diversity of ‘local custom’, colonial administrators lost interest
in this subject as their project changed from ‘pacification’ to ‘development’.
Although they were responsible for initiating several large-scale resource
development projects in the final decade of their rule, they barely began to think
of ways to ‘customise’ the social relations of resource compensation.
If nowadays we find a cult of incorporation amongst the Landowners
themselves, this suggests that the ideology of landownership is not the property
of any one party to the social relations of resource compensation, but is a form
of the relationship itself. This new African model asserts the novel, newly
rediscovered power of ‘custom’ and ‘customary groups’ against the powers of
the State and the Developers, but because it retains a segmentary structure, it
represents a customary shadow of the State that could either be a source of
compliance or resistance in the process of resource development. Landowners
anticipate their relationship with Developers before the Developers arrive on
their land, both in their imagination and in their social practice. They generally
want ‘development’ to happen, and they prepare themselves for it. If the
Developers do arrive, they also come with expectations about the Landowners,
which are derived from their understanding of national and local custom, national
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and provincial laws and policies, their own corporate policies and practices, and
those of other companies with which they are associated. That is the broad
‘mental landscape’ within which actual relationships are forged, and that is the
reason why the relationship of resource compensation reaches beyond the local
context of specific ‘development projects’.
The State and the Developers might think they are incorporating land groups
as part of a corporate strategy to control the wayward behaviour of clan agents,
landowner company directors, or other leaders of the ‘resource development
cult’ (Filer 1998a: 284), but these same land groups may then turn out to be
weapons of political intrigue in the hands of these same leaders (Lea 2002a;
Gosarevski et al. 2004b). If ‘the incorporated land group represents an attempt
to deal with the reality of capitalist relations of production through what the
legislators have conceived to be the traditional form of property’ (Lea 2002a:
83), it may also be one of the main reasons why ‘[t]he state is like a landlord
which cannot get the tenants out of its house’ (Taylor and Whimp 1997: 127).
At one moment, the process of incorporation is represented as a way of
subordinating custom to capitalist relations of production; at the next moment,
it becomes the vehicle by which those relations are customised, tribalised, or
even demonised.
These are all partial truths or double movements that bespeak the presence
of an ideology. What this ideology reveals is a desire to standardise the social
organisation of customary landowners as a condition or consequence of their
dealing with the social relations of resource compensation. What it conceals is
the fact that this desire is nowhere near to being realised.
Much of the debate about land group incorporation seems to assume that
land groups are indeed all much alike, just as ‘clans’ are all much alike, and this
view seems to be shared by the most radical proponents and opponents of any
kind of land reform. What I have tried to demonstrate in this chapter is that
people have been incorporating land groups for different purposes and with
different outcomes in different branches of extractive industry. But that is only
half the story. For if the ideology of landownership also conceals a real variety
of ‘local customs in relation to land’, we should also expect to find that
Landowners in different parts of the country are not all equally willing or able
to sustain the incorporation of ‘land groups’ for any particular purpose, whatever
the policies or strategies adopted by the State or the Developers. And that is the
point at which the art of land group maintenance invites the need for social
mapping studies to debunk the ideology.
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Chapter Nine
Determinacy of Groups and the
‘Owned Commons’ in Papua New
Guinea and Torres Strait1
John Burton
The means of owning and managing customary land (also known as traditional
land) in Australia and the Pacific has been treated in many ways in the century
and a quarter since Sir Arthur Gordon’s initiatives in Fiji (France 1969) — the
first large-scale attempt to accommodate native ownership in the framework of
a Western system of administration.2  In Australia, discussions of the essence of
native title, the local vehicle for customary ownership, have been framed in
terms of a ‘recognition space’ where Western law and customary law intersect
but remain separate. However, I deal in this paper with cases where this concept
is not an especially useful prism through which to view the situation, and I
choose not to pursue this line of argument.3  In the cases I present, indigenous
groups have been successful in pursuing their claims to land through various
processes of landowner identification, including through litigation, but have
found the outcomes extremely difficult to work with afterwards. In several
cases, the key problem is that the indigenous system had either to be
misrepresented by witnesses or misinterpreted by state officials in order for any
outcome to be arrived at. This happened in a different way in each case, but the
1  I would like to thank Jim Fingleton and James Weiner for comments on this paper, and Peter Bennett,
Ngawae Mitio, Lengeto Giam, the spokesmen for Nauti, Akikanda, Minava and Yokua villages, the
office bearers of Mer Gedkem Le, the Mer Island Council, and the individual persons in all other
communities I have consulted for being extremely forthcoming with information. I also acknowledge
all the relevant organisations for whom I have worked as a consultant or employee for enabling the
field investigations reported in this chapter.
2  In this chapter I will necessarily have to use terms that are familiar and comfortable in one jurisdiction,
but conventionally require qualification in the other. Thus the usages ‘custom’, ‘law’, ‘customary’,
‘traditional’, ‘indigenous’, ‘landowner’ (or ‘land owner’ or ‘land holder’ in some discussions), and more
have a particular history in the relevant bodies of literature relating to PNG and Australia. But except
where I specifically qualify a term, I am trying to use such phrases in such a way that general principles
can be derived across the two jurisdictions.
3  A metaphor that has been used in native title discussions is the intersection of two circles in a Venn
diagram (Mantziaris and Martin 1999). The metaphor has the arguably political purpose of disclaiming
the intention of state-made laws to connect directly with customary law, and perhaps even to deny the
possibility of this. In Papua New Guinea and the Pacific, though, the political agendas of statehood
emphasise the emergence of the state from customary forms of society — whether this is accurate or
not.
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result was essentially the same: landowners have been left to their own devices
struggling to make their custom inter-operable with their state’s administrative
system.
Approaches to Identification of Traditional Owners of Land
The administrative systems of both Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Australia
provide a variety of legal mechanisms for recognising the ownership of customary
land. In both cases the solution has two steps: the recognition of owning entities,
and the description of land estates and the connections that the owning entities
have to them.4
In both PNG and Australia landowners often emerge in a political context
prior to more specific identification. Sutton (2003: 116) suggests that indigenous
custom in Australia reflects a dual system:
The living holders of specific traditional land interests, often now called
the ‘traditional owners’ … hold title in the proximate sense, while
underlying titles are maintained by the wider regional cultural and
customary-legal system of the social networks of which they are members.
There is no provision to recognise ‘underlying title’ in Australia other than
politically. It is manifested in the creation of Native Title Representative Body
areas based on criteria such as occupation of ethno-geographic regions (for
example ‘Torres Strait’) or modern political regions (for example ‘Victoria’).
Another illustration is the 12 per cent of Western Australia held by the State’s
Aboriginal Lands Trust, which was established by the Aboriginal Affairs Planning
Authority Act 1972. Many of the reserves that this includes are leased or occupied
by Aboriginal corporations, but quite a number are not, and might therefore be
considered as falling under indigenous commons ownership (see Glaskin, this
volume).
In PNG, the equivalent of ‘underlying title’ is, I suggest, also shown by
political representation. One example is the creation of 296 Local-Level
Governments that are intended to group together people of ethnic and linguistic
affinity or, in Sutton’s terms, people who share the same ‘cultural and
customary-legal system’.
The Handling of Proximate Titles — Papua New Guinea
When land is required for a non-customary use, a Land Investigation Report
(under the Land Act 1996) must be carried out for each separately owned parcel
by a government Lands Officer. A Schedule of Landowners, with attached
signatures (or thumbprints), is attached to a survey plan and other descriptive
4  ‘Owning entity’ is a choice of words here that does not prejudge what kind of body it is that owns
land in a particular case: a named person, a family, a ‘clan’ (defined in some way), a Schedule of Owners,
or a made-up legal entity such as a Body Corporate.
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details. The Schedule of Landowners is not an ‘owning entity’ but a list of people
who attest to the fact that the description of the land is accurate and that they
have interests in it.
A formal kind of body that has the potential to be an owning entity for
indigenous land in PNG is the Incorporated Land Group (ILG), under the
provisions of the Land Groups Incorporation Act 1974. The main usage of ILGs
has been in forestry, where legislation requires their formation, and in the
Southern Highlands oil and gas projects (see Filer, this volume). The key defect
in the administration of this legislation is that applicants merely pay a fee to the
Registrar General’s office to register an ILG. No branch of government exists,
or is contemplated, for the purpose of vetting applications, in other words seeing
that they are properly formed or even that they really exist.5  In consequence,
there are now believed to be over 10,000 registered ILGs, with the number
increasing at 10–15 per day (Fingleton 2004: 117).
Not only is it easy for ILGs to proliferate in terms of absolute numbers, the
absence of provisions for the governance of ILGs has created ideal conditions
for existing ILGs to undergo rapid fission. Among the Foi and Fasu (Weiner,
this volume), members of subgroups within incorporated clans complained that
the executives and passbook signatories failed to distribute benefits fairly and
they split off to form new groups.
I can suggest here that the checks and balances provided by proper
governance — the holding of regular meetings freely attended by members, the
keeping of minutes, the election of and submission to accountability of the office
bearers — could have counteracted this propensity to fission. As I point out
below, in PNG the system is full of owning groups but empty of governance,
whereas in Australia the equivalent system is full of governance but empty of
owning groups.
The Handling of Proximate Titles — Australia
All the ‘title’ forms of indigenous tenure in Australia require that some kind of
incorporated group be formed first. In the Northern Territory the vehicle used
by the Aboriginal Land Rights Act is the Aboriginal Land Trust. In the Queensland
legislation, a land trust is used with trustees appointed by the Minister for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Policy. The High Court, in the second
Mabo decision,6  was not prejudicial to any particular form of traditional
ownership, such that the wording used by the majority (Brennan J at 61) was
copied in Section 223(1) of the Native Title Act as ‘communal, group or individual
rights and interests’ which are said to belong to the ‘common law holders’.
5  See Burton (1993) on the registration of five groups at Hedinia.
6 Mabo and Others v Queensland (2) (1992) 175 CLR 1.
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Be that as it may, the Act goes on to makes it clear that the standard means
of implementation is for the ‘communal, group or individual rights and interests’
to be loaded into a Prescribed Body Corporate (PBC) after a successful claim.
This is the pointy end of the native title process and there is little provision for
anything beyond incorporation (Mantziaris and Martin 1999, Chapter 2 and
Figure 2).
Integrity in native title is maintained by at least three levels of vetting. A
Native Title Representative Body will in the first instance endeavour to avoid
the formation of overlapping claim groups and overlapping claim areas by
holding meetings with members of communities in its representative area. Next,
the National Native Title Tribunal, through the application of the registration
test (Section 190 of the Native Title Act) and its Geospatial Services, in checking
for overlapping or geographically invalid claims, will screen out invalid claims
and claimant groups. Last, contested claims that cannot reach negotiated
settlement can be subject to trial in the Federal Court.
Examples of improperly constituted claim groups are groups consisting of
only one person, containing non-indigenous people, or containing so-called
‘historical’ people — for example, indigenous people living in another group’s
area (Sutton 2003: 19–20). While the Office of the Registrar of Aboriginal
Corporations (ORAC), in its acceptance of PBCs, does not have a role in the
determination process, it is meant to continue to make sure that PBCs continue
to correctly represent traditional owners by holding Annual General Meetings,
electing office bearers with correct procedures, and submitting (brief) annual
reports. In practice, PBCs often fall behind with compliance, whether they are
‘empty’ PBCs set up in anticipation of winning native title or PBCs that hold
native title following successful determinations. Given that these bodies are
unfunded, policy makers have no current answer to this situation — successfully
claimed native titles could hardly be forfeited — so the effectiveness of the
oversight role of ORAC in the governance of PBCs is moot.
The irony with these arrangements is that, with only 53 successful claims so
far, Australia has an elaborate system that is empty of owning groups, while
PNG has 10,000 owning groups but nothing like the National Native Title
Tribunal to vet applications or ORAC to ensure that each of the groups is properly
formed and sticks to its rules.
Determinacy, Bounded Groups and ‘Owned Commons’
From the above it can be seen that there is a strong expectation of the group
ownership of proximate titles in both jurisdictions and that, at any point, the
membership of an owning group is fully determined in the following senses:
any reasonably knowledgeable adult member ought, at least in principle, to be
able to list all the other adults in the group; no member is likely to contest the
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eligibility of other members of the group to be in it, except in borderline cases
which should be few in number; and, in a landscape of many similar groups, it
is not expected that members with full rights in one group could also have full
rights in another group, even if it is possible to have lesser rights in another
group.
This essentially portrays such entities as bounded groups. It contrasts with
the fully indeterminate situation in a parcellised landscape where many people
each claim rights to many land parcels; an indeterminate number of people claim
rights to any one parcel (that is, the information to work out how many claimants
there are likely to be is not fully knowable); many of the claimants do not know
of one another’s claims, or identities, or both; and a large proportion of claimants
dispute the claims of others. In the indeterminate situation, ‘groups’ — collections
of people who can take coordinated action — cannot be found in a meaningful
sense.
In the Australian context, Sutton foreshadows the possibility of considering
more than two layers of title, but after briefly giving examples, he says that the
‘usages refer to constructs that are different from the underlying/proximate
distinction’ he has made (Sutton 2003: 116). The concept he touches on but
passes over is that of a ‘grant’ from a proximate title. It is worth noting here that
no provision is made in either jurisdiction for differentiating the internal
ownership of titles (or for varying the types of rights across a native title area).
In consequence, when ownership is undifferentiated and collective, it can be
said to be held as owned commons.
In PNG, influential writers seem more than content to go along with the
‘corporate clan’ or even ‘corporate village’: ‘a village recognises itself as an
independent, autonomous social unit … identity constitutes the unit as a
“corporation”, an entity’ (Narokobi 1989: 21–2). No extant public utterances
offer a contrary view to the assumption that village-level social units — usually
‘clans’ or wanpisin in the newspapers — are the title-holding entities and the
primary owners of land.
‘Owned Commons’ Cases: Dauan and Iralim
An Australian example of an ‘owned commons’ case is the native title
determination over Dauan Island in Torres Strait.7  I have chosen this because
of the small size of the island (4.5 km2) and the easy grounds for saying that the
Dauan people, the Dauanalgaw, form a single owning entity. While they recognise
totemic divisions among themselves, and families identify with particular areas
of gardening land, no ‘tribal’ divisions were noted as relating to land when the
then very small community of 67 people was first visited by a government agent
7 Dauan People v Queensland 2000 FCA 1064.
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(Captain Pennefather) on 5 December 1879, and none are claimed today. In other
words, such internal boundaries that exist are within the single polity represented
by Dauanalgaw, and negotiations over access are a matter of discussion between
families. In this sense, Dauan fits the owned commons model reasonably happily.
In PNG, a nationally important example is the Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement)
Act 1976 that granted the Special Mining Lease around Mt Fubilan. Hyndman
was present at the time and found that main ridges between drainage basins and
the Ok Tedi River divided the landscape up in to ‘parishes’:
The … parishes are territorial and social groupings which have claims
on and ultimate rights to use named and delimited hamlet, garden and
rain forest resources. Thus, the parish is recognized as a clearly bounded,
territorially discrete unit (Hyndman 1994: 7).
This led to the identification of the people of the Wopkaimin Iralim parish as
the traditional owners of Mt Fubilan. The residents of Bultem and Finalbin
villages, within Iralim parish, were treated for all intents and purposes as a single
group of landowners (Welsch 1979; Jackson et al. 1981, Table 5.2).8
I use this example because it is one of very few in PNG where anthropologists
and government lands officers concurred on the absence of internal differentiation
in ownership rights. For example:
Wopkaimin land tenure is essentially communal in nature … everyone
in [the] community shares rights to a large tract of undeveloped forest
land used for hunting and foraging. (Welsch 1987: 122).
Hyndman’s map (1994, Figure 1.4) shows that a parish is further subdivided
into bounded ‘neighbourhoods’, though he does not say if parish members have
differentiated rights among neighbourhoods. At all events, there are few
impediments to Wopkaimin moving among hamlets that can spring up anywhere
within the parish, and Hyndman himself recounts that in 1973–74 his was the
first house built at a hamlet called Moiyokabip, in the upper part of the Kam
Valley, which had seven houses by the end of his stay. A short time later, most
of the Wopkaimin had relocated to new settlements on the Ok Tedi mine access
road, and by 1985 only 12 of 700 Wopkaimin were still living anywhere in the
Kam Valley where almost all had lived previously (Hyndman 1982, 1994: 108ff.).
8  I am familiar with the case of the Wopkaimin from my time as co-leader of the Ok-Fly Social Monitoring
Project, 1991–95, a consultancy project of the University of PNG for Ok Tedi Mining Limited. Field
investigations were done in the neighbouring Ningerum and Awin areas in 1991–92 and touched on
Wopkaimin matters only in relation to Ningerum and Awin claims to, and legendary associations with,
Wopkaimin places.
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The Collectivisation of Land at Mer Island
The Mabo case, which concluded in 1992, is widely known for its effect of
erasing the concept of terra nullius — the idea that Australia had been the ‘land
of no-one’ prior to white settlement (Beckett 1995; Keon-Cohen 2000).
This achievement has overshadowed the effects of the case on the Meriam
themselves.9 The Mabo plaintiffs did not present evidence to the Supreme Court
of Queensland in the form of conceptual claims against the government, but as
they had done for a century when litigating among themselves in the Murray
Island Court. When the case was referred to the High Court in Canberra, and its
judgement handed back to the Supreme Court of Queensland, the individual
statements of claim were abandoned without resolution.
Subsequently, a PBC, Mer Gedkem Le (literally ‘Mer Landowning People’),
was created to act as the holder of Mer’s native title. This promised to put Meriam
customary ownership of land on a sound footing. The problem remained,
however, that observations going back to the first moments of the annexation
of Mer to Queensland in 1879 did not emphasise corporate or collective rights
but personal ones.
In 1879, Captain Pennefather reported of Mer that the islanders ‘are very
tenacious of their ownership of the land and the island is divided into small
properties which have been handed down from generation to generation’.10  In
1886, John Douglas, the Government Resident at Thursday Island, wrote: ‘I do
not see how it will be possible to administer these islands under the present laws
of Queensland, more especially as touching the land question.’ In 1891, Douglas
commissioned Captain Owen of the Queensland First Regiment to make a land
survey of Mer showing all dwellings labelled by household head — the only
island in Torres Strait where such a detailed survey was undertaken (Douglas
1894).11 Owen’s map, it should be added, remained undiscovered during the
Mabo case. Wilkin, a member of the Cambridge expedition to Torres Strait in
1898, began his account of land tenure with the statement that ‘Queensland [in
other words European property law] has not affected native land tenure’ (Wilkin
1908: 163). J.S. Bruce, who presided over the Murray Island Court from the
9  I am familiar with the cases of Dauan and Mer from my time as Senior Anthropologist, Native Title
Office, Torres Strait Regional Authority 2001–03. In the case of Mer, I spent a further month on the
island in 2003–04 as a consultant to the latter body to prepare for a land dispute workshop held in
January 2004 (Burton 2005). The native title determination at Dauan predated my tenure.
10  Captain Pennefather’s ‘Report of a Cruise in the Islands Lately Annexed to Queensland’ is held in
the Queensland States Archives at COL/A288/460.
11 Owen’s report, entitled ‘Meer Island, the largest of the Murray Islands group, surveyed by Captain
Owen, 1st Regiment Queensland, June 1891’, is held in the Queensland State Archives at REP (formerly
Q9 1891).
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1890s, wrote in the 1904 annual report: ‘I was present at the hearing of 29 of
the [42] cases … the land disputes are the source of a lot of trouble.’12
The dispute cases among the surviving records of the Murray Island Court13
(1908–83) leave the reader in no doubt that the matters at issue are about the
struggles of individuals to assert rights to marked out pieces of land in a system
of inheritance:
S wished to get possession of seven portions of land in the Piadram
district which belonged to his uncle E (deceased). His father, I, succeeded
to the land at his brother E’s death and at his death his mother D looked
after the land, at her death G was appointed the guardian of the land for
K and S (the sons of E) as they were both minors (Murray Island Court,
25 August 1910).
M charged G with encroaching on her portion of land at … by altering
the boundary line. M is acting as a caretaker of the portion for her
nephew E (Murray Island Court, 25 April 1913).
B disputed the right of E to a portion of land at … on the ground that it
was part of G’s property and should go to her family as heirs. E stated
that when she married D in 1901, G gave them the portion from the
kapere tree to the point and up as far as the bamboos just on the other
side of the street. She had been in possession for 24 years, using the
ground for herself, and G had never disputed her right (Murray Island
Court, 26 August 1925).
An annual average of 10–15 land cases went before the court up to World War
Two and 5–10 thereafter, dwindling to none by the end of the 1970s. The
reduction in cases after 1960 is in part a reflection of new life choices being
exercised by Meriam. For example, a reduction in the frequency of disputes
over garden land parallels the decline in importance of garden cultivation at
Mer. Similarly, when Meriam began to migrate to mainland Australian towns
in significant numbers in the 1950s, it is likely that pressure on land for family
housing in the village area slackened. Meriam land tenure, of course had not
changed at all:
The traditional system of land tenure persists, with ownership rights
transmitted by inheritance and generally vested in individuals or a group
of brothers. Everyone owns some land, though some are said to be short
while others have more than they need (Beckett 1963: 174).
12  Letter to H. Milman, Government Resident, Thursday Island, 27 December 1904 (Queensland Votes
and Proceedings 1905).
13  Records for the years 1908–1983 are held in the Queensland State Archives (Microfilm SRS4117).
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The final demise of the Murray Island Court may be laid at two institutional
changes. The first is the evolution of the role of the council from mainly political
representation in a system of colonial-style indirect rule — including presiding
over the court — to acting as a service deliverer in the conventional manner of
local government. The second is legislative change in the form of the Community
Services (Torres Strait Islands) Act 1984, which included provision for a new,
more formal island court system presided over by islander Justices of the Peace.
This simply had the effect of killing off the previous system without replacing
it. No Island Court is believed to have been convened in Torres Strait under this
legislation; cases of a civil nature either go unresolved or are reformulated as
offences that can be heard in the Magistrates Court on Thursday Island.
At Mer, disputes were put on hold from the inception of the Mabo case in
1982 until the High Court judgement of 1992, and after this until Mer Gedkem
Le was registered (in 1999), and then until office bearers were successfully elected
(around 2001). In the meantime, the disadvantages of living in a remote part of
Queensland were now being addressed in the form of State and Federal grants
for new housing, road sealing, reliable power generation, greatly improved
access to education at all levels, better health care and care for the aged, new
technology services such as electronic banking, and the ‘normal’ availability of
telephones.14 This has stemmed the exodus of Meriam and it has led to a reversal
of the direction of migration in some age groups.
These things have combined to create a heightened demand for housing land
and a resurgence in land disputation. In 2002, the Council of Elders tried to hear
eight dispute cases using provisions in the constitution of Mer Gedkem Le, but
this escalated intra-community tensions when all eight decisions were
immediately appealed. A workshop held in 2003, with funding from the Mer
Island Council and the Torres Strait Regional Authority, was no more conclusive,
but it did at least help to document more fully the backlog of at least 50 cases.
A workshop in 2004, with the additional participation of the National Native
Title Tribunal, probed the problems again with no greater success. The upshot
is that the annual $2–3 million construction program is compromised. Houses
are not being built for needy families and building materials are frequently
moved from house block to house block, as disputes break out one after the
other, until they spoil in the weather and cannot be used at all (Burton 2004,
2005).
14  In his commentary on the Mabo case, Keon-Cohen (2000) pointedly observes that Mer had just one
public phone in 1988.
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When Owned Commons is a Contrivance: The Case of
Nauti
‘Nauti’ is one of three landowner parties with rights to Hidden Valley, a gold
mine prospect on an extension of the Owen Stanley Range near Wau.15 The
Nauti people are Hamtai language speakers, otherwise known as Watuts. The
other two parties are ‘Kwembu’ and ‘Winima’ in the Biangai language area. The
three names, which are the names of the nearest three villages to Hidden Valley,
emerged from a 1987 ruling of the Provincial Land Court in Morobe Province.16
In 2000 they joined formed the Nakuwi Association to negotiate with the mining
company (Burton 2001). 17
For the benet of the current analysis I want to deconstruct the meaning of
‘Nauti’ from the point of view of landownership. In the rst place Nauti, a village
in the Watut Council, 18  is certainly not a ‘clan’. Agnatic members of the Yatavo
patriline — the descendants of a man called Yatavo — of Equta patronymic,
whose spokesmen were the appellants in the Provincial Land Court case, made
up no more than 26 per cent of the residents of the village, who numbered 330
in 2000. Their spouses and recently Nauti-born non-agnatic cognates (mainly
sisters’ children) formed another 26 per cent, and more distant relatives (mainly
grandfathers’ sisters’ descendants) in six other patronymics (together with their
spouses) make up the remaining 48 per cent.19
The word ‘Nauti’ is actually derived from the name of the Nautiya patronymic,
which currently has no members resident in the main part of the village. It was
probably rst applied by the patrol ocer K.W.T. Bridge who took up station
at the nearby Otibanda Patrol Post in 1935, as shown in Blackwood’s map of the
area at the time of her eldwork in 1937 (Blackwood 1950, Map 1; 1978). This
was a correct designation at the time, but the original population of the Nauti
15  I worked on Nauti representational and social impact issues on a consultancy basis to CRA Minerals
1995–96, to Australian Goldelds 1997–98, and as an employee of and consultant to Morobe Consolidated
Goldelds 2000–01.
16  Record of Proceedings, Provincial Land Court, 6–22 May 1987, before Georey Charles Lapthorne,
Provincial Magistrate. The parties, incidentally, are alternately referred to in the proceedings as the
‘Nauti clan’, ‘Nauti people’, ‘Kwembu clan’, Kwembu people’, and so forth. Space precludes me from
deconstructing ‘Kwembu’ and ‘Winima’ here, but suce it to say that, like Nauti, they are neither
‘clans’ nor do they map cleanly onto group-like clumps of people called the ‘Kwembu people’ or ‘Winima
people’. In the text, ‘Nauti’, in apostrophes, will refer to the court party and Nauti, with no apostrophes,
to the physical village.
17  Nauti + Kuembu (alternate spelling of Kwembu) + Winima = Nakuwi. The mining company was
initially CRA Minerals, then Australian Gold Fields, then Morobe Consolidated Gold (and Harmony
Gold after the events described here).
18 The culture area was called Upper Watut by Blackwood (1950) and is to be distinguished from the
Middle Watut which is inhabited by unrelated people speaking a dierent language; today Blackwood’s
Upper Watut forms the Watut Council, one of several Local-Level Governments in the Bulolo District.
Blackwood also used the term Kukukuku; Watuts use this as an alternate today (for example in business
group names) deriving it from Kouka! Kouka! or ‘my boy! my boy!’ in the Hamtai language.
19  See Burton 2003: 207–8 for this usage of the term ‘patronymic’ and a full dissection of the composition
of Nauti.
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area — who were of Nautiya patronymic — was almost completely replaced
after epidemics of disease swept across Morobe at the end of World War Two.20
Because of this complication, a meeting of hundreds of would-be claimants,
from perhaps 20 villages in the Watut Council area, was held at a hamlet called
Tontomea before the court case. At this meeting it was resolved to endorse the
understanding that the Yatavo patriline at Nauti, the nearest village downstream
of Hidden Valley on the Watut River, and their close relatives at Yokua, Akikanda
and Minava villages,21  which are located in other parts of the Watut Council,
would be designated as ol man i go pas (‘those who go first’), and the remainder
of the Watut claimants would sanap baksait (‘stand behind them’) to receive
secondary benefits. This is referred to as the Tontomea Agreement.
The coalition had no name for itself so the spokesmen approached Guyo
Saweo, the senior man of Nautiya patronymic living on the forested tracts of
Nautiya land where Nauti had been in Blackwood’s time (Saweo and Saris 1995).
They asked for, and were given, permission to use the name of Guyo’s sit paia
(hearth), the place name ‘Nauti’.
There was a strong expectation that the magistrate, whether an expatriate
(as he was) or from another part of PNG, would only be capable of dealing with
the most straightforward group name possible. The Watut claimants knew that
their Biangai neighbours were going to court with two village names of their
own, Winima and Kwembu, the nearest settlements on their side of Hidden
Valley. The name ‘Nauti’ would match these for simplicity.
To Watut ears, use of the term ‘Nauti’ also conveyed the fact that this was a
‘hearth’, a real place, or, in language, wa taka. Strictly, the exact location of the
current village was not a wa taka, because it was of recent foundation. The name
owned by Guyo, though, was a real wa taka: that is, it referred to the traditionally
founded Nauti that existed in Blackwood’s time. When the spokesmen were
granted the use of the name, it lent their litigation cultural authenticity.
The Provincial Land Magistrate duly set out a distribution of rights to an
area of common interest at Hidden Valley among the three parties, and Nauti won
50 per cent of this area (Figure 9-1).
20 See, for example, J.H.L. Armistead, Wau PR No. 5 of 1943/44 and Wau PR No.  1 of 1944/45.
21 These are the descendants of two men called Qavaingo and Pakieo.
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Figure 9-1: Area of common interest at Hidden Valley.
The compression of a multiplicity of Watut interests into the single entity
‘Nauti’ for the purposes of going to court — and even allowing the court recorder
to represent it as a ‘clan’ — was a contrivance for the purpose of representing
Watut rights in Hidden Valley to the outside world. In reality, ‘Nauti’ was made
up of the 332 descendants of closely related patriline ancestors spread among
five villages (Table 9-1).
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Table 9-1: Distribution of living descendants of the ‘Nauti’ constituent
patrilines of Equta patronymic by village (in 2000).
VILLAGE 
TotalYokuaNautiMinavaKaumangaAkikandaANCESTOR
75–87––11. Yatavo
10450191432. Qavaingo
––– ––3. Sons of Pakieo*
26––26––3a. Yandiyamango
23––––233b. Mdakeko
24–1––233c. Tupango
33–132––3d. Yamaipango
341––33–3e. Aqipango
3325190673490Total descendants
99112933016290198Total residents
32.239.523.141.437.845.5Descendants (%)
* In agreements and in the business group name ‘Yakaya’, Pakieo’s descendants area collected together as
‘Yandiyamango’ though Yandiyamango was strictly the name of the eldest of five brothers.
After the case the solidarity of ‘Nauti’ wavered. This can be seen in the
subsequent evolution of the payment arrangements for occupation fees and bush
damage compensation with the mining company. For several years, these cleared
legal debts and earlier advances. The few bankable amounts left over were made
out to ‘Nauti Land Owners’ and witnessed by patriline spokesmen.
In 1991, Yakaya Business Group22  was formed to be a new organisational
umbrella. But this also failed to satisfy, and the government’s Project Liaison
Officer spent most of 1992 brokering a percentage distribution formula among
the constituent groups.
From this point, cheques were raised for each subgroup separately. Then the
Yatavo and Qavaingo groups fell into dispute and for a period in 1993–94 asked
that no payments be made to them. At the same time, the number of signatories
proliferated in each village (Figure 9-2).
22 Yatavo + Kavaingo (‘Qavaingo’, the spelling on their own documents) + Yandiyamango = Yakaya.
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Figure 9-2: Approximate number of signatories for ‘Nauti’ by year.
This tendency to break down into ever-smaller groups is sometimes taken as
evidence of a society fragmenting under the pressure of modernisation. But here
we can see that a collection of people with joint rights in a property created a
contrived owning entity to win recognition from a court. That accomplished,
what is seen is not fragmentation but a reversion to normality.
Discussion
I will now revisit some of the concepts I introduced earlier to produce a more
critical analysis of each situation. Table 9-2 provides a summary of the criteria
by which the four cases can be differentiated.
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Determinacy of Groups
Were the claimant groups ‘fully determined’ in the sense I have used? With the
Wopkaimin, it is possibly surprising that we cannot say for certain. On the one
hand Hyndman (1994: 7) says that a Wopkaimin parish is a ‘clearly bounded,
territorially discrete unit’, but on the other he describes the cognatic Wopkaimin
as having far-flung connections of kinship across the wider Min cultural region.
Thus the Wopkaimin could be characterised as the ‘proximate owners’ among
an indefinitely extended network of ‘underlying’ Min owners, all of whom are,
at least in theory, secondary right holders anywhere in their cultural region
(Welsch 1987: 129). The many informal settlements around Tabubil known as
‘corners’ and built by immigrants from other Min areas may be a symptom of
this. Analysis of the flows of mine-related benefits from the Wopkaimin to
non-Wopkaimin relatives, such as occurs between landowners and their relatives
at Porgera (Banks 1994, 1997), might also cast light on the situation. Unfortunately
we have little information on the subject.
The Dauan and Meriam people are ‘well determined’ as groups. A short
distance beyond their shores there were traditionally no more Dauan or Meriam
people. The only ambiguity is posed by drawing a line between them and their
neighbours: for Dauan, this was Saibai and Boigu Islands, and for Mer, Erub
(Darnley Island) and Ugar (Stephen Island). Beyond these places there were no
further speakers of their respective languages, Kala Kawaw Ya and Meriam Mir.
Genealogically speaking, the lines were quite easily drawn, with the exception
of some families with shared Dauan and Saibai ancestry. The situation did not
resemble that of a seamless net of kin extending into a hinterland.
The ‘Nauti’ are not ‘determined’ at all, which underscores their problem. The
name represents a composite of many descent lines and, while the core lines are
arguably ‘determined’, in the sense that the agnatic descendants of particular
apical ancestors are knowable, there are many competing histories which could
have placed — or could yet place — an ancestor from a different descent line
in the same position.
Boundedness of Groups
The Wopkaimin parish boundaries, as indicated by Hyndman, have the integrity
of a local organisational type23  where main ranges and large rivers form land
estate boundaries.
23 To avoid a lengthy discussion, I will use this terminology at face value for present purposes. Two
key attributes of the type in question are that it is common in areas of low population density, and
‘excisions’ (bits of territory excised to another territory along the boundary) and ‘pockets’ (enclaves of
other clans or tribes in the middle of a territory) are uncommon.
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Being islands, Dauan and Mer have external boundaries which give the native
title areas a ready integrity such as is much harder to come by on the mainland
of Australia.
This configuration of land estate is ostensibly found in the 25 km long valley
formed by the headwaters of the Watut River above Nauti village where principal
ridges and creeks draining from the high ranges form the boundaries of family
landholdings. But it is hard to portray this as an absolute boundary of ‘Nauti’
because of the indeterminacy of the group. The map of the ‘area of common
interest’ at Hidden Valley (Figure 9-1) does show a boundary — it follows the
crest of the dividing range for the most part and is completed by a straight line
at latitude 7°27” south — but it is an artificial line created by prospecting
authority maps in the 1980s. ‘Nauti’, the entity discussed in court, is not bounded
after all.
Were Internal Ownerships Differentiated and Boundaries
Surveyed?
In no case were internal boundaries surveyed. At Dauan and among the
Wopkaimin, as I have discussed, internal boundaries are purported not to have
existed or, if they did (as in the case of Wopkaimin ‘neighbourhoods’), they
were not seen as relevant to the main issue of community identification.
Around Nauti village, as noted, principal ridges and creeks delineate the
family landholdings of residents, but it took me several years to ascertain which
families matched with which ridges and creeks.24  Nauti leaders were reluctant
to disclose information that might enable family heads to bypass them in relation
to lease and compensation payments (see Figure 9-2). My view was that
maintaining their positions as signatories was a burden upon leaders that stood
to poison their relationships with community members and obstructed them
from representing community viewpoints effectively. It was also leading them
to make extremely inequitable distribution arrangements. Surprisingly, these
did not always advantage the principal families; in 2000 an obscure cousin lineage
of five men shared K17,000 while 62 men in a main lineage had to divide up
K20,000. This was just bad arithmetic; I sought to move benefit distribution to
a fairer census-based formula along the lines already being used for the mining
company’s discretionary assistance schemes, such as housing improvement and
school fee payments. I devoted a section of my socio-economic impact study
(Burton 2001) to how this should be done, but the project was sold to a new
company shortly afterwards and neither I nor my PNG counterpart have been
contacted since to see how this formula should be implemented.
24  See previous footnote on the circumstances of fieldwork in this area.
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At Mer, the internal differentiation of landownership and maintenance of
boundaries is a key element of Meriam culture and identity. The colonial response
to Meriam landownership was to commission an immediate land survey of the
island and to create an island court — both accomplished by 1892. The court’s
records contain many sketches of land portions and boundaries (Murray Island
Court 1908–1983; Sheehan 1987–89). But as time went by, Mer’s internal
boundary problems were taken less and less seriously by the Queensland
Government. Since the 1970s it is probably true to say that hundreds of thousands
of dollars have been expended on survey work for infrastructure improvement,
but not a single garden, patch of bush, deup (traditional boundary bank or line
of piled volcanic rocks), or customary house block has been surveyed in the
same period. I did sufficient social mapping in 2003–04 to scope out the problems,
but my work ran against the trend of a policy blank in the area of assisting PBCs
to sort out internal governance issues. At Mer, as I have said, these are severe
(Burton 2004, 2005).
Were There Other Primary Claimants from the Same Ethnic
Group?
It would be rare indeed if there were not competing claimants to a land estate,
but at Dauan, Mer and among the Wopkaimin, the position of the primary
claimants is not seriously challenged by others from the same language group.
A qualification at Mer is that a current land dispute concerns whether a
disputant’s ancestor was from Mer or Erub, a neighbouring island; it is thus
about group membership, not whether non-Mer people claim bits of Mer.
Among the Wopkaimin, people whom residents of Iralim parish and outsiders
alike might not see as Wopkaimin — because they were born and reside
elsewhere — might believe otherwise. Although they would not contest
Wopkaimin title, on the grounds that they already believe themselves to be
inside the claim group, this is an encumbrance on ownership by people of the
same ethnic group.
On the other hand, the ‘Nauti’ were and are vigorously contested in their
rights to land by other speakers of their language. Competing claims take the
form of assertions by men of distant lineages that their ancestor preceded any
other on the land and that they alone know the hidden history of the area (even
though they do not live in it). As with the preceding, this is an encumbrance
on ownership by people of the same ethnic group. However, the challengers
repeatedly fall down because they cannot — and it does not occur to them to
do this — form a claim group representative of a putative resident population
50, 100 or 150 years ago. The ‘Nauti’ are safe from challenge from a tribe-like
or clan-like entity from among other Hamtai speakers because the problem of
determinacy besets the challengers as much as it does the incumbents.
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Were There Secondary Claimants from Other Ethnic
Groups?
At Dauan and Mer there are no effective secondary claimants from neighbouring
ethnic groups, mainly because the main candidates living to the north are
politically cut off by the international border between Australia and PNG.
The Wopkaimin are subject to political challenge from Ningerum and Awin
speakers to the south from time to time. For example, a councillor of
Mongulwalawam village, in the Ningerum council area, in 1984 claimed a billion
kina a fortnight compensation on the grounds that Mt Fubilan was not a
Wopkaimin place (Burton 1997: 42). This kind of claim is ineffective, and the
Wopkaimin have been defended both by government officials and
anthropologists — Welsch said none of the Ningerum ‘have any obvious claim
… on Mount Fubilan’ (1987: 121).
Welsch discusses the claims to the mine area made by the Faiwolmin, Tifalmin,
Telefomin and other northern neighbours with considerable cultural affinity
with the Wopkaimin. He says the Wopkaimin did not dismiss the claims in
principle, but also did not entertain the idea of sharing their royalties with what
would potentially have been another 20,000 people (ibid: 129–130). Politically,
these broad area sentiments had a certain amount of traction, because the Mining
(Ok Tedi Agreement) Act 1976 granted the Kiunga (including Awin and Ningerum)
and Telefomin people ‘preferred area’ status for employment and business
development. Ambit claims were floated between 1978 and 1980, when Kopiago
and Tari people (in another province and separated from Ok Tedi by impassable
geographical barriers), and the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka) in West Papua,
each claimed ownership of Mt Fubilan (Welsch 1987: 126–7). None of these
claims made any political headway for obvious reasons.
I have already mentioned the court settlement reached in 1987 between the
‘Nauti’ and their eastern neighbours, the Biangai villages of Kwembu and
Winima, now joined in the Nakuwi Association. This also now faces new claims.
Candidate claimants include the Manki, a relict enclave of distantly related Anga
speakers in the Upper Watut; and the Taiak, Galawo, Kapin and Sambio people
generally called ‘Middle Watuts’. It would seem unlikely that claims from distant
places would make political headway, but a salutary lesson is that the Buang
Mai-i clan from Mumeng did succeed in claiming Bulolo township in 1999 and
continue to grumble over Bulolo and Wau landownership to this day.25
25  Recently a Mai-i clan letter writer complained that ‘the Nakuwi Association … are not the rightful
owners to that land [Hidden Valley] … they lost the case several times against the Mai-i clan’
(Post-Courier, ‘Gold signing questioned’, 5 October 2005). It is unclear what case the writer refers to.
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Conclusion
The purpose of presenting these cases in detail is not to make out that indigenous
and Western legal systems are universally incommensurable — I do not believe
this to be the case — but to point to two problem areas.
The first area is that which current procedures allow outsiders — whether
lawyers, anthropologists, lands officers or various representatives of the State
— and traditional owners to map out together in the identification phase of a
claim.
In Australia today, pre-litigation investigations and negotiations relating to
the configuration of claim groups is often exhaustive but, on the other hand,
the law is highly prescriptive about the rights that can be claimed and the kind
of legal vehicle that will hold successfully claimed rights. This can subject the
claims process to a hegemony of legalism that can be intimidatory to both
claimants and anthropologists alike, and stands to defeat the close rapport that
may develop between claimants and investigators in the earlier stages of a claim
(Martin 2004: 38–41).
In PNG, negotiations prior to litigation or registration have often been
perfunctory in the past. Far from taking a firm grip of legal processes and
standing over customary owners, the State has become enfeebled and is itself
the victim of all kinds of rorts. It is notorious that many cases have been pursued
by single litigants or very small groups of litigants acting against other parties
without their knowledge.26 There is no place for anthropologists, or any other
professionals, in such actions.
In formal terms the situation has brightened since the 1980s. For example,
social mapping is mandated by the Oil and Gas Act 1998 and, although mining
sector legislation does not require it, mining companies have adopted similar
practices as part of the social impact assessment process since the mid-1990s.
However, in both cases outcomes have been less than satisfactory over the longer
term (see Goldman and Weiner, this volume).
How could the ‘Nauti’ have been helped? That they won at all is admirable,
as they went to court without outside help. But they could have been greatly
helped if there had been a way of getting the same outcome without having to
pretend they were one of Mr Narokobi’s ‘independent, autonomous social units’
26 The main contribution to the large number of recent actions against the State are the 37 orders made
by Papua New Guinea’s National Lands Commissioner between July 1999 and September 2002 for the
State to pay K80 million compensation to the supposed customary owners of Kiunga, Bulolo, Mt Hagen
and parts of various other towns and plantations. In four cases I looked into in Hagen in 1999, the State
had been unaware of the actions and the National Lands Commission had met secretly with the claimants.
Similarly, the Commission awarded the Mai-i clan of Mumeng K1.2 million in 1999 for parts of Bulolo
township without any of Bulolo’s customary owners — in the eyes of the majority of the public —
being aware of the action. The Deputy Chief Justice ordered the 37 cases to be reviewed in October
2005 (Post-Courier, Public Notice, 29 August 2005).
194
Customary Land Tenure and Registration in Australia and Papua New Guinea
when they were not. As things stand, there is no provision for an alternative
way of administering unincorporated rights without incorporating them.
The second problem area concerns the level of assistance to which customary
owners can get access to help them properly ‘operate’ their native title, or
recognition of customary title, once they have it.
‘Nauti’ quickly ran into difficulties because they were unable to devise
governance procedures for the very few tasks that they needed to carry out in
the years after 1987 — namely, holding simple meetings and distributing very
small amounts of lease fees. A government liaison officer was available to them
as a mediator, but he had few resources. For example, he had irregular access
to a vehicle but his clients lived several hours’ drive from town without means
of communication with one another.
The Meriam do not need to be told of their litigious reputation and they are
well aware of the predicament they find themselves in. In short, it is that the
Mabo case says traditional ‘laws and customs’ should now govern land dealings
among themselves, including dispute resolution, but it is not proving easy to
adapt traditional ways to the point where any matters can be handled decisively
and quickly. In Australia, no money is available to manage successfully claimed
native title because PBCs are not funded.
Personally, I was struck by the directness of the question which George Mye
OAM, a well-known Eastern Islands elder first elected to Mer Council in 1955
(Beckett 1963), asked me when he found out I had worked in PNG: ‘Can people
in PNG own land individually?’ While I could easily answer ‘yes, of course’
from the customary point of view, a lengthier response would have been that
the legislative response to land matters in PNG, as in Australia, places an equally
heavy emphasis on the collective ownership of land. This was the gist of Mr
Mye’s complaint: that Islanders had campaigned for years for autonomy, but
when the government had finally given ground in the wake of Mabo, it was to
give them something they did not want in the form of the forced collectivisation
of traditional land.27
How can the Meriam be assisted? This is not hard to set out. The Meriam are
a case not readily covered by Sutton’s two-tier conceptualisation of ownership,
if it is ‘proximate’ ownership that matches with a determination of title.28  In
order for this model to fit their case, a ‘family’ tier of ownership has to be
envisioned. Meriam operated customary transactions perfectly well for the first
27 The antipathy of older Islanders to the threat of over-centralising governments may also be seen in
the popularity of membership in the Mer branch of the Australian Legion of Ex-Servicemen in the 1950s
(Beckett 1963: 205ff). This was one of several Australian ex-service organisations with a reputation for
conservative politics and, in that period, anti-communist leanings.
28  It could be said that the native title on Mer is an ‘underlying title’, but the regional system is a wider
thing.
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100 years after annexation because the Murray Island Court made it as if this
tier was recognised by Australian or Queensland law. Native title has confused
the situation and the community has yet to find a new institution to replace the
old court.
It is not possible to be overly prescriptive about a replacement, but one
attribute is easy to set down. Most disputes are inheritance disputes compounded
by ambiguities over the intentions of the deceased, the recognition of the rights
of adopted children; and the caretaking of land belonging to absentees. In these
cases the ability to maintain proper documentation is an excellent aid to
straightening out what particular disputes are about.
The Meriam themselves have evinced an avid interest in documentary
evidence for a century. Oral testimony has been largely replaced in favour of
the presentation of documents — typescripts, photocopies of genealogies that
every family knows its place in,29  and copies of wills and letters. Unfortunately,
such official records of new disputes that are made have a typical lifespan of
2–3 years. Supporting documents disappear with the building contractors whose
work could not proceed, and council, Island Coordinating Council or Torres
Strait Regional Authority correspondence rarely survives beyond this time as
offices are moved and files put in storage or just lost. The poor standard of
documentation in the post-Mabo period means that there is a weak ability to
track current disputes as they arise. A first step towards getting to grips with
the 50-case backlog of disputes is to rectify this situation, and the failure to do
so is primarily due to the inability of the various tiers of government to grasp
the problem (Burton 2005).30
29 These include the 1898 genealogies of W.H.R. Rivers (Rivers 1908).
30  Contrast this with the institutional reverence with which Eddie Mabo’s papers, held at the National
Library of Australia, are preserved (Mabo 1943-1992). They are one of only two Australian entries in
UNESCO’s Memory of the World Register, the other being Cook’s Endeavour journal
(http://www.unesco.org/webworld/mdm/register/index.html).
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Chapter Ten
Outstation Incorporation as Precursor
to a Prescribed Body Corporate1
Katie Glaskin
On my first journey to northern Dampierland Aboriginal communities in 1994,
many members of those communities spoke to me about ‘making a claim’. I had
travelled there to speak with Bardi and Jawi peoples about the native title claim
a group of elders had legally instructed the Kimberley Land Council to begin
preparing on their behalf.2 Within a short time I realised that when people spoke
to me about ‘making a claim’, and when I spoke with them about the native title
claim, we were referring to different matters. They were speaking about
outstations and the process of incorporation under the Commonwealth Aboriginal
Councils and Associations Act 1976 (ACAA); I was talking about a claim to native
title under the Commonwealth Native Title Act 1993 (NTA). The conflation many
people subsequently made, between ‘making a claim’ to form an outstation group
and ‘making a claim’ for native title, had its basis in their experiences of the
outstation movement.
The outstation movement amongst Bardi and Jawi has resulted in a large
number of small incorporated outstation groups, while a determination of their
native title claim requires the formation of a single larger incorporated group,
a Registered Native Title Body Corporate. The latter is defined either as a
Prescribed Body Corporate (PBC) or as a body corporate registered on the National
Native Title Register.3  A Registered Native Title Body Corporate holds native
title on trust (as in a PBC) or acts ‘as an agent or representative of the common
1  An earlier version of this chapter is embedded in my PhD thesis (Glaskin 2002). For their contribution
to the overall development of that work, I am grateful to Francesca Merlan, Ian Keen, and Tim Rowse.
To James Weiner for comments on an earlier draft of this chapter, to Bardi and Jawi people who have
shared so much of themselves with me since 1994, and to Geoffrey Bagshaw with whom I worked on
their native title claim since that time, I am also extremely grateful. The fieldwork on which this chapter
is based would not have been possible without the support of the Kimberley Land Council and The
Australian National University. I am grateful to them and to the Berndt Foundation at the University
of Western Australia, which awarded me a postdoctoral fellowship that enabled me to further develop
this work.
2 This claim was heard by the Federal Court of Australia in 2001 and 2003, and the court delivered its
native title determination on 10 June 2005.
3  See Subsections 193(2)(d)(iii) and (iv) and Section 253 of the NTA (reprinted as at 27 July 1998).
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law holders in respect of matters relating to native title’ (NTA Section 58(a)).4
For the purposes of this chapter, I shall focus on PBCs incorporated under the
ACAA.
This chapter is concerned with the relationship between two different kinds
of incorporation among Bardi and Jawi peoples of Western Australia. Outstations
are a means by which people can live on their country; native title is a mechanism
by which people seek legal recognition of their relationships to country. Both
require incorporation and are concerned at some level with indigenous
connections to country. At issue here are not just the relationships between
different kinds of Aboriginal corporations formed in response to different
legislative requirements, but the consequences for the expression and enactment
of property relations amongst those concerned. To what extent are these
successive corporatising regimes an expression or transformation of those
customary relations to land that they are constituted to represent in some sense,
and how might such developments affect or influence one another?
This chapter is based on fieldwork conducted at various times between the
years 1994 and 2001, prior to the determination of the Bardi and Jawi native
title claim in June 2005.5  It does not, therefore, address post-determination
efforts and discussions concerning PBC establishment; rather, it is concerned
with the processual relationship between these kinds of incorporation as they
emerged prior to a determination of native title. Notwithstanding this, I would
expect that many of these same issues would emerge post-determination, and
that the form of the determination itself is likely to have created additional issues
with respect to PBC formation.6
Background
The area considered in this chapter is located in the northwest Kimberley region
of Western Australia. It includes the northern tip of the Dampierland Peninsula
(north of the Beagle Bay Reserve) and the islands in the King Sound to the west
of Sunday Strait, the area over which Bardi and Jawi made their native title
claim.7 There are three main communities within the claim area — Lombadina,
Djarindjin and One Arm Point — which are also incorporated under the ACAA.
Lombadina was a Pallottine Catholic mission that began as an outpost of Beagle
4  Fingleton (1994: 5–6) identifies the main functions of a PBC under the NTA, which include: entering
into agreements with the government, whether for the surrender of native title (s.21(1)(a) and (3)),
authorisation of future Acts (s.21(1)(b)), or to enter into local or regional agreements (s.21(4)); to participate
in negotiations regarding grants of mining rights over native title land (s.29(1) and (2), s.31(1)(a) and
(b), s.33); to be consulted about access to native title lands (s.26(4)(c)); to exercise procedural rights with
respect to compulsory acquisition (s.23(6)); to deal with compensation issues (s.61 and s.51(6)); and to
apply for variation of native title determinations (s.61). See Memmott et al. (this volume) for further
discussion.
5 Sampi v State of Western Australia [2005] FCA 777.
6  As of 10 July 2006 this decision was under appeal before the Full Federal Court of Australia.
7 The islands were not included in the determination of native title made on 10 July 2005.
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Bay Mission to its south in 1910.8  In the 1980s, local politics within Lombadina
led to the formation of Djarindjin community. This is situated immediately
adjacent to Lombadina, and the two communities are distinguished mainly by
the fence that divides them, separate corporations (and hence community
councils), and their own community stores.9  Sunday Island Mission was
originally formed as a non-denominational Protestant mission in 1899, and was
transferred to United Aborigines Mission control in 1923.10  Bardi and Jawi were
still coming into these missions up until the late 1920s at least, and even then,
many people did not remain sedentary at the missions but moved between them
and a number of white pearlers’ camps. Such movement meant that the
populations at these missions did not become settled until after World War Two
(Robinson 1973: 175). Following a period of dislocation in Derby in the 1960s
when Sunday Island Mission was closed, Bardi and Jawi who had formerly lived
at the island established the community at One Arm Point in 1972.11
Bardi and Jawi movements into these missions in the early days had both
voluntary and involuntary aspects. ‘Coming in’, as a number of Bardi people
have referred to this movement, initially occurred as news spread that rations
were available at the missions, and ultimately became a practical necessity in a
changing economic landscape. Once a number of people were congregated at
the missions, being near kin provided additional impetus for bush people to
‘come in’ to the missions. These centralisation movements occurred slowly. The
movement of Sunday Island Mission residents to Derby occurred more quickly,
and under greater coercion, as the mission was closed and school-aged children
from the mission were taken to Derby and were subsequently followed by their
parents.12  Coombs (1974) discussed Bardi and Jawi movement from Derby back
to Sunday Island, and the ultimate formation of One Arm Point community, as
an early example of the ‘decentralisation trend’. Although this movement began
as a process of individuals splintering from a centralised group, within a short
time nearly all the Bardi and Jawi from Sunday Island Mission, who had been
living in Derby, were living at One Arm Point. In that sense, while it was a
disaggregation in terms of Bardi and Jawi moving away from other Aboriginal
groups in the reserves at Derby, the movement is better understood as a return
by those people who had been in exile from their country. All of these
movements, however, can be seen as ‘symptomatic of an inherent tension in
Aboriginal accommodation to European presence’ (Sullivan 1996a: 27). The
8  For further information regarding the establishment and founding of Lombadina, see Durack (1997).
9 They share a school and a health clinic.
10  For a detailed discussion of the formation of Sunday Island Mission, see Robinson (1973).
11  See Drysdale and Durack (1974) and Coombs (1974) for further discussion of the early establishment
of One Arm Point community.
12 This was not just the case with respect to Sunday Island. Jebb (2002: 254–5) says that when Kimberley
Aboriginal children from pastoral stations were taken to school in Derby by Native Welfare, they were
similarly followed into the town by their parents.
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outstation movement, a movement away from the major communities, is not
dissimilar in this respect.
While the outstation movement can be considered, as it is by Coombs (1974),
as a ‘decentralisation trend’ (and this is true of both its spatial and administrative
aspects, since it has resulted in the multiplication of incorporated outstation
groups), it also has a centralising aspect. As the processes of incorporation (under
the ACAA) and the economic means through which outstations can be established
originate outside the indigenous community, the apparent dispersal of groups
conceals a more complete political centralisation with respect to administrative
and incorporative processes. Nevertheless, since one of the effects of the
movement is to create multiple indigenous corporations, each with its own
chairperson, set of rules and so on, with this caveat in mind, I continue to
consider the outstation movement as decentralising in terms of intra-indigenous
relationships and political authority.
The Outstation Movement
In parts of the Kimberleys, usually those where outstations are excised from
large pastoral leases, Aborigines refer to excisions as ‘matchboxes’ because of
their small size. When speaking in a possessive sense Bardi most commonly refer
to an outstation as a ‘block’. The outstation or homelands movement has been
a visible trend amongst Aborigines in many parts of Australia for at least three
decades (Coombs et al. 1980: 1). As well as returning to traditional country,
Aborigines have chosen to form small outstation groups to avoid social problems
in larger communities.13 The timing of the trend was concurrent with the
provision of welfare benefits to Aboriginal people (Smith 2000: 62), and with
government policy shifts, from assimilation to self-determination (later
self-management) formulated in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Coombs et al.
1980: 5; Altman 1986: 477).
There are significant differences between outstation movements in different
regions of Australia. Sexton (1996) compares the outstation movement in the
Northern Territory and Western Australia, concluding that one of the most
significant differences is in relation to the tenure of the land available for
outstations. In the Northern Territory, the operation of the Commonwealth
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act since 1976 has resulted in the
return of significant amounts of land to Aboriginal people. Aborigines who
successfully claim land under the Act obtain a title that is an estate in fee simple
(Sexton 1996: 5). Altman (1987: 1818) similarly identifies ‘a correlation between
the growth of the outstation movement and security of tenure’ gained under
13  For example, Sullivan (1996a: 25) refers to movements by Aborigines from Warmun (Turkey Creek)
to set up independent camps on Alice Downs, Frog Hollow and Glen Hill ‘without facilities’ in the
mid-1970s, as moving away from destructive and disruptive social processes in the larger community.
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this Act in the Northern Territory. In Western Australia, where there was no
land rights legislation prior to the NTA, secure tenure of this kind was not
available. Many outstations were formed on vacant Crown Land (now called
‘unallocated’ Crown Land). Some were excised from pastoral leases, in which
case the outstation group obtained a Special Purpose Lease for periods of 25–50
years, though these ‘guarantee free entry to the holders of a mining tenement’
(Sexton 1996: 6). The third possibility was for an Aboriginal group to obtain a
99-year lease from the Aboriginal Lands Trust, although in the northern
Dampierland Peninsula these seem usually to be issued in relation to the creation
of Aboriginal reserves under the Western Australian Aboriginal Affairs Planning
Authority Act 1972 (such as the One Arm Point reserve), rather than outstations.
The consequences of the Western Australian system were that Aboriginal land
was ‘much more a product of government discretion’ than in the Northern
Territory, with its statutory regime for claiming land (Sexton 1996: 6).
There are regional differences in outstation movements within states as well
as between them. In the Kimberley region, there are marked differences in the
outstation movement between Bardi and other nearby groups. While there are
outstations south of Bardi in the Beagle Bay Reserve among Nyul Nyul and Jabirr
Jabirr peoples, and south of Broome among Yawuru and Karajarri peoples, the
density of outstations in these regions is not the same as amongst Bardi.14 The
factors Smith (2000: 450) identifies with respect to variation in the outstation
movement in the Coen region — local organisation, the environment and
historical factors — are equally salient to the explanation of such differences
between Bardi and other nearby groups.
In Western Australia the outstation movement has been in progress since the
1980s, and in 1999 there were some 225 outstations across the state (Muir 1999:
11). The outstation movement coincided with an era in which Aborigines began
to receive wages or cash welfare payments instead of rations, and the transition
‘from rations to cash’ reflected ‘a change in the rationalities of government, from
tutelary/pastoral to liberal/contractual’ (Rowse 1998: 86). In remote communities,
integration into the cash economy was accompanied in many instances by the
transition from mission-dominated institutions to secular self-governing towns,
resulting in a ‘dramatic shift in the nature, structure and moral economy of these
Aboriginal communities’ (Peterson 1998: 109).
Moizo relates the introduction of the Community Development Employment
Projects (CDEP) scheme in Fitzroy Crossing to the movement of Fitzroy Aborigines
14  According to a 1994 ATSIC listing of incorporated groups in the ATSIC Kullari region (which
encompasses this area), there were a total of 18 incorporated outstation groups in the region extending
south of the Bardi and Jawi claim area to Bidyadanga, over a north-south distance of approximately
250 km. In contrast, during the same period, there were at least 33 outstations in the Bardi and Jawi
claim area, a north-south distance of approximately 60 km.
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out of the town and into smaller (outstation) communities.15  He says that this
movement occurred ‘since they had the opportunity to be financially autonomous,
an opportunity that did not exist prior to the introduction of CDEP’, which was
implemented in Fitzroy Crossing in 1988 (Moizo 1990: 36). CDEP provides an
important source of income for outstations, and this is augmented by pension
monies, one-off grants, and cash earned through various means (Altman 1986:
478; Spicer 1997: 32–3; Smith 2000: 397). In 2005, government debate about the
economic viability of remote Aboriginal communities was specifically linked
with a view that communal landownership and lack of economic opportunities
for remote area Aboriginal people were causally linked (Dodson and McCarthy
2005).
Outstation Establishment
In the Bardi and Jawi claim area, in common with many outstations in Western
Australia, living areas are not large areas and do not ‘confer much actual land
or control on Aboriginal people’ (Sexton 1996: 7). The outstations I was able to
measure on the basis of land tenure documents are 5223 m2, 7782 m2, 1.5 ha, and
just over 2 ha, and this appears to cover the usual size range.16 By way of
comparison, the communities of One Arm Point and Djarindjin have leases
covering areas of 14 339.5 ha and 56 727 ha respectively.17 Sullivan (1996a: 26)
says that, on average, outstations in the Kimberley are of 1 km2 (0.405 ha or 4050
m2) in size.
During the latter half of the 1980s, the first of the outstations in the Dampier
Peninsula became incorporated under the Aboriginal Councils and Associations
Act.
The provisions of the Act relate to a residential group in the area, not
the owning group. They confer control over very limited aspects of the
life of the group, are subject to very intrusive intervention prior to
incorporation by the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations and encourage
non-Aboriginal procedures for representation and decision-making
(Sullivan 1997: 18, emphasis added).
Funding grants through various government agencies were available to
incorporated groups to assist with the establishment of outstation infrastructure,
15  Sanders (1998: 145) describes CDEP, a scheme that began in March 1977, as an attempt to ‘put in
place a more appropriate arrangement for remote Aboriginal communities than standard individualised
UB [unemployment benefit] payment. This more appropriate arrangement was justified by an analysis
of difference.’ The arrangement, as Moizo (1990: 36) describes it, reduces the number of Aborigines on
unemployment benefits by requiring Aborigines ‘to do several hours of work per week in order to get
an amount of money similar to that which they would receive on unemployment benefits’.
16  One outstation is as large as 8.0089 ha, and the exceptionally sized outstation in the region is 405.3871
ha (Pender Gardens in the southern portion of the claim area).
17 These are One Arm Point Reserve 20927 and Djarindjin Aboriginal Corporation, Dampier Location
297.
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such as bores or rain tanks, energy panels or generators, basic housing facilities,
and outstation vehicles.18 The absence of recognised land rights in Western
Australia meant that outstation groups were dependent on government support
of this kind, since mining companies were not obliged to make financial
contributions or compensation to indigenous landholders (Sullivan 1996a: 29).
Regular outstation income then is derived from specific purpose grants, pensions
or CDEP funding.19  Muir’s description of the economy on which outstations in
Western Australia have generally been built accurately portrays the situation I
am familiar with in the peninsula:
The people moving to outstations were often registered as participants
in CDEP projects of the larger communities. These people then remained
on the larger communities’ CDEP programs, with the outstation allocated
as a specific CDEP project. The CDEP wage meant that people had an
income and were able to purchase essential capital items … As outstations
developed, became permanent and incorporated under the Aboriginal
Councils and Associations Act 1976 (Cwlth), they were, formally, able to
secure separate funding from ATSIC for essential services like water,
housing and continued CDEP support (Muir 1999: 11–12).
The outstation economies in this region then are based on a mixture of subsistence
through fishing and hunting, with some gathering, social security payments
(including pensions) and CDEP monies. Some outstations derive further income
from commercial trochus exploitation, aquaculture, and tourism.
A Place of One’s Own: The Politics of Land Tenure
Since outstation groups become incorporated under the ACAA, applications for
incorporation go to the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations and must include
a copy of the proposed rules of the corporation. Sullivan says that ‘while the
rules may be based on Aboriginal custom (s. 43(4)), they need to address a number
of matters … many of which have no counterpart in Aboriginal custom or may
be contrary to it’. These include the requirement for the corporation to make
rules regarding meetings (there is a requirement for Annual General Meetings),
and to keep a register of members, of which there must be at least twenty-five
(Sullivan 1996b: 16–17).
After addressing a number of requisite criteria, including that of
incorporation, applications for land to form an outstation are submitted to the
Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority which administers the Aboriginal Affairs
18 These are now available through the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination, and were formerly
available through the now-defunct Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) and its
precursor, the Department of Aboriginal Affairs.
19  See Sanders (1998) for a discussion of the basis and development of the scheme. The process of
incorporation required outstation groups to submit plans for outstation specific CDEP.
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Planning Authority Act that established the Aboriginal Lands Trust. One criterion
was to demonstrate that the applicants had traditional attachment to the area in
question, although the corroborating documentation required was not
substantial.20  Such documentation could include genealogies prepared by
anthropologists, by resource agency workers (who generally assisted with all
facets of the incorporation process), or by the applicants themselves. Assertions
regarding traditional attachment to the area could be augmented by supplying
the local language name of the area as well as brief comments about the
connections of the applicants to the area. Such requirements have been neither
extensive nor prescriptive, and they have not been tested nor made subject to
the kinds of proof of connection to country that is ultimately required by the
NTA. So, while some parallel could be drawn between these two processes on
the basis that both involve traditional affiliation with country, the very real
differences between the two mean that the parallel cannot be sustained to any
great extent.
Local shire councils also scrutinise applications for outstations, because of
the implications of service delivery to remote communities.21  Local community
councils also have a role in the approval of outstation areas, where proposed
outstation areas fall within their lease jurisdictions. The process of groups seeking
community council approval to form an outstation on an area of land seems to
occur prior to the more formalised processes associated with incorporation and
the Aboriginal Lands Trust application. Even this is likely to be preceded by
informal consultations with other Aboriginal people with attachment to the area
in question.22  Once a group has been incorporated and its outstation area has
been approved by the Trust (and subject to these other processes), applications
for funding the outstation group are submitted to the relevant funding body.23
In the absence of land rights legislation in Western Australia prior to the
NTA, most Bardi family groups have sought to secure an outstation on their
country. As a result, numerous outstations now exist within a very small region.
Figure 10-1 represents the general locations of outstations within the Bardi and
20  Under the heading ‘Customary Tenure’, Section 32 of the Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority Act
refers at 32(1) to ‘Aboriginal inhabitants of that area, being persons who are or have been normally
resident within the area, and their descendants’. At 32(2) the Act says that: ‘Regulations made in relation
to an area to which subsection (1) applies may provide for the compilation, maintenance, and use of
documentary evidence as to the entitlement of persons to any interest in the use of, or benefit to be
derived from, specific areas of land or in the enjoyment of natural resources related to customary land
use.’
21 With respect to outstation policy, the 25 June 1992 minutes of the Shire of Halls Creek in the East
Kimberley included that ‘the applicant is required to provide details as to their traditional association
with the land’ (Crough and Christophersen 1993: 137). The Shire resolved that they would not ‘be
responsible for the provision and maintenance of any services’ (ibid).
22  Amongst Bardi, failure to consult with relevant landowners would usually have ramifications,
including for community council members who were held responsible for allocating the land.
23  At the time of my research, this body was ATSIC. As at 2006, such applications for funding would
be handled by the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination.
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Jawi claim area.24 These outstations are all located quite close to the major
communities, and to each other, and are typically situated within a small walking
distance from the coast. This spatial distribution is reflective of Bardi and Jawi
local organisation, which itself also reflects upon the environment — the
availability of fresh water sources along the coast, as opposed to the hinterland
— and the narrowness of the Dampierland Peninsula at its northernmost end.
Figure 10-1: Approximate location of outstation groups in 2001.
24 The orthography in this figure is that used by the incorporated outstation groups. The most distant
outstation is approximately 50 km away from one of the major communities, while most outstations
would be roughly within a 20 km radius or less of these communities.
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Local Organisation
Bardi and Jawi share a system of local organisation comprised of estate groups
centred on freshwater sources on the mainland coast or islands. The interior of
the Dampierland Peninsula, which lies between Bardi estate groups, does not
contain permanent water and is characterised as nimidiman (shared) country, or
nimidiman jugara buru (‘together possessing country’) (Bagshaw 1999: 48),
analogous to the notion of shared commons (see Burton, this volume). Bardi and
Jawi are primarily affiliated with estates through patrifiliation: paternal adoption
(andala) can similarly confer primary estate affiliation (Bagshaw 1999: 58). An
individual’s ‘own’ country (their buru) is therefore considered to be the buru of
their father (and father’s father). Individuals also have significant rights in their
maternal estate (ningarlm) and in their spouse’s estate (gurirriny). However:
In all matters pertaining to their respective ningarlm and gurirriny,
individuals are expected to defer to estate-affiliates (i.e. those identified
with the estate through patrifiliation). They are also expected to ‘back
up’ the latter on estate-related issues … (Bagshaw 1999: 62).
Effectively, rights in mother’s country (ningarlm) and spouse’s country (gurirriny)
are not considered to be of the same primary order as those in father’s country
(buru). Bagshaw writes that while the land component of estates ‘is typically
quite small’ (around 6 and 4.5 km2 in two mapped examples), ‘the offshore areas
of a bur may … be quite extensive’ (ibid: 49). Tidally exposed areas contiguous
with the land are considered part of an estate, as are nearby offshore features
such as islands, rocks, sandbanks, reefs and shallow waters (Bagshaw and Glaskin
2000: 5). Bagshaw (1999, 2001a, 2001b) identifies 21 extant Bardi buru, four
extant Jawi buru, and six deceased estates within the Bardi and Jawi claim area.
The deceased estates are in various stages of succession. The general locations
of these buru are represented in Figure 10-2.
Hiatt (1996: 13–35) summarises the anthropological arguments that have
historically occurred regarding the concept of clan, horde and band. Clan groups
are not the same as residential groups; the latter consist of people related to each
other by various means, and common descent in the male line, the criterion of
estate (clan) affiliation, is only one of these. Bardi outstation groups frequently
reflect and are premised on estate ownership, but similarly, the residential groups
formed at outstations do not correlate entirely with them.
Bardi and Jawi consider the main requisite criteria of a person’s ability to
establish an outstation in a particular location within the terms of their own
system of land tenure. Patrifiliates are considered to have every right to build
an outstation in their own country, although senior patrifiliates are the people
having greatest authority (or ‘say’) over that country and other members of the
estate group should, in principle, defer to them. Outstations within the Bardi
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and Jawi claim area have largely (though not entirely) been established by estate
affiliates within their own buru, and consequently some estate affiliates have
begun to use the terms referring to their estate (buru) and to their outstation
(‘block’) interchangeably.25  Since there are very few people in the Bardi and
Jawi claim area with ‘historical’ rather than traditional associations to country,
historical attachment (as opposed to traditional affiliation) has not been a
significant issue in the allocation of land for outstations to date. Some Aborigines
who were neither Bardi nor Jawi grew up at either Sunday Island or Lombadina,
but these cases are few. Typically, where these cases do occur, the family or
person with the historical attachment has approached patrifiliates from the estate
where they would like to build their outstation for permission to do so.
Where individuals have a non-Bardi or non-Jawi father, and have not been
‘grown up’ by a Bardi or Jawi father, they often emphasise other lines of descent
in order to reckon their connection to country.26  Some individuals with Bardi
mothers and non-Bardi fathers (who are therefore unable to reckon country
through their father) have instead ‘followed’ their maternal grandfather (nyami)
‘for country’ — in other words, in reckoning matters of descent, and
consequently in articulating rights in country. This sometimes produces
considerable friction between people claiming rights to the same area through
different mechanisms. Where estate affiliates are unable to form an outstation
within their own country because the land is alienated, they too have sought to
emphasise other means of connection to country in order to make claims within
other buru. These strategies have implications for the politics of land tenure
among Bardi and Jawi peoples, and these politics have become especially apparent
within the context of the outstation movement.
Estate-affiliates are empowered to grant enduring, albeit limited, rights
of access, residence and usufruct in respect of their own bur to unrelated
or distantly related persons. Such rights (and their referents) are known
as nimalj, a term which I gloss as ‘authorized use’ … Birth at a place
outside one’s own bur is also generally believed to confer a range of
inalienable nimalj rights (including rights of access, residence and
usufruct) in that locality (Bagshaw 1999: 61).
25 This was evident in some evidence given by applicants during the 2001 Federal Court hearing of the
Bardi and Jawi native title claim.
26 This is mainly relevant to marriages with non-indigenous people, but can also occur where the father
is Aboriginal (but not Bardi or Jawi) but the individual feels more socially connected to Bardi and has
therefore followed the mother ‘for country’. Trigger (1987: 223) makes a similar comment with respect
to choice of linguistic affiliation at Doomadgee.
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Figure 10-2: General locations of Bardi and Jawi buru.
Source: Bagshaw 1999, 2001b, 2001c.
When estate affiliates grant nimalj, it confers particular rights within a
specified area of country to a person (the grantee) for the duration of their life.27
These rights may be as narrowly defined as the right to harvest bush fruit from
a particular tree, or to mine ochre or fish at a certain location. As discussed,
Bardi have a strongly held view regarding the primacy of the rights of estate
affiliates within buru, and this is reflected in normative statements regarding
principles of land tenure. Giving permission to others to set up an outstation is
a contemporary corollary to giving nimalj to camp within that buru on an ongoing
basis. Reflecting modern alterations of indigenous custom, verbal permission is
27  As Bagshaw (1999: 62) states, ‘unless voluntarily relinquished by the recipient’.
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in some instances replaced by written permission. Difficulties arising between
the respective parties — the grantor and the grantee — have increased the
tendency towards written agreements, since conflict can arise when the
individuals making the initial agreement pass away and these issues have to be
negotiated by their descendants.
Sutton (1978: 125) describes the formation of outstations in the Cape Keerweer
region as ‘providing a source for an emerging group structure of a corporate
type at a higher order of generality than was previously feasible’. Within the
outstation movement, traditional land tenure is being articulated within a new
political economy, one that involves aspects of ‘intercultural production’ (Merlan
1998). The nexus between the politics of land tenure and resource acquisition
in this area is accentuated by the structural location of these matters within a
‘whitefella’ domain, involving various government agencies, programs,
bureaucratic requirements in relation to procedure and expenditure,
accountability measures, spot-checks on outstation groups, and so on. Such
mechanisms pit outstation groups within the same region against one another
symbolically, and in many instances materially as well. Claims to country in the
context of the outstation movement, have, in my view, consolidated notions of
the autonomy of these contemporary land-using groups. While there is a broad
correlation between these outstations and buru (estate groups), that is, between
some of the land users and the landowners (estate affiliates), this correlation is
not complete; but where the correlation occurs, outstations are, in some cases
at least, conflated with buru. These transitions could be considered ‘a regenerated
Aboriginal system of local tenure … embedded within a different mode of
material production’, but which demonstrate ‘strong continuities of the social
and cultural modes of Aboriginal life including its political and territorial aspects’
(Smith 2000: 442). Nevertheless, these transformations have implications for the
emergence of new property relationships amongst Bardi in general, and within
the context of a communal claim to native title.
Prescribed Bodies Corporate
Rowse’s discussion of general principles underlying the incorporation of
Aboriginal groups is equally apposite to a consideration of PBCs under the NTA.
As a strategy of reform, incorporation assumed an indigenous willingness
to change, just as assimilation programs assumed, solicited and even
coerced change in their clients. Incorporation must therefore be seen as
an instance of continuity between assimilation and self-determination.
Corporations, councils and associations are thoroughly ‘Western’ modes
of collective action … ‘Self-determination’ begs the question: what self
or selves? (Rowse 2000: 132).
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Fingleton says that, since native title is a communal title, the rationale underlying
the PBC includes it being the ‘“contact point” for dealings between the native
title holders and outsiders’, so that:
The need for bodies corporate is explained partly by legal reasons —
the need for a legal entity with its own separate existence — and also
by practical reasons (to facilitate dealings), and by a desire to protect the
interests of individual members of the native title-holding group (1994: 3).
As Fingleton indicates, PBCs are designed, in large part, to facilitate external
dealings between governments (and other interests) and native title-holding
groups. Sansom (in Rowse 1993: 54) describes this succinctly: ‘Leviathan
addresses not Aborigines, but Aborigines Inc.’ But, as Rowse says, ‘mobs are
not “corporations” whose anatomy can be given in terms of a series of offices
and functions’ (ibid: 55). Aboriginal social formations are not correlates of
Western-style corporations. Political life within Aboriginal domains is
characteristically dynamic, not particularly commensurate with the static
corporate entity they are being asked to maintain.
The relationship between multiple incorporated outstation groups and a
larger PBC (as a native title-holding body) is unlikely to emerge without some
difficulty. While the outstation movement in this region can be seen, on the one
hand, as both an exercise of people’s native title and reflective of their traditional
attachments to country, on the other hand, the implications of such incorporation
in this area have been considerable. Relationships within communities have been
impacted significantly as groups vie for allocation of resources, draw artificial
boundaries around their incorporated groups, and use ‘traditional’ concepts to
validate particular positions. Since the politics over land have become exacerbated
in this context, the incorporation of the wider native title group as a PBC is likely
to prove politically difficult, as I briefly describe below.
Towards a Representative Structure
In 1996 the Kimberley Land Council began working with the Bardi and Jawi
claimant group on the development of a PBC. The claimant group’s involvement
in commercial developments on their country (such as tourism and trochus),
and in non-commercial development of land through the outstation movement,
meant that the right to negotiate under the NTA primarily involved negotiations
between claimants rather than others outside of the claimant group.28
28  Under the NTA, prior to its amendment in 1998, once the National Native Title Tribunal had accepted
and registered a native title claim, claimants held ‘the right to negotiate’ in relation to certain ‘permissible
future acts’ within the claim area. Under Section 26, permissible future acts are ‘essentially acts relating
to mining, the compulsory acquisition of native title for the purpose of making a grant to a third party,
and any other acts approved by the Commonwealth Minister’. The right to negotiate under the NTA
was not the equivalent of a veto; rather, it allowed claimants and proponents of permissible future acts
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Accordingly, the claimant group needed to develop mechanisms through which
negotiations over land management issues within the communal and legal context
of native title could be addressed. This was necessary both for potential dealings
with outsiders and for land and sea management issues arising between members
of the claimant group. Management issues (such as the further development of
outstations or the setting up of aquaculture projects) also held potential legal
implications, since they could result in the issue of leases over land (or sea) that
was under a native title claim. Since the right to negotiate required communal
decisions about land interests which had not previously been negotiated
internally in this manner,29  the development of a working group as a precursor
to a PBC was closely related to the right to negotiate in this claim.
Decisions about land use had not previously been subject to this kind of
formalised decision making by the broader Bardi and Jawi group. Rather, they
had usually been made by the community councils, which were not necessarily
or formally accountable to the wider jural public, although informal consultations
with senior patrifiliates (where their country was concerned) and with madja
or bosses (senior ritual leaders) were sometimes held.30 Madja (collectively
madja-madjin) also frequently intervene in land use decisions in contexts where
ngulungul (culturally restricted, ‘sacred’) locations are threatened by development.
However, community council decisions have not necessarily taken into account
the principles underlying the laws and customs of their peoples, and in this
sense, their relationship with the PBC represents a significant issue.31
In late 1996 Bardi and Jawi established an interim working group to deal
with matters requiring negotiation and to begin the work of consulting with
the other native title holders about how their interests might best be represented
in the structure of a PBC. The claimant group decided that their representative
working group would comprise two representatives from each of the ‘clan
groups’. ‘Clan groups’ is a term that, especially since this time, has been
increasingly applied by some claimants to the various regional aggregates defined
by directional or geographic descriptions (rather than to estate groups).32
(the ‘parties’) to attempt to reach a negotiated agreement regarding the development or acquisition
under consideration.
29  External negotiations have occurred with the Department of Conservation and Land Management
(who sought to declare a nature conservation zone over part of the claim area); these negotiations were
conducted via community meetings.
30 Madja is an Aboriginalisation of the English word ‘master’ and is equated with ‘boss’.
31 These difficulties were already apparent in this area prior to 2002, as some of the community councils
reacted against what they saw as a potential loss of power to the PBC — long before the latter entity
had even been formed.
32 The working group members were chosen from the following ‘clan groups’: Mayala (which in this
instance referred to Jawi from the islands east of Sunday Island); Iwanyun (Sunday Island Jawi); Inalabulu
(islander Bardi); Ardiolan (northern Bardi); Gularrgon (western Bardi); Baniol (eastern Bardi); Banararr
(north-eastern Bardi) and Guwarlgarda (southern Bardi).
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Although ‘working group’ meetings were designed primarily for nominated
representatives, as many claimants attended these (between 1996 and 1998) as
attended larger-scale native title meetings. There were a number of reasons why
this was the case. Bardi and Jawi have a vital interest in anything potentially
having bearing upon their country, and native title falls squarely within this
ambit. In addition, the notion that members of the group could have their
interests adequately represented by others was at odds with internal community
politics and competitive status relations (see Trigger 1988). The political nature
of social relationships within indigenous groups means that consensual decision
making in the context of PBCs (and their formation) will require time. Decisions
are likely to remain subject to ‘an ongoing struggle over authority, legitimacy
and influence between different groups and factions’ (Martin and Finlayson
1996: 7). This means that even so-called ‘consensual’ decisions (Sutton 1984/5:
382) are likely to be subject to revision, especially where they deal with questions
of landownership and resource use. Discussing the problems inherent in ‘opinion
formation and the problem of group consent’, Sutton argues that:
European ideas of collective decision-making fall back naturally, almost
unconsciously, on corporate notions which are different from those of
Aborigines … European corporate groups making major decisions,
especially those with financial implications, have well-bounded
memberships which may be publicly tested in an established neutral
context (the courts). Aboriginal corporations, on the other hand, have
customarily been reifications reflecting certain states of negotiation, in
some cases blurred by chronic disputation for which no referral to
external adjudication has been possible (ibid: 383–4).
In the Bardi and Jawi claimant group, politics within the group reflect the
historical experiences of the members.33 These politics has been accentuated by
the outstation movement, which has consolidated intensely localised interests
and competition over the allocation of resources; they have typically centred
upon whom has pre-eminent rights in buru, and as corollaries, who has the right
to exploit specific resources in a buru (such as trochus),34  or more generally use
that buru for tourism ventures. Such issues of connection to country, who is
seen to have proprietorial rights in country, and hence can derive economic
advantages most legitimately from that country, have tended to assume centre
stage in negotiations over the formation of a representative working group and
in discussions about their PBC.
33  See Glaskin (2002) for further discussion of this point.
34 The alngir (trochus) issue is a volatile resource issue among Bardi and Jawi, and is heavily implicated
in the politics of country ownership. Foale and Macintyre (2000: 34) discuss reefs in West Nggela
(Solomon Islands) as ‘subjects of formal disputes’, also as a consequence of the trochus industry.
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Local Organisation in the Contemporary Context
The ‘atomic approach’ (Sutton 1995: 1) to outstations evident amongst Bardi is
reflective of their local organisation (density of estate groups), but I argue that
this has been augmented in the current intercultural context. Many of the groups
gaining outstations in this region have done so within their own buru, and they
tend to see the establishment of their outstation as an outsider recognition of
their traditional connections to that country. While outstation groups often
reflect estate groups or their membership, they are not of themselves equivalent
to them. The typical unit of outstation incorporation tends to be the extended
family group, and Bardi either do not form incorporated groups on the basis of
including all estate affiliates within those corporations or, if they do, they are
usually unable to sustain such corporations (see Martin and Finlayson 1996: 7;
Mantziaris 1997: 9). In these and other cases, as outstation groups have competed
over control of outstation resources and the corporation, the groups have
fractured and formed further outstations within the same buru. Over time, these
choices people make about living arrangements (vis-à-vis the statutory
arrangements that make funding for incorporated outstation groups possible)
have the possibility of becoming naturalised. For example, Rigsby (1998: 35)
has observed that ‘individuals and groups may sometimes transform secondary
rights into primary property rights over time in a variety of circumstances
relating to succession, regencies and even land claim actions’. Sutton (1978: 126)
makes the point that ‘as the nature of secular property changes, corporate life
will change, since it appears to be secular property which provides the most
powerful constraints on fragmentation and unification’.
The outstation movement is considered as a ‘decentralisation trend’ (Coombs
1974) in spatial terms, since it involves the movement of people away from larger
communities into smaller satellite communities. However, it can also be
considered a decentralising movement in terms of the multiplication of Aboriginal
corporations it has produced, each negotiating separately the institutional and
administrative arrangements that are necessary to fund and develop outstation
infrastructure. Although my discussion of native title incorporation has been
on the processes preceding such incorporation (since this has not currently been
realised among the Bardi and Jawi claimant group), the parallels and
juxtapositions between these two processes should be apparent. Both the
outstation movement and native title can be considered as providing new
conditions of possibility for indigenous relationships to country to be formally
expressed and recognised outside the indigenous domain, and both require
incorporation.
However, one of the effects of decentralisation within the outstation
movement, as I have argued, has been to consolidate notions of autonomy
attaching to the outstation groups. This, along with differentiation within the
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claimant group consolidated by different historical experiences, and exacerbated
by economics associated with resource use, has meant that it has been difficult
for the claimant group to act as a corporate group. Rather, much claimant
attention has focused primarily on either their own buru (estate) or on their own
outstation. Particular rights in buru are embedded within a larger system which
gives form to these local entitlements: an estate group could not reproduce itself
but is system-dependent. Sutton (1996: 8) describes this as a ‘whole-part
dependency’ in which the dependency is, on the one hand, ‘between particular
rights and interests and the wider system of jural and cultural practices in which
they are embedded’, but on the other hand, is ‘between the rights and interests
held in land or waters by subgroups or individuals, and the communal native
title out of which they are “carved”’ (see also Rigsby 1998: 24). While patrifiliates
are considered to have the ‘final say’ with respect to estate matters, this is not
generally considered to mean that they are able to deny matrifiliates, for example,
their existing rights in those same areas. However, to the consternation of many
other Bardi, at least some outstation groups were, during the period of my
research, speaking and behaving as though their outstations were equivalent to
private property, erecting fences and gates around them, effectively preventing
(and denying) access by other Bardi to these areas. In addition, the persons who
were preventing access during this time were not always patrifiliates.
Conclusion
Although Bardi and Jawi reached an agreement about a representative structure
for a working group to precede their PBC, during my research, this representation
was consistently challenged from within the group. Incorporation within the
outstation context resulted in the multiplication of incorporated outstation
groups; but in the native title context, the requirement is for a single incorporated
group, a PBC. The outstation movement has a centrifugal impetus, while native
title, as in the PBC regulations, has a centripetal one. These two forces are
invariably in tension with one another, and it remains to be seen, at some later
stage, how the relationships between incorporated outstation groups and the
PBC will be accommodated.
At issue here is the relationship between these corporate entities that are, in
some sense, designed to give some external representation to indigenous
landowners, and landownership itself.
If the core of property as a social institution lies in a complex system of
recognized rights and duties with reference to the control of valuable
objects, and if the roles of the participating individuals are linked by
this means with basic economic processes, and if, besides, all these
processes of social interaction are validated by traditional beliefs,
attitudes, and values, and sanctioned in custom and law, it is apparent
that we are dealing with an institution extremely fundamental to the
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structure of human societies as going concerns. For, considered from a
functional point of view, property rights are institutionalised means of
defining who may control various classes of valuable objects for a variety
of present and future purposes and the conditions under which this power
may be exercised (Hallowell 1955: 246).
In his determination of the Bardi and Jawi claim, Justice French commented on
the distinction between the workings of property as a social institution at a
broader level that is reproduced over time, and the internal differentiation of
various rights within a claimant group that are fundamental to the workings of
property. In relation to the Commonwealth’s position that the determination of
native title should be made at the level of the estate group, he said:
The Commonwealth argued against the applicants’ position that the Bardi
and Jawi people comprise the proper native title holding group and that
the rights of patriclans, lawmen and others are to be determined
intramurally [i.e., internally]. This position, it was said, involved a
‘deliberate avoidance’ of the requirements of the Act. The Act, it was
said, requires the Court to specify who has what rights under traditional
law and custom and not to delegate that question to the applicants. The
Commonwealth position so expressed risked conceptual confusion
between native title rights and interests held in common by a particular
society and their distribution and exercise according to elements of a
unitary traditional law and/or custom which may be ambulatory and
responsive to changing circumstances without affecting the integrity of
its normative foundations.35
Discussions concerning the level at which native title should be recognised in
various jurisdictions will no doubt continue. Different levels of incorporation
may reflect, to uneven extents, the different levels at which land is traditionally
held (and sometimes the internal differentiation of these). The difficulties
indigenous groups encounter in forming PBCs may be considerable, and the
implications for social relations within indigenous groups have yet to fully
emerge or be understood. Regardless of the form in which native title is
determined, and the extent of rights and interests such determinations recognise
(Glaskin 2003), Aboriginal groups will be required to form PBCs to hold and
administer title or to enact agreements, and this will require internal negotiations
within native title claimant groups. At the core of many of these internal
negotiations are the claimant group’s own property relations, that is, the social
relations that they have among each other with respect to their exercise of rights
in land or to speak for land. These internal property relations are distinct from
those native title rights and interests that may eventually be recognised in native
35 Sampi v State of Western Australia [2005] FCA 777, at para 983.
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title determinations, but as I have argued elsewhere (Glaskin 2002, 2005),
participation in the native title process itself (of which determinations of native
title and incorporation as PBCs are part) will ultimately have an effect on the
articulation and enactment of the internal property relations within those groups
concerned.
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Chapter Eleven
The Measure of Dreams
Derek Elias
Currently, in the Tanami Desert of Australia’s Northern Territory, in excess of
seven million dollars in mineral royalties may be distributed to Aboriginal
communities and individual Aboriginal people each year. This royalty money
can fluctuate markedly from year to year depending on variables such as the
success of exploration, the price of gold, mining company expenditure, and the
rates of production in terms of mass and quality of ore from both the pits and
the mining plants themselves. The money, commonly referred to simply as
‘royalties’, is primarily paid out by mining companies and is subject to legal
agreements made with traditional landowners through their representative body,
the Central Land Council (CLC). Sections 35 and 64 of the Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA) provide for financial payments to be made
to the ‘traditional owners’ of areas associated with, or affected by, mining and
exploration.
The advent of the ALRA and the land claim process represented a significant
shift in the objective relations of Warlpiri cultural conceptions of place. Land
claims and the statutory requirements of the ALRA combined to place an
emphasis on the relationships of Aboriginal people to their land in a new manner.
The land claim process required people to articulate and objectify their
relationships to place in a tribunal setting that required the definition of which
people owned which land in relation to membership of descent groups and the
boundaries of their ‘estates’. In essence, the ALRA signaled a reification of
cultural forms that would underscore the fundamental tenets of Aboriginal
society, history and culture which were so clearly different from those of
Euro-Australians.
In the Tanami Desert, the CLC, as instructed by Warlpiri and landowners
from other linguistic groups, has entered into agreements with a large number
of companies. These agreements allow for exploration and mining on Aboriginal
land. The two most important features of these agreements, as far as Warlpiri
people are concerned, centre on the protection of their places of significance
and the payment of royalties to the relevant traditional owners of the land
affected by either mining leases or exploration licences. The developments
associated with the exigencies of mineral exploration on Aboriginal land have
forced, and are continuing to force, traditional owners to make many decisions
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about their land, such as about the relative importance of places and the bases
for membership of royalty receiving associations. The objectification of Warlpiri
knowledge of place and people’s relationships to place is extremely significant.
It is at the centre of tensions and politicking between people to identify who is
eligible to receive money from specific tracts of land, and the criteria upon which
such eligibility is based, contested and upheld.
In the year 2000, an area of 85,250 km2 in the central Tanami Desert was
covered by seven mining leases, more than 160 exploration licences within 53
separate agreements, with a further 100 applications awaiting consideration.
Extensive consultations, beginning with seeking consent from the appropriate
traditional owners, are necessary before any work by mining companies or other
external development interests can take place on Aboriginal land. Then follows
the project of mapping places and identifying those to be protected and avoided
during exploration and mining work, which is usually carried out by an
anthropologist working with the appropriate Warlpiri people. As a result of
these activities and other factors, Warlpiri relations to the lands from which
they now derive financial benefits have changed greatly since the arrival of land
rights. This chapter will specifically address the demarcation of space and place
and the ways in which the Warlpiri landscape is dissected by gold exploration
and mining, a complicated development that dominates the current modelling
of relationships between people and place in the Tanami Desert.
The CLC’s submission to the Reeves Review noted that the ALRA reversed
a long process that had denied recognition of Aboriginal owners’ rights and
responsibilities for their land, and that as a result, ‘for the first time since contact
between Aboriginal people and non-Aboriginal people, the balance of power
between Aboriginal landowners and mining interests has shifted’ (Reeves 1998:
519). The ALRA has afforded the greatest opportunity for Warlpiri, who became
sedentarised in missions and reserves following the establishment of such
settlements,1  to once more access their places in the Tanami Desert. These
opportunities to access remote country have resulted, firstly from the land claim
process, and secondly as a consequence of the processes arising from the mining
provisions of the ALRA (especially Section 42), which vests traditional owners
with a decision-making role over access to place. These provisions have given
Warlpiri people control of their places in the face of the intense pressure for
economic development in the form of gold exploration and mining in the Tanami
Desert. The provisions were vigorously contested in some of the submissions to
the Reeves Review, and the debate revolved around the extent to which
Aboriginal people will be able to have a meaningful say in the development of
economic interests over their land and places (Reeves 1998: 520).
1  See Dussart (2000: 36–38) for further details concerning the ‘forced sedentarisation’ of Warlpiri people.
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The competition for the right to control access to Aboriginal land is one that
is now familiar in recent Australian history. In the context of the two most
famous cases of disputes between government, the mining industry and
Aborigines — Noonkanbah (Hawke and Gallagher 1989) and Coronation Hill
(Merlan 1991; Keen 1992; Brunton 1992) — Merlan (1991: 341) has made the
observation that:
Such disputes highlight the problems which arise from contradiction
between direct governmental support for Aborigines as a traditional and
socio-culturally distinctive ‘type’, and support from the private sector
(thus also indirectly, from government) for them to become and to see
themselves as modernizing facilitators of economic development. Conflict
between these two paths realizes itself partly in conflict over space, and
its material and symbolic definition.
How the conflict over the production of space has been manifested in the Tanami
Desert is of direct concern. Elsewhere I have considered Warlpiri places as
natural, material phenomena that are imbued with symbolic and practical
characteristics that demarcate and orientate social space, to which myths and
stories are attached (Elias 2001a: 103–16, 2001b). Particularly important here is
the concept of jukurrpa, which is a term Walpiri use to refer to the creative epoch
often referred to as ‘the dreaming’. But it is also used to refer to the ancestral
beings who formed the country and to their activities or ‘dreamings’.2  One way
places are culturally ordered by Warlpiri is in terms of the way that they restrict
access to certain people. Such restrictions are based primarily on categories of
age, gender and knowledge, and with respect to the different bases upon which
people could claim identity with them as both individuals and social groups.
At the present time Warlpiri places are at the centre of interests that seek to
determine their location and physical boundaries. This determination is of great
significance for mining companies and governments who want to maximise their
ability to access space in order to ascertain the extent of mineral reserves. The
ALRA legislation recognises the Warlpiri right to exercise a considerable amount
of power over access to their land. Here is the source of conflict over the material
and symbolic definition of place that Merlan referred to earlier, which is most
simply explained by the fact that boundaries have different meanings in different
societies (Lefebvre 1991). The process of mapping in the Tanami Desert will be
shown to have had profound effects on the definition of place and space, and
on Warlpiri conceptions of them both physically and socially in terms of the
imposition of boundaries between people and place.
2  See Dussart (2001: 17–24) for a detailed description of jukurrpa.
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The Land Claim Process
Land claim hearings in the Tanami Desert commenced with the Warlpiri and
Kartangarurru-Kurintji claim (Peterson et al. 1978). Lodged in 1978, it was the
first claim heard by the Aboriginal Land Commissioner in the Central Australian
region. The claim itself involved a huge area of land that encompassed a number
of ‘tribal’/linguistic groups, including the Gurindji, Kartangarurru, Pirlingarna,
Kukatja, Ngardi, Nyininy, and all of the Warlpiri subgroups — Warnayaka,
Manyangarnpa (Yalpiri), Ngalia and the Warrmarla. From the outset, discussion
of landownership was based on the model of the patrilineal clan that involved
the identification of people’s association with corresponding groups of places
related to jukurrpa. The presentation of evidence for the early land claims placed
greater emphasis upon social affiliation stemming from relations coded within
the land than with respect to places within the land itself. The authors of the
claim book explained some of the more practical reasons for this situation:
The least satisfactory aspect is the accuracy of place location on the maps.
The principal reasons for this are the extent of the area involved, the
lack of roads in the area, the general difficulties of travel and the fact
that we have not visited the remoter parts of the Tanami Desert. We
have, however, surveyed the area from a light plane in company with a
small group of traditional owners. Even where places have been visited
the practical difficulties of accurately locating a soakage or other place
in an undulating plain or thick stand of mulga are considerable. In
consequence only the major places have been shown on the maps where
the location has been visited or can be confidently located. This means
that many hundreds of names are not included although they are well
known to the people and their order along the song lines is known to us
(Peterson et al. 1978: 2).
Clearly, when the Central Desert Land Trust was granted very little was known
about the location of most major places of significance except those that were
easily identified as topographical features. These places were discussed through
the claim hearings but the establishment of a successful claim was not reliant on
the demonstration of knowledge of the location of places of significance, but
rather on the links of traditional owners to the land. This situation was repeated
in the Warlpiri, Kukatja and Ngarti claim (Myers and Clark 1983), where hardly
any evidence was heard on the claim area at all and the mapping and presentation
of located places was virtually non-existent.
Beginning with the Chilla Well claim, the Land Commissioners (under
considerable political pressure) increased the demand for the accurate location
and identification of place, which then continued in subsequent land claims
(Stead 1985). The first reason for this was that accurate mapping of places was
facilitated through a combination of factors, including the availability of more
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financial and logistical support for research, the fact that a shorter time had
elapsed since yapa (as Warlpiri people refer to themselves) had worked and lived
on the land, and the political climate of the time. This climate was created by
the establishment of self-government in the Northern Territory in 1978, and
most notably the subsequent development of gold exploration and mining in
the Tanami Desert. The combination of these influences placed a pronounced
emphasis on the importance of identifying Warlpiri places of significance. There
continues to be enormous pressure applied to Aboriginal landowners and the
Land Councils by industry and government not to hinder economic development
by ‘locking’ up land. These interests have identified the sacred site or place as
a ‘bogey man’; its mythical status is argued to be a hindrance to a modern,
economically responsible country.
The preparation of the Western Desert and Tanami Downs land claims
witnessed the injection of more funds for research by the CLC and involved
numerous trips undertaken to identify the location of places. These necessitated
taking traditional owners on extended country visits mapping different dreaming
tracks. During such research the knowledge of senior people, who had walked
through these areas before being moved to settlements, was crucial to the
authoritative identification of these places. Maps were produced that accurately
recorded locations of places to illustrate how claimed areas of land were ‘full’
of places that were of significance to yapa.
The development of the Northern Territory’s mineral base has long been
identified as a key priority of the Country Liberal Party which held power from
the time of self-government in 1978 until 2001. The Northern Territory
Government’s opposition to land claims by Aboriginal people was a stance taken
in order to remove what was perceived as an unnecessary obstacle to the
development of economic infrastructure: the defeat of Aboriginal land claims
would have allowed mining and exploration to go ahead unimpeded. Not only
did the government fail in this respect; its vehement contest of land claims
actually assisted yapa to rediscover places of significance, thus strengthening
the Warlpiri position. Warlpiri, through the CLC, quickly established a number
of agreements with mining companies, and through the procedures of exploration
and contingent ‘site clearances’ provided for in these agreements, people were
rediscovering and locating many of their places. As more exploration tracks
were made in remote areas they provided the means for people to more easily
access their places. This process facilitated the preparation of subsequent land
claims as people travelled through country more frequently. However, there is
a critical distinction to be drawn between the mapping and recording of place
data for a land claim and the mapping and recording of place data for mineral
exploration. The exigencies of gold exploration and mining require that
boundaries be allocated to located places in order for development to proceed
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with surety. This situation introduced a new dimension to place that had not
previously been conceived by Warlpiri or institutional anthropology.
The Mining Provisions
Sections 41 and 42 of the ALRA clearly spell out the procedures for consultation
and negotiation between Aboriginal owners, defined as ‘traditional owners’,
other interested or affected Aboriginal people, and mining companies. The first
meetings that take place are known as ‘consent to negotiate’ meetings, and in
the Tanami Desert these are convened by the CLC. The CLC is responsible for
identifying and bringing together the correct groups of traditional owners (as
defined by the ALRA) to consider the mining company’s Exploration Licence
Application. The blocks of land that are the subject of such applications are
determined by the Northern Territory Government and subsequently offered
to one applicant mining company under the Northern Territory Mining Act 1980.
The ‘consent to negotiate’ meeting is the point at which Aboriginal people
exercise the power of veto over an application. They may reject outright the
proposal of a company to explore over a certain application for any number of
reasons that do not necessarily have to be disclosed. If an application is approved
by traditional owners, an Exploration Licence is granted and an agreement is
forged between the CLC on behalf of Warlpiri and the applicant mining company.
Such agreements include stipulations regarding protection of Warlpiri land
interests (places), financial compensation in the form of royalties, infrastructure
development, provision of employment opportunities, and a realistic
environmental protection program (Ireland 1996: 2; CLC 1998a). A separate
agreement is concluded if the stage is reached where actual mining can proceed
and be profitable.
The right of veto through the procedure of consent to negotiate is the key
element of the mining provisions of the ALRA that enables Warlpiri people to
regulate access to, and potential developments on, their land and places. The
right of veto was identified by Woodward (1974) during the Aboriginal Land
Rights Commission as the means by which Aboriginal people could be given
realistic control over their land and help to establish a meaningful economic
base by the subsequent negotiation of royalties and rentals from development
on their land. The right of veto has been consistently contested by the majority
of the mining industry, and also in some political quarters, on the grounds that
it potentially locked up resources and that royalties paid to Aboriginal people
would shorten mine life and adversely affect the national economic interest
(Altman and Peterson 1984). The record of gold exploration and mining in the
Tanami Desert has clearly disproved such a contention.
There have been significant social and economic benefits that have flowed
to both traditional owners and the mining industry through the CLC’s execution
of the statutory processes of the ALRA in the Northern Territory. In particular,
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this process has been assisted by the more progressive mining companies that
recognise the special nature of the link between Aboriginal people and the land
(CLC 1998a: 49). From the more enlightened industry perspective, the success
of the agreements made between mining companies and Warlpiri people in the
Tanami Desert hinges on a company’s respect for this special link and is the
foundation of a workable and mutually beneficial relationship (Ireland 1996: 1).
Manning (1997: 26) has noted that during the last decade there has been a
dramatic increase in the total area covered by mineral exploration licences in
the Northern Territory. This has been primarily due to negotiations over land
in advance and the establishment of protocols between Land Councils and mining
companies that have combined to speed up and streamline processes involved
in making agreements. Whilst this observation indicates the familiarity that
Aboriginal people have developed with the procedures for access to exploration
on their lands, it is clear that a comfortable relationship did not develop
overnight. The relative ease of gaining access to Aboriginal land for mining
companies is in contrast to the operational difficulties experienced by both
Warlpiri and mining companies that have been encountered in the actual
day-to-day workings of agreements. The process of finding a balance between
Warlpiri interests in identifying and protecting their places and the desire of
mining companies to maximise the amount of land at their disposal for gold
exploration was a difficult one. The introduction of both mining companies and
Warlpiri to each other and the Tanami Desert has thrown up intriguing questions
as to the contemporary definitions of place, space and jukurrpa (dreamtime) for
Warlpiri.
Gold Mining Returns to the Tanami Desert
The steady process of the transfer of land claimed and won back to Warlpiri
hands was followed closely by the rising interest in gold and other mineral
exploration that gathered momentum during the 1980s. By the early part of the
following decade, the central area of the Tanami Desert was literally being held
under the microscope. Both Normandy NFM (previously North Flinders Mines
— NFM) and Tanami Joint Venture were allocated exploration licences over The
Granites and Tanami respectively that had lain dormant during the 1970s. An
exploration licence was granted to NFM in 1975, with subsequent mineral leases
offered by the Northern Territory Department of Mines and Energy in 1980,
and an agreement was finally reached between the CLC and NFM in 1983. This
agreement was necessary because of the need for NFM to secure more land
outside of the licence in order to set up its processing plant and other
requirements for the proposed mine at The Granites, including a large and steady
water supply. In 1987 mining recommenced at Tanami, and by 1991 control of
the mine passed to Zapopan. Zapopan held the exploration licences negotiated
with the traditional owners and the CLC around the original Tanami Joint Venture
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mine site at Tanami, where the gold deposits within the existing lease were soon
exhausted. By 1995, further deposits were found in close proximity to the mine
and Central Desert Joint Venture was formed by Otter Gold Mines Ltd and Acacia
Resources.
The continuing attraction that the Tanami Desert region holds for gold
exploration has been buoyed by the success of Normandy NFM in the discovery
of a remarkable deposit west of The Granites. The effect of the substantial
high-grade gold reserves at Callie–Dead Bullock Soak was the catalyst for a
dramatic intensification of Exploration Licence Applications that cover the entire
survey area: ‘the 1992 discovery of Normandy Mining Ltd’s 3 million ounce
Callie gold deposit transformed the Northern Territory’s Tanami region into a
sexy exploration address’ (Bell 1998: 65). From the early 1990s Warlpiri of the
Tanami Desert have been involved in day-to-day consultations regarding access
to places that have been prompted by the post-Callie land-rush which is widely
considered to be ‘one of the great modern-day Australian gold discoveries’ (ibid:
67). The total capital expenditure on Callie up until 1998 was $76 million.
Normandy NFM’s Callie deposit is by far the greatest reserve of gold so far
discovered in the Tanami Desert, and is the first gold mine in Australia that has
been developed with the consultation and permission of the Aboriginal owners.
In 1999 Normandy NFM were completing a feasibility study on the possibility
of a new treatment plant, yet as of late 2000 there was no separate mill or
treatment plant at Callie, and ore was transported by haul road to The Granites
for processing.
Since its inception in 1976, the ALRA has certainly not restricted the access
of mining interests to Aboriginal land in the Tanami Desert. Annual exploration
expenditure in the Northern Territory went from $1 million to $40 million over
a period of 20 years, and is showing little sign of slowing (Ireland 1996: 2). Total
expenditure on gold exploration in the Tanami Desert alone was in excess of
$12 million in 1997 (CLC 1998b: 6). As of the beginning of the year 2000, there
were over 100 Exploration Licence Applications in the Tanami Desert awaiting
consideration, more than 160 licences had already been granted under the terms
of 53 agreements between the CLC and various mining companies, and there
were seven actual mining leases.
The Federal and Northern Territory Governments’ programs for the economic
development of Aboriginal people in remote areas have met with little success.
In contrast, mining companies have been active in exploiting the few
opportunities for economic development in remote Australia, particularly in the
Tanami Desert. The return of mining to this region is of great significance because
of the mutually beneficial relationship it affords. The mining companies benefit
through the extraction of gold on Warlpiri terms, and the Warlpiri benefit by
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receiving considerable financial benefits through royalty payments as well as
regional and community development and employment (Manning 1997: 33).
The Measurement of Dreams
Through a diverse variety of historical agents and processes, places — or ‘sites
of significance’, as they are often called— have become highly topical.
Conservative ideology has consistently argued that the Australian landscape
should not be divided into sacred and profane categories, and the basis of this
argument has been that Aboriginal places are empty and devoid of significance
because Aborigines no longer live a ‘traditional way of life’. Countering this
narrow view have been the realities of the ALRA, continuing academic research
into Aboriginal social and cultural life, and the increase of Aboriginal political
representation — all of which have combined to raise public awareness that
Aboriginal places and land have profound meanings that cannot be simply
dismissed as irrelevant.
The project of mapping places in the Tanami Desert attempts to link the
eternal Aboriginal ‘dreamtime’ or jukurrpa to the landscape. Places have been
widely conceptualised as the interface between the human and cosmological
present. The process involved in exploration and mining has served to give
boundary and shape to place. The mapping project results in the demarcation
of the ‘sacred’ and the subsequent division of Aboriginal peoples’ relations to
land into categories of places. The identification of places that are sacred tends
to render the remaining land as meaningless or inert place. This division of space
from place is termed the ‘grounding of significance’ by Lefebvre, and can be
seen as part of a wider intellectual process where: ‘Places are marked, noted,
named. Between them, within the “holes in the net”, are blank or marginal
spaces’ (Lefebvre 1991: 118). But the physical demarcation of the extent of
influence of a place or jukurrpa cannot be reduced to a simple process of
two-dimensional mapping; the content of the jukurrpa cannot be measured only
by a projection of its surveyed borders onto a map.
Consideration of the practicalities of how exploration and mining proceed
on Aboriginal land in the Tanami Desert thus reveals how these interests require
Warlpiri people to abstract, delimit and impose boundaries on places. Such
processes present both yapa and resource developers with considerable practical
and intellectual difficulties. The reason is that the identification of areas of land
as ‘no-go areas’ is an alien concept in both mining industry and Aboriginal
perspectives. Essentially the mining industry, long used to treating the landscape
as a potential economic resource, has been forced to recognise that land has other
sociocultural values. However, the realities of the process of exploration in the
Northern Territory, and particularly in the Tanami Desert, have also revealed
another intriguing reality. Aboriginal places have been infused with a previously
absent economic dimension because place is imbued with new meanings when
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it is identified by the mining companies as being of cultural value. Place becomes
valued and commodified as a kind of cultural real estate. It is the complexities
informing this infusion of economic value emerging from the division of the
landscape into place and space that will be examined in the remainder of this
chapter. The implications of this alteration of the meaning of place for Warlpiri
are compounded by the payment of royalty monies in the form of rent and
compensation for gold mining exploration and development in proximity to
Warlpiri places. The first question to consider is the manner in which place
becomes bounded and the land becomes divided into the sacred and economically
significant. This renders the remainder of the landscape empty of meaning, to
be subsequently explored and mined with impunity.
Mining and the Creation of Blocks
For Warlpiri one of the most difficult problems initially faced in coming to terms
with the exploration process is the fact that they are forced to consider
Exploration Licence Applications that have abstract boundaries made up of lines
and angles defined by latitude and longitude and the aeromagnetic grid. The
borders of these blocks cut across Warlpiri places and dreaming tracks in a
haphazard way that is devoid of any meaning or logic readily accessible to yapa.
From the outset, Warlpiri are forced to abstract their interests in place to a level
that has no correspondence with their understanding and experience of place
and land tenure. As Glowczewski (1999: 5) noted, ‘the institutional structures
which are proposed in Australia rarely give control to the Aboriginals in such
a way as to allow them to develop what is specific to them in their spiritual
relationship with the environment’. Before examining the initial cross-cultural
problems brought about by conflicting frames of reference, it is useful to briefly
describe how exploration licence blocks are created and offered to companies
by the Northern Territory Government.
In Australia the State owns minerals that lie beneath the ground. The
government considers that mining of such resources should benefit all citizens
as well as the government itself through the payment of associated royalties. In
order to maximise potential economic development and benefits for the nation,
the State desires that the exploration and mining processes be as rapid and
thorough as possible. This ideal is achieved by fostering healthy competition
amongst interested parties in areas of known reserves, resulting in a large number
of applicants seeking licences. The choice of licensee is based on the assessment
of exploration proposals that are submitted to the Department of Mines and
Energy. There are a number of mechanisms in place which ensure that the
licences issued to explorers are used as productively as possible.
Exploration for gold usually commences with very little knowledge of an
area and relies heavily on published geological data (if available), geological
maps and aeromagnetic surveys which assist in identifying anomalies that indicate
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the possible sites of gold-bearing deposits. It is up to the licence holder to design
an exploration program involving sampling and drilling in order to identify
potential deposits. This process may take some time and is intensive in terms of
effort as well as expense. Competition between explorers could not occur if
original licence holders occupied their ground for indefinite periods; this would
in effect tie up the land and prevent further exploration. To overcome this
problem the size of exploration licence areas is reduced over time in order to
maximise the use of space available for competitive exploration. Explorers must
not hold up the exploration process, and must therefore relinquish part
(approximately 50 per cent) of their licence area each year so as not to tie up
land unnecessarily. As a result, licence applications are generally made for areas
in excess of those actually required for exploration purposes, so that the risk
taker can progressively hand back those areas which are not thought to be
prospective. Through this process the government achieves its dual objectives
of regulating the size of exploration areas and maintaining economic incentives
for exploration (personal communication, Trevor Ireland, 2000).
Extensive exploration occurs throughout the central Tanami Desert region,
and as ground is relinquished by one company, another is waiting to apply for
the licence. This means that Warlpiri must participate in a bewildering number
of meetings and inspections throughout the year if they are to monitor mining
company activities and the progress of company work programs. Exploration
interests in the Tanami Desert are not showing any signs of abating either. In
part this is explained by the application of new exploration techniques facilitating
the penetration of deeper layers of rock. Hence mining companies continue to
apply for land that was previously thought to have been thoroughly explored
(personal communication, Simon Henderson, 2000).
Exploration for gold in the Tanami Desert is under the influence of another
dual imperative: the location of sizeable gold reserves as against the location and
avoidance of Warlpiri places of significance. This requires spatial measurement,
in which ‘boundaries’ must be defined in order to demarcate areas where mining
can proceed and areas where such activities are forbidden. The current land
tenure model, in response to the interests of exploration and mining, involves
a measurement or weighting of dreams, that requires yapa to identify and locate
their places of significance and to rank and weigh their cultural order of rights
in (and affiliation to) place. The remainder of the chapter will explore the manner
in which the mining model of land tenure cuts up the landscape of the Tanami
Desert into abstract parcels within which Warlpiri identify places and jukurrpa,
and ultimately negotiate their relationships with these and with each other.
Every year in the Tanami Desert, Warlpiri encounter a new round of
exploration licences for consideration. These areas of land are increasingly
irregular in shape; conglomerations of ‘empty ground’ discarded by former
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prospectors and in the process of being recycled by others as new exploration
licences. Warlpiri are continually being faced with new, irregular boundaries
of exploration applications and licences that make it difficult for them to keep
track of which places these new boundaries relate to in terms of ownership and
affiliation. The problems this situation poses for Warlpiri involve making
decisions about who can make decisions over these blocks, locating the places
of significance they contain, ensuring that development interests do not encroach
upon them, and deciding how they are to be protected. A common feature of
all of these problems is the speed of exploration and the impediments that are
encountered in attempts to define the boundaries of place within the changing
parameters of a mining company work program. There are two approaches that
have been used to identify the boundaries of Warlpiri places in the context of
gold exploration and mining in the Tanami Desert — the site clearance and the
work area clearance — and I shall now examine each of these in turn.
The Site Clearance Process
Long before the shift in Federal Government policy that formed the background
of the ALRA legislation, Stanner (1965) noted that it was no longer possible to
map an Aboriginal region in terms of its full resources — be they human, spiritual
or economic. Nevertheless, the reintroduction of people and place in the Tanami
Desert has witnessed a determined effort to map and detail Warlpiri interests in
and knowledge of place. The method of administering development projects up
until the early 1990s involved traditional owners’ approval of an Exploration
Licence Application, and once the licence was granted by the government, a
site clearance process was instigated.
Essentially the site clearance process involved a survey by knowledgeable
senior Warlpiri and CLC anthropologists. Together they travelled through the
licence area recording the location of places, defining boundaries or blocks where
mining exploration was forbidden. From the survey recordings, a map was
drawn that detailed places of significance to be avoided and areas in which the
mining company could pursue exploration. The method of mapping had the
primary aim of ensuring that those places which Warlpiri wished to protect
would be safeguarded from mineral exploration. A host of complex problems
that arose out of the site clearance process will be briefly summarised here. The
mapping project implicit in the site clearance project placed Aboriginal
knowledge at the disposal of the mining company but was far from effective in
detailing the sum of Warlpiri interests in land.
Mapping the location of places by Warlpiri involved significant problems in
that it forced people to detail precise locations of places that were often subject
to secrecy. One such example is the location of highly restricted men’s places
that invariably have rather nebulous boundaries. A site clearance survey had
the effect of pinpointing the exact location and features of such restricted places.
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This caused considerable problems for senior men in particular who, aware of
the location of a place, were often reluctant to reveal it due to the fact that the
knowledge associated with it was available to only certain persons on the basis
of such criteria as age, race, gender and semi-moiety. As a result it was not
uncommon for some of the most important places to remain unspecified and
hence unprotected. Also, the informants were unaware of the consequences of
maintaining secrecy about these places. The mapping of Warlpiri place involved
a clear transgression of sociocultural restrictions that caused considerable
difficulties and pressures for those people charged with the responsibility of
undertaking the site clearance survey in the first place.
Figure 11-1: Diagram depicting places of significance for the Warlpiri in relation
to the licence area in initial year of exploration.
Figure 11-2: Diagram depicting places of significance for the Warlpiri in second
year of exploration with reduced licence area.
Figures 11-1 and 11-2 illustrate just how difficult the measurement of dreams
can be under the exploration and mining model of land tenure, for both Warlpiri
and mining companies. Interpretation of these figures depends on knowledge
of the fact that Warlpiri have a subsection system, meaning that they have eight
social categories that are inherited through descent. These categories ‘potentially
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allocate all human beings in a universe of classificatory kin, with concomitant
obligations and responsibilities’ (Bauman 2002: 206). The vernacular terms
appearing in the figures refer to male and female subsection names: women and
men have similar subsection names, which are differentiated largely by their
starting consonant — Nangala refers to females and Jangala refers to males.
A problem that involved the grounding of the significance of place arose
from delineation of the physical boundaries of places. Put simply, the
practicalities of drawing a line around a place, as though it possessed a primarily
spatial significance that could be bounded, posed difficulties for Warlpiri. This
was due to the fact that jukurrpa created and left their essence in places, and
this presence in the landscape was manifested in complex physical and
metaphysical relationships between places (Elias 2001a: 106–12). The mapping
of place and the imposition of boundaries required by the site clearance process
created serious practical problems for Warlpiri in defining the location of place
boundaries.
For example, with respect to Figures 11-1 and 11-2, a comparison can be made
between the places 1a and 1b as opposed to places 2a and 2b on the basis of the
kind of travel undertaken by the jukurrpa related to the two different
semi-moieties. For argument’s sake, we may think of all four places as important
soakages (‘native wells’) existing in conjunction with some other topographic
feature. The jukurrpa moving between 1a and 1b travels through the air and so
the demarcation of boundaries around these two places is relatively
straightforward on the ground. However, in the case of 2a and 2b, the jukurrpa
ancestors are involved in a number of running battles with each other, so all of
the rocks in between the two places represent the bones of people who have
been speared and killed, yet this area does not have a name and may not be
considered important enough to restrict the activities of a mining company. The
way in which Warlpiri demarcate boundaries in such an example is a complex
matter and is difficult for a company to map.
Another example might involve an extremely powerful place such as place
4, which exerts influence around a huge area that actually includes the place at
1b, yet place 4 does not even lie within the boundary of the Exploration Licence.
The practicalities of issuing instructions to mining companies to effectively
manage and protect Warlpiri places of significance were extremely difficult
under the site clearance regime and predictably led to miscommunication.
The difficulties faced by Warlpiri in mapping the locations of places within
the context of mining exploration was further compounded by the fact that
there were deficiencies in the site clearance process that prevented Warlpiri
from locating all of their places of interests on their own terms. The site clearance
process could be characterised as one that attempted to take a ‘freeze-frame’ or
‘snapshot’ of interests in place that was reliant on the imposition of a very
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restricted timescale that allowed access to knowledge. Conversely, Warlpiri
knowledge of place is best understood as one in which layers of knowledge of
an area may be revealed slowly over time with the input of various individuals
and groups. Places are composites of knowledge that involve uncovering a vast
store of layered sociocultural meanings. The site clearance process distilled only
one of these layers as though it represented the entire complement of Warlpiri
knowledge of places within a region.
The shortcomings of the freeze-frame methodology of the site clearance
process can be effectively drawn out when compared to the way that Warlpiri
people map their own interests in place. Nash (1998) investigated Warlpiri sand
mapping techniques and discussed the ways that they are variously employed
to indicate places in an area, the dreaming tracks crossing an area, and how these
may be combined. The presentation of subject material displayed in a sand map
is dependent on a number of factors including scale, positioning, audience, and
the context of the mapping itself. Nash (1998: 3) observed that people would
talk about and map jukurrpa in order to open up and reinforce memories before
travelling to a region, and this was a process that involved a number of talkers
and drawers. Such multiple narratives emphasise the fact that the activity of
mapping is carried out by individuals and groups of Warlpiri who express
different links to country through their expression of rights, knowledge and
experience. The themes of knowledge and authority in the mapping of place
and the ability of mapping to reveal patterns of interdependence between people
within groups have been explored elsewhere in Australia and Canada by Biernoff
(1978) and Brody (1986) respectively.
Traditionally, a site clearance survey was undertaken by a limited number
of individuals and made no allowance for the fact that land and places contained
within an exploration licence area may not have been visited for considerable
periods of time. The return to country necessitated by a site clearance survey
demanded a reorientation of Warlpiri people to a specific tract of land that was
difficult to achieve in only one or two visits. The difficulties involved in
assembling the repertoire of place knowledge stem from the fact that a
considerable period of time had elapsed since people were in the region, and the
fact that the region itself was defined by arbitrary licence boundaries that in no
way corresponded with Warlpiri conceptions of regions and meanings. A licence
area may cut across land belonging to a wide number of different jukurrpa, each
with its own interested individuals and groups of people. In visiting a certain
area the routes of travel undertaken may have little to do with the previous
routes travelled by Warlpiri people or the directions and paths of jukurrpa. As
wide a group of people as possible was needed to share information, memories,
experience and knowledge of places in order to try and define the extent of
places contained in a specific area within an appropriate and meaningful cultural
framework. The site clearance process could not take such culturally specific
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parameters into account. The mapping project imposed a temporal and physical
boundedness on place that neglected Warlpiri ways of knowing, discussing and
experiencing places on their own terms.
Ultimately, the impossibility (for both the mining companies and Warlpiri)
of working with a map produced by the site clearance methodology came down
to the fact that subsequent visits to a licence area made by Warlpiri would always
reveal more places than had previously been identified. There were a number
of factors contributing to this recognition that combined to emphasise the vitality
of people’s relationships to place. These included the contribution made by the
knowledge and memory of different individuals, the fact that the area was widely
discussed back in communities and among other interested persons after initial
site visits, that jukurrpa and songs were sung and discussed to check the order
and connections of places, the land was often burned to allow easier location of
soakages later, and so on. The attempt to locate and bound all Warlpiri interests
in place under the site clearance process that attempted blanket coverage of a
licence area simply did not work. In Figures 11-1 and 11-2, for example, the
places that are mapped in and around the exploration licence area may have
taken several visits to locate after a considerable period of time and sustained
research had transpired. In addition there may yet be other places to be located
such as soakages that are difficult to locate or other places that have not been
searched for by knowledgeable informants.
It was not only Warlpiri interests that could not be clearly and definitively
mapped after one survey in the site clearance process. The mining companies
were also incapable of building a picture of an area in terms of its potential
gold-bearing locales through the gathering of information over a short period
of time. Sampling, costeaning (trench ripping), and drilling sites, along with
camps and access tracks, changed locations quite frequently. It was difficult for
both the miners and Warlpiri to keep a track of, and understand, each other’s
interests in place. The division of land into areas that were important and those
that were not, whilst based upon different criteria, was equally difficult for
Warlpiri and the mining companies. Lefebvre (1991: 334), observing the
commodification of space that attended the rise of capitalism, remarked that
under such extractive conditions:
Space is marked out, explored, discovered and rediscovered on a colossal
scale. Its potential for being occupied, filled, peopled and transformed
from top to bottom is continually on the increase: the prospect, in short,
is of space being produced whose nature is nothing more than raw
materials suffering gradual destruction by the techniques of production.
In the case of the Tanami Desert, what constituted space and place ebbed and
flowed over time, particularly so when places were continually being encountered
during the course of routine exploration. The production of space within the
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site clearance process sought to divide space into areas organised by introduced
scales of economic and sociocultural meanings, using Warlpiri place as the raw
material of the system. The process failed to account for the manner in which
people were able to identify and locate place, for it was Warlpiri who were the
producers of this material not the project of mapping itself. To plot a place on
the surface of the land involved trying to remove or extract it from the
complicated web of meanings in which it is constituted and negotiated by
Warlpiri. To point to a map and say ‘there is X at such and such hill’ is to take
a place and attempt to render it only in its physical dimension in order to confine
it in form and boundary. Mapping as envisaged by the site clearance process
hinged upon a distortion that did not reflect any other significance of place in
both physical and social landscapes. But the significance of place cannot be
confined to a purely physical dimension and must be understood in the local,
regionalised context of other places, jukurrpa, people, affiliations and politics.
The rapid expansion of the number of exploration licences approved by
Warlpiri in the Tanami Desert began escalating in the early 1990s, and the site
clearance process presented difficult obstacles for them as well as the mining
companies. The practical difficulties that prevented an effective working
arrangement for both parties also made it hard to see how interests in land and
access for the stakeholders could both be protected. The site clearance process
was unworkable and was therefore abandoned, to be replaced by the work area
clearance method that was designed to communicate and inform both parties of
their interests in place as part of an ongoing working arrangement. This new
approach achieved considerable success in reducing complications that had
arisen from the failure of the site clearance process to effectively identify the
complement of Warlpiri places and interests within a particular licence area —
and most importantly, within a culturally appropriate frame of reference.
The Work Area Clearance
The development of the work area clearance process cannot be solely attributed
to the need to more effectively incorporate Warlpiri ways of knowing and
identifying their places. A more successful working relationship between
Aboriginal people and exploration companies also required a commitment on
behalf of the latter to take a more positive approach to place. This certainly
necessitated the incorporation of an understanding of Warlpiri relationships to
place, but simultaneously identified and attempted to accommodate the objectives
and interests of mining companies. The mechanisms of the work area clearance
made the production of space and place more transparent and thus more easily
comprehensible to the stakeholders.
The underpinning philosophy of both exploration for and production of gold
is straightforward. A company seeks to maximise the amount of land available
for exploration in order to increase the chances of finding a prospective gold
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reserve that will pass on financial benefits to the company and its shareholders.
In the Tanami Desert this philosophy had to be adjusted in order to take into
account the instructions of Warlpiri people who designated which land was
available for exploration. The premise in operation remains the same for both
the site clearance and work area clearance process. As the previous exploration
manager of Normandy NFM in the Tanami Desert explained:
Dilemmas are best avoided by the simple commitment to the early
identification of sacred sites, and their immediate exclusion from the
area subject of exploration — ‘If it’s culturally important, we don’t want
to explore there’ (Ireland 1996: 11).
The difference between the two clearance processes lay in the manner in which
the cultural importance of place was identified and incorporated into a workable
relationship between yapa and mining interests.
The problems manifest in mapping place in the context of the site clearance
has been documented. However the work area clearance process did not dispense
with the idea of mapping altogether. The difference was that the attempt to map
Warlpiri interests in place under the work area clearance procedure instead
focused on the work program objectives of the company. In this way the area
under consideration in an exploration licence was substantially reduced and the
kinds of activities that were proposed were specifically detailed. The working
arrangement became proactive to the extent that Warlpiri people inspected an
exploration licence area on a case-by-case basis. Over a more workable time
period yapa were enabled to make more informed decisions and surveys, the
results of which informed subsequent instructions issued to the company. The
work area clearance was an approach to place that provided greater scope for
Warlpiri management of exploration on their own terms and removed the
impediment of designating boundaries of place. The process also allowed different
groups of people to identify their interests in places because it provided for a
number of visits over the life of the licence area. From the company’s perspective,
the work area clearance minimized the risk of an unforeseen identification, late
in an advanced exploration program, of a place of significance that intersected
with a gold deposit. This scenario would present enormous problems for both
Warlpiri and the company, but was difficult to avoid in the piecemeal approach
of a site clearance.
The Mining Model of Place
The implementation of the work area clearance program in the Tanami Desert
had the unintended effect of speeding up the rate of gold exploration in the
region. As the work area clearance process was refined, more Warlpiri places
were identified, people rapidly reoriented their interests in place, more tracks
were built making access easier, and the exploration process itself became
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progressively demystified in Warlpiri eyes. Indeed, exploration in the central
part of the region has become so intense that certain areas have already been
the subject of several successful licence applications and exploration programs.
The volume of interest in exploration in the Tanami Desert has forced the CLC
to convene massive meetings of traditional landowners to consider multiple
applications at once. In 1997 two meetings were held to deal with 42 and 62
Exploration Licence Applications respectively (CLC 1998a: 52).
The work area clearance approach of determining access to land was
formulated with reference to the dual imperatives of both Warlpiri and mining
company interests concerning the demarcation of space and place in the Tanami
Desert. The work area clearance process replaced the flawed site clearance process
and redressed the fundamental problems the latter caused by failing to effectively
locate and identify Warlpiri places of significance. The development of gold
exploration and mining has imposed a new model of land tenure in the central
Tanami Desert. The first dimension of this model concerns the way that it requires
yapa to continually divide the landscape into areas of space and place. This
measurement of dreams has necessitated that both Warlpiri and mining companies
rank and order their interests in land to effectively manage mining related
developments.
For a mining company there are a number of different activities that take
place over a long period of the time which have variable impacts in terms of
levels of disruption caused to the landscape and the extent to which they
encroach upon Warlpiri places. In the early phases of exploration these activities
include helicopter and four-wheel drive surveys and sampling, camp
construction, drilling and costeaning. These aspects of the exploration process
have relatively low impacts although they are extensive throughout an
exploration licence area. More intensive drilling and costeaning are usually
restricted to smaller prospective areas. Exploration requires a small number of
specialist personnel and little or no development of infrastructure. Sufficient
time is given for the identification of all places of Warlpiri interest before the
mining process begins. Mining itself is confined to a relatively limited area. The
requirements of a mining venture include the construction of infrastructure
such as roads, airstrips, water bore fields, pipelines, gravel pits, offices,
accommodation, processing facilities, workshops, tailings and waste dumps, in
addition to the ore pits themselves. Exploration and mining are very different
activities that variably affect the significance of the local constellation of Warlpiri
places and jukurrpa. Figures 11-3 and 11-4 illustrate how the interests of mining
companies contract over time in order to focus intense development activity in
the clearly defined area of a mineral lease. The second dimension for modelling
Warlpiri land tenure under the mining regime is the determination of which
places are affected by a new mine that has been developed within the original
exploration licence area.
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Figure 11-3: Diagram depicting broader areas of importance for Walpiri in
relation to the exploration licence area in initial year of exploration.
Figure 11-4: Diagram depicting mining lease area in relation to areas of
significance for Walpiri in the fifth year of mining.
Warlpiri have become increasingly sophisticated in the ways in which they
deal with questions determining which places are affected by mining and
exploration, how important the places are, and the weight given to them in order
to decide the proportions of royalties paid to the appropriate groups of owners.
In the exploration example (Figure 11-3) there are clearly four different jukurrpa
(one belonging to each semi-moiety) related to the licence area, from which
people affiliated with each semi-moiety could argue for a role in decision making
and a share of proceeds from royalties. To avoid unnecessary consideration of
the physical extent of a site, let us say that all four places are fairly important
soakages existing in conjunction with some other topographic feature. The most
common way that Warlpiri order the interests of each group of kirda (patrilineally
descended landowners) is as follows (in descending order of importance): 4
claimed by N/Japanangka and N/Japangardi; 2a and 2b claimed by N/Jakamarra
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and Na/Jupurrurla; 1a and 1b claimed by N/Jangala and N/Jampijinpa; 3 claimed
by N/Japaljarri and N/Jungarrayi.
In discussion of how yapa arrive at such a ranking reference will be made to
the Warlpiri gradation of place discussed in more depth in Elias (2001a: 106–17).
Place 4 is deemed the most important place because it was yukaka or kaninjarra
(inside or below) and is a restricted place where something of consequence was
happening (ngurrjumanu), even though the physical centre of the site itself lies
outside the licence area. It is also the prime place within the local area because
there is no other place associated with jukurrpa on that level. Places 2a and 2b
could be argued to have an equal degree of importance as place 4, even though
the jukurrpa travelled across the ground (yaninika-wurna) and they are not as
‘deep’ literally or metaphorically by comparison. This argument would be
justified on the grounds that there is an area where the ancestors emerged and
fought with each other in between the two places (also ngurrjumanu as in the
previous case), and the entire jukurrpa is confined within the licence area, thus
elevating its importance. Next in ranking of importance are places 1a and 1b,
where a jukurrpa simply flew through the air (kankarlu) between two places
doing nothing of great significance at either place except resting (ngunaja). These
places are also both entirely contained within the licence area. Finally, the least
important place is place 3, where the jukurrpa is said to be affiliated with trees
along a creek bed which it visited (ngunaja) before returning to its place of origin,
doing nothing else of significance. At issue in the determination of which jukurrpa
(and semi-moiety) are included within a licence area on Warlpiri terms are
considerations of the power or strength of jukurrpa, the proximity of site features,
the number of places and the activity of the jukurrpa itself.
As indicated earlier, under a mining regime, the emphasis on various aspects
of an existing system of Warlpiri land tenure can change rapidly over a short
period of time, given that the boundary of a licence area may change according
to the success of initial exploration. Figure 11-4 takes up the example five years
later when a gold mine is proposed in one part of a new mineral lease and the
rest of the licence has been relinquished. In this situation, the case of place 3 is
straightforward. It is discarded immediately from negotiations over a role in
decision making and a share of proceeds from royalties. What happens with the
other places becomes much more interesting. Places 1a and 1b, 2a and 4 all
become of equal importance and share authority, with perhaps a smaller
proportion of power and authority allocated to place 2b. How does this order
change? In the case of places 1a and 1b the kirda (bosses) of one patriline and
jukurrpa become increasingly important because there are two places in close
proximity to the site of the mine and their jukurrpa. Although travelling through
the air, they are still regarded as very close. Place 4 remains at the same high
level of importance because it is still the most significant place in the local region.
However, in the case of places 2a and 2b a distinction or contrast is drawn
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between them because, although they share the same jukurrpa and are from the
same semi-moiety, the patrilineal descent group associated with place 2b is more
distant from the mine site and is not within the mineral lease. However, place
2b is still included, albeit on a lesser level, because of the group’s close association
with place 2a and the fact that their jukurrpa is closely associated with the mine,
even though their place is not.
This simple example indicates that for Warlpiri the measurement of dreams
in terms of jukurrpa and place are closely associated with both the boundaries
drawn by a mining company and the activity which is undertaken. In reality,
the different combinations of jukurrpa and place are far more complicated than
these illustrations. The important points are that the mapping of responsibility
and authority over place is in the first instance mediated the different factors
already mentioned, and also the relationships of local descent groups and wider
regional considerations. In addition, decisions regarding the affiliation of
semi-moieties and jukurrpa in a localised region must account of royalty payments
and land tenure within a broader sociopolitical context.
Conclusion
The physical reintroduction of people to place in the context of mineral
exploration in the Tanami Desert has thrown up complex and challenging issues.
The production of boundaries over space and place in addition to the processes
of exploration and gold mining have created an enormous amount of work aimed
at identifying and maintaining different kinds of boundaries that are physical,
social and spatial. Under the ALRA, Aboriginal land can neither be bought nor
sold, yet the reintroduction of people to place has nonetheless commodified, not
only the relationships between people and place, but also those between different
groups of people. Mapping was the first part of this process that drew together
Warlpiri politicking over rights to places in the face of the institutional
requirements of the CLC, the mining industry and the government, in order for
them to resolve questions of boundaries and ownership of place. Decisions over
the identification and protection of places have, by and large, been the
responsibility of senior knowledgeable persons. The identification of the
appropriate owners of those places demands that Warlpiri people map their
relationships to place with respect not only to their own places and boundaries,
but also to those that are created by the development process.
The process of mineral exploration in the Tanami Desert requires Warlpiri
to think carefully about their places within different kinds of physical and social
boundaries. It has been argued that the mining model of land tenure requires
that both Warlpiri and mining companies must carefully weigh how Warlpiri
place is constructed with respect to an exploration or mining project. Exploration,
mining and royalty payments expand the scope of politicking among Warlpiri
by introducing an economic context within which they organise, negotiate and
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resolve competing claims of ownership and affiliation to place by different
individuals and landholding groups.
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Chapter Twelve
Laws and Strategies: The Contest to
Protect Aboriginal Interests at
Coronation Hill1
Robert Levitus
In recent decades, Aboriginal affairs in Australia have been punctuated by
disputes over development projects proposed in the vicinity of places attributed
mythological significance by local Aboriginal peoples. Noonkanbah, Coronation
Hill and Hindmarsh Island have been the biggest of these, attracting intense
national political attention. In such disputes, law, party policies and interest
group campaigning serially interact through the sometimes prolonged stages of
the associated political process. This chapter selects one theme from the
management of the Coronation Hill issue, which ran its long and tortuous course
from September 1985 to June 1991. It focuses on the early stages of that history,
and in particular on the events of 1987, and examines the ways in which two
statutory authorities charged with advancing the recognition and protection of
Aboriginal interests in land adopted courses of action that in different respects
complemented and competed with one another. It further traces the stages
through which one of these authorities was able to transform itself from a
marginal observer to principal representative of the Aboriginal interest.
The character of the relationship between these two organisations derived
from the distinct but overlapping legislative charters under which each operated.
There were two Acts involved, and they had a common public policy origin in
the recognition of Aboriginal land rights in the Northern Territory in the 1970s.
The first and principal Act was the Commonwealth Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA); the second and complementary Act was
the Territory’s own Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act 1978 (ASSA). Within the overall
land rights regime, jurisdiction was divided between the statutory authorities
established by these Acts, the Northern Land Council (NLC) and the Aboriginal
Sacred Sites Protection Authority (ASSPA) respectively. There were important
differences in the way these authorities were empowered to recognise and manage
1  I would like to thank the Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority and the Northern Land Council for
access to their records, and those officers of both organisations, past and present, who discussed the
history of Coronation Hill with me. I am grateful to David Ritchie and David Cooper for their comments
on drafts, and to the editors for their help in producing a shorter and more integrated paper.
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the indigenous interest in land. These concerned the extent of the land and the
purposes to which it could be put, and the category of Aboriginal people which
each organisation was required to consult. This chapter thus relates the contest
between them over management of Coronation Hill to the different kinds of
indigenous interest that were seen to be at stake.
This analysis therefore does not deal with the most contentious aspect of the
interaction between indigenous testimony and organisational strategy during
the Coronation Hill dispute. That was the problem of determining whether the
Aboriginal custodians genuinely held religious beliefs about that place of a kind
that should have precluded mining development. Rather, it is about external
history, an interpretation of an aspect of the strategies of the two organisations
involved, tracked through consultations, meetings, submissions, lobbying and
negotiations from Coronation Hill to Canberra. Connections between these issues,
however, will readily be found, as the history given here reveals sufficient
incidental details to indicate just how fraught the question of the significance
of Coronation Hill was, and why it became the point on which policy, in the
end, pivoted (Levitus 1996). That end point ultimately came in 1991 when Prime
Minister Bob Hawke, acting from a minority position in Cabinet, insisted that
the religious values ascribed by Aborigines to Coronation Hill were of such
importance as to preclude mining and justify its incorporation within Kakadu
National Park.
Rather, my analysis points to the way the organisations’ strategies during
this issue flowed in part from the way their understandings of indigenous
authority with respect to place were structured both by law and by their own
prior histories of practice. In the case of the NLC, that prior history bore the
force of precedent from a previous land claim, and in the case of the ASSPA, it
took the form of an institutional policy commitment to direct and individualised
consultation. Eventually, and after several years of contention, official processes
of arbitration and management again called upon local indigenous people to
propose their own model of landownership. The model they proposed in response
differed significantly from previous representations, most importantly in bringing
to salience a structural entity, the patrilineal clan, that had been de-emphasised
or left out of account by that prior history of organisational practice.
In the next section, I set out the respective points of departure that grounded
the orientations of the two organisations towards Coronation Hill. In later
sections, I narrate and analyse the phases of tension and cooperation that
developed between them. In the penultimate section I jump ahead to the early
1990s, when the Coronation Hill dispute passed through its final phase and an
Aboriginal land claim proceeded over the surrounding area. Here, in an
unexpected counterpoint to what had gone before, the local indigenous model
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of responsibility for country just mentioned achieved recognition in the final
political and legal settlements of land interests in the area.
The Land Council and the Sites Authority
The NLC, one of the statutory authorities concerned, was one of two major land
councils brought into existence by the ALRA. It is a body consisting of
Aboriginal people elected from various subregions of the top half of the mainland
Northern Territory, and served by a substantial professional bureaucracy divided
into branches such as Law, Anthropology and Resource Management. In the
period to the late 1990s, now thought of as the first generation of land rights,
the NLC’s major responsibility was to assist Aborigines to establish their
traditional ownership of unalienated Crown land before the Aboriginal Land
Commissioner, who could then recommend the granting of inalienable freehold
title to an Aboriginal Land Trust (ALRA Section 50(1)(a)). More generally, the
NLC’s functions are to ascertain the wishes and represent the interests of
traditional Aboriginal owners of land within the top half of the Northern
Territory with respect to any issue relating to ownership or use of that land
(ibid. Section 23(1)). Such issues have prominently included the negotiation of
conditions under which mining interests will be granted.
Traditional owners are determined by reference to the mythologically
sanctioned social structures, such as patrilineal clans or language groups, that
mediate relationships between people and land (Keen 1984). In land claims, these
structures are described from anthropological research and validated by claimant
testimony in a tribunal hearing before the Aboriginal Land Commissioner.
Traditional owners thus are members of a group or groups that occupy the
appropriate relationship of spiritual responsibility towards sites on the land.
While, in a land claim, at least some members of the group will have to show
knowledge of the country concerned, those lacking such knowledge retain the
status of traditional owners by reason of their membership of the relevant group.
Structural entitlement is thus the principal determinant of traditional ownership,
and participation in consultations on matters of land management is therefore
in principle open to any competent member of the owning group. In accordance
with Aboriginal custom with respect to speaking for country and making
decisions about land, those with personal attributes of knowledge, relevant life
experience, seniority or prestige play the largest roles in deliberations and are
those to whom the NLC has most resort for its instructions.
The ASSPA was a Northern Territory Government agency established by the
ASSA. The ASSPA existed until 1989, when it was reconstituted by new
legislation as the Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority. The Authority,
consisting of a majority of Aboriginal members nominated by the Land Councils
and served by an office of field anthropologists and technical staff, is responsible
for documenting and registering Aboriginal sacred sites throughout the Territory.
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It registers sites only on a request from local Aborigines customarily responsible
for those sites, referred to in its Act as the ‘custodians’ (ASSA Section 3). The
custodians generally number between one and a few individuals, and their status
derives from a combination of affiliation with the place or area, seniority in age,
and knowledge.
Unauthorised trespass upon a site is subject to penalties. Under the original
ASSA, in force until 1989, the ASSPA could give written consent for access to
and works upon a site. It became the practice of ASSPA officers to arrange
consultations between proponents of work and the site custodians, and then to
seek from custodians their views as to the acceptability of the work, a matter
on which they reported to the ASSPA for a formal decision. Since 1989, these
procedures have been formalised in law (Ritchie 1996: 214–5).
Other points concerning these arrangements for the protection of Aboriginal
land interests need to be made here. The first relates to the intended
complementary relationship between the two regimes just described. The ALRA
provided the definition of a sacred site as, in part, ‘a site that is sacred to
Aboriginals or is otherwise of significance according to Aboriginal tradition’
(Section 3), and further created the offence of unauthorised entry onto a sacred
site (Section 69). The Northern Territory’s own sacred sites legislation, however,
had its policy genesis in a decision by the Federal Government not to provide
for all relevant matters within its own land rights legislation, but to allow
subsequent ‘reciprocal’ legislation (ALRA Section 73) to be passed by the
Northern Territory Parliament, then approaching self-government.
Administration of a sacred sites protection process was considered an appropriate
area for such reciprocal legislation. This has been an object of criticism by Land
Councils who resent the denial of jurisdiction over a matter they perceive as
properly a part of land rights, and mistrust the placing of that jurisdiction in
the hands of a Northern Territory government dominated, from self-government
in 1978 until 2001, by an openly pro-development Country Liberal Party.
Consequently, there has been within the NLC persistent doubt as to the ability
or the willingness of the Sacred Sites Authority to stand up forthrightly for
Aboriginal interests.
The common policy origin of land rights and sites protection also enshrines
an underlying difference in the nature of the land interest being recognised.
The recognition of a sacred site has different implications depending on whether
it is on land claimable by Aborigines or elsewhere. On claimable land, sacred
sites are fundamental to the process of proving traditional ownership, because
the members of the claimant group have to demonstrate that they have spiritual
affiliations to, and exercise spiritual responsibility for, sites on the land (ALRA
Section 3(1)). Recognition of such attachments in a successful land claim thus
founds a legal property right. On land that is not available for claim, such
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attachments found rights of lesser extent which, though their exact character
is open to debate (Ritchie 1996: 211, 217), importantly include a right of entry
and a right to deny entry to others.
The land registration regimes administered by the NLC and Sites Authority
thus contrast in significant respects, including the areas of land involved, the
Aborigines with whom they must consult, and the range of issues on which they
are required to consult. Generally, the NLC assists in claiming and managing
areas of land, while the Authority assists in the protection of particular places
of religious significance, mostly of much smaller size. However, the Authority’s
charter extends across the entire Northern Territory, while the NLC is restricted
to unalienated Crown land with respect to its land claim function, and Aboriginal
land for its other functions (subject to an important exception to be mentioned
later). The NLC must have regard to the wishes of those identified as traditional
owners, while the Authority consults with the site custodians, again a generally
more limited group. The NLC must consult regarding the full range of land use
purposes bearing upon Aboriginal land, while the Authority specifically manages
requests for site registration from the custodians, and requests for site access
from others. In summary, then, the laws under which these two authorities
operate allow the registration of indigenous land interests of different extent
and according to different criteria, and require each organisation to seek
instructions from different categories of Aboriginal authority. These differences
underlay the divergent and sometimes competing roles of the ASSPA and the
NLC with respect to Coronation Hill.
The Regional Context
Coronation Hill is located in the Top End of Australia’s Northern Territory. It
lies in the upper South Alligator River valley in the northwestern sector of the
former Gimbat pastoral lease (see Figure 12-1). In the early 1980s, this area was
an object of increasing interest from several quarters, one of which was the
mining industry. A previous generation of small-scale uranium mining at many
locations along the valley in the 1950s and 1960s had also produced evidence
of gold deposits. In the early 1980s the international price for gold rose. Broken
Hill Pty Ltd (BHP), the on-site operations company for the Coronation Hill Joint
Venture, began drilling at the old open-cut mine on Coronation Hill in 1984,
and soon obtained very promising results.2
2  See Noranda Pacific Ltd 1985 Prospectus, pp. 16–21.
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Figure 12-1: Kakadu National Park, showing Coronation Hill and reduced
(post-1989) Conservation Zone.
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At the same time, the NLC and the environmental movement anticipated that
Gimbat would soon become available both for land claim and for declaration as
a National Park. In the mid-1970s, the Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry
(CoA 1977) had put forward a land use framework for the entire Alligator Rivers
region. Central to the management regimes it proposed was the establishment
of a major National Park to encompass at least one important river catchment.
The river selected for protection was the South Alligator (ibid: 288–9), and the
National Park was named Kakadu. Declaration of the Park proceeded in stages.
Stage I was declared in 1979 and Stage II in 1984, both to the north of Gimbat
(see Figures 12-1 and 12–2). By the mid-1980s, declaration of Stage III of the
Park was on the Federal Government’s agenda, and this was expected to extend
Kakadu south into Gimbat and Goodparla stations to protect most of the remaining
South Alligator catchment. Prior to the declarations of Stages I and II,
opportunities were allowed for Aboriginal land claims to be heard over those
areas, after which the successfully claimed lands were leased back by the
Aboriginal owners to the Parks Service. The NLC therefore anticipated that, in
the time between the stations becoming unalienated Crown land and their
declaration as parts of the National Park, there would be an opportunity to claim
Gimbat and Goodparla stations on behalf of the traditional owners. Supporters
of that scenario were worried that the Coronation Hill development might allow
a mining interest to be established before the land could be placed under a new
regime that protected its Aboriginal and environmental values.
Gimbat lay within the northerly reaches of the territory of the Jawoyn
language group. By the early 1980s there were no Jawoyn resident there, though
small numbers had worked and lived there under previous lessees. Now they
resided in many directions, but predominantly in a large arc from Pine Creek to
the east, in and around the town of Katherine, to Eva Valley Station and Barunga
Settlement to the south. The particular significance that Gimbat and its immediate
environs retained for a number of knowledgeable senior Aborigines, however,
arose from the occurrence there of a number of sites of extreme power and danger
associated with the creator figure Bula, not all of which were mapped. While
Aboriginal interests could not at that time be asserted through a land claim,
research conducted for the ASSPA had led to the registration in 1980 of two
Bula sites in Gimbat. Over the next few years, the NLC’s research in adjoining
or overlapping areas for the Jawoyn (Katherine Area) Land Claim (Merlan and
Rumsey 1982) recorded a complex of such sites across Gimbat and into
neighbouring areas, and documented the mythology of Bula as the most powerful
and dangerous dreaming known to the Jawoyn. The NLC relied on this
information in representations to the Federal Government made in the early
1980s, urging the priority of sacred site protection in future land use regimes
for the area.
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Figure 12-2: Kakadu National Park, showing stages of declaration and the
original Conservation Zone.
Source: SSCERA 1988: 2.
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During this period the Jawoyn themselves were entering a new phase of
political engagement and heightened self-consciousness. A decade after
introduction of the new Federal policy of indigenous self-determination, a range
of community issues bearing upon some part or other of Jawoyn country
demanded the constant attention of senior Jawoyn (Merlan 1998: 89). Among
these matters was the preparation and presentation of the Jawoyn (Katherine
Area) Land Claim over five parcels of land, the largest and most important being
Katherine Gorge National Park, lying between Katherine town and Gimbat
Station. The NLC presented this claim in a manner that had a particular bearing
upon Jawoyn self-awareness. It argued that the claimants made up a unitary
and undifferentiated group of traditional owners, the Jawoyn language group,
for all of Jawoyn country (Merlan and Rumsey 1982: 40, 55–6).3
That model of traditional ownership also carried implications for the way in
which the NLC could approach the policy issues emerging over Gimbat. Though
evidence in the Katherine Area claim concluded in 1984, the Land Commissioner’s
judgment was not received by the NLC until October 1987. Two small parcels
of land in northern Gimbat were included in the claim, and the NLC expected
the opportunity to lodge a further land claim over Gimbat as a whole on behalf
of the Jawoyn. The NLC consequently approached the representation of Jawoyn
interests in Gimbat in the mid-1980s under the constraint of that model of
landownership already argued before the Land Commissioner. In early 1986,
shortly after development works at Coronation Hill had become a public
administration issue, the NLC made clear its view of where sovereignty in the
matter properly lay. It told a Senate Inquiry that mining development there was
a matter for the Jawoyn people as a whole to decide, and that any statement by
a site custodian that denied the sacredness of the place should be put before a
full Jawoyn meeting for verification (SSCNR 1986: 2331–2).
The ASSPA, by contrast, needed to ensure that it was acting consistently
with the wishes of the senior custodians. This group consisted centrally of three
old men whose primary traditional attachments lay within Gimbat, though
respect was also accorded to the knowledge of a small number of other senior
men from other areas. While the ASSPA could accept decisions made at meetings
of larger groups, it attempted to verify that the custodians in attendance were
in accord with such decisions. Often that would be apparent from the role they
played in discussions. The NLC and the ASSPA thus came to the Coronation Hill
issue with markedly different conceptions of the locus of Aboriginal authority
that should govern its management.
This was of further significance in view of continuing organisational
immaturity among the Jawoyn themselves. The Jawoyn Association was
3  See Rumsey (1989) for a discussion of the concept of the language group and its use in land claims.
255
Laws and Strategies: The Contest to Protect Aboriginal Interests at Coronation Hill
incorporated in 1985 to manage royalty and business income from properties in
the region. It remained poorly organised and staffed for some years, acting
mainly as a public political front during the latter half of the Coronation Hill
dispute. In the absence of independent institutional resources, Jawoyn views
on Gimbat and Coronation Hill were thus articulated through the channels offered
by a continuing and at times intense engagement with external agencies,
especially the NLC, the ASSPA, and the BHP project team.
Liaison and Consultation
At the time the new mineral discovery became publicly known in 1985, Gimbat
was still a pastoral lease and so not available for land claim, and Coronation Hill
itself was not subject to any other form of legal protection for environmental or
Aboriginal values. In September 1985, members of the environmental movement
alerted the NLC and the ASSPA that a mining company had reported very
encouraging test drilling results at Coronation Hill. An ASSPA research officer
brought the matter to the attention of a meeting of Jawoyn people, and suggested
that the upper South Alligator valley be treated as a priority area for sacred site
survey.4 Following a visit to the valley with three Jawoyn men, including two
senior custodians, and supplementary interviews elsewhere, the officer prepared
a report for the registration of an area of about 250 km2 on the southwestern
side of the valley, including most of Coronation Hill (Cooper 1985). Registration
of that area as a sacred site, the Upper South Alligator Bula Complex, by the
ASSPA in October 1985 meant that further testing of the mineral deposit at
Coronation Hill could not proceed without permission from the ASSPA.
The process of obtaining such permission involved consultation between
BHP’s on-site project team and the custodians, mediated by officers of the ASSPA.
Those officers had the responsibility of ensuring that the custodians understood
and approved of proposals put to them, before recommending to the ASSPA
that site access be allowed. At this stage, sacred site registration was the only
legal impediment to further mineral exploration, and the ASSPA was the only
agency with the power to regulate BHP’s access to the deposit according to
Aboriginal wishes. Like the NLC previously, the ASSPA also tried, by its
representations to Canberra, to insert the Aboriginal interest in the proposed
Kakadu Stage III area into the Government policy debate and into regional
land-use planning as an independent third voice alongside the mining industry
and the environmental movement.5  In that broader regional context, then, the
4  File note referring to Jawoyn meeting at Barunga on the 11 September 1985, 13 September 1985,
Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority (AAPA) files.
5  Copy letters Blitner to Holding, 8 June 1983, 28 September 1983, NLC file 87/11; copy letters Ritchie
to Holding, Cohen, Evans, 18 November 1985; copy letter Ritchie to Secretary, Senate Standing Committee
on National Resources, 2 December 1985, AAPA file 81/208. Access conditions prevent me from providing
citations from NLC records for some points in my discussion of the role of that organisation and its
officers.
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ASSPA shared with the NLC a common view of the extent of the general Jawoyn
interest in the future of Gimbat.
Over the following months, the NLC also maintained its interest in the area.
It remained satisfied that the Jawoyn opposed mining development at Coronation
Hill and represented their position as such. Two NLC officers recorded statements
of concern about works at Coronation Hill from a small group of Jawoyn during
a visit to the area in November 1985. A Senate Inquiry into the resources of the
Kakadu area had by then begun its work (SSCERA 1988), and the first NLC
submission to it in December asserted Jawoyn opposition to the mining project.6
In January 1986 three NLC officers heard anti-mining statements made at a
Jawoyn Association meeting, after which the NLC expressed concern for the
sacred significance of the area to the Federal Ministers for the Environment and
for Resources and Energy. A meeting in March of NLC Regional Members passed
a resolution supporting Jawoyn opposition to the project.
This marked the culmination of the first stage of the NLC response to the
issue. It was a period in which its officers were able to maintain a role only as
observers and informal advisors to the Jawoyn, in which they had no standing
to formally oversee land use or site access, but in which their view of Jawoyn
interests and wishes with respect to the area, and specifically regarding
Coronation Hill, was based on a consistent record of expressed Aboriginal
anti-mining sentiment. While they deferred to the ASSPA’s jurisdiction, they
also noted their first reservations as to its approach. In March, on a joint visit
to Canberra, the senior NLC legal officer recorded his concern over hearing the
ASSPA director telling government ministers and senior bureaucrats that the
Jawoyn custodians might compromise over Coronation Hill.
The BHP project team spent the wet season preparing work plans for the
following year, and establishing informal communication with some individual
Jawoyn. When in March 1986 its development proposals were rejected by a
Jawoyn meeting, it embarked on a broad campaign of informal liaison and
information, including field trips, to familiarise small groups of senior Jawoyn
people with its personnel and with their work at Coronation Hill, and to ascertain
from the Jawoyn the location and extent of sacred places in the upper South
Alligator valley. This latter aspect of the BHP team’s liaison evoked objections
from both the NLC and the ASSPA, both of which wanted communications
contained within channels that allowed for proper consultation procedures and
representation of Jawoyn interests (Dodson 1986).7 The NLC during that period
recorded further Jawoyn comments opposed to the mine, while the ASSPA
director thought mining could be negotiated if communications were handled
sensitively.
6  Copy letter Ah Kit to Secretary, SSCNR, 11 December 1985, NLC file 86/36.
7  Copy letters Ellis to Rush, 3 April 1986, 12 May 1986, AAPA file 85/63.
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The BHP project team’s initial phase of liaison culminated on 1 July when
they organised a Jawoyn meeting that approved the resumption of works at
Coronation Hill in those areas already disturbed by past mining. On a report
from its officer in attendance at that meeting, the ASSPA gave official approval
for conditional and staged development to occur.8  A second meeting of 4 July,
however, conducted by a Jawoyn Association officer and observed by NLC
representatives and the ASSPA chairman, reversed that decision. A further
ASSPA meeting in Katherine on 11 July discussed this reversal with a number
of participants at the two meetings, including the senior custodians, and decided
that the approval it had given was valid. The NLC regarded this as a failure by
the ASSPA to act on the instructions of traditional owners.
The two decisions of early July were only the first of a long series of
contradictions to emerge from Jawoyn meetings and consultations over the
ensuing months. These presented a major source of indeterminacy for effective
management of the issue and remain an important interpretive problem that is
beyond the scope of this chapter (see Keen and Merlan 1990: 67–82; Levitus
2003; Merlan 2004: 259–66). The BHP team proceeded to develop its ‘good
neighbour’ relationship with the Jawoyn, and introduced a Jawoyn employment
program on site. In October 1986 a meeting of about 30 Jawoyn, including two
site custodians and some other senior people, agreed to BHP’s proposals to expand
its exploration and development works, this time to areas not previously
disturbed.9  By the end of the year, the results of the drilling program had proven
the existence of a commercial mineral deposit. Alongside good exploration results
and successful dealings with the Jawoyn, the Federal policy environment was
also looking favourable for mining. In September and December 1986,
government ministers announced that while Stage III of Kakadu would be
declared, 35 per cent of the area would be reserved for a five-year mineral
exploration program. Coronation Hill was acknowledged as a project of special
economic significance that would be approved subject to proper clearances.10
In early 1987 the project team maintained continuous direct dealings with the
Jawoyn, expanded the employment program, began preparation of an
Environmental Impact Study, proceeded with feasibility studies and planned
the steps towards a full mining agreement with the Jawoyn. In March the ASSPA
confirmed approvals for work proposed late the previous year.
The Role of the Northern Land Council
In the face of this steady progress towards mining, relations between the NLC
and the ASSPA were a mix of cooperation and reserve. Among field staff with
8  Copy letter Ellis to Rush, 4 July 1986, AAPA file 85/63.
9  Ellis, Minutes of Meeting Held El Sharana 31 October 1986, 3 November 1986, AAPA file 85/63.
10  Joint Statement by the Minister for Resources and Energy, Senator Evans and the Minister for Arts,
Heritage and Environment, Mr Cohen, 16 December 1986.
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local experience, there was a shared concern that the Jawoyn were not equipped
with the internal community resources and information, nor were they being
allowed the time and space, to adequately come to grips with proposals such as
Coronation Hill. These officers tried to provide the personal and organisational
support they felt was lacking, and were inclined to suspicion of the BHP team’s
liaison efforts. Formally the two organisations exchanged file materials for mutual
information, and the ASSPA director supported the availability of the NLC’s
Katherine office legal advisor to assist the Jawoyn. Senior NLC people
acknowledged that carriage of the issue lay with the ASSPA, but felt, initially,
that their reservations with respect to the capacity of the ASSPA to protect
Aboriginal interests were being confirmed.
By the end of 1986 a number of inconsistent Jawoyn statements, and the
further development works approved at the October meeting, had created new
doubts as to the Jawoyn position with respect to mining. Whatever the final
position on that issue, the NLC still considered a land claim as essential to protect
Jawoyn interests in the area. While such a claim could not be lodged while
Gimbat remained a pastoral lease, the NLC hoped in the meantime, by way of
Jawoyn requests for assistance, to manouevre itself into the role of protective
intermediary. This it achieved in January and February 1987, with formal
instructions from the Jawoyn Association to act as the Jawoyn legal
representative,11  and authorisation from the Association to attend all meetings
between the Jawoyn and BHP.
By these steps, the NLC sought to overcome any objection to its right to be
present and to advise the Jawoyn in all their dealings over Coronation Hill.
Shortly thereafter, however, in March and April, NLC officers recorded
statements on three occasions, largely from the same senior Jawoyn individuals,
in favour, against, and in favour, of mining. The NLC, having finally achieved
formal standing as the Jawoyn legal representative, could not effectively advocate
its client’s position, because it was unable to determine with certainty what that
position was. Matters were no better clarified at a Jawoyn Association meeting
in May where an NLC officer recorded that those present appeared undecided
about the issue.
The NLC encountered further difficulties in having its role acknowledged
by the BHP project team. In the midst of the events just described, the senior
legal officer wrote to the company advising that ‘the Jawoyn Association has
instructed the Northern Land Council to act on its behalf on all matters relating
to Coronation Hill’, and requesting that all communications to the Jawoyn
Association should be sent to the offices of the NLC. That letter further offered
‘to discuss BHP’s current involvement at Coronation Hill in a preliminary manner
11  Letter McDonald to Director Bureau NLC, 21 January 1987, NLC file 86/154.
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at your convenience’.12 The NLC thereby attempted to consolidate its
intermediary role by situating itself across the interface of contact between the
Jawoyn and the company.
The BHP project team had from the outset been wary of the NLC and
suspicious of its motives for intervening, perceiving its tactics as manipulative
of the Jawoyn and inimical to successful development of the project. Its
Aboriginal Affairs Advisor replied to the NLC that the team had to maintain
direct dealings with the Jawoyn on a number of day-to-day matters, but that if
the Jawoyn approved, it would deal with the NLC on formal matters.13 The BHP
team thereby refused to defer to the NLC’s claim for the priority of its
advisor-client relationship, and would allow only limited room for NLC
involvement if this was authorised through the team’s own communication with
the Jawoyn. Approaching the next round of development consultations in June
1987, the BHP team found no support among Jawoyn leaders for NLC
involvement. The team proceeded to organise a meeting of about 30 Jawoyn
people, including two senior custodians, and ASSPA officers, at which further
works on the project were explained and substantially approved, in disregard
of the NLC’s attempt to establish a formal role for itself.14
Events up to mid-1987 thus left the NLC uncertain of its client’s views
regarding the management of the upper South Alligator valley, lacking confidence
in the ASSPA’s handling of the central issue of development works at Coronation
Hill, and without proper recognition from the mining company as its counterpart
in negotiations. At that point, the legal basis of the NLC’s participation in the
affairs of the region was transformed by a raft of legislative amendments passed
by the Federal Government.15 The ALRA was amended to give Land Councils
the additional function of assisting Aborigines to protect sacred sites, whether
or not on Aboriginal land. Other amendments declared Gimbat and Goodparla
stations to be unalienated Crown land and therefore available for land claim,
and empowered Aboriginal Land Councils in the Northern Territory to negotiate
mining agreements over land under claim, extending their existing power to
negotiate only over land already won. In anticipation of these developments,
the Jawoyn Association instructed the NLC to lodge a land claim over the area
and to invite the company to enter negotiations for an agreement over exploration
and mining. The NLC lodged the land claim on 26 June, and wrote to the
company on 2 July.16
12  Copy letter Gray to BHP Minerals Ltd, 7 April 1987, NLC file 87/104.
13  Copy letter Rush to the Director NLC, 30 April 1987, BHP/Newcrest correspondence and reports.
14  Copy note to file, ‘Subject: G1/8–67C Aboriginal Community On-Site Meeting, 3/4 June 1987’,
BHP/Newcrest correspondence and reports; copy letter Ellis to Hewitt, 5 June 1987, AAPA file 85/63.
15 Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment Acts (2 and 3), Lands Acquisition Amendment
Act, Environment Protection (Alligator Rivers Region) Amendment Act, National Parks and Wildlife
Conservation Amendment Acts (1 and 2); all of 1987.
16  Copy letter Gray to Managing Director BHP, 2 July 1987, NLC file 87/104.
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The Contest over Aboriginal Interests
The BHP project team delayed negotiations, and instead moved to a new stage
in the process of gaining Aboriginal approval for the project. Development
approvals to date had covered test drillings and local road works, but there had
so far been no use of explosives. The BHP team and the ASSPA arranged a
consultation for 18 August 1987 at which the use of small quantities of explosives
at Coronation Hill would be demonstrated for the Jawoyn.17  About 18 Jawoyn
were in attendance, including the three senior site custodians. The NLC seized
the opportunity of this meeting to radically assert its standing in the issue.
Before the meeting began, two NLC officers arrived and handed to the
Coronation Hill project manager a letter drafted the previous day by their senior
legal officer. It referred to the NLC’s frustration over having ‘our clients complain
to us about direct approaches by your company’, reasserted the privileged nature
of its relationship with the Jawoyn, and objected to the company’s failure to
advise of this meeting and the matters to be discussed.18 The group then moved
to Coronation Hill to observe three successively larger detonations, culminating
in a line of four half-sticks of gelignite on a hill-side drilling bench. Before the
meeting reassembled for discussion, an NLC officer privately explained to the
Jawoyn that the NLC now had the legal power to negotiate a comprehensive
agreement with BHP, including exploration works and site protection, and
suggested that they should withhold a decision about blasting until after the
first of these discussions in a few days time. When, after retiring to consider the
matter alone, the Jawoyn announced that their decision would be delayed until
the NLC reported to them on the outcome of the proposed discussions, the
tensions already evident at this meeting manifested themselves as a direct
challenge by the NLC to the positions of both the BHP project team and the
ASSPA.
The decision to delay had two implications for the management of the issue.
It meant that the progress of the mining project was now contingent upon the
BHP team’s dealings with the NLC instead of its dealings with the Jawoyn. The
project manager attempted to reassert the priority of his team’s direct relationship
with the Jawoyn, describing it as one of trust that should not be undermined
by the imposition of outsiders. He tried to re-establish what he had previously
understood to be a separation between the questions of blasting and of dealings
with the NLC, arguing that any negotiations with the latter would be directed
only towards a final terms-and-conditions agreement for mining and would not
cover the exploration stages. Finally, he pronounced a caveat upon any
17  Memo, ‘Coronation Hill Joint Venture Fortnightly Site Report to 28 August 1987’, BHP Fortnightly
Site Report.
18  Copy letter Gray to BHP Co Ltd, 17 August 1987, NLC file 87/104.
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negotiations at all, that they would only happen if the BHP team could be satisfied
that the Jawoyn genuinely wished to be represented by the NLC.
Maintaining a separation between the immediate question of whether blasting
at the scale demonstrated was an acceptable level of disturbance within the
registered site, and the later question of the conditions under which a mining
project might eventuate, was equally urgent for the director of the ASSPA. He
attempted to impress upon the Jawoyn the legal and functional distinction
between what he needed to know — whether the custodians of the site would
authorise further exploration works involving explosives — and the larger
matter that the NLC wanted to argue out — the material relationship that might
finally emerge between the mining company and the prospective Aboriginal
landowners. A Jawoyn spokesperson replied that the senior custodians of the
site would accept blasting at the level demonstrated but no greater. An NLC
officer again tried to dissolve that separation, explaining that the NLC could
negotiate everything with BHP, and protect the site better than the ASSPA.
When the tenor of the discussion then shifted to adverse reflections on the NLC’s
past record in local Jawoyn affairs, the ASSPA director concluded the meeting
by stating that he would issue a permit for works involving blasting, but would
delay it until after the proposed initial discussions between the NLC and the
BHP team.19
Over the following weeks there ensued a contest between the NLC and the
ASSPA over the issuing of the authorisation to the company. The contest turned
ultimately on yet another distinction, discussed earlier, that was fundamental
to the legitimacy of the ASSPA’s claim to an independent role in the issue. That
is, whereas the NLC claimed to represent the interests of the Jawoyn people as
a whole, the ASSPA was responsible only to the custodians of the sacred site.
This distinction between the Jawoyn collectivity and the small group of senior
custodians of Bula sites in Gimbat reflected both the contrasting statutory charters
of the NLC and the ASSPA, and also the recent land claim history in which the
NLC had argued that the entire Jawoyn language group was a single local descent
group that satisfied the definition of traditional owners.
In the wake of the consultation of 18 August 1987, this disagreement came
to a head in a remarkable scuffle between the two organisations. The ASSPA
director began by attempting to re-institute a clear demarcation between their
respective roles and responsibilities. He wrote a conciliatory letter to the NLC
a few days after the meeting at Coronation Hill in which he offered to discuss a
cooperative and coordinated approach to the representation of Aboriginal
interests, but also made plain that the ASSPA could receive instructions only
from the custodians of the site, not from the Jawoyn Association or from the
19  File Note, 11 September 1987, AAPA file 85/63.
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NLC acting as the Association’s representative.20 The NLC responded by having
the three senior custodians of the site sign a letter instructing the ASSPA not to
issue a permit for blasting pending the outcome of discussions, now postponed,
between the NLC and the BHP team.21 This was an attempt to rescue the position
which the NLC had advocated at the blasting consultation, to make progress of
development works dependent on progress towards an overall negotiated
package. It furthermore positioned the NLC as the channel through which
custodians’ instructions were communicated to the ASSPA. The ASSPA director
advised the NLC that he considered himself bound by the decision of the
custodians at the time of the consultation that the blasting was acceptable, and
proceeded to issue an authorisation to the project team.
The NLC considered that the ASSPA had again failed to act in accordance
with Jawoyn wishes. A meeting of the Jawoyn Association on 1 September was
told that the NLC now had the same power as the ASSPA to protect sacred sites.
NLC officers took the three senior custodians to one side to explain and have
them sign another letter to the ASSPA, this time advising that the Jawoyn
Association should henceforth be the source of the ASSPA’s instructions. It said
in part:
We want future permit applications to be directed to the Jawoyn
Association … The Jawoyn Association will be expressing our wishes
in decisions about permit applications. We would like you … to accept
our instructions in this way from now on.22
In response the ASSPA at its next meeting formally noted ‘the request of the
Jawoyn custodians that future consultation be conducted with the assistance of
the Jawoyn Association’.23
The ASSPA’s legitimacy as a manager of the Coronation Hill issue rested then
on its specific responsibility for approving works on a registered sacred site and
its obligation to seek instructions from the site custodians. In August and
September 1987 the NLC sought to subvert the ASSPA’s independence, firstly
by trying to subsume sacred site approvals within a general package to be
negotiated over all development works at Coronation Hill, and then by trying
to subsume the source of the ASSPA’s instructions, the site custodians, within
the source of its own instructions, the Jawoyn Association. This attempt to assert
hegemonic representation of Aboriginal interests was based on a number of
perceptions within the NLC: that proper protection of Aboriginal interests in
the upper South Alligator valley required comprehensive negotiations over all
20  Copy letter Ellis to Director Bureau NLC, 21 August 1987, AAPA file 85/63.
21  Copy letter Brown, Barraway and Jatbula to Ellis, 26 August 1987, AAPA file 85/63.
22  Copy letter Jatbula, Barraway and Brown to Chairman, Aboriginal Sacred Sites Authority, undated,
AAPA file 85/63.
23  ASSPA minutes, 14–15 October 1987.
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aspects of BHP’s activities, and that removing exploration from the purview of
those negotiations constrained real Aboriginal options; that the ASSPA was
neither competent nor authorised to handle such negotiations; and that the
ASSPA’s effectiveness was in any event subject to a political calculus that
balanced the protection of Aboriginal interests against the need to demonstrate
to its political masters that protection of those interests could be managed in a
manner consistent with economic development of the Northern Territory. These
perceptions underlay a tactical imperative for the NLC to neutralise the
independent role of the ASSPA in the Coronation Hill project. For its part, the
ASSPA maintained its concern, first expressed during the contradictory episodes
of July 1986, that approvals for works on a registered site should be decided
according to the views of the site custodians as bearers of the relevant tradition,
and were not properly treated as a negotiating instrument.
The Contest over Policy
While the NLC’s intervention on 18 August had failed to achieve its immediate
objectives, it had directly challenged the primacy of those relationships that had
governed conduct of the Coronation Hill issue up to that point, and had served
notice that a new player, strategically aggressive and with a much broader
mandate to represent Aboriginal interests, was now in the field. Moreover, that
field itself was now much larger than Coronation Hill. Prior to the July 1987
elections, the Federal Government had declared Stage III of Kakadu National
Park over the area of Gimbat and Goodparla stations, subject to about one third
being reserved as a ‘Conservation Zone’ in which mineral exploration would be
allowed for 5 years. The Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service began
preparations to take over management of the other two thirds of the area. The
boundaries of the Conservation Zone were drawn tentatively (Figure 12-2), to
be refined later in the year, and the Coronation Hill Joint Venture was one of
many mining interests expected to compete for exploration rights over the zone.
What was immediately clear, however, was that the southern half of the zone
intruded into the region of the Bula Dreaming, and included, or lay very close
to, a number of powerful sites.
Having established its prominence with respect to Coronation Hill, the NLC
in September moved to engage comprehensively with the new complexities of
policy in the region. The first requirement was to consolidate its relationship
with the Jawoyn. In his report on the blasting consultations of 18 August, one
of the NLC officers had noted ruefully that the BHP project team had succeeded
in establishing good personal relations with the important Jawoyn decision
makers, and that the NLC had now itself to carefully win their confidence. The
first step, he suggested, should be to consult with them again to confirm their
instructions and clarify their relationship.
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The NLC’s meeting with the Jawoyn Association on 1 September ranged
widely over the problems and possibilities facing the Aboriginal claimants of
the area. As most of the Conservation Zone was not protected by sacred site
registrations, and as Federal policy at that time appeared to be moving strongly
towards allowing at least some exploitation of what was known to be a highly
prospective mineral province, the NLC’s program had to be broadly concerned
with advancing the Jawoyn position within the emerging mix of competing
interests. The NLC director pointed out that continued contradictions from the
Jawoyn over the Coronation Hill project could ultimately be used against them,
and assured them that the NLC would support whatever their final position
turned out to be. Following the meeting, the NLC renewed communication with
the BHP team to arrange discussions aimed at a mining agreement.
Most importantly, however, the NLC, in concert with the ASSPA and the
Australian Conservation Foundation, lobbied the Federal Government to delay
any decision on the final boundaries of the Conservation Zone and the allocation
of mining tenements until a survey of cultural and natural resources, and the
ASSPA’s sacred site documentation program, were completed, and the Aboriginal
claimants of the area were properly consulted.24 This renewed lobbying effort
showed that the NLC and the ASSPA, even at the height of inter-agency tensions
over their respective mandates with respect to Coronation Hill, were still able
to act in concert to advocate recognition of Aboriginal interests in the Stage III
area at senior policy level. Notably, senior opinion in both organisations regarded
Aboriginal acceptance of mining at Coronation Hill as a possibility. The NLC at
this point acknowledged both the ASSPA’s role in establishing the extent of
Aboriginal interests in the Conservation Zone and their joint effort in lobbying
the government. However, the request for the government to delay its decision
set the stage for a further elevation of the NLC’s strategic position in the region.
Five Federal Ministers met on 24 September in Canberra to discuss
Conservation Zone policy. Among them, the Minister for the Environment,
Graham Richardson, had had previous exposure to Aboriginal disagreements
over Coronation Hill, and the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Gerry Hand, was
also aware that Aboriginal opinion had been unsettled. The Ministers decided
that final determination of the Conservation Zone boundaries would be delayed
until there had been further consultation regarding Aboriginal concerns. In a
policy debate that to this point had been dominated by environmentalists and
miners, and in which Aboriginal issues had been seen as a secondary
complication, a high-level decision now turned on the Aboriginal interest in the
area. More significantly for the strategic disposition of the players, the Minister
for Aboriginal Affairs charged the NLC with responsibility for determining
24  Copy letters Ah Kit to Morris, Richardson, Hand, Kerin and Brown, 2 September 1987, NLC file
87/391; copy letter Ellis to Richardson, 9 September 1987, AAPA file 80/25.
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Aboriginal views and removing confusion over the Jawoyn position.25 The NLC
thereby became primary advisor to the Federal Government concerning
Aboriginal interests in the Conservation Zone. The NLC took this as legitimation
of its claim to sole running of the Aboriginal issues in the region. Its senior
officers determined that both the Jawoyn and the ASSPA were to be apprised
of the NLC’s position as representative of Jawoyn interests in the Kakadu Stage
III area, and that the Jawoyn should provide the NLC with relevant instructions.
The NLC’s position on Coronation Hill, however, was affected dramatically
a few days later. After some dilatory communications, the NLC and the BHP
team agreed to meet on site on 5 November to inspect the project and begin
substantive discussions aimed at a mining agreement. A small Jawoyn group
were present to observe and later receive advice from the NLC. This meeting
marked the high-water mark of the BHP team’s campaign to achieve Aboriginal
approval for the project. The following day, 15 members of the newly convened
Jawoyn Working Group (established by the NLC to manage Katherine Gorge
and Kakadu Stage III issues for the Jawoyn), including two of the senior
custodians, met with 10 NLC officers at Barunga and told the NLC that they did
not want any mining in the area of influence of the Bula sites, including at
Coronation Hill. This declaration sparked significant criticism of the NLC decision
to negotiate with BHP, including from within the organisation. The NLC advised
BHP that it was withdrawing from the process until the Federal Government
had arrived at a final decision concerning mining development in the area.26  In
other words, the NLC would not now discuss development of the Coronation
Hill project unless the government decided that the project would proceed.
As had happened previously, there remained the possibility that the ASSPA
might authorise further works. The NLC was therefore explicit in again
identifying the Aboriginal constituency to whose interests the government
should attend. In his letter to the Minister for the Environment, the NLC director
argued that the NLC’s presentation of a collective Jawoyn position should be
preferred over any inconsistent statements made by the ASSPA on behalf of the
site custodians.27 The ASSPA director had long believed that the custodians’
concerns over Coronation Hill did not amount to a total opposition to
development, and that the project could be negotiated if carefully presented for
approval in incremental stages. By December 1987, however, he perceived a
shift in the views of the senior custodians against mining. In February 1988, the
ASSPA deferred to the larger processes in train and agreed not to issue any
further development approvals to BHP until the NLC–Jawoyn submission to
Government was finalised.
25  Copy telex Hand to Ah Kit, 8 October 1987, NLC file 87/391.
26  Copy letter Ah Kit to Rush, 26 November 1987, NLC file 87/391.
27  Copy letter Ah Kit to Richardson, 12 February 1988, NLC file 87/391.
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Pursuant to its new expanded brief, the NLC set about the task of ascertaining
the extent and nature of Jawoyn concerns in the area, and of formulating political
submissions to advance those interests. Over the following months, it became
convinced that most Jawoyn were absolutely opposed to exploration or mining
at Coronation Hill or anywhere else in the Conservation Zone. A consultancy
project for the NLC canvassed Jawoyn opinion widely, and not only concluded
that most Jawoyn were opposed to mining, but argued that development activities
in the Bula region were responsible for major social stresses within the Jawoyn
community (Josif 1988). This was the formal Jawoyn position that the NLC
passed to the Federal Government, and continued to insist upon as the dispute
intensified. Development work at Coronation Hill was able to proceed for another
dry season on the basis of existing approvals, but came to an end early in 1989.
1987 thus proved to be a deceptive year for BHP. On the surface of things it
appeared to be a period of steady progress at every level. Development approvals
had extended to the use of explosives, and by November the BHP team had
embarked on the initial stages of negotiating a mining agreement with Aboriginal
interests and the company was able to mount strong arguments for favoured
treatment for the joint venture in the allocation of exploration rights in the
Conservation Zone. At the same time, however, its fortunes were being
undermined by the major transformation of that year, in the role of the NLC.
From its early position as occasional advisor, the NLC had succeeded, through
a combination of enabling legal change and evolving political strategy, in
inserting itself as the mining company’s counterpart in negotiations, and had
been recognised by the Federal Government as its chief source of policy advice
regarding Aboriginal interests in the area. From that position it supported and
advanced a case both against mining and in favour of Aboriginal ownership of
the Conservation Zone.
The Jawoyn and the Custodians
As the political dispute over Coronation Hill intensified during the next two
years, public statements from the Jawoyn Association, the Jawoyn Working
Group and the NLC repeatedly represented the Jawoyn collectively as the group
responsible for the Conservation Zone area in Gimbat (for example, JWP 1989).
The Josif Report of June 1988 established the terms of their argument against
development: that it was the Jawoyn community that bore the stress and social
detriment attendant upon any inappropriate interference in the vicinity of the
Bula sites. The three senior custodians were accorded distinctive status for their
special knowledge of Jawoyn traditions and sites in the area.
When in 1990 the Federal Government referred the issue to the Resource
Assessment Commission for inquiry and advice, it created a space for a return
to ethnography and analysis. A large, predominantly Jawoyn meeting at Gunlom
in Kakadu Stage III told the commissioners that the three senior men had the
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primary right to speak about Bula sites and mining in the Conservation Zone
(RAC 1991a: 176). The Commission accepted anthropological findings that this
status was a function not only of age and knowledge, but of clan membership,
and that both their Wurrkbarbar clan and another, Jawoyn Bolmo, maintained
primary responsibility for sites in the Gimbat area (Keen and Merlan 1990: 12,
35, 41–3; Levitus 1990: 21–3; RAC 1991b: 285–6). These clan identifications
marked a reversion to a more discrete level of structural affiliation between
people and country within the Jawoyn language group. During the Katherine
Area Land Claim hearings, with respect to the Gimbat sections of the claim, the
clan level of social organisation had been argued as a modification of the unitary
language group model of traditional ownership, but had disappeared from
currency in the lobbying over Jawoyn interests in the intervening years.
In 1989 the Federal Government had radically reduced the Conservation Zone
to a remnant 47 km2 area around Coronation Hill and a neighbouring prospect
as a pre-election appeal to the environmental vote. In June 1991, following the
Resource Assessment Commission inquiry, the government ended the Coronation
Hill dispute by prohibiting mining and incorporating the remnant Conservation
Zone into Kakadu National Park. An endogenous discourse of traditional
ownership with respect to Gimbat soon reasserted itself during the subsequent
preparation of the Jawoyn (Gimbat Area) Land Claim. As anthropologist for the
claim, Merlan initially advised the NLC that, consistent with the position
recognised by the Resource Assessment Commission inquiry, the strongest model
of traditional ownership would be clan-based. This occasioned some concern
within the NLC over the task of satisfying the Aboriginal Land Commissioner
that the single language group model presented during the Katherine Area Claim
was not appropriate for this section of Jawoyn country, and over the political
implications of abandoning that model at a time when feelings about Coronation
Hill were still strong.
The question of which of these models of landownership should be used was
put to a meeting of prospective claimants, including the three seniors, other
Wurrkbarbar and Bolmo and other Jawoyn, in April 1992 at Barunga. The
meeting told the advisors that the claim should be run primarily on a clan model,
and that other Jawoyn would provide evidence as people interested in the land
with separate representation. The meeting further instructed that the claim
should be extended in two ways, firstly with respect to area, by applying for a
repeat claim over the northeastern corner of Gimbat that had been lost in the
Katherine Area claim, and secondly with respect to claimants, by including
Matjpa as a third clan with localised attachments to Gimbat. The lawyers for the
claim had misgivings about the first and were taken unawares by the second.
Merlan thus argued to the Aboriginal Land Commissioner that Aboriginal
identification with Gimbat operates simultaneously at two structural levels. The
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Jawoyn as a collective language group are affiliated with Gimbat because it is
Jawoyn country and recognised to be so by other Aboriginal groups, while the
members of three particular clans — Wurrkbarbar, Jawoyn Bolmo, Matjba —
‘have historically special and continuous relationships to this area’ (Merlan 1992:
7). She ascribed to Wurrkbarbar a general attachment across all of Gimbat,
recorded a close attachment of Jawoyn Bolmo to north-eastern Gimbat as well
as responsibility for the more dispersed Bula sites, and, on the basis of recent
research findings (ibid: 65), reported a particular attachment of Matjba to the
Katherine River around where it enters Gimbat from the east. These two levels
of affiliation, of language group and clan, produced respectively larger and
smaller claimant groups, the latter a subset of the former, and these two groups
were argued in the alternative to satisfy the statutory definition of traditional
ownership, with the clan group model given the primary running (ibid: 62–9).
The claim was accepted by the Land Commissioner on that latter basis (ALC
1996: 16–21, 38–9). The three senior custodians played a leading role in both
preparing and proving the claim during site visits on Gimbat, and by their
success reasserted a local-level agency for discriminating relevant dimensions
of attachment between subgroups within the Jawoyn.
Conclusion
Conflicts between indigenous and non-indigenous claimants to land, and between
competing groups of indigenous claimants, are both common scenarios in
Australia. The Coronation Hill issue demonstrated another dimension of conflict.
There, the registration of indigenous land interests under Federal and Territorian
laws recognised different dimensions of land interest exercised by differently
conceived groups of interest holders, one a subset of the other within the same
language group and group territory. By vesting representation of each interest
in different bureaucratic agencies, the registration process created one of the
conditions for contest over how indigenous interests were to be represented and
advanced when land management became a political question.
My exegesis of that theme in the external history of the Coronation Hill
dispute has demonstrated a level of complexity in its management that arose
from competing strategic imperatives at the organisational level. I examined the
way political agency took advantage, or wrestled with the limits, of law, in a
context of persistent uncertainty often arising from the difficulty in interpreting
Jawoyn wishes. There were disagreements over how to proceed within both the
ASSPA and the NLC, overlapping personal commitments to Aboriginal and
environmental values, and competing assessments of attainable political outcomes.
Finally, from above, there were the contingencies of Federal policy making:
arbitrating between competing land-use values, shifting the legal ground on
which the players stood, widening or narrowing the terms of debate, and playing
for electoral advantage. In other words, no actor in this story was a simple
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reflection of any other actor, and the rules they played by were not fixed. In
discussions of sacred site protection issues the roles of organisations representing
Aboriginal interests are usually left opaque, with the implication that their
actions are to be understood simply as directly guided by the instructions of
their local-level Aboriginal constituents, or as the discharge of administrative
obligations prescribed by their governing statutes. The roles of such organisations
need to be made transparent in order that we invest them in our analyses with
the significance they are widely understood to have, as separate loci of active
political agency.
Significantly, the NLC operated throughout from a position of weakness
relative to that which it usually occupied in mining issues under the ALRA, as
the representative of traditional owners of freehold Aboriginal land. As early
as 1986, NLC legal officers had pointed out the strategic importance of finalising
a land claim and thereby fixing an Aboriginal property right over the area before
decisions about mining were made. Throughout the Coronation Hill dispute,
Gimbat was not, in a legal sense, Aboriginal land, and the NLC intervened in
the affairs of the area more as an act of political volition to assert an Aboriginal
stake than as an act of administration of an existing legal right.
That intervention was predicated upon a conception of the indigenous interest
that was broad both structurally, residing in the Jawoyn language group, and
politically, encompassing future land-use regimes. As the dispute intensified
during 1988 and 1989, the NLC also emphasised Aboriginal concerns from beyond
the Jawoyn, among neighbouring Arnhem Land groups. The ASSPA had similarly
tried when possible to promote the legitimacy of a general Aboriginal interest
in the area, but its management responsibilities required it to have resort to a
more particularised niche of Aboriginal authority, in the individual senior
custodians. As politics gave way to ethnography, analysis and modelling, first
during the Resource Assessment Commission inquiry and then in the Gimbat
Land Claim, the more discrete structural level of the clan was elevated to
attention, and the Aboriginal interest, conceived in terms of the formal
entitlements of traditional attachment, became vested in those more narrowly
defined entities. As part of that process, local claimants took charge of the
elucidation of the clan-based model of attachments to sites, revealing again an
endogenous discourse of land interests that had been submerged beneath the
imperatives of political lobbying about local rights carried out at a supra-local
level.
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Chapter Thirteen
A Regional Approach to Managing
Aboriginal Land Title on Cape York1
Paul Memmott, Peter Blackwood and Scott McDougall
In 1992 the High Court of Australia for the first time gave legal recognition to
the common law native title land rights of the continent’s indigenous people.2
The following year the Commonwealth Government of Australia passed the
Native Title Act 1993 (NTA), which introduced a statutory scheme for the
recognition of native title in those areas where Aboriginal groups have been
able to maintain a traditional connection to land and where the actions of
governments have not otherwise extinguished their prior title.
Native title as it is codified in the NTA differs from Western forms of title in
three significant ways. Firstly, it is premised on the group or communal
ownership of land, rather than on private property rights; secondly, it is a
recognition and registration of rights and interests in relation to areas of land
which pre-date British sovereignty, rather than a formal grant of title by
government (QDNRM 2005: 3); thirdly, it may coexist with forms of granted
statutory title, such as pastoral leases, over the same tracts of land.
While native title is a formal recognition of indigenous landownership and
sets up a process of registration for such interests, it remains a codification within
the Western legal framework, and as such is distinct from, though related to,
Aboriginal systems of land tenure as perceived by Aboriginal groups themselves.
This distinction is exemplified in the sentiment often expressed by Aboriginal
people that their connection to country, and the rules and responsibilities
attaching to this connection, continue to apply, irrespective of the legal title of
the land under ‘whitefellow law’. The very fact that Aboriginal systems of land
tenure managed to survive without any form of legal recognition for two
centuries in the face of legal and political denial, and the actual appropriation
of their land — that is, that there are still systems capable of recognition under
the NTA — alerts us to the fact that Native title is not the same as Aboriginal
land tenure. As a codification which draws upon features thought to be
characteristic of Aboriginal land tenure, it neither is, nor replaces, the indigenous
1 This chapter is based upon research undertaken in 2001 for the report Holding Title and Managing
Land in Cape York (Memmott and McDougall 2004).
2 Mabo & Ors v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1.
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system itself. Indeed, there is considerable room for debate as to whether there
may be a unitary system of Aboriginal land tenure over the continent or whether
such systems reside at regional or even more local levels of Aboriginal polity
(Sutton 2003).
Native title thus exists in a complex legal, administrative and cultural
environment of intersecting and sometimes conflicting interests. While this
complexity tends to be viewed by the wider Australian public in terms of
indigenous versus non-indigenous rights, what is less well appreciated is that
many Aboriginal groups find themselves caught within this same web, trying
to integrate and reconcile their newly recognised native title rights with other
forms of Aboriginal landownership. This is especially the case in remote northern
Australia where, as a result of state and territory based statutory land rights
schemes introduced over the past 30 years,3  many Aboriginal groups have
acquired land under a variety of titles which include pastoral leases, statutory
Aboriginal freehold and trustee arrangements. Much of this land is also now
subject to native title claim, often by groups comprised of, or including, those
who at the same time already hold, or in the future may hold, the same land
under one of these other forms of title. What these title forms all have in common
is that, in their own ways, they are attempts at drawing systems of Aboriginal
land tenure into the broader Australian system of landownership. But this
transition has a high potential to distort and even rigidify the indigenous system,
both in its description and in its practice, in order for it to ‘fit’ the legal
requirements of the various statutory schemes and their requisite landowning
corporations.
This complexity offers both opportunities and challenges. In Queensland,
for example, native title claimants and the state government have taken the
opportunity to resolve native title claims through a ‘tenure resolution’ process
whereby the land needs and aspirations of Aboriginal people in a particular area
may be settled through a combination of native title determination and the grant
of Aboriginal freehold land under Queensland’s statutory land rights legislation,
the Aboriginal Land Act 1991 (ALA) (QDNRM 2005: 16).4 The challenge is to
find ways of more effectively and efficiently integrating the ownership and
management functions of the multiple Aboriginal landholding entities which
result.
3 These schemes are based on various state and commonwealth government acts and are specific to the
particular states and territories to which they apply, and therefore quite variable in their legislative
nature. During the same period there have also been a number of land acquisition programs, mostly
funded by the Commonwealth Government, through which Aboriginal groups have been able to
purchase land, especially pastoral leases.
4  As of 2005, this tenure resolution approach was a matter of State policy (QDNRM 2005: 16). While
the authors’ experience is mainly in Queensland, we believe similar mechanisms for negotiated land
settlements operate in other states.
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This chapter argues that there is an important role for anthropologists to
work with particular Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander claimant groups,
ethnographically document the system of Aboriginal land tenure and customary
decision-making processes at the earliest possible opportunity in anthropological
claim research, and advise claimants’ legal advisers about the implications of
this system for the design of Aboriginal landholding corporations. To ignore
the opportunity to observe customary decision-making processes is likely to be
counter-productive if the sort of corporate structures prescribed by the various
land rights legislations are imposed without attention to how things actually
happen in an emic political sense on the ground and in the community. The
imposition of such legislative requirements are exacerbated further when multiple
corporations must be established in a particular region due to multiple
overlapping claims that fall under different legal and tenure regimes. Our view
is that claimant representative bodies, such as land councils, should allow
anthropologists to be proactive in this regard, and that such an approach should
result in a closer ‘fit’ between the membership structures and decision-making
processes of Aboriginal landowning corporations and the systems of Aboriginal
land tenure as they are understood and practised by claimant groups themselves.
While it may be unrealistic to expect that this ‘fit’ will ever be seamless,
incorporating anthropological analysis at an early stage in the planning of
corporate structures should minimise the distortion to the emic Aboriginal
systems and result in greater consonance between people’s experience of rights
and responsibilities toward their land under their own system of Aboriginal
land tenure and the practice of ownership within corporations set up under
native title and other land rights regimes.
This chapter considers some practical aspects of applying such research in
two case study areas of Cape York Peninsula in far north Queensland where
there are multiple and overlapping Aboriginal entities for the ownership and
management of lands and waters. It examines what will be required for the
successful operation of the various registered title-holding bodies in these regions,
namely native title Prescribed Bodies Corporate (PBCs)5  and Aboriginal Land
Trusts (ALTs) set up to hold title under the NTA and ALA respectively, as well
as Aboriginal corporations holding pastoral leases and other forms of title. It
proposes options for rationalising and possibly combining ALTs and PBCs, and
models for cost effective coordination of Aboriginal land management at a
regional level. Its premise is that this will be best achieved by giving primary
consideration to using elements of the local Aboriginal system of land tenure
and its associated decision-making processes as the building blocks in the
construction of corporate landholding entities and land management structures,
5  PBCs must be set up by claimants to hold their native title. Following a successful determination, the
PBC is registered as a Registered Native Title Body Corporate. Throughout this chapter ‘PBC’ will refer
to both entities.
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rather than allowing these to be subordinated to legal and administrative
convenience.
The case study areas are the Coen and Wik subregions of Cape York (CYLC
2001), selected on the basis of variation in the complexity of local land tenure
and coexisting land and sea management regimes (see Figure 13-1). Between
them, these offer a gradation of scenarios which we believe provide exemplary
models for the operation of Aboriginal landholding corporations that are
adaptable to other regions and other Aboriginal groups in Australia.6
Figure 13-1: Cape York Native Title Representative Body’s area of
administration and the subregions of Wik and Coen.
6  Unless otherwise indicated, the data presented in this chapter reflects the situation on Cape York up
to 2001/02, the time of the original research.
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Cape York Peninsula
The Cape York Peninsula Region covers approximately 150,000 km2 of remote
far north Queensland. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population
comprises at least 60 per cent of the region’s total population of 18 000. There
are more than 50 named traditional landowning groups in the region. At the
time of writing there had been native title determinations over lands of three of
these groups — the Guugu Yimithir, the Wik and the Kaurareg — with more
than 20 other active claims yet to be determined.
With the exception of parts of the Northern Territory, Cape York has the
highest proportion of land in Australia which is, or which has the potential to
become, Aboriginal owned and managed. Since much of this land will be held
as either Aboriginal freehold or leasehold, and since most groups on Cape York
have been able to maintain continuous traditional connection to the land,7  the
incidence of successful native title determinations over much of Cape York can
be expected to be high.
Forms of Aboriginal Land Tenure on Cape York
Native title is but one of several categories of Aboriginal owned land on Cape
York, each of which is associated with its own particular corporate landholding
entity and each of which may also sustain coexisting native title rights over the
same land.
In 1984 Queensland established Deed of Grant in Trust Lands (generally
known as DOGITs) in respect of Aboriginal residential settlements and
surrounding lands which had formerly been government- or church-run missions
and reserves. DOGITs are inalienable and are held in trust by the local Aboriginal
Council on behalf of its community.8  Over 11 per cent of Cape York is comprised
of DOGITS and there is a large DOGIT area in each of the case study subregions.
In 1991 a form of inalienable Aboriginal freehold title was introduced in
Queensland under the ALA.9 This provides for land to be granted usually on
the basis of either ‘traditional affiliation’ or ‘historical association’, with the land
title, once granted, held by an ALT which is usually comprised of a representative
group of the beneficiaries of the grant. As of 2005, approximately 5 per cent of
7 The NTA requires that claimants be able to demonstrate that they have maintained an unbroken
connection to the land, which is interpreted by the High Court to mean that they have continued to
observe traditional law and custom, and to have maintained a ‘vital’ society based upon this law and
custom, in a substantially uninterrupted way since sovereignty.
8 These councils were originally set up as exclusively Aboriginal local government organisations under
specific legislation; they have since been replaced with conventional shire councils, similar to those
operating in any town in Queensland. The local communities characteristically comprise a mixture of
traditional owners for the area and other Aboriginal residents with historical ties going back several
generations.
9  Readers are referred to Memmott and McDougal (2004) for more detailed explication of the operation
of the ALA.
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Cape York Peninsula was ALA Aboriginal freehold held by 19 ALTs (QDNRM
2005, Appendix 2). This freehold may be granted as a result of either a claim
process requiring claimants to prove their traditional or historical connection
before a judicial tribunal, or by an administrative process referred to as ‘transfer’.
Both mechanisms rely upon the government to make the land available by
gazettal, and this provision has enabled some creative tenure resolutions to be
negotiated between the Queensland Government and native title claimants. The
DOGITs already discussed are transferable, and the ALA requires that in time
they must be converted to Aboriginal freehold.
A number of Aboriginal-owned pastoral leases also occur in each subregion.
The favoured structure for pastoral lease landholding entities are corporations
of traditional owner groups formed under the Commonwealth Aboriginal Councils
and Associations Act 1976 (ACAA), the same legislation under which native title
PBCs must be incorporated.
Neither DOGIT nor Aboriginal freehold extinguishes native title rights and
interests, and the NTA provides for any past extinguishment on
Aboriginal-owned pastoral leases to be disregarded. Potentially, therefore,
traditional owners’ full native title may be recognised on all these tenure types,
leading to the duplication of landholding entities in ALTs, PBCs, and Aboriginal
corporations.
Native Title — Prescribed Bodies Corporate
Successful native title claimants are required to incorporate as a PBC under the
ACAA.10  Claimants may nominate to set up their PBCs to function in one of two
ways, either as an agent or as a trust. The essential difference is that under an
agency arrangement, decision making rests with the native title group as a whole
and the PBC acts only as its agent or representative, while under a trust
arrangement, decisions may be made by a small group of trustees without
necessarily involving the wider native title group. The choice is of significant
consequence as it determines the legal and operational relationships between
the native title holders, the PBC as a corporate entity, and the actual native title
rights and interests. Traditional owner groups on Cape York have generally
expressed a preference for agency PBCs because this structure is perceived to
give them greater control over decision making and avoids an additional level
of legal complexity interposed by the operation of a trust structure.
10 This Act has not proved to be altogether suitable for the purposes of PBCs because, in practice, it
has not been able to successfully incorporate customary group recruitment mechanisms and
decision-making processes (see Fingleton et a1. 1996; Mantziaris and Martin 2000: 183–232; Memmott
and McDougall 2004: 14–15). In 2005, the Commonwealth Government introduced a Corporations
(Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Bill, which it claimed would better serve the contemporary
requirements of indigenous corporations, including PBCs (RAC 2005).
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It is anticipated that eventually the majority of Aboriginal-owned land will
have at least two coexisting types of titles and the consequent establishment of
two landholding corporations for each area: either (a) Aboriginal freehold and
native title, with an ALT and a PBC; or (b) a DOGIT and native title, with a
Community or Shire Council and a PBC, or (c) leasehold and native title, with
an Aboriginal corporation and a PBC. As it is possible to lease land from the
trustees on both DOGITs and Aboriginal freehold, there is further potential for
three levels of Aboriginal landholding entity on these tenures, all of which may
have substantially the same membership of traditional owners — namely the
DOGIT trustees or an ALT, a native title PBC and an Aboriginal corporation
holding a lease (see Table 13-1).
Table 13-1: Tenures on Cape York Peninsula showing potential for overlapping
Aboriginal ownership.
Potential for Ownership by Aboriginal Groups   
Aboriginal-owned
lease or freehold
Aboriginal
freehold
Native titleLand area (%)Land area (ha)Tenure Type
Y Y59.28 063 000Leases
 YY12.11 647 709National Park
Y (leasehold)YY11.41 551 500DOGIT (Deed of
Grant in Trust)
Y (leasehold)YY5.4736 600Aboriginal Freehold
 YY3.5475 800Unallocated State
Land
   4.4597 800Statutory Mining
Tenure
 YY2269 361Reserve
  Y1.3189 613Timber Reserve and
State Forest
Y  0.790 600Freehold
   10013 621 983TOTAL
Source: The figures for each category of tenure are taken from CYLC (2001).
Native title holders may make and register agreements about the use and
management of land and waters with other land users, such as miners,
governments, pastoralists and developers. These are known as Indigenous Land
Use Agreements (ILUAs). ILUAs require the consent of all the native title holders
for the area covered, and once made they bind all native title holders (including
future generations), as well as the other parties to the agreement. ILUAs provide
a mechanism by which governments, native title holders and other land users
may come to agreement about the use of land and the recognition of indigenous
rights and interests without necessarily requiring a formal determination of
native title (Lane 2000). Importantly, where there is a PBC over an ILUA area,
it must be a party to the agreement. This enables PBCs to use the ILUA provisions
to assist in their function of protecting native title for traditional owners, as well
as a range of other land management and economic benefits which might flow
from such agreements.
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Active and Passive PBC Structures
Models for PBC design fall along a continuum from ‘passive’ to ‘active’.11 The
passive PBC is a minimalist structure. It is best suited to the agency PBC type
since it will not itself hold the native title interests. These will remain with the
native title holding group who may continue to exercise customary
decision-making practices. The PBC’s role is to consult with and implement the
group’s decisions, and its membership may be limited to that necessary to meet
the minimal regulatory requirements; it may therefore have a ‘representative’
membership structure, rather than a ‘participatory’ model (which aims to include
as many as possible of the native title holders as PBC members). The passive PBC
will have limited demands for resources, but is likely to be reliant on the support
of regional representative bodies, such as Land Councils or the Land and Sea
Management Agencies proposed in the operational models described below.
In contrast to the passive model, the active PBC assumes greater responsibility
for the making of decisions within the determination area. The trustee PBC type
is better suited to an active role, because it ‘holds’ the native title and has greater
authority to make decisions on behalf of the native title holders. Active PBCs
could adopt either ‘representative’ or ‘participatory’ membership structures.
There is a degree of expert design required here to ensure there is no conflict
between the traditional processes and those of the ‘active’ agency, for which
anthropological advice will be essential to minimise such conflict.
The distinction between passive and active relate not only to PBC functions
(for example, whether it is an agency or trustee PBC) but also to its membership
and its general mode of operation. The decision as to which model is best suited
in any particular case will depend upon a variety of factors, including the PBC’s
responsibilities in relation to other landholding entities owned by the group
and the levels and sources of funding.
Importantly, the choice reflects the spectrum of opportunities available in
apportioning decision-making responsibilities between the PBC and the native
title holders. At one end of the spectrum, a passive/agency/representative
structured PBC would have no role other than to ‘rubber stamp’ decisions
(including non-native title decisions) made by the native title holders. At the
other end, an active/trustee PBC, even with a minimal representative structure,
could make all decisions, including those involving native title rights and
interests. A condition for the operation of such a PBC would be that it is possible
to replicate traditional decision making within the PBC governance structure
itself. The obvious dangers of creating such a representative/active PBC include
the lack of accountability to other native title holders, who as non-PBC members
11  See Memmott and McDougall (2004, Chapter 6) for an in-depth discussion of the design and function
of PBCs.
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would be forced to rely on their status as beneficiaries to redress any concerns
about the management of the PBC.
These decisions may reflect the extent to which the wider membership of
the native title group is prepared to cede the day-to-day running of the PBC to
an operational and decision-making representative subgroup. As in the case of
the Wik PBC described below (in general terms a passive/agent/participatory
type of PBC), it is likely that many native title holders will prefer a hybrid of
the models to meet their particular requirements.
Structural Options for PBCs in Relation to Land Trusts and
Other Indigenous Landholding Entities
The prospect of ALTs and PBCs operating independently of each other with
respect to the same land is a source of concern to traditional owners and is
recognised by the Queensland State Government as one of a number of practical
matters needing to be addressed in order to improve the articulation of the state
and commonwealth legislation (QDNRM 2005).
There is a significant level of frustration about the respective operations of
ALTs and PBCs in parts of Cape York, particularly where they have similar
memberships and perform functions with respect to the same areas of land. From
the perspective of traditional owners, the expectation (and hope) may have been
that native title would result in a unitary system within which their customary
system of land tenure might be recognised and exercised. In practice, however,
it has failed to produce such a simplification of their position, but rather resulted
in greater complexity, ambiguity and consequent confusion.
In the Coen subregion for example, there are approximately 10 existing or
proposed ALTs, and as of 2004, five native title claims, the membership of whose
PBCs will overlap those of the ALTs (see Memmott and McDougall 2004: 93).
Given the importance of both the NTA and ALA regimes to the traditional
owners of Cape York Peninsula, there is a need to reconcile the practical
day-to-day operations of the landholding and managing entities to reduce not
only the confusion and frustration of traditional owners, but also that of external
parties trying to engage in negotiations, communications and contracts with the
traditional owners. It is to be expected that similar situations occur in other
Australian states and territories where there is a form of state land rights
legislation.
The integration of PBCs and ALTs into single corporate entities for suitable
large-scale socio-geographic units (for example language-based tribes in the case
of the Coen subregion) would not only simplify arrangements and reduce
confusion but also reduce the administration costs through a more effective (and
larger) scale of economy. There are three options for coordinating the operations
of ALTs and PBCs. On the face of it, the determination of an ALT as a PBC is the
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preferable option since it would limit the resultant structure to a singular
corporate entity. However, it is unavailable without amendments to the PBC
Regulations by the Commonwealth Government and possibly amendments to
the ALA by the Queensland State Government.12  Further, since the criteria for
ALA land grants and for determination of native title are so very different,
combining the two sets of responsibilities into a single entity may not always
be the best option because of resultant conflicts of interest for the members.
Given that there are no legislative impediments to appointing a PBC as the
sole trustee of an ALT, this constitutes a second option. However, Queensland
government policy in the past has discouraged the use of corporate bodies as
sole members of an ALT. This option would still entail the formation of two
distinct corporate entities, but Table 13-2 sets out how the two entities may be
harmonised within a single operational structure.
A third option is that of coordination between the PBC and ALT by agreement
only. The PBC and ALT operate as independent entities with respect to the same
land, with activities coordinated through formal agreements, such as Memoranda
of Understanding, setting out their respective roles and responsibilities in relation
to land use and consent. In practice, because the membership of the two entities
is substantially the same, members of the ALT will have to make agreements
with themselves as members of the PBC. This option is the least efficient and
provides the greatest scope for fragmentation of indigenous interests. However
without the regulatory or policy changes required to implement either of the
preferred options, it remains the only practical (and legal) option currently
available.
12  Recognising similarities in the structure and intent of ACAA corporations and ALA land trusts, the
Queensland Government has recently canvassed the option of doing away with ALTs altogether and
granting land directly to ACAA corporations, which could include PBCs, thereby avoiding the duplication
of organisations with almost identical functions. It has also acknowledged that the integration of land
trusts and corporations may be facilitated by allowing land trusts to be formed prior to the granting of
the land (QDNRM 2005: 33–4).
282
Customary Land Tenure and Registration in Australia and Papua New Guinea
Table 13-2: Model of harmonised rules for a PBC as trustee of a Land Trust.
PBC (as Grantee) RulesLand Trust RulesIssue
Objects to include acting as grantee
of land trust and as a PBC.
Objects are for purposes set out in the
Aboriginal Land Regulations 1991.
Objects
Open to adult native title holders only.
Note ‘historically affiliated’ persons
are ineligible for membership.
Limited to one grantee — the PBC. Alternatively
could include ‘historically affiliated’ persons as
grantees. Historical members to be qualified
with no voting powers.
Membership
By election at AGM.Limited to PBC. PBC is Chairperson.Committee
AGM (same day as for land trust).
Committee meets at least quarterly.
Annual General Meeting (same day as for PBC).
Committee meets quarterly.
Meetings
Prescriptive decision-making processes
set out in rules. Same as land trust.
As set out in rules and in accordance with code
of ‘permitted dealings’ provisions in ALA. Same
as PBC.
Decision- Making
Processes
Separate accounts/audit. Reports to
Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations.
Separate accounts/audit. Annual statement to
Land Claims Registrar.
Administration
The Wik Subregion
The Wik subregion is comprised of coastal flood plains and forested inland
country drained by several major westward flowing rivers on the central western
side of Cape York. It contains an Aboriginal land lease held by the Aurukun
Shire Council, on which are located the township of Aurukun itself and a number
of outstations that are seasonally occupied by Wik families. The region is
occupied predominantly by the Wik-speaking peoples,13  the majority of whom
live in Aurukun and the Aboriginal DOGIT settlements of Pormpuraaw and
Napranum, as well as the towns of Coen and Weipa which lie just outside the
region. This region and its people are well known nationally and internationally
through the Wik Native Title High Court Action which established that native
title may coexist on pastoral leases.14
The Wik people comprise a broad linguistic grouping sharing a range of
cultural similarities, within which there are a number of identifiable linguistic
subgroups, namely Wik Way, Wik Mungkan, Wik Ompom, Wik Iyanh or
Mungkanhu, Wik-Ngencherr and Ayapathu (Sutton 1997: 36, Chase et al. 1998:
59). The distribution of languages is often mosaic-like and language affiliation
may be shared by clans with non-contiguous estates. Further, languages are not
necessarily coterminous with political or social groups such as riverine groupings
and regional ritual groups in a given region. Commonality in language use does
not necessarily correspond to a unity of political or social identity (Sutton 1997:
33).
The building block of their land tenure system is the clan estate, in which
membership is based on the principle of descent. Such estates can be aggregated
13  See Thomson (1936: 374); McConnel (1939: 62); Sutton (1978); von Sturmer (1978) and Martin (1993,
1997) for an ethnographic history of these peoples.
14 The Wik Peoples v Queensland & Ors (B8 of 1996). While there have since been determinations over
areas of crown land, the Aurukun Shire lease and some pastoral leases, determinations over several
pastoral leases and areas of the bauxite mining leases were yet to be achieved at the time of writing.
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into various types and levels of configuration (Sutton 1978: 126–8, 140, 1997:
28), the most inclusive of which are ‘large estate cluster’ identity systems,
including riverine groups, ceremonial groups and language groups. These are
differentiated by particular principles of social and political organisation, totemic
and religious geography, and language and land tenure (Sutton 1997: 29–32).
Eight of these larger cluster groups comprising the Wik and Wik Way claim
group are the social units on which the Wik PBC representative membership
structure is based. These include five ceremonial groups and three based on
either language or geographic affiliation (Memmott and McDougall 2004: 96,
125).
As of 2005, within the native title claim area, there were at least 33 parcels
of land of coexisting (but non-extinguishing) tenure. These included parcels of
DOGIT land at Pormpuraaw and Napranum, the Aurukun Aboriginal land lease,
pastoral leases under both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal ownership, and areas
under mining leases. Outside the claim area, but still potentially subject to future
native title claims, were two large national parks which had been successfully
claimed under the ALA, and further pastoral leases. As well as the PBC for the
determined areas of the Wik and Wik Way claims, there were two DOGITs held
by the Pormpuraaw and Napranauum Shire Councils, the Aurukun Shire Council
which held the Aurukun lease, and at least two proposed ALTs.
Planning authorities in this region included such regional agencies as Aurukun
Shire Council, Pormpuraaw Community Aboriginal Council, Napranum
Community Aboriginal Council, and the Cook Shire Council. In addition there
were a wide range of government and indigenous agencies and departments that
had jurisdiction over the wider Cape York region, including Queensland National
Parks Service and other government agencies. Forms of planning agreements
which were in place included Wik and Wik Way Native Title ILUAs covering
pastoral leases under claim and the Western Cape Communities Co-Existence
Agreement which brings together native title holders and Aboriginal communities
with Comalco, owners of the extensive bauxite leases which have had a significant
impact upon Aboriginal communities in the region since the late 1950s.
A mature outstation movement existed with some 24 or more outstations,
most of which were serviced from Aurukun, with a smaller number being
serviced by an Aboriginal resource agency based in the adjacent Coen subregion.
Almost all of these were on the Aurukun Shire lease or on Aboriginal-owned
pastoral leases.
Management problems perceived by the traditional owners included a mixture
of both customary concerns relating to their traditional responsibilities for
looking after their land, as well as seemingly more contemporary worries relating
to access and security: over-fishing and fishing industry impact on dugongs and
crocodiles; lack of coastal management and dune damage; poor road access to
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country; cultural heritage protection; and impacts of visitors to country,
including theft and vandalism at outstations and littering. Their aspirations
included: greater control over natural resources and the environment; access
controls over non-indigenous land users and the prevention of vandalism of
outstations and other property; cultural heritage protection and site mapping;
improved infrastructure and access to traditional sites and living areas; and
greater economic engagement within the region, including employment and
commercial venture opportunities.
To develop and implement land and sea management programs across Wik
traditional owners’ lands, two resource centres known as Land and Sea
Management Agencies had been proposed for the Wik region. These would
provide a base for research into the environmental impacts of mining and
post-mining rehabilitation, aimed primarily at generating real options for
indigenous people to gain economic and employment opportunities from lands
impacted by bauxite mining. They would also become a hub for the training of
a skilled indigenous workforce that would build land management capacity
across all Cape York communities (ASC 2001).
The Coen Subregion
The Coen subregion is located on the east of Cape York and contains the small
service township of Coen as its regional centre, as well as a number of Aboriginal
outstations. It straddles the Great Dividing Range, and includes the uppermost
tributaries of the western-flowing Coen and Archer rivers and the streams flowing
east from the Geikie and McIlwraith ranges. Aboriginal people of the Coen
subregion reside in Coen and in some 10 outstations, the largest of which is Port
Stewart on the eastern coast. Many of the traditional owners and native title
holders live outside the actual Coen subregion at such large Aboriginal
communities as Lockhart River, Hopevale and Aurukun, and also in Cooktown.
There are four language groups with native title interests in the Coen region:
the Kaanju, Umpila, Lamalama and Ayapathu. While these groups maintain their
distinct linguistic identities and are each associated with well-recognised
linguistic and tribal territories, they share a system of traditional land tenure,
laws and customs which is regional in character (Chase et al. 1998: 37).
Due to historical forces, the Aboriginal system of land tenure in this subregion
has shifted from a patrilineal clan estate system toward that of cognatic descent
groups and the ‘language-named tribe’ as the primary social structural units by
which people identify with country and around which their ownership of land
is organised and conceptualised (Chase et al. 1998: 35–9). However, the extent
to which these transformations have occurred varies among different groups,
so that patterns of land tenure, social organisation and identity are not uniform.
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By the end of 2005, while there had been no native title determinations in
the region (though there were several outstanding claims), there had been four
grants of Aboriginal freehold land. Altogether there were eleven existing or
future ALTs. There was one Aboriginal-owned pastoral lease, and several smaller
blocks of conventional freehold held by Aboriginal corporations.
The regional planning environment included a central indigenous service
agency, the Coen Regional Aboriginal Corporation, which delivered outstation,
land and sea management services, as well as various administrative and welfare
services. It serviced approximately a dozen residential outstations established
on the various areas of Aboriginal land in the region, and assisted the operations
of several ALTs in the region. As noted above, it also provides services to some
outstations in the Wik subregion, and is likely to have a greater role in this
subregion in the future. As well, the Lockhart River Shire Council had a land
and sea management program with interests in the northeast corner of the Coen
subregion. It oversaw the activities of a ranger service on the DOGIT which had
responsibilities for natural and cultural resource management (LRC 2001).
Land and sea management issues of concern to the traditional owners of the
Coen subregion included: cultural heritage protection; fire management; the
problem of non-indigenous squatters encroaching into remote areas on Aboriginal
land, often associated with illegal marijuana cropping; feral pigs; fisheries
management; and under-developed infrastructure limiting access to country.
Their aspirations included: the establishment of more outstations, bores, water
tanks and other related infrastructure; the development of land management;
the protection of sites; joint management of the national parks in the region and
greater access to and use of national park lands; and small-scale enterprise
operations at their outstations and on Aboriginal land, including for cattle
herding, tourism, prawn fishing and pig farming or harvesting.
Operational Models for Land Use and Management in the
Case Study Subregions
The models to emerge for each subregion both have, as a core structural element,
a centralised Land and Sea Management Agency, providing administrative and
other functions to the various Aboriginal landholding entities in its subregion.
In other respects, however, the models differ, reflecting the different cultural,
demographic and socio-geographic landscape of each subregion.
Whereas the Wik have opted for a single PBC and have not chosen to formally
incorporate each of their eight subgroups for local land management purposes,
but rather to work through existing organisations (such as the Aurukun Shire
Council), the traditional owners in the Coen subregion wish to formalise their
four language-named tribal groupings into four corporations to carry out land
and sea management contracts, outstation development, and enterprises. In the
286
Customary Land Tenure and Registration in Australia and Papua New Guinea
interests of rationalising the multiplicity of 18 or more titles in this latter region,
a method is proposed to amalgamate these entities for each language group or
tribe. This will result in all of a tribe’s land and sea areas having a single PBC,
which also acts as a trustee of their freehold ALTs.
Administrative and consultative complexities are identified that are likely
to be encountered at and near subregional boundaries where groups may choose
to seek land and sea management services from centres in adjoining subregions,
and where land tenures on ILUAs straddle subregional boundaries.
The Wik Subregion Model
Wik and Wik Way claimants expressed a strong preference for having all Wik
people represented on a single PBC (‘all Wik people have spoken as one’).15
Their preference was for an agency type PBC with minimal membership based
upon representation by regional and ceremonial subgroups from across all Wik
and Wik Way country. There was an additional need to ensure that some of the
representatives resided in each of the Coen, Napranum and Pormpuraaw
communities, and to ensure adequate representation of native title holders in
these communities for the purpose of communication and feedback. Thus the
translation of customary membership into contemporary landholding corporations
has to take into account those post-contact demographic factors that have taken
people away from their country.
The Wik PBC model, as detailed in Figure 13-2, lies somewhere between the
passive and active PBC types.16  It has at its centre a ‘passive’, agency-type PBC
based upon representative subgroups and with limited objects and limited
executive powers. But it also has ‘active’ features, such as participatory
representation providing for widespread PBC membership and a representative
Governing Committee based upon the eight ceremonial and language groups
discussed above. The latter characteristics may support the growth of corporate
governance culture within the native title group, possibly causing the PBC to
take on a more ‘active’ role in decision making in the future.
15 This PBC, named Ngan Aak Kunch, was incorporated in 2002.
16 This Wik PBC model is very similar to the ‘tripartite’ statutory model of the Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Memmott and McDougall, 2004: 89).
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Figure 13-2: Wik subregion model.
Note: This model shows the proposed structural relationship between the Wik PBC and the Wik
Land and Sea Management Agency.
A core feature of this model is that each of the representational groups will
need to have a capacity to meet by themselves on occasions in accordance with
their customary methods of decision making, to make decisions about critical
events affecting native title in their respective regions. This is a most critical
aspect of the model, necessary to ensure that Wik and Wik Way law and custom
are incorporated into decision making on land and sea issues.
However, this is also a vulnerable aspect of the model, with potential problems
including the difficulty of individual groups having a viable meeting when key
personnel may be residing in dispersed centres (for example, Aurukun, Coen,
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and Pormpuraaw), the need to raise funds to facilitate transport for adequate
consultation, and the possibility of apathy amongst members of the representative
groups to attend meetings.
It should also be noted that decision making within each of these groups may
still have to devolve to the clan or extended family level, before being brought
back to the group level, because the ceremonial and regional groups are not
landholding units, nor are they units of political, social, or economic action.
They do not correspond to corporate units within Wik society which are
particularly relevant to the operations of native title. The basic appropriate
groupings in which such discussions would be held are ‘families’ within regional
associations.17
It is not proposed that any of the representational groups be separately
incorporated for business activities (as was the case for the four language-named
tribes of the Coen subregion). On the contrary, there is some concern about the
likelihood of ‘fissioning’ or the subdivision of such corporations if they were
formed, as it is a commonplace feature of the political dynamics in the Wik
universe, both socially and corporately.
The most plausible and efficient method of providing the PBC with an
administration facility would be for the PBC to contract the Aurukun Shire
Council as a service provider through the council’s Land and Sea Management
Unit (which in turn could draw on wider council resources by internal
arrangements). The minimal administration services required of such a secretariat
would include: dealing with correspondence; holding bank accounts, minutes,
legal documents and the like; calling meetings for decision making, elections
among the representative groups and information dissemination; providing
feedback to native title holders; representing the PBC at meetings with
development companies, government departments and authorities, and so on;
and raising funds to provide such services. While there are advantages of
centrality of location and economies of scale and resources in the council taking
on the administration role, there is also potential for conflict of interest in that
the civic interests and responsibilities of a Shire Council may not always coincide
with those of native title holders. There would therefore need to be protocols
in place to deal with such eventualities by separating off the council’s local
government functions from its PBC-resourcing functions.
In addition to the PBC having a service agreement with the council’s Land
and Sea Management Unit for administration services, there is traditional owner
support for this unit to eventually contract out a range of land and sea
management services on behalf of the native title holders, including: land and
sea management planning; provision of outstation services; provision of rangers
17  Personal communication, David Martin, February 2002.
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to monitor country and carry out management projects in country; negotiation
with developers of various sorts, including mining companies and tourism
operators; cultural heritage assessments and socio-economic impact studies prior
to land developments; and employment of native title holders to participate in
the range of land and sea management activities.
The Coen Subregion Model
Traditional owner groups expressed a preference for a structure which retains
independent corporate vehicles for each of the four language-named tribes while
at the same time recognising the need for a central agency for the subregion that
will provide the necessary administration functions common to all four groups.
Preference was for agency-type PBCs for each group.
This model is structurally analogous to the relationship which has been
established between the Coen Regional Aboriginal Corporation and the outlying
outstation communities which it has serviced for the past 20 years. The model,
as outlined in Figure 13-3, has two key structural dimensions. The first of these
is an overarching corporate structure which brings traditional owner and native
title groups from the subregion together to form a decision-making committee
for common purposes, such as financial administration, subregional land and
sea management, resourcing outstations, and liaising with National Park Boards
of Management.
Within this wider structure, separate traditional owner decision-making
committees for each of the four tribal native title groups will act as trustees for
their respective local areas of land. These committees will have responsibility
for making decisions about budget allocations for their own groups, use of local
assets, businesses and so on, as well as PBC- and ALT-relevant matters, and
overseeing land and sea management contracts on the group’s traditional land.
Eventually, this model should lead to the structural amalgamation of PBCs and
ALTs for each tribal group, though this may still be some way off since it will
depend upon the resolution of the political and legal impediments discussed
above.
There are persuasive arguments for having one central agency for the Coen
subregion as a point of contact with outside agencies, government departments,
industry groups and so forth. One is to achieve economies of scale; another is
that it is already a requirement of most state and federal government funding
agencies that funding goes through a regional organisation rather than to
individuals, family or outstation groups.
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Figure 13-3: Coen subregion model.
Note: The model illustrates the proposed Coen Land and Sea Management Agency, a set of tribal PBCs
which also serve as ALTs, and a set of four tribal corporations for day-to-day business in the Coen subregion.
This would result from an amalgamation and rationalisation of all existing PBCs and ALTs.
The most plausible and efficient method of providing an administrative
service to the various PBCs and ALTs is for them to contract to one service
provider. Using one agency will reduce the complexity of transactions, given
that for the foreseeable future there is likely to be a number of PBCs and ALTs
for any one language group, as well as PBCs and/or ALTs for multiple language
groups. To some extent this role is already being played by Coen Regional
Aboriginal Corporation, but this role will need to be mandated separately from
the four constituent language groups as they establish their PBCs or ALTs. The
administration services required from a central agency are likely to be similar
to those described above for the Wik Agency.
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The Coen subregion is economically ‘poor’ from the indigenous perspective.
As of 2002 there were no viable Aboriginal commercial enterprises in active
operation, nor were there any prospective mining projects from which cash
flows were imminent. Nevertheless, viable prospects for tourism, cattle herding
and prawn farming have been identified and form part of traditional owner
aspirations.
The Right to Negotiate and the ILUA provisions of the NTA also provide a
valuable basis for negotiating benefits in return for access to native title lands,
and in compensation for any extinguished or impaired native title resulting from
land and sea developments (for example loss of resource collection area, damage
to a sacred site, and so on). Mining and other development companies may also
be legislatively obliged to carry out a social and environmental impact assessment
in relation to their projects. Through such studies a range of economic activities
can often be designed in which local Aboriginal groups can engage and which
can ‘piggy-back’ on the main project. The proposed gas pipeline from Papua
New Guinea constitutes a project of this type which could provide such
opportunities in the Coen subregion.
Managing Aboriginal Title Holding Entities at the
Subregional Level
Three key components common to the land management models for both
subregions are centralised Land and Sea Management Agencies providing support
to landholding entities; predominantly passive, agency-type PBCs; and a strong
desire for the amalgamation of PBCs and ALTs, at least to the extent possible
under state and commonwealth regulations. This arrangement is predicated upon
an understanding of the traditional social organisation, land tenure and
decision-making systems among groups in each subregion, but constrained by
the necessity of incorporating traditional decision-making practices into
organisations which will be economically sustainable and will comply with the
legal and regulatory environment imposed by state and commonwealth legislation
for the registration of Aboriginal interests into various forms of title.
The role of the regional agencies is to provide sufficient economies of scale
for their affiliated title-holding bodies to be able to accommodate a more
traditional mode of operation. They would provide contracted secretarial services
to PBCs, ALTs and leaseholding corporations. PBCs and ALTs might also
outsource some of their functions, for example the management of certain areas
of native title land, issuing of entry permits onto Aboriginal freehold land, and
so on. The agencies’ activities will intermesh with a range of the native title
rights and interests being claimed in the region with respect to: the general use
of country; occupation and erection of residences; hunting, fishing and collecting
resources; management, conservation and care for the land; the right to prohibit
unauthorised use of the land; and cultural, heritage and social functions.
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Therefore the most critical external design factor in the regional models is
the development of satisfactory consultation and communication among
landholding entities (PBCs, ALTs, corporations holding leases and so forth), the
native title holders and the regional agencies. In order to respond to consent
requests for planning and development activities from other parties under the
NTA, properly resourced consultation of native title holders needs to be ensured.
In the case of PBCs, the extent of outsourcing to a regional agency will depend
on whether an active or passive PBC model is adopted. However such an
arrangement would ideally require that the native title holders agree to consent
to the regional agency performing certain acts or classes of activity. This would
enable day-to-day transactions to take place within such an agency without its
staff having to continually consult with the native title holders — for instance
a policy where the agency staff can approve permits for certain scales of tourist
activity, camping, fishing and so forth, without having to worry the PBC
membership.
The proposed regional agency model also allows income derived from
compensation or other benefits, such as those negotiated under ILUAs, to be
channelled through the PBC to the agency, which can then engage practically
in a range of land-based operations, drawing upon any available infrastructure,
Community Development Employment Program workers, community rangers,
or consultants, on behalf of the native title holders. In all cases there needs to
be a close coincidence between the membership, and to some extent the structure,
of the landholding entities in the subregion and that of the agency to prevent
conflicts of interest, although it would be possible to incorporate spouses, and
those with historical interests in land, in the membership of the agency where
that is not possible for a PBC.
A key problem for indigenous landholding groups is to develop a capacity
to independently fund their operational as well as infrastructure costs. At the
very least, a minimum income is required for a base secretarial and administration
service to fulfil the legislative duties of ALTs, PBCs and leaseholding corporations
(including meeting organisation and travel costs). Therefore the ability to use
ILUA agreements to finance not only title-holding bodies but also their regional
service agencies will be vital because ongoing grant funding is likely to become
increasingly limited. Neither the commonwealth nor state governments were
allocating money for the recurrent administration of PBCs or ALTs. Yet these
corporations will be unable to perform their prescribed functions without some
base funding, and this is a critical limitation on the ability of Aboriginal
landholders to derive real benefits from either native title or statutory land rights
legislation in Queensland (QDNRM 2004: 20).
Poor funding already results in low levels of minimal corporate compliance
(such as failing to hold annual general meetings, lodge financial reports and hold
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elections and so forth) (ibid: 21). But it also results in poor levels of consultation
and places limitations on traditional owners’ abilities to engage in the interactive
social practices that often characterise traditional decision making. This in turn
increases the likelihood for dispute amongst native title holders and poorly
negotiated outcomes marked by corruption, lack of accountability and legal
uncertainty.
There is a substantial dollar investment required to maintain Aboriginal
traditional connection to country through customary land tenure systems
incorporated into contemporary corporate entities. Traditional land management
does not equate necessarily to a cheaper alternative; indeed, because of its
communal nature and a general tendency toward consensus decision making
through intra-community consultation, resources are required to run what might
be termed the ‘software’ (such as the recurrent administration) of traditional
land management, as well as the ‘hardware’ (such as the management operations).
Funding bodies all too often fail to get this balance right, so that while there
may be resources available for ‘doing’ things (often termed project,
implementation or program funding), there is little provision for maintaining
the capacities of the organisation to function effectively over the longer term.
Clear rules of agreement will have to be established amongst traditional
owners (including native title holders) as to how monies coming into the regional
agency will be distributed, to complement those set down for PBC and ALT
income (if any). This is particularly the case where a subgroup of native title
holders has an established income stream from an ILUA or other agreement, but
the other subgroups in the PBC do not. There is thus a need for an economic
plan that allows, on the one hand, Aboriginal income into the region to be
equitably spread to groups across the region for basic regional agency functions,
but which at the same time recognises local native title rights in compensation
outcomes or acknowledges local enterprise initiatives by individual groups.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have discussed the possibilities within the existing Australian
planning and legislative framework for rationalising and integrating the
operations of PBCs, ALTs, and Aboriginal landowning corporations so as to
improve the outcomes possible from land acquired by Aboriginal groups on
Cape York and elsewhere under a variety of tenures. A key to the models
proposed has been to take a regional approach and, to the extent possible, to
pool resources and to service landholding bodies on this basis. However all such
attempts are severely constrained by limitations on funding within the public
sector, and by legislative and legal constraints which apply to PBCs, ALTs and
the operations of Aboriginal corporations.
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These constraints may only be readily overcome with policy and legislative
reform of the commonwealth native title and state land rights legislations (and
their associated regulations) to harmonise the amalgamation of tenures and
landholding entities, to provide adequate levels of base funding for landholding
and management entities and to amend them to enable greater flexibility in the
types of corporate landholding structures available for native title holders and
traditional owners under statutory land rights regimes.
In both the ALA land claim and the NTA title claim process the structure of
the title-holding corporation is often the last aspect to be considered. In our
view the preferred approach is to work with claimants from the outset on
designing and establishing their PBCs and ALTs. This would shift the initial
focus from the frustratingly lengthy and legalistic processes leading to a
determination, to consideration of the long-term outcomes people wish to achieve
from their native title. It would assist in achieving desired outcomes because,
as the claimants pursue their claim, important dynamic aspects of their political
processes and social structuring are likely to be revealed, and these may hold
valuable clues as to how their title-holding corporations might operate in reality.
Anthropologists can further assist by promoting landholding corporation
design and operation as a component of effective community government. A
basic design assumption should be that the customary system of Aboriginal land
tenure cannot be divorced from the social relations of its ‘owners’, nor from
their systems of internal group authority and governance. At the same time, it
is important that PBCs and ALTs are structured to ensure congruency and
compatibility with the planning frameworks of state and local government
bodies. This may best be done through the sort of regional land and sea
management agencies suggested in the case study models. Other specific
governance aims would be to minimise unreasonable and unnecessary friction
and obstruction with respect to community settlement planning and development
processes, through ILUAs between native title holders and DOGIT-owning
councils.
In the introduction we drew attention to the distinction between native title
as a recent construct of the Australian legal system and Aboriginal land tenure
as the emic system of indigenous landownership. A key principle is to inform
the PBC design process, and that of ALTs and other landholding corporations,
with an understanding of the social structure and decision-making dynamics of
the autochthonous Aboriginal land tenure system. This presents a classic
opportunity in applied anthropology for the practitioner, based upon his or her
research on the emic system, to mediate the transition from the Aboriginal system
of land tenure to the holding of title under a corporate, statutory entity, whose
objectives include the replication of ‘traditional’ membership and
decision-making processes, into a structure capable of articulating with a variety
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of non-indigenous planning and land management entities. Major design
challenges include: maintaining the integrity of traditional decision-making
processes whilst responding to the legal and administrative requirements of the
various statutory regimes for Aboriginal land rights; structuring the membership
to reflect traditional social organisational arrangements; and having a capacity
to subsume any politicisation and power politics within the native title group.
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